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MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

TO

CONDUCT AN INQUIRY INTO THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST AND THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE RELIEF OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR FROM HIS ASSIGNMENTS IN THAT AREA

PART 4

JUNE 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, AND 27, 1951

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
and the Committee on Foreign Relations

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MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

THURSDAY, JUNE 14, 1951

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Bridges, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson of Texas, Morse, Kefauver, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, Long, Wiley, George, Smith of New Jersey, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Tobey, Sparkman, and Brewster.

Also present: William H. Darden, clerk, Committee on Armed Services; Verne D. Mudge and Mark H. Galusha of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; and Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committees will come to order.

Gentlemen of the committees, the witness before us today is former Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson.

It is a pleasure personally to me to greet Colonel Johnson before these committees. I have known him personally for many years, and, in my opinion, he is an able public servant, and I know him to be a man who speaks candidly and forthrightly on any subject.

He has served his country in time of war, and he has served it well in time of peace.

As a citizen, soldier, as the head of the American Legion, and Assistant Secretary of War and as the Secretary of Defense, he has played a part in the protection of this country and developing and promoting its interests. He has served at a time when critical decisions were made.

He has information that is very pertinent to the matters that are under investigation, and I know that he is willing to give us the facts that are within his possession.

Mr. Johnson, the committees have instructed me to administer the oath to all witnesses. Please rise and raise your right hand and be sworn.

You do solemnly swear that the evidence which you will give these committees upon the matters that are now under investigation will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS A. JOHNSON, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Chairman Russell. Do you have any prepared statement that you desire to make?

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committees, first, may I thank the chairman for his opening remarks. He is very kind. I am appreciative.

Some years ago in a great Catholic hospital in the city of Chicago——

Senator Wiley. A little louder, if you please.

Mr. Johnson. Some years ago in a great Catholic hospital in the city of Chicago, I was impressed as I went in by an overly large sign and later by smaller signs in the corridors I visited, all reading the same: "Please go quietly."

With the sole exception of the speech to the National Convention of the American Legion on October 9, last year—copy of which I have with me if you want it—from the time I left the Defense Department until these hearings I have not talked publicly or privately about my departure from the Department of Defense, about the Department of Defense, about the removal of MacArthur, or any allied subject.

I would prefer not to be here today. I am here because of the letter of June the fourth from your chairman inviting me to be here, which letter from this distinguished group of Senators of the two committees is to me a summons.

I shall not indulge in personalities; I shall not violate the confidences of the President of the United States obtained while I was a member of his cabinet. Within that framework, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, to the best of recollection and ability I shall be glad to answer any questions asked me.

I have no prepared statement.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Chairman Russell. Mr. Johnson, outline briefly the positions you have held with the Government and the years, dates in which you served in each capacity.

Mr. Johnson. Not mentioning the boards to which President Roosevelt from time to time appointed me, which are not important here, I became Assistant Secretary of War in the middle of 1937 and resigned therefrom in 1940 in July, I believe.

In 1941 or 1942—I can think that out for you as to the exact date, if you want—March 1942, President Roosevelt appointed me his special representative in the Far East with senior authority in that part of the world, and I represented the Government there, carried, I believe, on the rolls of the State Department for about a year.

Senator Wiley. How long?

Mr. Johnson. On the rolls of the State Department for about a year.

Senator Saltonstall. What year, please?

Mr. Johnson. 1942, as I recall. That is deceptive, however, I was in India about 3 or 4 months—and I can look up the dates for you—when I was taken seriously ill and spent the next year getting well. On January 28, 1949, Mr. Forrestal, with the approval of the President of the United States, later confirmed on that date by the President, asked me to succeed him as Secretary of Defense. I served in that capacity until September 18, 1950.

Chairman RUSSELL. What was your service during World War I, Mr. Johnson?

Mr. JOHNSON. When World War I broke out, I was chairman of the judiciary committee and majority floor leader in the West Virginia Legislature, and I attempted to resign forthwith, and was asked by the then Gov. John J. Cornwall to remain until we had put through the work-or-fight law; so I missed the first training camp contingent and went in with the second, and became a captain of the Infantry; went overseas and was overseas about 13 months, as I recall, returned and was discharged. I went overseas in May.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will you state briefly your connections with the American Legion?

Mr. JOHNSON. In my own State of West Virginia, I believe the record will show that I served the American Legion in almost every capacity, up until the time I was elected department commander.

In 1932, at Portland, Oreg., I was elected national commander and served 13 months.

I am a member of the national executive committee of the American Legion, for life; vice chairman of its national endowment foundation; and have served on many of its most important committees, and probably am a member of some others now that I do not recall at the moment.

VISITS TO JAPAN

Chairman RUSSELL. During your service as Secretary of Defense, did you pay any visits to Japan, or the Far East?

Mr. JOHNSON. With General Bradley, in June of last year, 1950, we visited installations in the Pacific en route to Japan, where General Bradley and I together had long conferences with General MacArthur, were briefed by his staff and later, rather, on the same visit, briefed by the representatives of each of the three services.

On that visit I meticulously stayed away from getting into the political situation in Japan in the sense of visiting with Japanese officials, largely limiting our visit to the military situation which was our responsibility.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you recall when you returned to the States in June of last year?

Mr. JOHNSON. General Bradley and I arrived at National Airport, Washington, in the neighborhood of noon on June 25. That is the day the night of which the Korean offensive was started.

CONDITIONS OF OUR FORCES IN THE FAR EAST IN JUNE 1950

Chairman RUSSELL. What did you observe and hear as to the condition of our military forces in the Far East during the time that you were there?

Mr. JOHNSON. Within the limits of the forces we had, we found them in good shape, with the forces in Japan being occupation forces, so designed and so set up.

Chairman RUSSELL. How do you distinguish occupation forces from other armed forces?

Mr. JOHNSON. They were not equipped with the things that you would need if you were going to fight a hostile enemy. They were staffed and equipped for occupation; not for war or an offensive.

Chairman RUSSELL. Why were they in that condition? Why were they not equipped for any eventuality?

Mr. JOHNSON. So far as we in the Military Establishment were advised, we had no establishment for Korea. It was under the State Department at that time, and the forces were designed as recommended by General MacArthur and as agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the light of the obligations imposed upon the military in that part of the world.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you receive any information while you were visiting various military units in the Far East that would have served to put this country on notice that an aggressor was about to move into South Korea?

Mr. JOHNSON. In the briefing of my intelligence covering all that part of the world, nothing was said about any immediacy of trouble in Korea, nor did anyone else on that trip give to me or to General Bradley, in my presence—and we were together in all these conferences—any indication of such.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. You discovered no feeling whatever anywhere in your visits throughout the Far East that an attack was imminent in Korea upon the South Korean Republic?

Mr. JOHNSON. I did not.

Chairman RUSSELL. What was the situation with respect to the numbers of troops in Japan? Did we have as many forces there as had been requested by the commanding officer of that territory?

Mr. JOHNSON. If there had been any request for more troops than we had in Japan, any such request would have antedated my connection with the Defense Department.

To the best of my knowledge, there was no such request during the period I first went to Defense, until Korea, the Korean incident. I am not dodging; I just cannot answer as to what happened before I went over there in Defense.

Chairman RUSSELL. I certainly should not expect you to.

DECISION TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN KOREA

Can you give us a résumé of the development of the events and decisions which led to the final decision to intervene militarily for the protection of South Korea?

Mr. JOHNSON. You will recall—and I believe I have said here before today—that the Defense Department did not have responsibility for Korea. Hence the first advices from Korea came from the representatives there of the State Department, except such as may have come in from the wire services.

The first knowledge I had of trouble in Korea was some time, an hour or two before midnight, when one of the wire services passed on to me what they had. There were many conferences on the telephone that night, but we really had very little to go on.

I finally went back to bed. The next morning General Bradley and I debated whether we should go to Norfolk I believe where the joint orientation course was being held, the program for which had been outlined on the basis that we would return on June the 25th, this Sunday being the 26th, and after talking with all the Joint Chiefs and looking at what we had, we agreed that it would best be serving the whole situation by going down, which took a few hours.

We came back, had more conferences, and in the Military Establishment reached no conclusions prior to the President's return. Many of us met the President at the airport on Sunday evening when he came in. Secretary Acheson and myself rode to Blair House with the President.

There was a period of time before dinner at 7:45 to which dinner there had been invited all the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman thereof and the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Force and myself, Secretary Acheson and several others of the State Department.

Senator **Knowland**. Mr. Chairman, might I just correct the record. I think that Saturday was the 24th of June, Sunday the 25th. You originally testified that you got back on the 25th. Do you mean Saturday, the 24th?

Mr. **Johnson**. You are quite correct.

Senator **Knowland**. I think the record ought to be clear because these dates will have some significance.

Mr. **Johnson**. I wasn't aware that I had said the 25th in the first instance. It is Saturday, the 24th, and what I am talking about now is Sunday, the 25th, and what I shall come to is Monday, the 26th.

There were on my recommendation a couple of minor decisions made before that meeting broke up that night, recommendations I made without first consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, something I seldom did.

When we adjourned, the impression was that we would get together the next day, and there were conferences the next day, but that whole group, less a few but not less any of the military men I named, met again on Monday evening, and at that time the decision on motion of Secretary Acheson was made to send the Navy and the Air Force into that situation, the United Nations having met at 3 o'clock on the previous Sunday afternoon and declared North Korea an aggressor.

EVACUATING AMERICAN NATIONALS

Chairman **Russell**. Was there any mention made of sending the Navy and the Air Force for the purpose of evacuating American nationals, or was it pursuant to the resolution of the United Nations?

Mr. **Johnson**. It was taken for granted on Sunday evening—and I think it was brought up by Admiral Sherman—that whatever was necessary to be done to evacuate Americans would be done. It wasn't in the nature of a motion or a decision, it was just an assumption of what under such circumstances would be done any time in a like condition.

Chairman **Russell**. The evacuation or protection of American nationals is usually under the jurisdiction of some field commander or some naval commander in the area?

Mr. **Johnson**. Yes, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. I understand there always are plans for the evacuation of nationals in all parts of the world.

Mr. **Johnson**. Usually there are general plans, but that is something you don't waste time on when a situation of that kind arises;

you immediately take steps to that end. And I am sure before the Sunday night meeting Admiral Sherman had moved in that field.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO DECISION TO SEND GROUND FORCES

Chairman Russell. Now will you give us your recollection as to the events leading up to the decision to send ground forces into Korea?

Mr. Johnson. On Tuesday morning we met with a number of you gentlemen, representatives from the Congress, the House; announcement was made of the position of the United States in relation to the Navy and the Air Force. It was pursuant to the decision on Monday night, not Sunday night.

Just before the conference broke up I said to the conference——

Senator Wiley. A little louder, please.

Mr. Johnson. I said to the conference that unless the President objected I was putting General MacArthur in charge.

Prior to that time, because of the secrecy of the situation, General MacArthur had not been communicated with officially, nor, so far as I know, personally, nor had his opinion been asked.

I asked Secretary Pace and General Collins and General Bradley if he was to go along to get General MacArthur on communications and advise him as promptly as possible of the decision made that the responsibility was his, and to give us his recommendations.

I can still see the report of that conversation. General MacArthur accepted the authority, had no recommendations.

Two or three days later there came the recommendation that all would be abortive, that nothing would be accomplished unless ground troops were used.

Those are recorded messages which I hope you have seen. I do not have copies of those or any like documents.

Chairman Russell. That came from General MacArthur's headquarters?

Mr. Johnson. It did—from General MacArthur.

Chairman Russell. When was the decision——

Mr. Johnson. On the basis of that——

Chairman Russell. Excuse me.

Mr. Johnson. On the basis of that, within 24 hours, and that same week, the decision was made to use the divisions in Japan and to implement; and again you gentlemen came down and met in the Cabinet Room with the President, Secretary of State and myself, and you were told of that situation.

Chairman Russell. When you say "you gentlemen," Mr. Secretary, you do not mean these entire committees, I am sure, because——

Mr. Johnson. No. There have been some changes in the committees, but those who were chairmen of these committees, authorities, or what not. I have forgotten how the list was made up. I helped make it up. But there were quite a group of Congressmen and Senators who held key positions in both parties on the Hill who were invited there.

DECISION TO USE SEVENTH FLEET IN FORMOSA STRAIT

Chairman Russell. When was the decision reached to employ the Seventh Fleet between China and Formosa, and what were the reasons for that decision?

Mr. JOHNSON. The decision was made on Monday night, on motion of the Secretary of State, the motion not being in exactly the form of the release given out on Tuesday, but there was no decision and no recommendation to that effect on Sunday night.

This is a Monday night decision.

Senator WILEY. What was that decision?

Mr. JOHNSON. To use the——

Chairman RUSSELL. To use the Seventh Fleet between China and Formosa.

Would you give the reasons for that?

Part of my question was—the reasons for the employment of the Seventh Fleet.

Mr. JOHNSON. There had been considerable difference in the administration about Formosa.

On Sunday night I had taken the position that Formosa, in the hands of those not friendly to the United States, was inimical to the security of the United States, this paraphrasing what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had said, and because I believed it so deeply, I had, on Sunday night, even though I had previously been overruled, or decided against, injected the Formosa issue into the Sunday night conference.

On Monday night, the State Department's position was different. They no longer opposed doing the things to keep Formosa from falling into unfriendly hands.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, my time has expired.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, a procedural question.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In order that all of us may get this matter in a way that is clear, I ask unanimous consent that the chairman be given 15 minutes more.

Senator STENNIS. On the time of the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. No; I prefer to follow the regular——

Senator SALTONSTALL. I think there is merit in the suggestion.

Chairman CONNALLY. That, I think, is right.

Senator STENNIS. I was going to make the suggestion.

Senator LONG. I believe we were all requesting it.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that Senator Connally shall act as chairman for a moment, and put that request.

Chairman CONNALLY. All those in favor of the motion say "Aye"; opposed, "No."

(There was no dissenting vote.)

Chairman CONNALLY. The "ayes" have it. The motion is carried.

Mr. JOHNSON. Even the chairman can be overruled.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest one thing: As I understood him, he said that he had been overruled on the matter of Formosa, and he said the next day that on the motion of the Secretary of State the question of the fleet being sent there was made and the State Department withdrew its objection.

Do I understand he was referring to the overruling, who overruled, or——

Mr. JOHNSON. May I interrupt? As you have stated it, you have given an interpretation to this that I did not give, Senator Hickenlooper. I did not say that I was overruled on Sunday night. I said I had been previously overruled on this, it was some months before.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am sorry. I had no intention——

Chairman **Russell**. The very next question I would have asked if I had had more time was to develop that. That was very obvious.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I appreciate that the Senator would ask the question.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS ON FORMOSA

Chairman **Russell**. I understood you to state that there had been some differences of opinion between State and Defense as to Formosa. I would like to have you develop those differences of opinion, outlining the position of each of the Departments with respect to Formosa.

Mr. **Johnson**. Mr. Chairman, it is a pretty broad question. I don't want to be in the position of volunteering any information.

Chairman **Russell**. I asked you a question, Mr. Witness.

Mr. **Johnson**. If you think this suffices, Mr. Chairman, to take two bites at that cherry, one discussing the overruling to which I referred, and the other discussing Formosa, by giving a chronological story, which is quite vividly in my mind, of the two Blair House conferences with relation to Formosa—if that doesn't seem to be the way you want it, then you ask it specifically.

Chairman **Russell**. It is all right, if you want to take two bites of that cherry; that is all right, or if you want to take three or four; but we want to make clear that you dispose of this cherry.

Mr. **Johnson**. I discussed it with Mr. Forrestal in the period between January 28 and March, when I was first told by him that the President wanted me to be Secretary of Defense, and March 28 when I was sworn in, and in the period when he left Washington——

Senator **Smith**. That was 1949, Mr. Secretary?

WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM KOREA IN 1949

Mr. **Johnson**. Yes. He discussed the question of the troops left in—he got for me, and I think I read them, maybe, at Key West, all of the pertinent documents on the withdrawal of our troops from Korea.

At that time, my recollection is that this agreement which had been worked out in the United Nations had been complied with by the Russians north of thirty-eight, and under what seemed to us the obvious terms or understandings arrived at in the United Nations, our troops were supposed to be out of South Korea.

I wanted to know why we still had troops there, and I went into the matter fairly thoroughly, and within a few months and before the end of the fiscal year—that would be June 30, 1949—our troops, other than these training people who were under the State Department, were out of southern Korea.

EARLY DISCUSSION OF FORMOSA

In the course of that, of those discussions, we ran across this Formosan situation. I talked with Eisenhower, Bradley, Denfeld Greuenther, and what I thought were the top men of the Military Establishment, and omitting a name does not imply any distinction there on any of the particular conversations, as to what an enemy could do in possession of Formosa, which had been so well built up by the

Japanese, that they couldn't do from China, because signs were then evident that the Communists were moving ahead in the China mainland.

There were differences in the information which the State Department had and that which our files showed.

I asked General Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs—he was sort of an acting chairman without statutory authority at that time—to look into the situation.

There were many discussions, and sometime in September the Joint Chiefs advised me, and I think in writing, that they were of the opinion that they shouldn't even do the limited thing of sending a mission over to check into the Formosan situation.

In early December—that is right—early December, the Nationalist Government left the mainland of China and moved to Formosa. That intensified the interest in the picture and changed the picture.

I asked the Joint Chiefs again to review the situation. I think my request was some time before that, but later than September, when it looked like they were going to lose.

My general recollection is that General Chiang set up his headquarters on Formosa on December 10—I may be in error.

At that time or about that time, maybe that same day, I found the Joint Chiefs not in complete agreement about the situation. We discussed it in great detail and at great length.

There had been trouble in Mr. Forrestal's time, and there was trouble in my time, and we tried to correct it. The military department is supposed to be concerned with military power; the State Department with political objectives, and when it comes up to the top we have to reconcile or else the Security Council and the President have to reconcile.

I may have expressed the opinion that I wanted an answer from them disregarding the political considerations. I am sure I did. That was not their job at this stage of the game. I wanted an opinion as to whether or not there was anything the Military Establishment ought to be doing that affected the security of the United States, regardless of what might be the Government's political objectives.

Shortly after that, I knew from the Joint Staff and in discussions that the Joint Chiefs felt that a mission should be sent to Formosa to get the exact facts. That was set in cement by the loss of the mainland of China to the Communists and the moving of the Government of China to Formosa.

I had discussions with the President, the Secretary of State before the President went to Key West. Knowing how the Joint Staff and some of the Joint Chiefs felt, I began to assemble all the data possible on Formosa. I sent to the President a statement from Secretary Voorhees who just returned from Japan, and the very excellent statement by Senator Homer Ferguson who had been in Japan.

I do not have copies of them. The letter by Senator Ferguson is about the 13th of December 1949. My memorandum on the subject to the President was December 15, 1949. The Voorhees, here, Mr. Chairman, is the letter from the President from Key West on December 17, 1949, acknowledging both of these documents.

By that time the military was getting much more exercised about Formosa. We were not agreeing with the State Department. The next your committee may want to strike or the censors may want to strike.

My recollection, without benefit of calendar and relying only on memory is the President came back from Key West. I met him at the airport, it must have been December 20 because I went to New York to make a speech on the 21st. I gave the President some additional data at lunch, after lunch at the Blair House on Thursday of that week—it should be the 22d, if I figured correctly; check me Senator—and at that time found out that I had lost my fight on Formosa.

The President did not disagree with the military considerations that were coming to him that day or a day or two later—I don't have the date but it is before the 23d—from the Joint Chiefs of Staff urging the sending of a military mission. I was told without quoting him directly, that he wasn't going to argue with me about the military considerations but that on political grounds he would decide with the State Department.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What was the last word?

Chairman RUSSELL. State Department.

Mr. JOHNSON. I recall it very vividly because it is one of those things you get into, and because after that the President gave me clearance to go on and take 4 or 5 days in Florida following spending Christmas Day at home, and while I was in Florida Mr. Early I believe called me and said there was to be a Security Council on the 29th, and if anybody ever got hell in the press for not being at that hearing on the 29th, I did, but I told Mr. Early on the telephone that the matter was already decided, there was no point in my being there, and unless the President wanted me to come back for it, I would stay until the 30th or whatever day I did come back. That is what I mean by the first block that I wanted to answer.

Chairman RUSSELL. Before you move into the second, do you care to state the nature of the political considerations——

Senator WILEY. You fellows talk. Why can't we hear you back here?

Mr. JOHNSON. Don't you hear me?

Senator WILEY. You talk between yourselves. The rest of us are entitled to hear.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVING FORMOSA IN DECEMBER 1949

Chairman RUSSELL. Before you move into the field of the decisions taken in June, did he care to state the nature of the political considerations which caused the overruling of his recommendation as to the mission to Formosa in December 1949.

Senator WILEY. I can hear that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSON. The President did not give me the nature of those. I knew about them only from my discussions with members of the State Department, and I cannot probe the President's mind as to which of the various arguments that were advanced were the persuasive ones.

Senator WILEY. Let's get the State Department——

Chairman RUSSELL. Can you state the reasons that were assigned to you by the representatives of the State Department for disagreeing with your recommendations?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that would be unfair to the State Department because to me those reasons were not satisfactory; although after the President ruled, I abided by that decision.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I did not ask you your views as to the unfairness of it; I asked you if you would give us the reasons that were advanced by the State Department for disagreeing with your conclusion that a mission should be sent to Formosa.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, at the meeting on December 29 when they formally advanced their reasons I was not present.

Senator WILEY. What did they say to you before?

Chairman RUSSELL. Had you discussed this recommendation that you made in December 1949 with the Secretary of State?

Mr. JOHNSON. I had.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did he state to you whether he approved or disapproved of your recommendation?

Mr. JOHNSON. He did not approve of them at that time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did he give you any reason as to why he disapproved of them?

Mr. JOHNSON. He felt we would lose face with other governments in Asia whose friendship and support we needed; that it might be adversely construed in Japan itself; that he really wanted to have nothing to do with the Nationalist Government.

Chairman RUSSELL. What other governments did he mention that we would lose face with in the event your recommendations were approved? Did he mention any by name?

Mr. JOHNSON. The only one I recall at the moment was the Indian situation.

Chairman RUSSELL. Indian?

Mr. JOHNSON. I am sure there were others mentioned. I want to be absolutely fair in that.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, sir; now you may go to the change in policy in June, I believe.

DISCUSSIONS ON FORMOSA IN JUNE 1950

Mr. JOHNSON. Filling in the gaps on the Blair House meeting—everyone arrived on time, but shortly before the time for dinner everyone was there except, I believe Secretary Matthews, who came in a few minutes later.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was that Sunday night the 25th, now?

Mr. JOHNSON. This is Sunday night the 25th; yes, sir.

The Secretary of State talked about the action of the United Nations and discussions with other people he had had.

I then brought up Formosa; said I was still concerned about Formosa in considering the security of the United States.

I felt that Formosa entered into our security more than Korea, but I wasn't discussing at that moment the Korean situation: and that General Bradley and I had just returned, the day before, from Japan, and while there we had talked with General MacArthur about many things, and among them was the Formosa question; that General MacArthur had prepared a memorandum on Formosa which I thought was brilliant and to the point, and that I was asking General Bradley to read that memorandum.

General Bradley did read, from start to finish, that memorandum of General MacArthur on Formosa, without interruption.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you remember about when that memorandum was signed by General MacArthur, when it was prepared?

Mr. JOHNSON. He had the outline of it, not in final copy, form, or shape, the first conference we had with him in Japan.

Senator WILEY. The date?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't know what date the memorandum bears. It was given to me on the day I left Japan, and——

Chairman RUSSELL. June 1950?

Mr. JOHNSON. In June 1950, which was a couple of days before I landed in Washington. I came nonstop.

I don't know its date. I don't have a copy. If you gentlemen don't have a copy, I am sure it is available. I furnished copies after that meeting to the White House, the Secretary of State, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the three Secretaries.

Upon completion of the reading of it, the dinner, which had been delayed a few minutes, started. Up until the time of dessert there was no discussion that had any particular bearing, as I recall, although it was serious discussion of world conditions, and so forth.

During dessert, maybe before the dessert plates were taken out, for we continued at that table all evening, the Secretary of State again brought up the Korean question; and when he had talked a little bit, I interrupted to say that before we got into that too deeply I wanted to discuss Formosa further.

The only really violent discussion Secretary Acheson and myself ever had took place for a moment. I don't recall particularly what he said. I remember my reply, that relatively the security of the United States was more affected by Formosa than Korea, and I should insist upon its being discussed. The President at that time indicated that we would take Formosa up later.

There was no further discussion in that meeting about Formosa until the motion was made the next night.

DECISIONS OF JUNE 25, 1950

When the President took over the meeting, Secretary Acheson stated the picture as he saw it on Korea. The President then turned to me and asked the views of Defense.

I stated that before I replied, since the Joint Chiefs had no recommendations to make, I should like to call on each of the members of the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman and each of the Secretaries.

That was done. A major portion of the evening was taken in the individual, unrehearsed, and unprepared and uncoordinated statements of the several Chiefs and the Secretaries, the President asking a number of questions that showed he had a great knowledge of where our troops were and the military situation.

The President indicated we would adjourn until the morrow and I said, "There are two things I haven't discussed with the Secretaries and the Chiefs; I should like to do so and will do unless you order me not to. The first is that General Bradley and I just a few days ago had seen the fleet in the Philippines. I should like now to start the fleet moving, whether they stop at Japan or not, moving to that part of the world. It is a several days' trip."

The President said, "That is a good idea, do it." I turned to Admiral Sherman and said, "If you will excuse yourself, you get it started right away."

I said, "Secondly, there are these little islands"—and I hope the censor will strike this out—"there are these little islands back of Formosa owned by us." Someone in the meeting disagreed with me. I said, without arguing it, "There are these little islands back of Formosa owned by us, on one of which the jets can land. Regardless of whatever may be the decisions on the morrow, Mr. President, I should like, with your permission, to order the jets in that part of the world moved in on one of those islands that will land them.

The President thought that was a good idea, not prejudging the question, and I asked General Vandenberg to excuse himself, and get that started since it was 10 o'clock in the morning, comparatively, over there. That was it.

We then adjourned, without any other decisions having been made.

MEETING ON JUNE 26, 1950

There were these discussions the next day. We met on Monday night at the Blair House. At the beginning of the meeting the Secretary of State moved, reading from a prepared statement, that we send the Navy and the Air Force in, as you know.

Chairman **RUSSELL**. Please speak a little louder.

Mr. **JOHNSON**. I am trying to think this thing out.

Senator **WILEY**. The acoustics are not very good.

Senator **BREWSTER**. This may spur him on. It is the one thing that he shares with Secretary Acheson, and that is great difficulty in being heard back here.

Mr. **JOHNSON**. In what?

Senator **BREWSTER**. Great difficulty in being heard back here.

Mr. **JOHNSON**. I wanted to know what that was.

Reading from a prepared paper, the Secretary of State moved, in the sense of suggesting to the President, that we use the Navy and the Air Force, as you gentlemen know from the release the next day.

The military neither recommended it nor opposed it. We had on the previous evening pointed out the difficulties and the limitations, and there was further discussion of the difficulties and limitations on this Monday night.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. May I ask, that was the Navy and Air Force with regard to Formosa?

Mr. **JOHNSON**. No, Korea.

Chairman **RUSSELL**. He is speaking about the use of the Air and Navy in Korea.

Senator **HICKENLOOPER**. Thank you.

Chairman **RUSSELL**. As I understood it.

Mr. **JOHNSON**. The President then made the decision to go into Korea with the two. I thought the decision was right then and I think so now.

Someone with the Secretary of State presented a paper for release. It was not satisfactory to the military, and anyway the President wanted to talk to the Congress. So, the staffs of the two departments worked until about 2 o'clock in the morning preparing a statement for the President to be shown and discussed with the Members of Congress and for the press.

In the early morning when we got that statement—I had gone to bed—General Bradley and myself discussed the last prepared statement and found it in certain respect unsatisfactory.

I called the President, and about 8 o'clock General Bradley and myself, as I recall, maybe Mr. Early went along, I am not sure about that, saw the President to discuss this statement, and found that the President had been up a long time.

He had changed this draft I am referring to, and I believe had it recopied, and on comparison we found that the three or more suggestions that General Bradley and I thought were essential to be made had been by the President incorporated in his own draft, in the draft that the President showed to the representatives of the Congress that came down and which became public, with the President's own corrections, a partial rewrite of what the staff had worked on for the past—from 2 o'clock in the morning.

That, I think, covers both of those situations, and to the best of my ability I have done it without indulging in personalities and without violating the President's confidence.

Senator SMITH. May I make one suggestion?

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEES CONSULTED ON KOREA

Chairman RUSSELL. If you will pardon me for just one moment, I want to make one.

Frequent references have been made here to the conferences with members of these committees, with respect to the matters about which Colonel Johnson has testified. I do not know just what members of both committees were present, but I am advised by Senator Bridges, who is the ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, according to his recollection the representatives of this committee who were then present were the then chairman of this committee, Senator Millard Tydings, of Maryland, and the Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Bridges.

I thought that the record should clear that up, and I do not know who was present from the Foreign Relations Committee. I assume the chairman, the Senator from Texas, was present, Mr. Connally, and the ranking member, the Senator from Wisconsin, or Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. The Senator from Wisconsin was in Wisconsin, I think, in connection with his election, and I think I was asked to go in his place.

Mr. JOHNSON. You were there.

Senator SMITH. As the Secretary will remember, I was there.

Chairman RUSSELL. I just want the record to show which members of this committee were present at these conferences.

Mr. JOHNSON. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman, if I created confusion.

Chairman RUSSELL. There wasn't any confusion. It has been through the thread of all this testimony about these Blair House meetings, and I thought that the record should show conclusively.

Now gentlemen, I have used much more than my time, for which I apologize, and I will now call upon Senator Connally.

Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, I don't mind if you in your examination asked the Secretary many questions.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Mr. Secretary, you had, before becoming Secretary of Defense, long service in the War Department in other positions, had you not? Hadn't you been Assistant Secretary of War?

Mr. Johnson. I served in the World War, as I indicated awhile ago, but nothing much to do after the armistice. I wrote a long letter of many pages about what was wrong with the Army, to the Secretary of War and delivered it to him when I got out.

On the basis of that they asked me to come back in and write Army regulations, and I debated that for a while and didn't, but did make some suggestions to the people who were doing it. I met with them once or twice—I don't recall who they were now—but I have been interested as national commander of the Legion more than any other problem outside of my country generally, my family and this question of defense.

Chairman Connally. Now was it not true that while you were Assistant Secretary of War that you took a great interest in a build-up of the industrial relationships to the War Department, getting factories to manufacture war materials and things of that kind?

Mr. Johnson. You of Congress in your wisdom put under what was called the Assistant Secretary of War, because there were no others, just one, responsibility for aviation and industrial mobilization. I yield to nobody in my interest in preparedness and I toured this country from one end to the other and lobbied everywhere I could on the Hill and everywhere else for industrial mobilization, adequate funds, and preparedness.

Chairman Connally. I remember that very vividly, your activities along the lines of industrial preparedness.

Mr. Johnson. I hope, Senator, I may say the criticism that came to me when I left as Secretary of Defense was as nothing compared to the criticism I got when I was Assistant Secretary of War, and when the record of that came out it was all right.

Chairman Connally. I am sure it was, because I thought you did a very fine job.

Mr. Johnson. I thank you, sir.

EVIDENCES OF NORTH KOREAN BUILD-UP ON JOHNSON TRIP TO JAPAN IN JUNE 1950

Chairman Connally. As Assistant Secretary of War.

Now you were in North Korea before the outbreak were you not?

Mr. Johnson. I was not, sir.

Chairman Connally. Well, where were you? You made a trip didn't you, to Japan?

Mr. Johnson. We went to our military installations across the Pacific, into Japan, missing Okinawa only of those major installations, came back to Okinawa from Japan, went back to Japan, from Japan jumped to Alaska to Washington.

Chairman Connally. Now while you were out in Japan and in these other areas, did you have any information whatever as to build-up by the North Koreans preparatory to making an attack upon South Korea?

Mr. Johnson. No, sir. I saw the CIA discussions, the CIA messages that I testified before these committees about as Secretary of Defense and to which you devoted yourselves later, but about every Sunday morning—this is an oversimplification—the North Koreans came across the thirty-eighth parallel, then excused it as maneuvers and they went back, but this Sunday morning of the 24th it was the real thing and not a maneuver.

Chairman Russell. The 25th, don't you mean?

Mr. Johnson. The 25th, pardon me.

Chairman Connally. Well, such information as you did secure about that matter—where was their build-up, within North Korea, or across the Yalu River, over in Manchuria?

Mr. Johnson. We got no additional information on the trip to Japan about any additional build-up in Korea.

Chairman Connally. Well, I want to congratulate you, Mr. Secretary. I think you made a very fine Assistant Secretary of War.

I think you made a very fine record as Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Johnson. Thank you, sir. I am grateful.

Chairman Connally. I waive the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

In response to the questions of the chairman, you have covered the vital spots.

Mr. Johnson. I tried to save a lot of questions.

Chairman Connally. I think you did.

Chairman Russell. Senator Bridges?

FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DECISION TO ENTER KOREAN CONFLICT

Senator Bridges. Mr. Secretary, when you made your recommendations to the President in regard to intervention in Korea, were they made with the expectation that we would receive considerable assistance from other United Nations countries, or a country, or did you take into consideration that we might have to go it alone, there?

What was the thought at that time when the decision was made, and the discussion held?

Mr. Johnson. Neither I nor any member of the Military Establishment in my presence recommended we go into Korea.

The recommendation came from the Secretary of State, but I want to repeat that it was not opposed by the Defense Department, all the members of which had severally pointed out the trouble, the trials, tribulations, and the difficulties.

Senator Bridges. Now, the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, in an address before the convention of the American Newspaper Guild, in Washington, D. C., on June 29, 1950, said, and I quote:

> It was the unanimous view of the political and military advisers to the President that we meet force with force in Korea.

Now, that was not an accurate statement, was it?

Mr. Johnson. I wouldn't quibble with him too much about the words used there, because the Military Establishment did not oppose the suggestion of Mr. Acheson to the President that we go into Korea.

Senator Bridges. But you, the military, did not recommend it; is that it?

Mr. Johnson. That is right.

Senator BRIDGES. You concurred when the recommendation was made by the State Department but you differentiate between that and——

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, I am not going to quibble with words today, but concurred is a little too strong. We had discussed all the angles of this thing on Sunday night. On Monday night we opened up with the suggestion of the State Department that we go in. If we wanted to oppose it, then was our time to oppose it. Not a single one of us did. There were some pointing out of the difficulties, and I pointed out the night before; and then the President made his decision, which, as I have said, I thought was the right decision.

Senator BRIDGES. Now, as Secretary of National Defense, at that time did you personally consider and was consideration given to the possible Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. That came up but, more importantly, there came up Russian intervention.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, when you considered the possibility of the Chinese Communists coming into the war, or Russia coming into the war, did you reach any conclusion in it, or did you just recognize that was a calculated risk?

Mr. JOHNSON. We of the military recognized it was a calculated risk. Generally a part of the military didn't think they would come in. The general approach was that we, having washed our hands of Korea, that this might well be an excursion which they started and hoped to accomplish before they moved somewhere else.

REASONS FOR ENTERING KOREAN CONFLICT

Senator BRIDGES. Well, when you arrived at the decision to go into Korea, or when it was arrived at at this conference, what was it stated that the objective of the United States was at that time? What were you going in there for?

Mr. JOHNSON. The fairest statement I can make as to the general approach was that if you let this one happen, others would happen in more rapid order; that the whole world looked to the majesty of strength of the United States to see what we were going to do about this picture. The impression was abroad, very widespread, it seemed to us, in the world as well as the United States we were not going to do anything about it. There were signs that if we did nothing about it American stock would drop pretty low and where we needed friends on the Japan question we would not have friends.

Moreover, we have joined the United Nations, which had certain commitments contained in its Charter, and this was a direct violation of that Charter—it looks to me now as though it was a testing ground for the Charter. But at that time it was a question of resisting aggression and not absolutely a question of then fighting communism.

OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

Senator BRIDGES. Well, was your objective just to drive the Korean Communists back beyond the thirty-eighth parallel where they came from, or was it the United Nations objective stated later—that we establish a democratic, free Korea, or just what was the aim at that time?

Mr. Johnson. There were no expressed conclusions at that time in my presence on any one of these points. In other words, no one in that meeting discussed whether we stopped at the thirty-eighth, we stopped at the Yalu, or what.

Senator Bridges. Now, was it known to you people who made the decision at the conference there, was it known that the troops invading South Korea were purely North Korean Communist troops?

I mean did you have knowledge that there were no Russians and no Chinese in the invading forces?

Mr. Johnson. No; we did not, because we were not in charge of that part of the world in defense, but the assumption was that they were North Koreans. Personally, I felt they had been trained and were directed by Russians.

Senator Bridges. Now, if there had been Chinese troops, Chinese Communist troops, in the invading forces, would that have made any difference in the decision, do you think?

Mr. Johnson. I think not.

Senator Bridges. And supposing there had been Russian troops there. Would it have made any difference in the decision?

Mr. Johnson. I don't believe so.

Senator Bridges. We were set to resist aggression and that was aggression, no matter who was doing it.

Mr. Johnson. That is right. The history has been that Russia uses her satellites for things of that kind, and it was a pretty safe bet here, I felt, and the military felt, and I think State felt they were using their satellites again.

EVENTS AT THE TIME OF MAC ARTHUR'S MESSAGE TO VFW

Senator Bridges. Mr. Secretary, you recall, I think you were Secretary of Defense when the so-called communication of General MacArthur went to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the President subsequently asked him to withdraw that statement, and it was withdrawn, but it was published in one or two periodicals that it had reached in advance.

In exploring the basis for the removal of General MacArthur, when that happened, was there any discussion between the President and you and the President and the Joint Chiefs or anybody else about dissatisfaction with General MacArthur at that time?

Mr. Johnson. Senator Bridges, that is one of the questions that I have to give you a chronology to answer you, just as I did on one of the chairman's a while ago; and if that is permissible, I will.

Senator Bridges. Yes.

Mr. Johnson. It is again 8 o'clock in the morning——

Senator Wiley. Louder.

Mr. Johnson. It is again 8 o'clock in the morning when several of us—Bradley, myself, the Secretary of State—are summoned to the White House. Secretary Harriman had gotten from some newspaperman, he said, and shown to the President the release to the press of the MacArthur statement to the VFW.

The President read it, the first I had heard of it, to us. He issued an order that "I order MacArthur to withdraw that statement." I had that order issued, just one sentence, a wire.

Before we left, the question came up—I don't know who asked it, I think it was the President—as to how that message got in this country, if it came by communication to the Military Establishment.

I said I thought if it had, that I would have heard of it. I had not heard of it. I would have to check. I did check and was told from the Army and from Communications that it had not come through the Military Establishment, at least not through the Army communications to Japan.

Oh, around 10:30, 11 o'clock, I heard from one of the generals, then from Frank Pace, that there had been an error. Tokyo had asked for communication to Washington, then I believe given it up, then asked for it again, and either through Washington to Chicago or through San Francisco to Chicago Army communications had been used to send that message some several days before this time.

I went over to see the President right away, without appointment.

Senator Brewster. Louder.

Mr. Johnson. I went over to see the President immediately, without appointment, because unintentionally I had not told him the truth that day, relying on the information I had first gathered, and explained to him what had happened, as I have outlined it to you.

The President was quite indignant. There was discussion at that time between the President and myself about relieving MacArthur as Korean commander, not in any other field, as I recall it.

It is permissible, I think, to state the conclusion that we would do nothing about that at that time.

I had no other like discussion, but do wish, Senator, I had been there the day that the last MacArthur thing came up, because, knowing the sincerity of the President and his not desiring to hurt anybody unnecessarily, if I had then been a member of the Cabinet, I should have argued with the President to let's do it another way, maybe let me go out, as Harriman went out after the previous discussion, or bringing him back, or something of that sort.

Not being in the Cabinet, I didn't have that opportunity.

Senator Bridges. Then, Mr. Harriman went out after the other things were discussed with him?

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Harriman went out shortly afterward. What Harriman's instructions were, what he discussed, Senator Bridges, I don't know.

Senator Wiley. I don't know why you fellows cannot talk up.

Mr. Johnson. Is it me?

Senator Wiley. Yes.

Mr. Johnson. From now on you are not going to get objections. I may get too loud.

Senator George. They are deaf on that side.

Senator Wiley. No; we are not.

Mr. Johnson. Did you hear that answer? No?

Senator Wiley. No; the rest of us did not.

Chairman Russell. Senator Bridges, due to this interlude there as to whether we need hearing aids in the committee or do not, whether we are talking loud enough or not, I will allow you to ask one more question.

Senator Long. Mr. Chairman, I would like to put in a word for the witness. I am somewhat hard of hearing myself, and I have heard every word that the witness has said.

Senator Brewster. He has looked at you.

Senator LONG. Probably, I ought to trade seats with the Senator from Maine; probably I have a better seat.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have another question, Senator Bridges.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, I asked you about Harriman's visit to MacArthur after this, and would you reply so that——

Mr. JOHNSON. My reply was, in response to the question asking me if Harriman went over to discuss this matter I have just told you about, I discussed with the President the removal of MacArthur as Korean commander; that I did not know what the instructions were to Harriman or what he talked about, and had no report thereon at any time.

Senator WILEY. What date was this, about what date?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. About what date was this?

Mr. JOHNSON. It was shortly after the VFW message. The date I cannot give you.

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Without a calendar in front of me.

EFFECTIVENESS OF UNIFICATION OF ARMED SERVICES

Senator WILEY. Now, you are the one that carried through the unification policy, are you not?

Mr. JOHNSON. I like the way you phrase that question. I did my best, sir.

Senator WILEY. How do you believe that has been carried out in Korea?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think, sir, that if there had not been unification——

Senator WILEY. What?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that if there had not been unification directed by the Congress, and as made permissible by your amendments after I came into office—congressional enactment—we would never have gotten into Korea, and never have done the good job that our military forces have done in Korea; and I think, secondly, in answering your question that if you had not had unification, and the new thing on the finances that you authorized in the unification bill, you would have been pouring money down the rat hole in furnishing money for the United States for defense at the present time.

Senator WILEY. Just before the Korean War broke out you said you were in Japan, and you had consultations with the military folks there. I suppose that included MacArthur, did it?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Did you know MacArthur personally before that?

Mr. JOHNSON. I did, sir.

Senator WILEY. What?

Mr. JOHNSON. I did.

Senator WILEY. At that time, of course, he had no jurisdiction whatsoever in Korea, did he?

Mr. JOHNSON. None.

Senator WILEY. That was outside of his field entirely.

You mentioned something in your previous testimony about intelligence.

[Deleted].

INTELLIGENCE ON OUTBREAK OF KOREAN CONFLICT

What intelligence did we have here in Washington, world intelligence, so to speak, and what was its relation as to the far eastern situation?

Mr. JOHNSON. As I have testified in the Senate before, I don't think there was any intelligence—and I know the two reports that you have, but reading all of the intelligence reports, as I did every day, I, when I was out of Washington, caught up with it when I came back, there was no advice to the military in any of the reports—"wolf" being, and having been, cried so often on the Sunday morning excursions—that put us on notice that anything was going to happen in Korea.

I said that before when Hickenlooper, Acheson, and myself testified when I brought up the whole batch of communications from the CIA, and pointed out what was said in each of them, and I still feel the same way about it.

Senator WILEY. Then, putting it bluntly, there was no intelligence out of Korea—and I suppose it was not the function of MacArthur to get any intelligence on the mainland or in Korea, because that was not in his field?

Mr. JOHNSON. It was not MacArthur's duty to report to us on Korea.

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Pardon me, but to correct the record you meant Hillenkoeter instead of Hickenlooper; did you not?

Mr. JOHNSON. Did I say that? Of course, I meant that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, does the witness mean that the conclusion of my testimony would look stupid? [Laughter.]

Mr. JOHNSON. You know I didn't.

VOICE OF OUR ALLIES IN KOREA

Senator WILEY. Do you believe that the nations which have forces committed in Korea should have an equal voice in military decisions in Korea in spite of the fact that the United States supplies the vast bulk of the troops and equipment there?

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you still beat your wife?

The element of getting along with people in the United Nations calls at times for the United States to speak as but one nation of many associated in that group. There come other times when the sovereignty of the United States and the death of its sons make it imperative that we stand on certain fundamental principles—and further than that I just can't go in answering your question.

MAC ARTHUR'S POSITION IN THE FAR EAST AND THE VFW MESSAGE

Senator WILEY. Well, let's get back to MacArthur again. When you were in Japan was there any discussion at that time about the so-called veterans' speech?

Mr. JOHNSON. None whatsoever. I had no intimation or inkling directly or indirectly of any type or character of that until the President told us about it at 8 o'clock in the morning when Harriman took it to him.

Senator WILEY. But you were in Japan in June. I see. Now then, do you believe that——

Mr. Johnson. I didn't even know he was invited to send a message to the organization.

Senator Wiley. Well, did you see the message?

Mr. Johnson. Not until it was read to me by the President the morning I was ordered to have it stopped.

Senator Wiley. What was objectionable about it, to you I mean? I am not asking you to quote the President.

Mr. Johnson. I was neither asked to nor did I discuss it at that point. When it was finished reading, I got my order and I carried it out.

Senator Wiley. I realize that, but of course you appreciate the significance of MacArthur's position in the Far East, holding the job he did. Did the speech strike you in any particular as objectionable, violative of any directive or order?

Mr. Johnson. Without taking a day or two in discussing that, Senator, if you will look, and I think you must have it, at the message on Formosa which I referred to this morning that I brought back with me, General Bradley and myself, which I gave to the President at the first opportunity the night of the Blair House conference, you will see the deviations in the two which from memory I am not going to attempt to state, that shows a little different approach.

I am quite sure that the President must have felt that such a communication ought to have been cleared by either the military or the policy-making people before it was issued, and that was the grounds of the charges. Do you hear me?

Senator Wiley. You believe, do you not, that MacArthur did a great administrative job in Japan?

Mr. Johnson. I think MacArthur in Japan did one of the outstanding jobs ever done by any American anywhere, [deleted] and still answering, I think that MacArthur is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, generals of our generation.

Senator Wiley. Do I understand that MacArthur and you were practically in agreement in relation to the strategic importance of Formosa?

Mr. Johnson. We were.

DISAGREEMENTS WITH MAC ARTHUR

Senator Wiley. And were you in disagreement with him in any respect when you were over there with him?

Mr. Johnson. There was a lot of discussion in the newspapers about the Secretary of State and myself disagreeing about the Japanese peace treaty provisions.

Answering your question necessitates telling this story, which I am asking that the censor remove, as it might complicate the making of the treaty.

[Deleted.]

MacArthur said to Bradley and myself, Bradley supporting me—he said, "You are absolutely right," and he wrote out a supplement to his memorandum on the peace treaty, and when that was done there was no difference between MacArthur and the Defense Establishment.

Senator Wiley. You were informed there were differences, and when you came to talk with him, you found out that he was in agreement on that particular issue?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

I do ask, Mr. Chairman, that the censor consider cutting out that question, because it might well affect the treaty provisions.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. I am willing to leave it to Admiral Davis' judgment.

Mr. JOHNSON. Fine.

BOMBING NEAR OR ACROSS THE NORTH KOREAN FRONTIER

Senator WILEY. Now, during the time that you were Secretary there did MacArthur follow the directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense implicitly and faithfully?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Now, did you have any disagreement with him as to the recommendations as to the advisability of bombing the bases north of the Yalu—I am talking about you personally—when you were there? He did not do it; the directives were against it. Now, who caused those directives to be made—you or the State Department, or what?

Mr. JOHNSON. MacArthur, or somebody, probably the Air general—came from MacArthur—advised——

Senator WILEY. Louder now.

Mr. JOHNSON. Advised that they wanted to bomb Racin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is Racin and not Russia? It sounds awfully like Russia.

Mr. JOHNSON. Racin.

They bombed it. It was a very important point to be bombed. I believe Secretary Acheson was away. I got quite a strong letter as Secretary of Defense from Jim Webb as the Acting Secretary of State protesting it.

Senator WILEY. What about——

Mr. JOHNSON. They wanted to bomb a second time, and I took Secretary Webb's letter to the President and told him that unless he, the President, told me not to, I was going to follow the military recommendation, and I got clearance from the President to do it.

There were no discussions further than that ever of bombing closer than 10 or 12 or 18 miles to the border or across the border. I was not a party to those.

Senator WILEY. You weren't a party to it?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir.

ECONOMIC AND NAVAL BLOCKADE OF KOREA AND CHINA

Senator WILEY. You agreed with his concept that Korea had to be blockaded, and it was blockaded?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Did you agree with his concept of the economic blockade of China?

Mr. JOHNSON. Long before that, at the instance of the Munitions Board, I was protesting everywhere to the shipping of supplies by ourselves or the British or anybody else into Communist China, even as I was fighting the sending of things with approval of this Government in behind the iron curtain on the European front.

Senator Wiley. Then you agreed with that concept.

Now what about the actual blockade of China by the Navy?

Mr. Johnson. You said blockade of Korea a minute before.

Senator Wiley. Well, the other was Korea, and the economic blockade of China now.

Mr. Johnson. I was not in the Government when the economic blockade of China, as such, came up.

Senator Wiley. What would have been your concept?

Senator Smith. He wasn't in then.

Senator Wiley. No; I understand. Assuming you had been, what would have been your concept of the advisability of economic blockade?

Mr. Johnson. I want to be as helpful as I can, but you take me too far afield. I have an opinion, but I don't want to be an armchair strategist on the things I didn't live through.

Senator Wiley. During your tenure as Secretary of National Defense did you on any occasion indicate to General MacArthur any dissatisfaction which you or your department had with his conduct of military or administrative affairs entrusted to him?

Mr. Johnson. No, sir.

Chairman Russell. Your time has expired, Senator Wiley. I might say I gave you 2 minutes over due to the interruptions.

Senator Byrd?

Senator Byrd. The questions I had in mind have been fully covered, and I have no questions to ask.

Chairman Russell. Senator Saltonstall?

CONSIDERATION OF DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST NORTH KOREA

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Johnson, at these meetings on June 24 through the 27th was there ever any consideration given of a message to Congress either in the form of a declaration of war or a statement of intentions by the Government?

Mr. Johnson. When the representatives of the Congress came down to the Cabinet Room on Tuesday morning, my recollection is that Senator Smith brought up the question.

Senator Smith. I think your recollection is correct. I asked the Secretary of State if he recalled the matter.

Mr. Johnson. I recall now Senator Smith brought the question up and Secretary Acheson replied to him, and there it died aborning.

Senator Saltonstall. Then——

Mr. Johnson. No, wait a minute. Another Senator spoke to it.

Senator Smith. I thought, as I recall it——

Mr. Johnson. My hunch is Tom Connally said something about it and was inclined to be a little crochety and fussy about it.

Senator Wiley. Now you wouldn't want us to believe that, would you? Unusual.

Senator Saltonstall. In other words, then, you joined with the administration group in believing, either by your compliance or because you actually complied, that it was not necessary for a message to be sent to Congress?

Mr. Johnson. That is my opinion.

Senator Saltonstall. Then it became in your opinion a police action of the United Nations?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't like the phrase "police action," but I know its origin; so the answer to that, as phrased, is "Yes."

Senator SALTONSTALL. I don't want to confine the word to police action any more than you do, but that is the ordinary use of that term.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct, sir. Thank you.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now another question on which you testified and which interested me very much because of the testimony here by Secretary Acheson on one of the points it has been most difficult for me to get any clear picture:

You were always of the belief that Formosa was very necessary for our security?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You had at one time the feeling that the Department of State did not have the same attitude toward Formosa as you did?

Mr. JOHNSON. Definitely.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And that that attitude changed on June 25?

Senator SMITH. June 26.

Mr. JOHNSON. June 26.

Senator SALTONSTALL. June 26.

Mr. JOHNSON. Between Sunday night and Monday night.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now we have had long discussions here concerning the trip or mission of General Marshall from December 1945 to January 1947 into China. On that mission there was an effort to get the, to end civil war in China—put it that way—in an uncontentious way.

Now I have never been clear as to the attitude of the State Department toward the Nationalist Government during that time and afterward. Was it your impression that the political policy of our Government was always to recognize the Nationalist government as the Government of China?

Mr. JOHNSON. If it was, I did not so understand.

Senator SALTONSTALL. What was your understanding as Secretary of Defense and therefore a responsible Government official?

Mr. JOHNSON. I can't give you the date—it is in January of 1950—when the Secretary of State spoke before the National Press Club and drew the defense perimeter of the United States. I am sorry I don't have that language here. Maybe you have it. That left Formosa outside of that perimeter.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I understand that. Now perhaps you did not understand my question.

I understand it is your testimony that in your opinion Formosa was always essential to our security, and that until the period June 25 to June 27 that it was not the attitude of the State Department, that Formosa was essential to our security. Is that a correct statement?

Mr. JOHNSON. The answer generally is, "It is a correct statement." I argue with you only about that date—at the beginning of the Blair House conference.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes, well——

Mr. JOHNSON. They may have wobbled in between somewhere. If so, I was not advised of their change.

STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT VIEWS OF CHINESE NATIONALISTS

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now my next question was as to the attitude of our Government as represented on the political side by the State Department toward the Chinese Nationalists.

Now I stated that we have had long discussions concerning General Marshall's mission in the calendar year 1946 to end civil war in China. Now is it your impression as a Government official, Secretary of Defense, that our Government as represented by the State Department on the political side always recognized the Chinese Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek as the Government of China?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think they actually always recognized it in the sense that they didn't recognize the Communists, but I would not be true to myself if I did not say that in that recognition I think it did not carry the support that our security required when they got to the Formosan area.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You stated in one period of your testimony here—I cannot use your exact words—that Secretary Acheson was not going to help the Nationalist Government. I don't remember exactly the date that was. But at one time you felt there was no support by the State Department of the Nationalist Government. Is that true?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator Saltonstall, I know you don't intend to misquote what I said. I didn't say that.

I talked about losing the fight. My firm conviction was that we ought to send this military mission over and determine the true facts about that as it affected our security and then determine a policy.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, your attitude of mind was that the first question was the security of the United States.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS

Mr. JOHNSON. That was my controlling motive all the way through, and I think, if you will permit and the chairman don't charge you the time, I would like to take 3 minutes to explain it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sure that under our rules, Mr. Secretary, you have a right to elaborate on any question that is asked you.

Mr. JOHNSON. I beg your pardon if I take too much time. It will take 3 minutes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. All right, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. When I went to the Defense Department, Mr. Forrestal was concerned about the political domination of Defense in many ways by State.

Senator WILEY. Louder, please.

Mr. JOHNSON. We checked into that and we found numerous instances where when a question was coming up to the Joint Chiefs, myself, or the top side, let's say, of Defense, that already State had talked to the bureau or board from whom we wanted advice and opinion on which to base our conclusion, and frequently when we got down to arguing, something was different from what had been collected down below; we were confronted with those things.

At the same time, there were one or more men from the Military Establishment who were over in the State Department working there, who were giving advice, which disturbed the Joint Chiefs of Staff very much, because that advice was one colonel's advice over there, not seeing all the documents the Joint Chiefs had, who was advising them as to the military situation, and they taking a position that conflicted with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

So after much talking with Eisenhower and Bradley and other people about that picture, I wrote a letter to the Secretary of State, and that letter will tell the story, and it is available to you, I guess, saying that we were establishing in the Defense Department in the Office of the Secretary of Defense a new set-up and to be headed by one of the finest officers I have ever known and the man who was familiar with the whole world situation, and that everything that went from Defense to State would go through this office headed by Gen. James H. Burns, who ran lend-lease in the last war, and requested the cooperation of the State Department in sending their things back instead of going down below and creating all this, let's say, muddy situation.

Senator KNOWLAND. The date of that letter, Mr. Secretary, for identification?

Mr. JOHNSON. It is not too long after I was sworn in but I can't give it to you. I have no copy of it. I took the letter over and showed it to the President and he approved it and in that discussion the President pointed out something that was a little stronger than it occurred to me in trying to solve a problem.

President Truman said that the question of military power is a thing that Defense ought to concern itself with independent of political objectives, that political objectives are the thing that State ought to concern itself about, in the early instance independent of the military situation, and then it became the top side of the two Departments' responsibility with honest to God anwers uninfluenced on either side by the job of the other to reconcile those or else bring them to him and the Security Council and that approval he gave to the letter, it was signed and that set-up went through.

I must say this. There were a half dozen instances afterward where some of the State Department boys came over—we had issued instructions on our part to comply with it—didn't pay any attention to that. I called each of them to the attention of the Secretary of State, and he complied fully and wholeheartedly in trying to get that thing to work.

STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS' VIEWS ON FORMOSA

Therefore on this question here on Formosa, I thought the political considerations—we are getting into the military again, Senator Saltonstall—despite that directive that had gone out, and that is why I asked them to take another look-see at this thing from the standpoint of the security of the United States only and let it go to the President as such, and that is what we did.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, the statement that I referred to that you stated here—I may not quote you absolutely correctly—was that the meeting on December 28 in which you said Acheson did not approve of the reasons but said it was adverse to the interests of other governments and wanted nothing to do with the Chiang government, that is the way I made my own shorthand notes, so to speak, of what you said, so I got from that the impression that at that time the

Department of State for various reasons did not want to support strongly at least the Chiang government.

Mr. JOHNSON. I didn't say that, Senator Saltonstall. What date did you say, December 28?

Senator SALTONSTALL. That was December 28. That was when the Security Council was told that the military mission should not go to Formosa.

Mr. JOHNSON. You did not quite understand it, and I guess the acoustics were bad. I was answering an insistent question of the chairman as to why and what reasons the State Department gave in the meeting of the 29th, which I did not attend, but had discussed with Secretary Acheson, for not wanting to let us send a military mission to Formosa.

Senator SALTONSTALL. That is correct; that is the time that I had in mind.

Now, what I am trying to get at is, did the State Department, in your opinion, always support the Chinese Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. JOHNSON. Your prior question was "recognize," and that, I said, I think they did. When you say "support" my answer is "No."

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I don't think the witness had finished the completion of the answer.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sorry.

Mr. JOHNSON. It is all right. It is better than if I had gone on.

Senator GREEN. You should.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have, on the committee's time, any opportunity that you desire to amplify any statement you care to make here.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; that is all right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. I think that most of the ground has been covered, Mr. Secretary, but I want to ask you about some other matters.

WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES TROOPS FROM KOREA IN 1949

Had the decision been taken to remove our troops from Korea when you went in as Secretary of Defense?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator George, the decision had been made, and I think in the latter part of the preceding year, 1948, the Russians had removed their troops, but there was a regimental combat team, United States Army, still in Korea, the departure of which was delayed at the request, in writing, of the State Department, but which did leave within a short time after I was sworn in. I had nothing whatsoever to do with that withdrawal, in other words.

Senator GEORGE. You had nothing to do with the withdrawal of the troops from Korea?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir; it did not even take an order for or approval by me for that remaining unit to come out; it was all set when I came in.

Senator GEORGE. That unit had been kept there by State, apparently?

Mr. JOHNSON. At the request of State.

Senator GEORGE. At the request of State?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Secretary, there is another matter I wish to ask you about. I think it ought to be made perfectly clear—I do not want to confuse my own recollection about any of it—but I wish to ask you about the budget in which you participated after you became Secretary of Defense.

DEFENSE BUDGETS OF 1949 AND 1950

You did participate in the making up of the budget, and I will ask you if I am correct in this: That there had been a military budget substantially advanced, at least, either by Mr. Forrestal or someone else, of about 22 or 23 billion dollars originally?

Mr. JOHNSON. At the National Press Club about January 30 or 31, 1949, Mr. Forrestal made a speech—that is about 3 days after he talked to me about succeeding him—in which he told of the $30,000,000,000 requested by the three services—and I think in the budget for 1949, which budget was a study of what was needed.

Mr. Forrestal did not recommend that amount; he cut it down. It was whittled down finally to the amount that you did appropriate.

You opened up with the question of the budget that I was concerned with; that is the budget for 1950.

Again the requests were for around $30,000,000,000. That is quite some time before I went over.

The President and Mr. Forrestal in November or December of that year, preceding my going in, had invited General Eisenhower to come to Washington and assist in the preparation of the 1950 budget.

He had given before, the year before, $15 billion less $600,000 for stockpiling.

Chairman RUSSELL. Million.

Mr. JOHNSON. Fifteen billion, less 600 million for stockpiling, which gave them $14 billion 4.

There had been some discussion from the budget that for 1950 they would only get $12 billion 5.

Then, Mr. Forrestal hoped that they'd get $17 billion; but splitting those two figures, and also looking at what Congress had given them before, they had 14 and a half billion.

So, through the months before I went over, and it was finished when I went over there, March 28, there had been set up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower, the materials and the strength of units adding up to $14 billion 6, as I see it, on the chart, and $14 billion 4 on the supporting memorandums which General Eisenhower showed me.

Those strengths shown there went out through the services. They all knew about them.

One day, all the Secretaries, all the Chiefs, myself, General Eisenhower, as I recall, and some others, were summoned over to the Cabinet room to talk budget.

PRESIDENT'S ACTION ON 1950 DEFENSE BUDGET

The President talked a little bit and turned it over to Secretary Pace, and he announced that the President had approved a $13 billion budget. That was the first we ever heard of it. Nobody in the room said anything when the President said that. Pace backed it up. Nourse, the Chiefs, nobody protested it, either Air, Army, Navy, or myself.

I was sick about it.

I went over to see the President, and talked about it, and he told me to see Pace. I then saw Pace and then saw the President again, and the most that I could get was that $500 million we asked for, for stockpiling, was to be added to the $13 billion, and not included in the $13 billion as we had been told at this Cabinet room conference.

Then, Senator George, I had the most soul-searching couple of weeks I ever had in my life.

I had, as Senator Wiley's and Senator Connally's questions have shown, worked my heart out for preparedness in 1937 to 1940. I had believed in preparedness. I don't think the amount of money was enough to do the things that should be done, and I was embarrassed by the $14 billion 5 thing that Eisenhower set up, and everybody seemed to be in agreement about it.

My choice was to try to make that thing work or resign. I talked with each of the Chiefs.

Senator JOHNSON. May I interrupt, Senator George? Secretary Pace, you referred to, was then Director of the Budget?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct, and Gordon Gray was Secretary of the Army.

I talked with each of the then Secretaries and each of the then Chiefs about the 13 billion, and I had some soul-searching discussion particularly with Bradley and Eisenhower. I talked to some people besides, in whom I have the greatest confidence in national defense, including some people on the Hill. When I think of all the worry and trouble I had afterward, maybe I made the wrong decision in not resigning. I did not discuss a resignation with the President.

At the insistence of some of those men, we went in to do the best job we could with the 13 billion. General Eisenhower and General Bradley cut the troop strength and the matériel down to conform to the 13 billion.

I am a little embarrassed, Senator George, because now for the first time in my life it sounds like I am passing the buck. I don't mean it that way. I am trying to answer your question.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR CUTS IN THE 1950 DEFENSE BUDGET

The records will show that I did not fix the 13 billion. The records I have just given you, the reductions to the 13 billion, were those that were worked out—Eisenhower, Bradley, and the Joint Chiefs—to get within the figure which Nourse, the economist, took credit for in a couple of speeches, and so did Pace.

I have been lied about, hurt, on cuts that were the whim of Louis Johnson. Except shaving for the end of the year to get down to this 13 billion—and Congress lacked a couple of hundred million in the first instance of making it 13 billion—Louis Johnson never made a cut. Louis Johnson increased those items, but I have caught hell on the other score, on that score.

I hope the committee will strike that out, because I don't mean to pass the buck to anybody.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ECONOMIES TO MAKE UP FOR CUT

This other thing comes back to me, Senator George, and I have got that here. All I have is my annual report and three or four statement to committees on the Hill. This criticism became rampant. We kept sawing wood, trying to cut out the waste, duplication, standardize, until the Armed Forces Committee of the House subpenaed General Eisenhower.

General Eisenhower came down and talked and he said the 13-billion budget, which it was, as you know—said he hadn't worked on it much since July, but he thought that there ought to be added to it 500 million.

Of that 500 million he thought, as I recall it, about a hundred million should go into Alaska housing. He thought 250 million should go to the Air Force and indicated—or I did later—that he had asked me if I could find it in the 13 billion to give it to the Air Force. He thought they should have it.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Okinawa.

Mr. JOHNSON. That was included with Alaska. And he asked that, maybe the figure was a hundred million, for the Navy for antisubmarine, and you will recall, Senator Johnson, he discussed CIA and a couple of other things that really don't enter the picture. I won't refer to those.

I came before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations following their request, and I explained the Alaskan housing picture, the hundred thousand that we were asking——

Senator SALTONSTALL. Hundred million.

Mr. JOHNSON. The hundred million; we were asking Congress for another 130 million.

I explained that out of cutting out the duplication, and so forth, we had given the Air Force not the $250,000,000 General Eisenhower had recommended of the $500,000,000, but we had given them $350,000,000, and I explained that out of these savings that we had offered to Admiral Denfeld the $79,000,000 for antisubmarine—and there are the records of the Armed Forces Policy Committee of the Military Establishment that will show that Admiral Denfeld refused the money and said if he had it he couldn't fairly use it. I think that is his phrase, declined it.

That money, as I testified before your committee, was offered to Admiral Sherman, and he accepted that, but I don't think you will find—maybe the committee never released from executive session in which I testified the testimony on that subect.

I have here, which I got from the Military Establishment—I asked for three documents and those I have here, and that is the only contact I have had with military, I think, since I left there.

I have here the statement that I made on April 26 before the subcommittee—no; this is before the Armed Services Committee. That is where Eisenhower testified. I don't want to seem to be passing the buck. Ir somebody wants to be critical, I don't want to leave it on what I am saying to you now, Senator George.

TESTIMONY ON DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1950

There are two or three quotes from a statement which I will leave with the committee and ask to be added to the appendix, one of them a copy of "Statement of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson before the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on the 26th of April 1950," quoting:

> Mr. Chairman, I have read with much interest the testimony of General Eisenhower before this committee, and I should like to begin my testimony by discussing some of the areas General Eisenhower touched upon.

This is when he asked $500,000,000 be added to the thirteen billion.

> First, let me discuss Alaska construction. Last October, Congress made available approximately $130,000,000 for construction in Alaska. In addition, public-works authorizations pending before the Congress, and proposed supplemental appropriations requests under the one-line item for military public works included in the President's budget, contain approximately $100,000,000 more for Alaska construction—and the enactment of these pending bills, when added to the $130,000,000 mentioned above, gives us a total of approximately $230,000,000 for military public works and housing in Alaska during the 1950 and 1951 building seasons.

I go on and I will leave the whole document so you can see I have taken nothing out of context, and I come to the second point. This document, quoting, says:

> Second, when he appeared before this committee General Eisenhower stated that he had been closely associated with the budget that is before you, from January to July of last year, but that he had not been closely associated with the budget since July. This is true. As compared with the levels that had been contemplated in July, and within the $13 billion ceiling established by the President, a number of significant increases in military forces and matériel procurement for fiscal 1951 were made.
>
> The July planning ceiling for aircraft procurement during fiscal year 1951 was $1,800,000,000—$1,100,000,000 for the Air Force and $700,000,000 for the Navy. At that time General Eisenhower expressed to me the hope that I might be able to increase the amount allocated to the Air Force for aircraft procurement. As a result of changes between early July and the time the President submitted the 1951 budget, this amount was increased by $200,000,000, with the result that $2,000,000,000 was requested for aircraft procurement, $1,350,000,000 for the Air Force (that is, $250,000,000 more than the July figure), and $650,000,000 for the Navy. In order to round out the picture, particularly in the light of the apparent decrease of $50,000,000 for naval aircraft procurement, it should be added that there was a $79,000,000 increase over the original allocation for antisubmarine warfare equipment, together with the provision of funds for 700,000 additional flying hours for combat-type units in the Navy.
>
> With respect to the Army, the dollar figures reflect an increase in Army matériel procurement of $41,000,000, as compared with the July level. This $41,000,000 includes $10,000,000 for the new type signal equipment for the mobile striking forces; $17,500,000 for heavy ordnance, including special-type prime movers, and $7,800,000 for modernized portable bridges and other new engineer equipment. In this general connection mention should also be made of increases in the amounts recommended for Army civilian components. Specifically, there were increases of $5,000,000 to rebuild and modernize equipment for the National Guard, and there was provision for an increase of $16,000,000 to cover the cost of armories for the National Guard and the Organized Reserve.
>
> Thirdly, as I have already stated, the amount in the President's budget for the Navy includes a readjustment to increase by $79,000,000 the amount originally allocated for antisubmarine equipment last July. Specifically, the amount originally allocated was $40,000,000—and after Admiral Sherman became Chief of Naval Operations he asked for and received (from savings made in the budget) an increase of almost 200 percent in the amount of funds allocated to antisubmarine-warfare equipment.

GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL 1951

And from this same document on page 10 thereof I want to read another short quote. In conclusion I said on that day—you will recall that is applying to the Eisenhower request for five hundred million over the thirteen, I concluded this way:

> In conclusion, I should like to comment on a situation which seems to me to be remarkable. I have reference to the fact that this year's budget for the Military Establishment, with very little variation, has received the approval of the Executive Office of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Appropriations Committees of Congress, and other responsible persons such as General Eisenhower.
>
> In other words, there has been substantial unanimity of opinion on a vital point, namely, the fact that the world in which we live requires military expenditures of approximately the amount which the President submitted to the Congress last January. Consider for a moment how unusual it is to find that all of the responsible authorities who have spoken to this subject have been in complete agreement on more than 95 percent of the military budget.
>
> The House Appropriations Committee has suggested some reductions; General Eisenhower has suggested the possibility of some increases. But even taking the maximum of these suggestions—both on the minus and on the plus side—there has been no suggested variation which would affect the military budget in an amount greater than 4 percent. I call this fact to your attention in closing because I think it constitutes the best argument that I could possibly present as to the fundamental soundness of the budget which is before us.

Now, it is only fair to all the Democrats and the Republicans who were talking economy at that time to say that was the spirit of the world in peacetime: that the economists were all saying that is all we could stand for the budget; but Korea came along.

It seems to me, Senator George, if I can be permitted to make one or two other short quotes, that it would help, because I got from the Defense Department another statement. It is headed—that will go into the appendix?

Chairman RUSSELL. What you read?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, the original statement; it is not what I read.

Chairman RUSSELL. The entire statement will be printed in the appendix.

(The statement of Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson before the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee dated April 26, 1950, referred to will be found in the printed appendix.)

HOW FISCAL 1951 DEFENSE BUDGET WAS COMPOSED

Mr. JOHNSON. The second statement is an original marked "Confidential until released." It is headed "Statement of Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, before the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee," and is in connection with the appropriation estimates for the year 1951. I want to read the second paragraph of that to you.

> Work was commenced on this 1951 budget over a year ago. The President and the late Secretary of Defense Forrestal requested General Eisenhower to come to Washington and assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in making recommendations of the forces and matériel requirements upon which this budget could be based. Discussions of this problem were based upon decisions as to the roles and missions for each service, reached at Key West and Newport in March and August of 1948. Beginning in December 1948, General Eisenhower and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reexamined our military requirements in this light as well as in terms of the strategic situation. These preliminary discussions culminated in a second Key West conference in May 1949, in which I participated.
>
> As a result of these extended studies and discussions, General Eisenhower made recommendations as to the composition of the forces which should be maintained and the major matériel requirements which should be provided in

> fiscal year 1951. The forces and major requirements to be provided by the budget before you, are essentially those that he recommended.

Then I skip over a couple of pages in this statement, and pick up again:

> Because of these conferences, and the savings and economies instituted in fiscal 1950, as well as the elimination of unnecessary or doubtful items, the plans for 1951 have been modified to provide significantly more powerful military forces within the same dollar requirements. As compared with the estimates made by the military departments on August 1, Navy strength has been increased—

these are what I added—

> by three attack carriers, three carrier air groups, one cruiser, and one battleship in reduced commission. There will be two Marine divisions instead of six battalion landing teams. The Army will be organized into 10 divisions rather than 9, and will also have 2 additional antiaircraft battalions. The Air Force will increase the number of planes per group in three additional bomber groups.
>
> Also, since August 1, 1949, $150,000,000 was added to aircraft procurement for the Air Force and $50,000,000 for the Navy. In addition to the 200-percent increase in the allocations for antisubmarine warfare equipment, 700,000 hours were added for flying in combat type—

and I then go on and list the items, which, if this document is going into the appendix, I need not repeat here.

Chairman Russell. Yes, if you want it to go.

(The statement of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson before the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee dated March 13, 1950, referred to will be found in the printed appendix.)

IMPROVEMENTS IN ARMED SERVICES SINCE 1945

Mr. Johnson. I want to call attention in the same document. On page 11 I quote before this committee the statement of Gen. Lawton Collins that says that the Army is in better shape then than it has been at any time since 1945.

I quote Admiral Sherman on the Navy, that the Navy is ready to go, and the ships we have, which were not ready to go when I became Secretary of Defense, were then manned and ready to go; and I make references to the statements of General Vandenberg and Stuart Symington, Secretary Symington, and the increases.

To summarize, since we got into that, I don't think I made a mistake in not resigning when I was hit with the $13 billion because we left the Army, Navy, and Air Force stronger than they had been at any time since 1945.

The point system was not properly thought out. It wrecked the Military Establishment in all of its branches, and they were still suffering from that when I went over.

We took men away from their desk jobs and put them in the services, and the facts on that are given in the annual report of last June 3, We got rid of a lot of fat as we referred to then, and I tried to get them down to muscle, so there was a basis on which you could have built now; and the fact that you have been building shows that the resignation at that time would not have been justified because we did establish, Senator George, a base on which we could now go forward.

What I said is an apologia—I shouldn't have used that word. You all know what I mean, but somebody might think that it was an apology. I am making no apology. The record is all right.

"Apologia" means to me an explanation of the history of a thing within the circumstances surrounding it, and in no sense an apology, and I appreciate, Senator George, your asking that question, because the things that have been asked of me today indicate that up until this time pretty largely there were just weeds in this garden; and I go back to my high-school days when a very distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Hoar, at the turn of the century, told a story.

He said in these lawns which he wanted to protect that he put up "No trespass" signs; it did not do any good. He put up "Keep off the grass" signs and it didn't do any good, and then at the suggestion of some of the ladies in the family, he put up a sign "Please don't trample on the flowers," and that worked. Senator George, there are some flowers in this whole situation.

Senator GEORGE. I thought that the facts that you brought out should be in this record.

Mr. JOHNSON. I thank you very much, sir; I deeply appreciate it and am deeply grateful because the story has never been told.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you desire those other matters to be printed in the appendix?

Mr. JOHNSON. I gave the speech to the reporter.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand that.

Mr. JOHNSON. This is the third speech that he has; I gave him all of that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you wish that which you did not read printed in the appendix, Colonel?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think it should be.

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will repeat, it will be printed in the appendix. Senator Johnson?

MANNER OF MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, did I understand you to say you, if you had been a member of the Cabinet when the decision was made to remove General MacArthur you would have advocated other methods being employed in the removal?

Mr. JOHNSON. Maybe I should not have said it the way I did. What it was intended to be was this——

Senator WILEY. You are talking that way, now.

Mr. JOHNSON. The stature of MacArthur is so great, his military record is so superb, and his desire to serve the country, and what he believes are the country's interests are so controlling that if I had been one of those with whom the President conferred about ousting him, I would have asked that it be done a little differently, whether he let me do it, or somebody else.

Senator JOHNSON. That is what I understood.

Mr. JOHNSON. And I believe that my past relations with the President on such matters was such that I had a conviction that, with his desire not to hurt anybody unnecessarily, he would have permitted me, or somebody else, to do just that.

That is one time that I was sorry I was not in the Cabinet.

JUSTIFICATION FOR MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator JOHNSON. Now you are speaking about the methods to be employed in notifying a man he is out, and my question is—I want to know, in the light of the situation that existed, would you have favored his recall?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator Johnson, I would like to answer that, but all I know about the situation that existed is what, in the press, has been said about it, in Secretary Acheson's testimony before this committee, because I have read no other testimony and that I have only read in the New York Times.

I have had access to no other records.

Senator JOHNSON. So you don't care to express an opinion as to whether or not his recall was justified?

Mr. JOHNSON. Without all the facts, it could only muddy up the water.

If the President had lost confidence in him, and I think someone else said that before, as I read in the newspapers, there should have been a change made because he is the Commander in Chief, I will go that far with you; but what the facts were, I don't know.

I wouldn't buck the President's decision, if he had lost confidence in the general.

I would only argue on the matter and manner of his going.

Senator JOHNSON. So you would have disapproved heartily and vigorously the method employed in removing him, but that doesn't mean that you would not have favored the recall?

Mr. JOHNSON. If, knowing all the facts, I had reached that conclusion.

COMMENTS ON MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator JOHNSON. Have you read the recommendations General MacArthur made to the Congress, on the program that he should like to put into effect?

Mr. JOHNSON. As carried in the newspapers, I have.

I heard that on television.

Senator JOHNSON. On page 198 of the Senate document—I am quoting from that document—General MacArthur says——

Chairman RUSSELL. What was that page?

Senator JOHNSON. Page 198, at the bottom of the page:

> Apart from the military need, as I saw it, to neutralize sanctuary, protection given to the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary:
>
> First, the intensification of our economic blockade against China.

Do you agree with that statement?

Mr. JOHNSON. Was that at the bottom of page 198?

Senator JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; I am inclined to agree with that.

Senator JOHNSON. Second:

> The imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast.

Do you favor that recommendation?

Mr. JOHNSON. I discussed that when I was in the Defense Department with Admiral Sherman, asked that some research be made on the definition under international law of what constitutes an act of war and what does not. As long as you are talking about the China coast, my instinct would be to blockade the China coast. As I read the newspapers you were talking about blockading the Russian ports above. I don't go along with that.

Senator JOHNSON. The third recommendation is:

> Removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria.

Can you give us your opinion on that?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, I have been out of there since last September 18, and I am just a civilian armchair strategist.

Upon the basis of the information I had then, I realized that in the absence of the North Koreans quitting, we couldn't go along with the Russian policy of bleeding us dry in Korea forever; that the time had come when the things you are here discussing would be things that we would have to do. And on that, if I had the confidence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff that I had when I left the Defense Department, I would have followed their judgment.

Senator JOHNSON. And fourth:

> Removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with logistical support to contribute to their effective operation against the Chinese mainland.

I would appreciate your comments on that.

Mr. JOHNSON. Of course, somebody said, I saw somewhere, that I had been counsel for Dr. Soong. I saw that somewhere in the press. I am not and never have been.

Senator BREWSTER. Just a little confidential now.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am not and never have been.

And the Chinese lobby, I have never been a part of it and don't know who they are, except I see Kohlberg's literature quite frequently in the mail.

I want to clear that atmosphere in the light of all the continuing questions.

If mine were the deciding voice on doing that, I would have been furnishing equipment if the group I wanted to send over to study this situation thought they could handle equipment and could train the people. I wanted to get first-hand facts from our own military people. That I have never seen.

But so far as lifting the restrictions and letting them drag us into war over there at the present time, I would not.

PERSONAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF WITNESS

Senator JOHNSON. Well, Mr. Secretary, I don't want to ask any embarrassing questions, and I am totally unfamiliar with the matter that you are talking about. We have had the recommendations of General MacArthur and the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in whom I know you have great confidence, and I just wanted to have in the record any recommendations that you cared to make on two principal points.

Mr. JOHNSON. I really don't have any. I don't want to be an armchair strategist. I was doing my best by not talking. You know I haven't talked. You tried to get me to answer questions one night and I didn't do it—just an ordinary casual inquiry about it. I try to be a good American and now where I don't know on things that happened before and which I don't have the information afterward—I don't mean to be cagey but I don't want to get into something without it and argue against the Joint Chiefs or somebody over there who has all the information, and the President, when I don't have it.

Senator JOHNSON. So you would not make a recommendation one way or the other on our providing logistical support to Chiang's troops?

Mr. JOHNSON. I said from what I know I would and if the military mission recommended it, I would. We do things like that in other places in the world where our Government doesn't trust the leaders, I imagine, any more than some people trust Chiang. We take the tools where we find them and use them. I can make—as I said at Blair House that night, I can make right violent speeches against some of the people we play with in the world, but with me it is the security of the United States, and I firmly believe that Formosa in the hands of an unfriendly people, the Communists, is inimical to the security of the United States, because you can reach from there, among other things, places you can't reach from the mainland of China.

Senator JOHNSON. Would you care to express an opinion on the advisability of bombing Manchuria?

[Deleted.]

Senator JOHNSON. Would you also follow their recommendations on the other points I have enumerated?

Mr. JOHNSON. If you had all the Joint Chiefs in agreement, the answer is yes—and the Chairman.

WISDOM OF $13 BILLION DEFENSE BUDGET FOR FISCAL 1951

Senator JOHNSON. The $13 billion budget figure that you referred to in reply to Senator George's question was not your figure; it was the figure given you by the Director of the Budget and by the President.

Mr. JOHNSON. Not only wasn't given to me—I never heard it until it was thrown out to all of us gathered there in the room, and that after Mr. Forrestal had spent 2 months and I spent all this time with Eisenhower on the fourteen-billion-six figure. No, sir.

I then went back and got $500,000,000 back. But we did, on cutting out this fat, we did get enough money, as far as the Air Force, more than we would have gotten on the fourteen billion six.

Senator JOHNSON. As you look back on it, do you think that $13,000,000,000 figure was a mistake?

Mr. JOHNSON. If a Republican had asked that question, I would understand it.

Senator WILEY. You would be suspicious, wouldn't you?

Chairman RUSSELL. We are trying to conduct a nonpartisan inquiry here as far as we can.

Mr. JOHNSON. There is certainly proof of it there.

Chairman RUSSELL. We don't always do it, but we have tried.

Senator JOHNSON. I have tried never to operate as Republican or Democrat on questions of fairness.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Will you answer it as a Republican or Democrat?

Mr. JOHNSON. The climate on the Hill, the climate of the President's economists and all the rest of the economists, the climate of the world at that moment—the airlift having been successful—the climate was, there was going to be peace.

It was on that basis that the 13 billion was a figure that everybody accepted, as I have tried to demonstrate here today.

Senator JOHNSON. I am familiar with what happened.

Mr. JOHNSON. It was not my figure. I protested the figure: I tried to get it raised, but all I was seeking was back to the fourteen six.

If it isn't clear, I am not sorry I didn't resign, but I did the best I could with it.

Senator JOHNSON. I want your opinion today, not then. I wanted you to tell us as you look back on it, whether you think it was a serious mistake we made, without referring to who made the decision or who is responsible for it. I want your opinion on whether you thought it was a serious mistake.

Mr. JOHNSON. You are going to get a surprising answer. If before the budget was applied you had given 30 billion, or 40 or 60 or 70 billion to the Military Establishment before you cut out the waste and the extravagance and put them away from desks out in the field and made the ships get ready to go instead of floating around dangerously without control—if you had furnished this money before that was done, that would have gone down a rat hole.

That is an exaggeration to make the point.

Therefore, I think somebody from above guided this economy thing to the extent we got a base established that we can successfully build on and you can operate in Korea.

I believe, therefore, the $13 billion was good.

Senator JOHNSON. Don't search my mind for what answer I expect. Very frankly, I didn't know what kind of answer I would get, and I don't know yet what your answer has been. I asked you the question: Do you think that $13 billion figure was a mistake? And I gather from what you just said that you don't think it was.

Mr. JOHNSON. The amount it would buy, it was a mistake, but it would have been a mistake to have given the services—any one of the three—any more money at that time until you got them in shape that they could use money.

Senator JOHNSON. Were the services, any of them, appropriated more money than was actually used?

Mr. JOHNSON. On the contrary, speaking in generalities, I guess the Navy is the best illustration, I found out sometime afterward, when we got people in there and were checking it, that the Navy spending, they had probably $3 or $4 billion that you didn't know about on the Hill that they had been spending during the 2 or 3 years before I went over there, out of fat, taking the money and using it for the things they had to spend money, but they had all this other stuff.

The Air Force was in the worst shape on this. The Army was in about as good shape as the Navy.

Therefore, when they were hit with $13 billion, they weren't cut from $14.4, that everybody thought they were, but they had all this fat they had piled up in previous years they were really living on. So the blow was really worse. They had to begin to live within the budget. They didn't have much more of this fat left.

IMPOUNDING OF CERTAIN FUNDS FROM AIR FORCE

Senator JOHNSON. Were you consulted about the decision that was reached to impound certain funds appropriated to the Air Force?

Mr. JOHNSON. I was not, and that is one I want to amplify. I gave Secretary Symington—and I am not sure whether it was General Vandenberg or Norstad, but one of them—clearance to go to the White House and to the Budget the minute that thing came through on the Hill.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you remember how much that was?

Mr. JOHNSON. I know it was enough to bring it up to 70 groups. You have the figures. You were one of the leaders in that thing.

Senator JOHNSON. I don't have that exact figure; that is why I asked you.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think it was two-hundred-and-some million dollars. Have you got it there? I would recognize it if you used it.

Senator JOHNSON. I asked General Mudge for the figure, and he says, "McNeil is checking for any subsequent amounts impounded in subsequent budgets."

He said about $822 million, but I think that was, of course, during the period when Secretary Forrestal was Secretary.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired.

Mr. JOHNSON. I authorized them to go. Then it seems the deadlock—maybe one oughtn't talk about this—but the deadlock between House and Senate had been pretty deep, and I think the deadlocks were resolved with a full knowledge and appreciation the President was going to impound; and to none of that was I a party, nor was it ever discussed with me by Budget or by the President or by Senators.

PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Might I again ask the chairman our plans for the afternoon? Are we going to adjourn after this inquiry?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, if I understand this unanimous-consent agreement, if all of the time is consumed, there can't be a vote until 4 or 5 o'clock.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Two o'clock and two-thirty, I think, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. That may be what it means, but I wasn't on the floor. I do have the unanimous-consent agreement before me. It says:

> *Ordered*, That when the Senate reconvenes on the calendar day of Thursday, June 14, 1951, Mr. Neely have the floor; and his time to discuss his motion to recommit the bill be limited to 1 hour, that the time thereafter be limited to 1 hour and 30 minutes on the side.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, most respectfully and subject to error, there is a question by Senator Wherry that the vote on the recommital will be at 2 o'clock and the vote on the bill will be at 2:30.

I read the Congressional Record this morning. I don't want to assert myself incorrectly, but I think that is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator has the advantage of me, if he read the Record, because I did not.

According to the unanimous-consent request, after Senator Neely has spoken for an hour, the time thereafter will be limited to 1 hour and 30 minutes on the side.

Senator STENNIS. One hour, with thirty minutes to each side, was the agreement.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, it is very apparent that the Members who were more diligent in their attendance at the Senate yesterday than I, are of the opinion that there will be a vote by 2 o'clock.

In that event, Senator Smith, after you have concluded your questions, we will take a recess until tomorrow morning.

Senator JOHNSON. Tomorrow morning?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator SMITH. I thank the chairman for the information.

Chaiman RUSSELL. If they vote at 2 o'clock, is there any reason why we could not have an afternoon session at 2:30?

Senator BREWSTER. Unless you want to hear Senator McCarthy.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will have an afternoon session. I would not like to deny any member of the committee that privilege, and he may return for his round of questions.

Senator GREEN. The latest at 2:30, I think.

Chairman RUSSELL. We will then recess after Senator Smith concludes his period of questioning, until 2:30, or within 5 minutes after the conclusion of the vote, whichever is earlier.

You may proceed, Senator Smith.

DISCUSSION OF USING GROUND TROOPS IN KOREA AT BLAIR HOUSE MEETINGS, JUNE 1950

Senator SMITH. Secretary Johnson, I want to take this occasion to thank you sincerely for the cooperation you gave me, when I was trying to get some light on these subjects, in assisting me to go to the Far East in the fall of 1949.

I want to ask you, first of all, one or two questions about the Blair House meetings of June 27 and June 30 in order to get my own thinking straight on that.

Let me ask you if you can identify the statement made by the President of the United States to a group, of which I was a member, on the 27th of June in this little book published for the use of the committees entitled "Compilation of Certain Published Information on the Military Situation in the Far East"?

On page 11 there appears to be the statement of June 27, 1950. I just want to identify that in passing, and call your attention to one expression there.

Mr. JOHNSON. I have no reason to question the accuracy of that statement.

Senator SMITH. Now, in that statement of the President's, he says, in the first paragraph:

> In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

As I recollect that meeting at which I was present and, of course, you were present, there was no question of ground troops at that time.

Mr. JOHNSON. On the contrary, you were told there at that meeting that ground troops were not planned to be used.

Senator SMITH. That is my recollection.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. Now, Mr. Secretary, on page 15 of this same document we have the statement by the President of the United States of July 3, 1950, 3 days later, on further military action in Korea.

Mr. JOHNSON. What page?

Senator SMITH. Page 14, F, statement F there in the compilation. That was the statement that was released, was read to the group that I was a member of, again, on that day, and you will note in that statement at the very end it says, "General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground units."

Mr. JOHNSON. That was the purpose of the meeting, to tell you that.

Senator SMITH. That is what I understood.

Should we have understood at that time that in addition to supporting ground units, which I think we were told were to help the evacuation of our people and also to protect the beachhead at Pusan, we were going to add additional ground units without further conference with Members of the Congress?

As I recall it, we were advised that certain of the troops that MacArthur had in Japan would be sent over for the purpose of maintaining that beachhead and assisting in the evacuation of our nationals and give them such aid as we needed for the progress of the campaign.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think, sir, that there was some discussion of that, and I took the position that we had reached the stage in this operation where when MacArthur was asking additional troops and we were moving them in from all parts of the world, that we ought to quit talking about what we were sending in there because it was undoubtedly of aid to the enemy, so there was no further discussion of it. I don't think there had been any discussion of that point prior to the issuance of this item F.

Senator SMITH. Well, do you recall whether at that time so far as the Department of Defense was concerned, it was your expectation that from then on in we would try to send in such ground troops as might be needed to carry on an aggressive campaign and to clear up the Korean situation?

Mr. JOHNSON. We expected to do that. This is June the 30th, you see, and we have asked MacArthur for his recommendations. You will have the file and I won't, that the final recommendations of MacArthur were not in on June 30.

Senator SMITH. Those recommendations came later?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN JUNE 1950

Senator SMITH. Now, do you recall as this whole situation was developing that we contemplated the possibility of the Chinese Communist troops and also of Russian troops coming in before the Korean situation was cleaned up, or did you anticipate that we could clean up the North Koreans and that is all that would have to be done?

Mr. JOHNSON. Some of you brought that up at the first White House meeting after the Korean business. It was discussed at Blair House on Sunday night, some questions asked about it on Monday night.

It was the thing that was always in the background, but the decision to do what we did was in the light of the possibility of those things, as I answered Senator Saltonstall.

Senator SMITH. And we took what might be called a calculated risk at that time?

Mr. JOHNSON. Very definitely.

Senator SMITH. That the Chinese Communists might come in, as they ultimately did come in?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right, sir.

Senator SMITH. Now you stated earlier today in your opening statement that the Defense Department did not anticipate the attack on South Korea from North Korea. You did not expect that that would happen.

[Deleted.]

DISCUSSION OF THREAT TO SOUTH KOREA DURING KOREAN AID

Senator SMITH. Well, now I just want to call your attention to the fact that in July of 1949 our committee—that is before I went out there myself and had my own first-hand observation of the situation—at that time was contemplating aid to Korea prior to the ECA aid.

In our report at that time we used this language. This is on page 5 of the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 2319, "A bill to promote world peace and the general welfare, national interest, and foreign policy of the United States by providign aid to the Republic of Korea." This document is dated July 22, 1949. In that document we said—I don't recall whether you appeared before our committee or not. I think the State Department was advocating this aid, but we said in that document:

> Communists constitute an unsleeping menace to the independence and the economic recovery of the South Korean Republic. The U. S. S. R. and Communist China lie close by and on the northern border a Communist Korean organization is ready to seize control of the Republic if the opportunity ever presents itself.

I am wondering why if that was brought to our attention and it was embodied in our report, the Defense Department did not have the same view, or did they have the same view at that time?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think the Defense Department was pretty much in agreement with a number of people on the Hill who were right about this thing all the way through. You didn't wobble, the Joint Chiefs didn't wobble too much when we got the political separated from the military.

Senator SMITH. Well, now we have another instance. I am reading now from the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 3304——

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't have that.

Senator SMITH. "A bill to amend the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, which is the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950." This is dated March 24, 1950.

I don't think this came before your Department at all. I think this is work we were doing with the State Department.

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't remember that bill at all.

Senator SMITH. On economic assistance. In that we said this, on page 29 of that report of our committee:

> Since 1945 when our troops occupied South Korea the United States has extended various types of assistance to the Korean people. Through this aid we

> hope to strengthen the Republic of Korea so that it may successfully withstand the constant threat of Communist expansion from the north and serve as a possible nucleus for the eventual unification of the country on a democratic basis.

And on page 33 in the same report we said:

> South Korea has a new and untried government; it confronts a refugee problem of serious dimensions; it is under constant threat from the north and must maintain a large internal police force.

Now in light of those conditions and in light of the fact that we were giving I think $150,000,000 of appropriations for economic assistance there, we all felt that we were in danger of this invasion from the north and this military threat. I am not quite clear what you meant by your statement earlier today that the Defense Department did not anticipate the possibility of this attack on South Korea. Why did we withdraw our troops and why was our policy what it was at that time?

DIVIDED COMMAND BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA

Before you answer that, let me say this: When I arrived in Tokyo, General MacArthur pointed out to me something that amazed me. He said:

> You know, the commands out here are divided. I have the responsibility for the island areas from Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and the islands of the Pacific. As far as the mainland of China is concerned, that is not in my jurisdiction. That is in the hands of the Navy. As far as Korea is concerned, it is in the hands of the State Department.

He said:

> Undoubtedly if we have some trouble out here, I will be asked as the commander of our forces in the entire Far East to take the responsibility, but I don't have the policy making in these areas or any voice in it.

Now does that explain why we do not seem to have been prepared for this Korea attack?

Mr. Johnson. The best answer I can give, that we then did not have the two departments functioning as they should and the answers coming up, but the decision to come out of Korea was long before my time.

Senator Smith. I realize that—I realize that, and it disturbed me when I was there.

I was rather talked into the idea that I was justified in recommending $150 million in economic aid to Korea; but I realized, also, when I was in Korea, that while they had an army there, the army wasn't adequately equipped, or supplied, and really wasn't prepared for the attack that came later.

Mr. Johnson. I don't know whether you recall it, but after you returned, you came down and met with me and some of the rest of the establishment, and you were most helpful——

Senator Smith. I do recall it.

Mr. Johnson. In your analysis of the picture, and we appreciated it.

Senator Smith. Thank you very much.

But, I was just wondering whether the Korean situation fell into a sort of unclassified area, because of the differences of jurisdiction, and the fact you stated a minute ago, the Departments were not properly coordinated in that field.

Is that a fair conclusion to draw? I don't want to draw any unfair conclusions.

Mr. JOHNSON. That might be one of the reasons, but that doesn't strike me as being a too important reason.

KOREA AND FORMOSA IN THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE LINE IN THE PACIFIC

Senator SMITH. I understood you to say a minute ago that in the Secretary of State's address to the Press Club in January 1950, I think you said this, according to the notes I made on it:

> He left out Formosa and Korea as two of our most important defense areas in the Far East.

He took the line from the Aleutians, I think, down through Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, but didn't include Korea and Formosa. I have been wondering whether, because of that policy of the Department of State at the time, we hadn't given thought to the possible attack on Korea or Formosa, or didn't care much one way or the other whether they were——

Mr. JOHNSON. As I have it here, I think it is accurate, it should be—it was from the press conference on January 5, and from last week's issue of Time:

> Secretary Acheson said in the press conference: "There has been a great deal of amateur military strategy indulged in in regard to this matter of Formosa. We are not going to get involved militarily in any way on the island of Formosa."
>
> He continued: "So far as I know, no responsible person in the Government, no military man, has ever believed that we should involve our forces on the island. We gave vast amounts of military eqdipment to that government. It is not that they lack rifles or ammunition, or that they cannot purchase what they need. The trouble is elsewhere, and it is not the function of the United States, nor would it, nor can it, attempt to furnish the will to resist and the purpose of resistance to those who must provide for themselves."

Then on the 12th of January—that is where I was confused on the date.

Senator SMITH. That was the Press Club speech?

Mr. JOHNSON. At the Press Club; yes. I just missed it by a week. Acheson said:

> The defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands.

He excludes Formosa positively.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. I haven't time for one more question?

Chairman RUSSELL. Beg pardon?

Senator SMITH. I haven't time for one more question?

Chairman RUSSELL. By unanimous consent, the Senator from New Jersey can proceed for one more question.

Senator SMITH. I just want to ask Mr. Johnson this question: He recalls, I think, when I came back from Japan we discussed this whole thing very fully, and I recall the enthusiasm I felt because of your attitude on the Formosa issue.

I came back all steamed up from the contacts I had made out there that it would be very serious for us to let Formosa get into hostile hands and you concurred.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir; and I never changed on that viewpoint from that time until this day, and have continued to feel this same way. And these stories that I represent this and that are just to becloud the issue, because when I am for something—I believe in national defense—I am just for it.

Senator SMITH. I thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, we will request you to be here at 2:30 this afternoon, and I hope that all the members of the committee can be here to greet you. But if we are not, we will be shortly after the vote.

Senator GEORGE. I think there is a roll call.

Senator KNOWLAND. A procedural matter?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would hope in the event we are having our roll call at 2:30 the fact that some of us are down on the roll call will not cause us to lose our opportunity.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator will protect the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. Wiley, whose name is the last that appears on the roll.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee stands in recess as previously announced.

(Whereupon, at 1:09 p. m., the committees recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., or as soon thereafter as possible, this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Green, Hickenlooper, Sparkman, Brewster, Saltonstall, Johnson of Texas, Morse, Knowland, Cain, and Stennis.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will be in order.

Senator Morse?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

BLAIR HOUSE MEETING OF JUNE 25, 1950

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to go over the Blair House meeting again, the one on Sunday; and I don't know whether you have had a chance to read an article which appeared in the June Harper's magazine, by Mr. Albert L. Warner, which has the title, "How the Korean Decision Was Made," and on page 101, he says the following:

> There was an obvious air of tension as the conferees gathered in the President's residence diagonally across Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House. While they awaited dinner, Mr. Acheson told the President of the swift United Nations action. He was enthusiastic that a beginning had been made to check the aggression. Now Secretary Johnson brought up the question of Formosa. In the new outbreak of danger in the Far East, this island off the coast of Communist China must be considered.
>
> It was a delicate subject for Johnson to press. Eight months earlier he had been overruled and Acheson's laissez faire doctrine for Formosa had become administration policy. But Johnson pushed his point: the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that this island in hostile hands would be inimical to American security. He suggested that Gen. Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, should speak on the question. The President listened as Bradley dwelt upon Formosa's strategic importance. Strictly in the light of American security, Formosa was more important than Korea.

That is the end of the quote I shall read.

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, I have not read the article. I have it. I did not read it because I wanted to tell the story, as I knew it to be, without being influenced by any other person's idea of it.

I have read, in reading Mr. Acheson's testimony, an answer he made relative thereto.

The Secretary of State was confused. I gave the story, this morning, as it actually happened, without reference to the Warner article I have not read, but bearing in mind the Secretary of State's answer reported in the New York Times.

What you have read from that article is incorrect to the extent that when we first went in, as I stated this morning, after Mr. Acheson's reference to the current information on Korea, United Nations, when I picked up the ball, General Bradley made no presentation following my comments on the subject, except to read without comment the article I had brought back, written by General MacArthur, on the Formosa question, with which General Bradley and myself were in agreement.

Senator KNOWLAND. I might say that, following your testimony this morning, I went out and dictated a letter to the Defense Establishment, which we have now requested, asking that that memorandum of approximately June 23, 1950, that General MacArthur gave you in Tokyo be made available to the committee, so that we may have an opportunity to examine it.

Mr. JOHNSON. The date may be different from the 23d, because he had it prepared when we went in for the first conference.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes. I have, I think, sufficiently identified it so they can find it.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA

Now, as I understand your testimony, keeping for the moment exclusively to this Formosa situation, the view of the Joint Chiefs has for some time now been that the island was and is of strategic importance, and that it would be detrimental to the best interests of this country to have it fall into unfriendly hands.

Mr. JOHNSON. The last part of your statement, that it would be inimical to the security of the United States for it to be in unfriendly hands, has, I think, actually, with all of the wobbling that the record shows, been the way the majority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have felt since I have had personal knowledge or in the period through which I checked.

Senator KNOWLAND. Apparently from your testimony this morning, when you went out to Tokyo in June with General Bradley, among other matters this question of Formosa was discussed. General MacArthur gave you this memo to which you have referred and I have since requested a copy from the Defense Establishment, and your views and those of General Bradley were in substantial agreement with the MacArthur memo; is that right?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. There may be some little differences——

Senator KNOWLAND. Just some minor differences.

Mr. JOHNSON. Without looking at it, I don't recall, but on the general substance I agree with that memorandum.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, do you recall offhand the difference between the memo given you on or about the 23d of June of 1950 in its strategic concept and the letter that General MacArthur sent to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, which dealt exclusively with the question of Formosa?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator Knowland, I have not seen those documents, either of them, since that time; and since I brought no records away from the Military Establishment of that type with me, only the personal files which they sent me, I don't think it is fair to myself or fair to this record to try to point those things out without refreshing the recollection by reference to them. I decline to answer this morning as an unfair thing to you and to me.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I would like to ask this question on what I am leading up to now: You have also testified, and the President himself at a press conference had indicated, that for a year approximately he had been thinking of a possibility that he might have to remove General MacArthur, and then Mr. Short, the Presidential press secretary, the following day clarified by saying the President had been speaking in general terms, but that the date more precisely was the August 26th date when the Veterans of Foreign Wars letter came to his attention. That we have from the Presidential secretary and the President's press conference.

WHITE HOUSE MEETINGS ON VFW LETTER

Now, in answer to examination by members of the committee today, you have testified that you were called to the White House——

Mr. JOHNSON. No; that I was called in the morning, but when I found out that our information that I had given the President was in error—that the communication did not come through the Military Establishment—that I then went back to the White House to tell the President that I had been wrong, relying upon War Department information; I wanted to correct it—it did come through as I explained this morning.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. And that is when the discussion took place about removing him as Korean commander.

Senator KNOWLAND. I understand that, but what I am getting at is that you first went to the White House subsequent to your call, did you not, or did you just get this first message regarding the President's wanting a directive issued to MacArthur to withdraw the VFW letter?

Mr. JOHNSON. We went in answer to a White House telephone switchboard call the President wanted to see us right away.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is what I am getting at. But did not he tell you over the phone he wanted to see you right away?

Mr. JOHNSON. No; he didn't call. He had somebody else call for him and said what he wanted, and all of us there were thus notified.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is right, and that is the meeting that you testified that you and, I think, General Bradley and Mr. Acheson and Mr. Harriman, and Mr. Harriman had somehow gotten hold of an advance to the press of this VFW letter. That was my understanding of your testimony.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. And at that meeting that you had been given the directive, and the directive is just about one or two paragraphs of short sentences really, which appear in our printed document——

Mr. JOHNSON. It is about one sentence, if I recall correctly.

Senator KNOWLAND (continuing). And which says, if I recall it, "The President has directed me to have you withdraw your statement," or something to that effect.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now then, due to the fact that you had inadvertently been informed by somebody in the Defense Establishment that the message had not come over the Army communications, when you found that had been an error you then went, on your own motion, to the White House to correct your prior statement.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. And it was at that meeting, in answer to questions from members of this committee who asked about it, that the President had indicated some annoyance and the possibility of the removal of General MacArthur. Am I substantially correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. You are. That is the meeting at which the removal of General MacArthur as Korean commander was discussed between the President and myself, and with no one else there. I ought to clarify that. That is the only discussion of that type I ever had with the President.

Senator KNOWLAND. I see.

I would like to ask this question, because I think it is pertinent to the understanding of the record, and as I visualize this situation, what we are trying to do is to get a basis so that perhaps we can find wider areas in the Government to better understand future moves which may have to be made by this Government.

RELATIONSHIP OF FORMOSA TO JOHNSON RESIGNATION

Inasmuch as General MacArthur very clearly saw the strategic importance of Formosa, and his views were well known, and that your views coincided with those of General MacArthur, in general, at least, though you might have differed in some detail, inasmuch as the President himself, through his press secretary, has indicated that he first thought of the removal of General MacArthur as a result of that VFW letter which dealt solely with Formosa, might I ask you, did your stand on Formosa play any part in your leaving the Defense Establishment?

If you will just permit me to parenthetically say this, I am fully cognizant of the fact that in the early stages of the Korean operation when we were being pushed back there was some criticism, as will always be found of military leaders or those holding high civilian responsibility when you are on the retrogade movement, but I call your attention to the fact that on the 15th of September, the very successful Inchon landings had taken place. The press of the country were filled with the fact that the United States Forces had taken the initiative; that we were now on the forward movement, a tremendous amphibious landing had taken place, and presumably the back of the Korean enemy had been broken, and the earlier criticisms were being changed to praise for the activity of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, all of which were under your Department of Defense.

It has always seemed a little odd to me that at that particular point, on the 19th, 4 days afterwards, you should have left the Defense Establishment, so I ask, in all good faith, whether or not this Formosa situation which resulted finally in the removal of MacArthur played any part in your own separation from the Defense Establishment.

Mr. Johnson. Senator Knowland, I cannot answer that. I can tell you, if you are asking why I was ousted from the Defense Establishment, my answer is truthfully under oath, I don't know; I don't know to this day.

On Inchon, I carried the responsibility, along with General MacArthur. I resigned 2 days before Inchon.

Senator Knowland. No, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Johnson. Three days.

Senator Knowland. Your resignation, as I understand, was the 19th of September. The Inchon landings were on the 15th of September.

Mr. Johnson. The resignation was effective on the 19th and it was tendered about a week earlier, and it was tendered 2 or 3 days before Inchon. That hurt me.

Senator Wiley. That what?

Mr. Johnson. That hurt me, because I had been carrying along with General MacArthur the responsibility for Inchon. General Collins—maybe the censor will want to strike this out—did not favor Inchon and went over to try to argue General MacArthur out of it.

General MacArthur stood pat. I backed MacArthur, and the President has always, had before backed me on it. He went ahead. The date had been fixed quite some time before, so that was distressing because I felt that Inchon would have cleared up much of the criticism.

Senator Knowland. And no reason was given at the time of your resignation being asked for or accepted as to the reasons for it, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. Johnson. No. I do not know why I am out of the Defense Department.

Senator Knowland. Well, that is an amazing statement to me.

Chairman Russell. Your time has expired, Senator Knowland.

Senator Green?

ALTERNATIVES ON FORMOSA

Senator Green. Mr. Secretary, you were talking about Formosa from time to time, and it has been assumed that in the discussions there were two alternatives. One that Formosa might fall into enemy hands, which as I understand it everyone is opposed to, and the other was our taking control of Formosa. Are there not other alternatives?

Mr. Johnson. Yes; there are a lot of intermediate steps between there, and I did not and never have negatived those steps. All that I sought on this opening step on Formosa was to send a military mission over to get the facts on which there could be such action whether it was the steps you have indicated or the steps in-between, and that is the fight I lost with the State Department.

Senator Green. That is what I understood your position was and that you had not gone further than to say, as almost everyone else has said, regardless of what they thought the future of Formosa should be, that it should not fall into enemy hands.

Mr. Johnson. That has been my position, that we must do the things necessary to keep Formosa from falling into the hands that would affect the security of the United States, and always I have tied this defense effort of mine to the security of the United States regardless of what any other government would think about it.

Senator GREEN. In other words, it is not a question of just black or white. There are a number of degrees of gray in-between which might be chosen?

Mr. JOHNSON. And I wanted to send competent men to give us the advice on that.

ADMINISTRATION ATTITUDE ON FORMOSA

Senator GREEN. Thank you. Now, in answer to one other question that was asked you, you were asked did the administration continue to give support to the Nationalist Government, and you hesitated and then you said they did not give support, but did they gave any opposition?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. Active opposition?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't know what you mean by "active" quite, but there were efforts from my office at the instance of the military, of the Defense Department, to speed up the doing of the things they wanted to do in the line of acquisition and material that it seemed they were asked to get, and without being able to give you details, the definite feeling I had, there was a dragging of feet, an effort to delay.

Senator GREEN. In other words, they did not continue to give the same support they had in the past, but they did not give any support to the opposition. May it not have been because they hoped that giving less support would bring the Chinese Nationalist Government into step with their plans for rehabilitation?

Mr. JOHNSON. It might well be that the position of seeming hostility to the National Government was an effort on the part of the administration, which wasn't in Defense, to correct some of the practices, to change some of the things they talk about as the evils of that administration.

That was the political side. I recall discussions generally with topside State on that subject, but always my viewpoint was those are things, yes, that must be considered by this Government, but so far as I am concerned, on aid you give them—I want aid, whether it be China or anywhere else in the world, to be under the control and direction of American citizens, and then you cut out the things about which you are now talking.

So if you are going to do something for them, do it with Americans in charge, and in this hour of trial and danger, I think Americans ought to be on guard, where we have a past record of——

Senator GREEN. Without regard to the reason, there was temporary withdrawal of the aid of the extent given theretofore and given thereafter.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. I want to get over, talking to you, that so many questions here about Formosa, that Formosa was only one of many facets of the problem.

Senator GREEN. Oh, yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. That I had to handle, and it seems out of due proportion here today.

Senator GREEN. I regard all these questions as of minor importance, but I thought I would clear them up, as they raise an opportunity for misunderstanding.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.

WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA IN 1949

Senator GREEN. Now, you also said you had nothing to do with the withdrawal of troops from Korea, but prior to that you did have to do with the arming of the troops in Korea, did you not?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, I was not in the Military Establishment during the period of the Second World War and on up to 1949. I had nothing to do with that phase of the situation.

Senator GREEN. But later——

Mr. JOHNSON. The question of the arms to be left and to be given to the Korean troops was a matter determined before I was connected with the Defense Establishment.

Senator GREEN. Was there no continuance of armament when you were Secretary?

Mr. JOHNSON. Whatever was left by the regimental battalion that was pulled out, the pulling out of which should have taken place the preceding fall, but was delayed at the instance of the State Department.

No action was required from my office on that, and I gave it no consideration at any time. Once I brought up the matter with the Secretary of State, just an informal discussion, and was told it was an ended and closed matter.

That was in the presence of the President, so I gave no attention to that, can't intelligently answer any questions in that field, and the military records are in existence and they will show the Forrestal position and his communications relative thereto, which I have seen but won't attempt to speak about here today.

Senator GREEN. I thought, if you did know——

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't know.

Senator GREEN. It would be valuable information to the committee.

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't know, Senator Green; and this afternoon, after thinking at lunch, I am not going to speculate and give opinions on things I don't know about.

I just don't know about it.

Senator GREEN. Of course not. It is best not to.

Well, Mr. Chairman, I will yield the rest of my time.

I don't want to keep the witness any longer than is necessary.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Senator CAIN. Mr. Johnson, by way of appreciation and a compliment, sir, I should like to say that you, this morning, provided at least this member of the committee with more information about the Blair House meetings in late June than I have been able to gather from the testimony offered by the Secretary of Defense, by the Chairman of the JCS, by the JCS, and by the Secretary of State.

I am, however, desirous of asking you several more questions, if you don't mind.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you very much.

[Deleted.]

Senator CAIN. What I am getting at is this:

CONSIDERATION OF RED CHINESE INTERVENTION

How much consideration was given to the likelihood of Red Chinese entering the war, and what was your position on that question at the time of these Blair House meetings, please, sir?

Mr. JOHNSON. There was consideration given to Red China in this picture.

The censor may strike that out, but between the time that General Bradley and I went to the Far East, and our return, 12 or 14 days, the troops opposite Formosa had been increased from less than 40,000 to about 156,000.

We knew therefore that there was that organized group with the Army behind estimated at 300,000, I believe, and I am sure that the questions of the President that night brough out those figures.

That is the fairest way I know to answer it.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

May I ask you this: Did you have the same feeling about the necessity for withdrawing allied——

Mr. JOHNSON. I said less——

Chairman RUSSELL. Just a minute.

Mr. JOHNSON. I said less than 40,000. That should read slightly more than 40,000. I knew the exact number recorded by intelligence once, but I would like to change that in the record, if I may.

[Deleted.]

DISCUSSION OF THE BLAIR HOUSE MEETINGS

Senator CAIN. Mr. Johnson, from what you have said up to this minute, I take it to be so that a major part of the emphasis in that Blair House meeting was on the question of the likelihood or possibility of Russia rather than Red China entering the war?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; but both were discussed.

Senator CAIN. You have indicated to this committee that because the Defense Establishment had no set position on this question of Korea that you encouraged each member of the JCS and each of the civilian secretaries and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to speak for themselves.

Would you summarize as best you can recall the major problems they advanced as being obvious in this problem?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think without violating the confidence of the President, I have gone pretty far. I went that far because in the testimony here, as printed in the New York Times, it starts off—Senator Knowland was touching on it—that the Secretary of State presented at the request of the President the views of the Joint Chiefs. In the nicest language I knew how I was trying to get over to you that he did not present the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; there were no views presented for the Joint Chiefs of Staff except the individual views of the Chairman and each member thereof, and each of the secretaries, coming to me finally.

Senator CAIN. They were the only the views of individuals——

Mr. JOHNSON. And were deliberately in that stage, kept as such, so that each member would feel that there was no inhibition on the

President having the benefit of whatever he honest to God thought was the situation.

Senator CAIN. I find it very interesting, Mr. Johnson, that each one of the civilian secretaries was called on to make his contribution——

Mr. JOHNSON. I called on them myself.

Senator CAIN. Yes; during those Blair House meetings.

POSITION OF THE CIVILIAN SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

I have long been concerned in these hearings as to why, with reference to the removal question concerning General MacArthur, that the three civilian Secretaries were not given an opportunity to consider that question. I ask you against your meritorious background in the Defense Establishment, if you think it is in our Nation's interests to bypass in any important military queston the three men within the Defense Establishment to whom this Nation looks for civilian advice?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator Cain, I do not know that they were bypassed. I have no knowledge on that subject, not being in the Government then. But it will not be misunderstood, I am sure, if I said that I felt so strongly as you feel on the joint principle that I created an organization while I was over there of the three Secretaries—Army, Navy, and Air Force—and brought in Dickinson, one of the ablest young men in the Government, and made him secretary of that group, so that the civilian did function on an organized basis independent of and through my office just as the Joint Chiefs did. I haven't heard anything about them lately. I have made no inquiries about it. I don't know what has happened to that organization.

Senator CAIN. I was one among several Senators who asked a number of questions in this connection of previous witnesses, and the substance of their testimony was that General MacArthur was a United Nations commander and therefore he was not to be considered as being solely an American officer and an American representative, and for that seemingly very strange reason to me, it was thought completely unnecessary to even advise any of the civilian secretaries individually or collectively that the question was in prospect.

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't know what testimony you have on that. The order issued to General MacArthur went through the Secretary of the Army, to him from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The reports that come in came in through the Army, checked in my office. Frequently somebody wanted to make a change in MacArthur's reports. None were ever made while I was over there except as cleared back with MacArthur and by him approved.

MacArthur was an American general designated by the President of the United States, pursuant to directions from the United Nations; but he was still commanding mostly American troops.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir. Is it possible, Mr. Johnson, to give us a definition of the relationship between the civilian Secretaries of the three services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff? I ask the question against the possibility that a similar problem might confront this Nation at some future time.

Mr. JOHNSON. The procedure when I left was when the recommendations came up from the three Secretaries, as they came frequently and very helpfully and happily, I sent them to the Joint Chiefs. When the Joint Chiefs' recommendations came up involving a policy matter, I sent them to the three Secretaries and asked their organization to advise, and it was working well and safely for the Republic when I left there. The procedure now, I don't know.

Senator CAIN. May I ask if that was a custom that you put in motion or was it a system being followed as of the time you took over from Secretary Forrestal?

Mr. JOHNSON. They were going in three different directions when I went there. This was a thing I started about 6 or 7 months after I went over, after full discussions with the Armed Forces Policy Council.

Senator CAIN. And you do not know when that custom was changed after you left the Defense Establishment?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't know that it has been changed, except I have not seen the joint Secretaries mentioned anywhere in months; so, I think it must have been changed, for just like so much of the Military Establishment, unless somebody follows it it just lapses.

Senator CAIN. Well, occasionally, sir, I reflect on those civilian Secretaries because, in my mind, they are very important people.

Mr. JOHNSON. Indeed they are.

Senator CAIN. And they are likewise extremely important in the eyes of the general public, who have a right, both moral and statutory, as I read the law, to look to the civilian Secretaries for answers concerning matters of policy within the Defense Establishment.

Mr. JOHNSON. The law you passed made the civilian Secretaries senior to the military, and that I respected and observed throughout.

Senator CAIN. In the MacArthur question, sir, one of the civilian Secretaries was used in the role, and I seek not to be disrespectful, of a messenger boy—I refer to the Secretary of the Army—who was to have been given the role of advising General MacArthur of his removal, and the testimony indicates that with reference to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force, they were advised at no time of the question being under consideration; so far as I know, their first advice on the question was received from the public press.

Mr. JOHNSON. About that I am not informed.

EXPLANATION OF FORMOSA POLICY

Senator CAIN. Mr. Johnson, on page 6795 of the testimony given by you this morning, Chairman Russell inquired of you as to whether you had discussed with the Secretary of State your recommendation that a military mission be sent to Korea, and your answer was in the affirmative. Then——

Chairman RUSSELL. You meant to say Formosa, did you not?

Senator CAIN. Formosa; yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. Does the record say Korea?

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sure it did not. Does not the record say Formosa?

Senator CAIN. I am satisfied that it does, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. What page?

Senator CAIN. Page 6795. It says Formosa.

Then, Chairman Russell asked you if the Secretary of State gave any reason as to why he disapproved of your recommendation, and your answer is as follows, and it is not quite clear to me:

> He felt we would lose face with other governments in Asia whose friendship and support we needed; that it might be adversely construed in Japan itself; that he really wanted to have nothing to do with the Nationalist Government.

I would like you to amplify, if you will, that last section in that sentence.

Mr. JOHNSON. I can't amplify; that is all I know.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain, your time has expired.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND JOHNSON RESIGNATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I would like to pursue just a little further the line of questioning Senator Knowland was engaged in when his time expired, which is the question of your resignation, and I want to pursue it without morbid curiosity but as a matter of historic interest, and I think of public interest. As I understand it, you said that——

Mr. JOHNSON. I said I don't know.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That you don't know about why the acceptance of your resignation occurred, but you did say that you had submitted your resignation 2 or 3 days before the Inchon landing.

Now I think it is important, at least it appears to me to be important as to the reasons why at that time you would submit your resignation. The reasons for its acceptance may be unknown, but it is important I believe as to the reasons why you submitted your resignation 2 days prior or 3 days prior to the Inchon landing.

Mr. JOHNSON. Because on the Saturday morning before the resignation on Tuesday, the story had broken in the press to the effect that I would be out; Mr. Acheson would be remaining.

Senator SALTONSTALL. That what would remain?

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Acheson would be remaining long after I had gone, and the story was not knocked down by the White House. I felt that my resignation was wanted.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And I take it that you took a position which I can very readily understand. I can understand what I believe to be high motives of your position, that under those circumstances you would submit your resignation. If it were wanted, it could be accepted; if it were not wanted, it could be refused.

Mr. JOHNSON. I thought it would be accepted when I tendered it, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, then let me go a step further, Mr. Secretary. What pertinent reasons, may I ask, led you to believe that your resignation would be accepted?

Mr. JOHNSON. This story carried in the Star, an AP story byline that the White House declined to knock down.

I was out of town. Mr. Early attempted to have the story knocked down without success. I phoned the President relative thereto, and the resignation resulted, but please do not read into that what wouldn't be true.

There was no scene. I made no arguments for myself then and I haven't since, unless the fortunate to me questions of Senator George this morning gave me a chance to explain something that has long been misconstrued by the press.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask you this question as a matter of interest and with reference to the claims and rumors and other matters that have been rampant? Had there been a situation of friction or conflict of ideas and programs and policy between your Department, that is you as Secretary of Defense and Mr. Acheson at the State Department?

Mr. JOHNSON. There had been——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I just finish? I understand there had been, but had there been such conflict of policies and ideas in which the State Department had, let us say, with greater frequency impressed its ideas on our national policy than the ideas of the Department of Defense to the point where you felt that the State Department was in the ascendency in fixing policy in the East, both military and political, which might have led to your conclusion that perhaps this resignation might be desired or would be acceptable?

Mr. JOHNSON. I can't go that far, sir, and haven't in any of my own thinking. There were a number of differences such as the Japanese treaty I discussed this morning, Formosa, Spain, the procedure for handling things at top level and not by mussing them up at lower levels—and I could go on through—an army in Germany, matériel going behind the iron curtain, Europe supplies to Communist China—and I could go on with some more.

I haven't analyzed those, I am thinking on the spur of the moment. There were all those things in which the Joint Chiefs or the Munitions Board or someone had raised the question, having conferred about it in our own staff meetings; when satisfied they were right, I carried the ball.

You will pardon me if I say that most of the things that we then argued about, if not all of them, since my departure, although then decided against, since my departure most of them, like Formosa, have now been decided as they were initiated in the Defense Department and supported by me.

I had no personal ideas that I carried, because those things were checked back with Defense or Munitions or whatever the expert body was. I had no feeling of that kind.

I had the complete support of the President in the things that were purely defense. When he overruled me on political grounds, that is the right of the President, the Commander in Chief. I lost no respect for him.

We carried them out and I had no quarrel when I left.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I want to say this to you. I never had the opportunity to say it, but I do want to say it. I am perfectly willing and glad to say it on the record.

I don't know that you recall, but I was, shortly before your resignation I was at lunch——

Mr. JOHNSON. I remember.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. At the Department of Defense. At that time in one way or another you, without disclosing secret policy or anything of that kind, you firmly stated your belief in the interests of our own national security of programs that should and in your opinion must be adopted. I came away from that meeting with a great feeling of comfort and I have so stated.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was frankly highly disappointed when your resignation as Secretary of Defense was accepted, because I feared that it meant that policies which I knew you held and which gave me comfort, that those policies were not prevailing.

Mr. JOHNSON. God bless you for your attitude, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have not hesitated to say that to people.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that will help clear the record, as I tried to do with modesty and humility in replying to Senator George this morning.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I again want to say that I did not have full knowledge of all incidents and details, but I came away from that meeting and my discussion with you with a feeling of confidence and I had deep disappointment——

Mr. JOHNSON. I am glad you were there. There were a number of other representatives from Congress and Joint Chiefs and secretaries, if you recall, and it was a most interesting session.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I recall.

RUSSIAN INTENTIONS

Now, Mr. Secretary, I believe you said that the calculated risk of possible participation of the Chinese in the Korean War was considered and also the possibility of Russian intervention in the Korean War.

I would like to ask you this. That is this: Whether or not the Russian timetable and policy is such that if war is considered to be a necessary part of Russian policy, Russia will precipitate that war when Russia believes it is advantageous to Russia to do it and that Russia will not precipitate a war until and unless Russia is fully ready to precipitate a war.

In other words, some little incident might suddenly emotionally cast Russia into a third world war.

Mr. JOHNSON. A pistol shot in the Balkans, that type, could precipitate another world war. When I left the Defense Department, I did not think that Russia was ready for a war, but did approve and did submit the program for our rearmament and support, rearmament without waste and extravangance and fully checked, completely. I worry more at the moment——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. At what?

Mr. JOHNSON. At the moment, talking now as a citizen, I worry more now when I hear about $70 billion budgets and a lot more back of them about another phase.

We didn't read Mein Kampf very intelligently. If you will take Mein Kampf, as I did, Sunday afternoons and evenings, within the last several months, you will find, sometimes in a general, and sometimes in a specific way therein, everything that Hitler did, or tried to do.

I am now going through the things, as I can get them, that come from this situation from behind the iron curtain.

You would conclude, if you read Stalin's books, and what Stalin said, that he doesn't look to a clash of arms, that he expects America to spend itself into bankruptcy.

[Deleted.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The point I am getting at, Mr. Secretary, is, and it has been testified to by highly competent authority, is this:

We talk about calculated risks in Korea. We talk about treaties of friendship between Russia and the People's Government of China—the Communist government of China. That treaty, as I understand it, applies specifically to any aggression by Japan against China, but it could be stretched. We have done things around the periphery of Russia, such as the Berlin airlift, which was certainly a calculated risk; aid to Greece and Turkey, which were calculated risks; the Korean situation, undoubtedly a calculated risk. Do you think that a mere treaty existing between Russia, or the Soviet, and Red China would raise sufficient moral issues for instance to cause Russia to start a third world war unless Russia believed she was ready for a third world war, and ready to win it?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't.

Senator CAIN. And in that event, she would start it anyway, would she not?

Mr. JOHNSON. May I say something?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, but Senator Hickenlooper is through.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know whether your answer got in the record.

Mr. JOHNSON. I want to be frank.

I don't think we serve the interests of national defense—

[Deleted.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think the Secretary was about to answer that question, where I went over my time, Mr. Chairman.

I would appreciate it if he could answer it.

Mr. JOHNSON. I did answer it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thought you were continuing on.

Mr. JOHNSON. I did answer it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

THE FISCAL 1951 DEFENSE BUDGET

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary, I was a new Member of the Senate in 1949. I saw you struggling with the budget problems we had, saw you reducing the expenses, and I was impressed with your work there, and your great energy.

And, I think it is a good time to say I think you did a mighty good job as Secretary of Defense.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you very much.

Senator STENNIS. I personally hated to see you leave that important post.

This morning you were telling about your budget troubles. You had asked for more money.

Now, did you ask the President for a more liberal allowance of money for that budget you were talking about this morning?

Mr. JOHNSON. I talked to him. He sent me to Pace, I got the $500,000,000 out of Pace, the President approved, and they wouldn't budge further.

Mr. Forrestal, in the speech I referred to this morning, before the National Press Club, talks about the adamantness of the President on those things.

It was the climate.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Everybody was for it.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. We couldn't even get the Congress to approve the $13,000,000,000. They clipped me $222,000,000, and I had to come back.

Senator STENNIS. At that time we were getting a great deal of mail about balancing the budget; and I think it was a timely matter. I think that the people should be concerned about that subject all the time.

I know later we received a lot of mail praising you for your efforts, and then later, why, there was some blaming you for things that I did not think you were to blame for, the lack of preparation.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.

Senator STENNIS. But I realized now that a lot of folks blame us in the Congress that there should have been more funds there.

CONSIDERATION OF A NAVAL BLOCKADE

Now, getting over to the naval blockade, Mr. Secretary, this morning you said you called on Admiral Sherman for a briefing and staff work with reference to the possibility of this naval blockade. You did not follow that up. I think time was cut off. Could you give us some more light on that?

Mr. JOHNSON. No; I had asked the Navy for a study, I said this morning, of the elements of a blockade, considering the international law as to what constituted a declaration of war and what didn't. That study I had not received when I left Defense.

Senator STENNIS. Well, do you have any light now that you could give us with reference to a naval blockade? Admiral Sherman, you will recall, in his testimony said that he supported strongly the idea of a United Nations blockade, naval blockade by the United Nations.

Had you followed up any of your original thinking on that to bring it down to date?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, Senator. I have the greatest admiration and respect for Admiral Sherman. He has a wonderful mind and a high character. I would not want to express an opinion about that until I talked with him further about it.

He is one of the great men of our time in the Military Establishment, and the country will know it in time.

Senator STENNIS. I beg pardon? The country what?

Mr. JOHNSON. And the country will know it in time.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

STRESS ON FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN KOREAN CONFLICT

Well, one thing that I have been concerned about was the lack of what I call all-out support by the members of the United Nations in the Korean War and, particularly, the slowness with reference to this economic blockade.

Now, I suppose that was more a political question and was not in the Defense Department, that is about their response or lack of response in the military efforts.

You were there several weeks, at least, after it started. Could you give us any light on that experience with them?

Mr. JOHNSON. It went very slowly for months, and Mr. Early, Deputy Secretary of Defense, took the question of foreign troops participation in Korea into hand himself, and I had a feeling personally, without knowing all the details, that about 90 percent of all that was done by other countries, was the result of Steve Early's raising hell day and night whether this was a United Nations war or our war.

Senator STENNIS. Yes The thought had occurred to me as to whether or not we emphasized enough that point. Maybe as a Member of the Congress, I did not emphasize enough on the floor of the Senate, we will say, or before committees—maybe our committee did not urge it enough—the President and the executive branches—I felt that we should have urged that in a proper way, in a proper way always.

Do you feel like a great deal of what was done came through this urging by—who was that; who did you say?

Mr. JOHNSON. Stephen Early.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Senator STENNIS. He was Deputy Secretary of Defense when you were Secretary?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Well, I can see where we can so easily misunderstand each other. I think often about how the States got crossed up on that very matter under the Articles of Confederation, and even after the Constitution was adopted, where they were accusing each other of dragging their feet. That was finally straightened out.

Mr. JOHNSON. After 13 years.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR AND COORDINATION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ON ASIATIC MATTERS

I want to ask you if, without going into it so much in detail, but I have never understood about this intelligence matter in Japan and in Korea—let me ask it this way: Upon whom did you depend for your general intelligence as Secretary of Defense on matters in Asia? Was that Central Intelligence or was it intelligence acting under General MacArthur?

Mr. JOHNSON. I got the intelligence, CIA flashes, and the CIA reports the minute they came in. I personally read them. But each of the Secretaries, the three services, and the Joint Chiefs were likewise charged with responsibility to call to my attention anything that they thought of importance in the intelligence regardless of whether or not I had brought it up with them.

Then there were these meetings all the time with the Joint Chiefs and with the Secretaries, and General Bradley came in the first thing every morning after the intelligence reports were in and gave me, before he went to see the President and gave him his summary, his estimate of the whole situation.

Senator STENNIS. Well, now, before this Korean War started was there a coordinated intelligence in Asia for General MacArthur and for you and for the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

My question goes to was there a cross-up there, or was there confusion or conflict. It seems to me like we certainly ought to have a coordinated intelligence for the top men that are making decisions.

Mr. JOHNSON. Every other Thursday I met with Admiral Hillenkoetter, with Mr. Early, frequently one of the Joint Chiefs, or maybe all of them, with Under Secretary of State Webb, who was charged with the responsibility for that in the State Department, Admiral Souers, and different people added from time to time, in an effort to coordinate and improve, as it needed improvement, the coordination of intelligence services.

There was disposition in the military service at one time not to cooperate with the CIA. In fact, it has been printed that in World War II that some of the services did not furnish to a central agency that information which they gathered. We did everything in the world we could to improve it. When I left it still needed improvement.

Senator STENNIS. Well, that was with reference to coordination here. Was that tied in with General MacArthur's intelligence in Japan, in Tokyo? Before the war I mean.

Mr. JOHNSON. I can't tell you whether MacArthur got his stuff—oh, he had to get his stuff from us on the Korean picture because he had no responsibility for it.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Except as he picked it up.

CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE RED CHINESE AND SOVIET INTERVENTION IN KOREA

Senator STENNIS. Well, now, I believe you said this morning that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and you did not think at the time the Korean War started that Red China would come in. Did you say that? I thought you said that.

Mr. JOHNSON. I said that in effect. What we meant was we hoped they wouldn't come in, and the night at the Blair House the general feeling was that they weren't coming in.

Senator STENNIS. It was what?

Mr. JOHNSON. They weren't coming in.

Senator STENNIS. Yes. But still you felt this Korean War was at least in part planned and conceived and trained for by Russian activities and inspiration, did you not?

Mr. JOHNSON. I felt that it might grow into world war, and said so; and we had to consider all the factors.

Senator STENNIS. Yes. But you thought it was right to go in under the circumstances either there or somewhere else, as I understood you this morning?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. JOHNSON. Before you move on to another one——

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. You asked about the budget.

Senator STENNIS. Anything you wish to say.

CONDITIONS OF OUR ARMED FORCES IN JUNE 1950

Mr. Johnson. I referred this morning, Senator Stennis, in replying to Senator George to the statement before the armed services subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations in the House of Representatives on July 25, 1950, and we filed in the appendix of this hearing that statement.

I want to read something I didn't have this morning, marked out from that statemen which is already in the record.

Senator Stennis. I will be very glad to have you on my time or you have the time to do it.

Mr. Johnson. All right.

> Carrying out this congressional mandate—

that is the one you have been talking about—

> has been the steadfast policy of the Department of Defense, and a prime condition of our efforts in this regard has been the elimination of unnecessary overhead with the simultaneous improvement in the combat potential of the Armed Forces.

This is what I wanted to get into the record:

> Indeed the over-all combat potential of our Armed Forces was at a higher level on June the 25th, the day the Republic of Korea was invaded, than had been the case at any time since postwar demobilization was completed.

That is all I am going to quote after reading you this sentence as follows:

> I realize that the foregoing sentence would be regarded as a fine, glittering generality so I would like to make it concrete. For that purpose I will use specific illustrations.

That is the end of the quote, but then on to the rest of that statement we name cases and give data and give dollars.

Senator Stennis. I see. All right, thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Chairman, that is all the questions I have.

Chairman Russell. Senator McMahon?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Sparkman?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Brewster?

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH MAC ARTHUR'S DISMISSAL WOULD BE JUSTIFIED

Senator Brewster. There are one or two statements you made this morning which need clarification, at least to my mind. One was concerned with your opinion regarding the recall of MacArthur.

As I understood you first to express some hesitation about passing on that without a knowledge of all the circumstances, and then later indicating that under certain circumstances you would have thought it was justifiable, do I understand that you do express an opinion on it or only upon hypothetical cases which are presented to you, what might have prevailed or what might not have prevailed?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't quite follow you, Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, the point is in answer to a question of Senator Johnson I think he said, "Would you be in favor of the recall of General MacArthur?" and I think you answered that you would.

Mr. JOHNSON. I didn't

Senator BREWSTER. I think it was associated with two or three hypotheses. I think it was associated with the question if he had lost the confidence of the President.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct. I said if he lost the confidence of the President, the President didn't have trust in him and he thought he should go, and then he should have been.

Senator BREWSTER. But you did not express an opinion as to whether the President had lost that. You might assume it.

Mr. JOHNSON. I did not know, and I don't know.

Senator BREWSTER. I wanted that to be clear so you would not be quoted as having expressed an opinion one way or another on a matter about which you said you were not entirely informed.

Mr. JOHNSON. I didn't.

DISCUSSIONS AT BLAIR HOUSE, JUNE 1950

Senator BREWSTER. Now you spoke several times about the discussions at the Blair House. You mentioned, I think, that the Defense Establishment, both the Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff, presented the difficulties and the limitations. Have you given in more detail what some of those were or would you feel free to?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, I think I went the whole way my conscience will permit and not violate the confidence of the President. I tried to be helpful to the limit of my ability this morning. I don't believe I have a right to quote exactly what was said in those meetings.

Senator BREWSTER. Could you answer this? To what extent were the military requirements of such an operation discussed and estimates furnished?

Mr. JOHNSON. No estimates were furnished. The President asked some questions that really put us on the spot as to what we had and where, that brought forth, I am happy to say, knowledgeable answers forthwith from the Chiefs. I was rather proud of them that night.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, in the case of Formosa, the JCS recognized its strategic significance. If the Joint Chiefs were asked for an opinion as to whether troops could be committed there at any given time, would that not involve their first taking into account their commitments in other areas and determining as to priorities?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. So that the question of whether or not troops were committed there would not necessarily indicate their concept of strategic significance but simply the question of whether or not they could add up their reserves and their resources to the point where that would have priority.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that is right.

Senator BREWSTER. And I take it that the estimate of the relative importance of commitments in various areas might well be a matter of opinion both among the military and among the diplomatic personnel?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

INDUSTRIAL-MOBILIZATION PLAN OF 1939

Senator BREWSTER. There was reference made this morning to the industrial-mobilization plan. I think you as the Assistant Secretary of War were the first one who finally gave your mark to the industrial-mobilization plan around 1937 or 1938——

Mr. JOHNSON. 1939. 1939 was the rewrite.

Senator BREWSTER. What year?

Mr. JOHNSON. There had been a plan drawn before and this was a rewrite in 1939.

Senator BREWSTER. And that was the efforts first of Secretary Baker and Bernie Baruch and finally reached a culmination under your administration.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir, and adopted and worked upon and was the guide for the Germans and never adopted by this country.

Senator BREWSTER. And after we became involved the President did direct Mr. Stettinius and the group named with him to make a study of the industrial mobilization. When some years later, after the vain attempt of then Senator Truman and his committee to get a copy of that Stettinius plan which was finally delivered to me by President Truman when I became his successor as chairman, we discovered that the Stettinius report was almost identical with the program you yourself had developed.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct, sir, but the history is that President Roosevelt appointed the War Resources Board on my recommendation, the theory of it coming to me from Baruch, who was very closely associated with me in those days, and all the personnel of that committee the President permited us to name.

They did a thoroughly remarkable job. It wasn't quite as F. D. R. wanted to do it; so he ordered all copies sequestered, buried. I gather from reading a lot of biographies of the time that it was at the instance of the Secretary of Labor that that was done.

I didn't know you had ever gotten a copy. I don't have one.

Senator BREWSTER. When I became chairman of the so-called Truman committee, President Truman delivered it, and we found then it duplicated almost exactly the earlier report which you had made.

Senator WILEY. May I ask what copy was that?

Mr. JOHNSON. War Resources Board Report. It was done in late 1939 and early 1940, and is truly a real document, and the war would have been shorter and the job quicker and better done if that had been done, if that had been followed in most of its facets, instead of improvising from day to day, as was done.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Baruch testified before the committee after the war that, if that had been put into effect at the beginning of the crisis, that would have meant a saving of thousands of lives and billions of dollars.

Mr. JOHNSON. I agree.

Mr. Brewster. I bring that out because it demonstrates, I think, the understanding which you had of the problem of totalitarian war and also because there is a somewhat more personal aspect to it in the association over many years in the American Legion program of universal service in which, I think, at that time you were a leader.

That brings me now to the question of your retirement. As I understood you to say to Senator Knowland, you do not know to this day the reasons for the request for your retirement.

Mr. Johnson. I do not.

EXTENT OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN WITNESS AND SENATOR BREWSTER

Senator Brewster. And that leads me to a further personal approach. I was out of the country, in Europe, at the time you retired; but I read on my return a report of certain columnists that you were supposed to have discussed defense matters with the Senator from Maine, with whom you had long been acquainted.

I would like to have this record clear as to the extent of our discussions of matters during that somewhat tempestuous summer of June, July, and August 1950.

It is my recollection that I saw you only once during that period—and on this the columnist was correct; the rest of it was 85 percent incorrect—that I did meet you in the coffee shop of the Mayflower Hotel along in early July, and at the time you spoke to me in rather complimentary terms of Secretary Acheson, which was somewhat to my surprise, because I had been reading reports of dissension.

As far as I recall, that was the only time I saw you or had discussion with you or that you mentioned anything of any character concerned with defense.

Mr. Johnson. You are quite right, Senator, and since you are into that, and you weren't here, the report that was spread to try to injure me was that the Republicans knew all about what was going on, because I met you in the coffee shop at the Mayflower at 6:15 o'clock in the morning, when I actually did have breakfast there, and told you all these things.

We never met there. I never saw you at 6:15 in the morning anytime, anywhere, and that was the hour of breakfast. There wasn't a word of truth in that story.

The second installment or one of the installments was you and I had adjoining apartments in the Mayflower Hotel; yes, and it said that we had cut a door in between, so that we could——

Senator Brewster. Have more frequent contact.

Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir. I don't know what apartment you had. Mine was 570. I don't think you were ever on the same floor in the hotel, as far as I know, and certainly there was no door cut between us, and during that period that one visit is the only one I recall we had.

I had no intention of referring to it, but there were other things in there. There were a number of them in a row, just as untruthful, sir, as those you brought up involving you.

Senator Brewster. Well, I lived first on the eighth floor and now for 10 years on the third floor, and I think in the 10 years that I have known you you have been in my apartment once—and that must have been 3 or 4 years ago—and I have been in your apartment once—and that was at least 5 years ago. You invited me down to your establishment for lunch one day with several other Senators last summer, and I was unable to go.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right. When a number of Senators came over, you didn't even show at the Pentagon. That is right. I had forgotten.

Senator BREWSTER. I wanted to have this record cleared under oath, so that at least if the President had ever listened to any of these stories, which were more or less constantly circulated, and if they affected in any way his mind, it was to me a matter of profound distress because of my great respect for him as well as you.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir; those stories were circulated and maybe caused the President to lose confidence in me, or what not. Most of them are without the slightest foundation or substance.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, off the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, gentlemen.

Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chairman?

THE JCS

A few minutes ago you expressed your opinion of Admiral Sherman and praised him in the very highest terms. I, too, entertain a very high opinion of Admiral Sherman.

I wonder if you would mind stating, on the basis of your association with them, your opinion as to the integrity and the professional capacity of the other members of the Chiefs of Staff?

Mr. JOHNSON. I appreciate the finesse of that question because I was talking about Admiral Sherman. I meant no reflection on any of the others of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I am sure the answer would so indicate.

I have the highest opinion of each of the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman, of their Americanism, their integrity, and their ability or, I assure you, they would not be there when I left.

Chairman RUSSELL. You played a part in the selection of some of them, I believe?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; and was in the position that, if I had recommended the going of any of them when I was Secretary of Defense, I am sure the President would have been in accord with me.

Chairman RUSSELL. In other words, your opinion was that they were the best men who were available for the positions that they occupied?

Mr. JOHNSON. If you will take the list of officers who were available for those jobs and go through it, I think most anyone would arrive at that conclusion. You have as fine a team as you can get, and I said so in a public speech on three occasions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Connally?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. Well, we are back home.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I hope the Senator will speak out loud; we had a little trouble hearing him this morning. [Laughter.]

Senator WILEY. Well, I appreciate what the Secretary says, when he says "the finesse of that question." [Laughter.]

That is all right; you never have any trouble hearing me, but I will take just one second to say that if you were sitting over here you would appreciate our difficulties, Senator. Somehow or other, when they are facing you fellows you get the idea, we don't.

Now, keep track of time, will you, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. We have got your time. You have used only 2 minutes.

ANALOGY BETWEEN JOHNSON AND MAC ARTHUR

Senator WILEY. Louis—I am going to call you Louis, instead of Secretary—some writers have contended that there is an exact parallel between your dismissal as Secretary of Defense, and the removal of General MacArthur.

It has been contended that you were a vigorous supporter of MacArthur's policy, and because of that reason, it was and has been alleged that your resignation was, in effect, required.

Would you say that your leaving the Department was due to your fighting for the policies of your Chiefs?

Mr. JOHNSON. It could be when you mean the Joint Chiefs, because every argument that ever took place when the State Department and myself got into them, initiated in either the Chiefs or Munitions Board or the other responsible branch of Defense.

Senator WILEY. Would you say there is any parallel between your leaving the Defense Department and MacArthur's being fired from his four positions?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't know about that.

Senator WILEY. I believe you said that during the period when you were Secretary of Defense that MacArthur followed the directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense implicitly and faithfully.

Mr. JOHNSON. I say "Yes" to that unqualifiedly. There was some confusion once over censorship; that was all cleared up. Outside of that there was never any question of it so far as I know when I left there, sir.

MATTER OF THE SUPERCARRIER

Senator WILEY. During the early postwar years, one of the great controversial issues was the matter of building a supercarrier, superaircraft carrier, the matter in which you played quite a role.

Apparently, the Navy had gone ahead with plans for such a carrier. I wonder if you would care to comment on that matter, and also if you would like to comment on the question of the usefulness of such a boat in the atomic age?

Mr. JOHNSON. The supercarrier, as it was then called, first was brought to my specific attention after I came back from Key West in February of 1949 by Mr. Forrestal.

Mr. Forrestal asked that on due occasion I give thorough study to the supercarrier, because he had come to have some doubts about it but didn't feel that he could do anything about it.

Accordingly, I referred the matter to the Joint Chiefs. General Bradley, Chief of the Army, and General Vandenberg recommended its cancellation.

Admiral Denfeld supported continuing it. I consulted General Eisenhower; he agreed with the majority of the Joint Chiefs on cancellation.

In the meantime, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the House had suggested to me its cancellation. I then took it up myself with Senator Tydings, then chairman of the Armed Services Committee, who approved its cancellation.

I then submitted it to the President of the United States, who approved its cancellation, and it was accordingly so canceled. But there were a dozen other people whose advice we sought and who were practically unanimous in recommending its cancellation.

But Admiral Sherman, when he came in, thought that a lesser carrier was what the Navy needed. He asked for the approval of the additional carrier. The Joint Chiefs all agreed, and I approved that and another one like it. That is the part of the story that never gets out.

The new carrier is appreciably smaller, less of a show piece, and more of a fighting ship.

Senator Wiley. Now, in connection with your position, I wonder if——

Mr. Johnson. Does that answer all your question?

Senator Wiley. Yes, that is very fine, sir.

DEVELOPMENT OF OUR AIR FORCE

I wonder if there was called to your attention the fact that our Air Force has so concentrated on strategic bombing that it does not seem to have specialized in tactical support of the ground forces. Apparently our men in Korea have had to call upon naval air force, including Marine squadrons, to give the close air-to-ground support in attacking ground positions or defending positions.

Now I want your opinion. Have we overconcentrated on the B–36 strategic bomber at the expense of tactical bombers?

I note that Soviet Russia seems to have been far superior to us in development of tactical squadrons.. With your wide experience with these men that represent, as you have said, the best we have got in the upper echelons—Army, Navy, and Air—I would appreciate getting your reaction to that subject.

Mr. Johnson. I think, sir, that the Marines and their close support do a magnificent job, and did a better job than the Army and the Air Force in their combination.

I know that General Vandenberg and General Collins are profiting by the Korean experience, and I have full confidence that the Air Force in backing up the Army will meet that situation, plus what the Army is doing under the congressional authorization for itself.

That is only part of the story.

I explained this morning the point system wrecked everything. You had groups in the tropics without malaria-control officers; you had whole squadrons without a pilot; you had ships that couldn't sail; because of taking men without regard to what was left in any given regiment.

I think that there has been no war and Russia is not ready for war because our policy has been to deter, defend, and defeat. There has been no stinting, therefore, in building up the strategic air force. I think it was entitled to preference. It undoubtedly has had preference and should have had because it is the knowledge of Russia that at this time and for the last year or two, several years, the strategic air force is something that, as I said once in a speech in New York—that if they strike at 4 o'clock, that strategic air force is going to be ready to go at 5 o'clock.

Senator WILEY. I was coming to that next. You have anticipated my next question.

Mr. JOHNSON. I have got the speech here.

That strategic air force is the greatest deterrent to war in the hands of America; and to not have given it preference and priority within the funds available might have us involved in war today.

I approve everything that Mr. Forrestal and Mr. Symington and General Vandenberg, and particularly General Vandenberg's very able and distinguished predecessor, did, and what General LeMay did, in building up the strategic air force.

CONDITION OF OUR AIR FORCE

Senator WILEY. I am interested in this in view of the fact General Vandenberg has testified that we have a shoestring Air Force and in view of the fact the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared we are unprepared to wage a third world war.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am not going to——

Senator WILEY. How do you explain that with our appropriations?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't explain it, and I don't think it is so.

Senator WILEY. What?

Mr. JOHNSON. I can't explain it, and I don't think it is so. A shoestring toward what he ultimately wants, but General Vandenberg has said many things about the existing Air Force which would bother him in calling it a shoestring. But in accord with what General Vandenberg wants, he might use that dramatic sort of a word, and that is the usual Air Force approach to getting more money for the things they want to get.

We have an Air Force; its personnel and equipment are pretty good, but it ought to be much larger.

Senator WILEY. Do you feel that in the National Security Council the recommendations originating from the Department of Defense were given equal weight with those of the Department of State?

Mr. JOHNSON. May I pass?

Senator WILEY. Well, you——

Mr. JOHNSON. I think the President in all sincerity gave consideration to the military viewpoint.

Senator WILEY. All right. A while ago you mentioned Forrestal. Do you know what became of his diary?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir; I do not. I never saw it, never attempted to see it.

Senator WILEY. You have given us, you feel, a pretty clear-cut picture of what his views on the far eastern situation were. Do you want to supplement that?

SPEECH ON PREPAREDNESS IN 1947

Mr. Johnson. No, sir. But I want to finish answering the question.

Here is the speech I referred to, a couple paragraphs from "The Ramparts We Watch," an address by myself, before the Annual Congress of American Industry at the Waldorf Astoria, December 7, 1947.

> The first of these conceivable engagements might possibly happen at some unscheduled 4 o'clock in the morning when an enemy would hope to catch us asleep. That 4 o'clock in the morning attack could come tomorrow; it might come next week, next month, next year, or years from now. Let us hope never. But when and if it comes, we must be ready, and I assure you that we will be ready with every member of the team prepared to perform his assigned role and carry out the special mission he is most capable of performing for achievement of victory for all of America. We have a plan for such a 4 o'clock in the morning right now, and its essentials have been agreed upon unanimously by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
>
> The plan is essentially predicated on the principle that we would be on the receiving end of the first attack.

Now, what we are talking about is a strategic air command. And that speech was made and was cleared in the State Department, and all of us alike, it was felt it was a necessary thing to be said at that time in the policy of deterring Russia. But it is a true statement and it gets truer every day under the strategic air command.

THE WEDEMEYER REPORT

Senator Wiley. Do you agree that the Wedemeyer report should have been kept under the wraps for as long a time as it was?

Mr. Johnson. You are asking me about a lot of things that are just one American's opinion.

Senator Wiley. What position did you as Secretary of Defense take on its release?

Mr. Johnson. I would have released it.

Senator Wiley. What?

Mr. Johnson. It is a fair question. I would have released it.

Senator Wiley. You would have released it.

MILITARY SITUATION IN KOREA AT PRESENT

Do you agree with General Wedemeyer, who said that if we cannot come to a decision in Korea reasonably soon, we should withdraw from the theater because it is a bottomless pit in which to drop our men and materials?

Mr. Johnson. I am going to ask to be excused from getting into the differences between Marshall-Wedemeyer-MacArthur strategies, except to the extent I answered the questions on the four proposals brought up by Senator Johnson of Texas.

You have military men. They are disagreeing. There is confusion between them. I don't want to add anything to that confusion, nor get involved as one of the parties participant beyond the point I did this morning.

INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

Senator Wiley. Now, while you were Secretary did you have any information that would indicate that our policies were being shaped or influenced by any foreign folks, governments?

Mr. Johnson. Yes; on instances when I tried to keep things from going behind the iron curtain I would find agreement that I was right, but the British wouldn't go along. I argued repeatedly against those things.

Of course, there is to a certain extent an obligation upon the State Department to present that British viewpoint, an obligation on the part of the American Government to consider those elements; but when we are at war and these things are going to equip an enemy, I want to be a little firmer than we then sometimes were.

Chairman Russell. Senator Bridges?

Mr. Johnson. Did you finish?

Senator Wiley. He won't let me go any longer.

Chairman Russell. I give him extra time all the time. He complains about it and I gave him 2 minutes overtime.

Senator Wiley. He is a tyrant, that guy.

Chairman Russell. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Saltonstall?

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Johnson, could I ask you just several questions? You have made it clear that you had always felt the importance to our security of Formosa, that the State Department did not feel the same way until June 26 or 27, 1950.

EXTENT OF STATE DEPARTMENT SUPPORT OF NATIONALISTS

What is not clear to me is the attitude of the State Department toward Chiang's government, say, from the time of Marshall's return in 1947 to June 25, 1950. Did it always support that government but with varying degrees of intensity, but it had changed from one of nonsupport to support in 1950 after Korea? Would you be willing to try to help me clear up that?

Mr. Johnson. Generally speaking, it seemed to me that the State Department was critical of and did not support the government we recognized. Personally, I was extremely fearful that we were going to recognize Communist China in the indirect way of permitting it to become a member of the United Nations.

It was my understanding that we would not use the veto in the Security Council to keep them out. I read the Secretary of State's testimony. That seems to be pretty well cleared up now, but it was a matter of grave concern and frequent discussion as far as I was concerned at that time.

I thought the veto ought to be exercised in the Security Council, we ought to try to beat them in the Assembly. It was not by understanding at that time that we would use the veto, and if you look to the press and magazines and statements at that time, you will find that they uniformly represented the State Department as being unwilling for the first time to use the veto to keep Communist China from being seated, so maybe my viewpoint was somewhat based on that approach of members of the State Department.

There is no question that the motion on Monday night to do what we did about Formosa in effect did come from the State Department to my great surprise and my relief.

Senator Saltonstall. In other words then, while you could not say definitely, from any definite expression at any meeting of the

Security Council or any meeting you had with representatives of the State Department, that they were adopting an attitude of recognizing the Communist Government or of withdrawing their support from the Nationalist Government, you had enough feeling of insecurity regarding that attitude because you believed it was very important to support the Nationalist Government and to maintain the security of Formosa.

Mr. JOHNSON. Your first part of the statement is correct. My concern was not particularly supporting the generalissimo but doing whatever was necessary to save Formosa from being in hostile hands.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, as I see it, there are perhaps three or four points involved in this inquiry directly. First, should MacArthur have been dismissed, and, if so, was it a proper way of doing it. You have discussed that quite fully.

The second is the theory by which we are carrying on our war in Korea. A third one is perhaps our policies in the Far East in the future.

PRESENT POLICY AND OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

Now, as I see it, the great difficulty of ending this war in Korea is that our policy is a negative policy. Our policy as expressed by Secretary Acheson is to suppress aggression and restore peace. Now that is negative in the point of view that we can't take necessarily action that will overcome a much larger number of Chinese troops.

We have got to let the affirmative step come from them, as opposed to MacArthur's theory of bombing Manchuria and the other points that Senator Johnson brought out.

Now when you were in the Department, did you support the theory of the war in Korea that our Government is now apparently supporting and has identified in the words that I have used?

Mr. JOHNSON. I left in September. We were still in the process of getting the strength over there to contain and force them back. We were in the process of working out a policy.

To the average American it seems that we are drifting. The only thing I want to say is, that may be right at the moment, with the victories that are coming our way, but it can't go on forever.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, by the time you left the Department, there was no definite policy lined out as to what our action should be and how we were going to end this thing?

Mr. JOHNSON. The answer is that that is quite a correct statement.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now as a citizen then rather than as a high Government official, you have felt doubts of the policy that has since been expressed by the State Department?

Mr. JOHNSON. I have, yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would you go as far as General MacArthur has gone?

Mr. JOHNSON. No.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Then you certainly won't go as far as General Wedemeyer has gone.

Mr. JOHNSON. No; but there may come a time in the not too distant future when some of the things talked about by General MacArthur will have to be the policy of this country.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that your thoughts as a citizen, but as a very distinguished citizen who has perhaps more knowledge of these subjects than 99 percent of us, you feel that somewhere between the present policies of the State Department and, we will say, the policies of MacArthur, if there is any intermediate step, is perhaps the right one.

Mr. JOHNSON. That, generally speaking, is a pretty good statement.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Your thought then, as a citizen, is to come closer to the State Department's point of view and say let's carry on for a little while longer and see what happens.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that the situation demands that we go along with the current successes, successes maybe ultimately, at the present moment, to see if this thing can be ended as a lot of people are guessing it will be.

It just can't go too long this way.

Pressure will do nothing to stop communism in China. We know that the blood-letting operation is to drain America, and I believe there will have to be a part of the MacArthur program adopted.

FUTURE POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would you be willing to give—again speaking as a citizen, with your knowledge as a citizen, and a former Government official—what, in your opinion, should be the policy of our Government in the Far East, in the future?

Mr. JOHNSON. My mind is not sufficiently clear as to how some of these questions are going to be resolved.

I hope the United Nations is going to be successful. I don't know.

You have got to take a lot of factors into consideration before we can intelligently answer that question; and after it is asked, I would like a month to think about it before it is answered.

Senator SALTONSTALL. But you will agree with me, Mr. Johnson, that that is one of the not only very perplexing problems to our official Government, but also to everybody, every Member of Congress who is trying to conscientiously help answer that question?

Mr. JOHNSON. Of course it is.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And that is one of the questions that we have got to answer, or at least consider—I won't say "answer," but at least we have got to consider, in working out thoroughly this investigation which we are undertaking?

Mr. JOHNSON. A month from now I will invite you to lunch and will sit down and discuss it with you. I would like to roll that one around with you in 2 or 3 weeks.

Senator WILEY. You ought to have a fellow Democrat along.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Johnson, I appreciate that very much; but I would like to emphasize to you, as a witness, that the problem that faces us, and how important it is for us to get the most reliable information we can, from men like yourself, looking into the future.

Mr. JOHNSON. I will be calling you, I hope, within a month.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is your time remitted to the committees, Senator Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Off the record, I would be glad to sit down with Mr. Johnson any time, but always in the presence of any member of the joint committee.

Mr. JOHNSON. Invite the chairman to come along.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. Mr. Johnson, I would like to ask you this question:

REMOVAL OF MAC ARTHUR FROM SCAP

You are familiar with the SCAP job that General MacArthur did in Japan?

Mr. JOHNSON. Superb.

Senator SMITH. Supreme Commander, Allied Powers?

Mr. JOHNSON. Superb.

Senator SMITH. Now, looking over this whole situation, do you feel, as you look at it objectively, that it was necessary to remove General MacArthur from the SCAP job just because he was removed from the command in Korea, because of differences of opinion, which was reasonable to have, between MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as to strategy?

Mr. JOHNSON. Not necessary to have; but while I said I hoped it would be done differently, I don't want to criticize the President for that, if he was going to do the other.

Senator SMITH. I recall, when General MacArthur was here, I asked him whether, if he had been invited to come to Washington, or if some one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or some one of the Defense Department heads had gone out to Tokyo to talk with him, he would have been willing, at request, to turn over his command. He said of course he would have, that is just the very thing he would have been very happy to do if he had been asked to, and he had been seriously advised as to what the differences were.

And I asked whether that necessarily would interfere with the SCAP job, and he didn't think they were related.

I don't want to press you on that. I am just one of those who feel that we, in one fell swoop, lost the benefit of the magnificent services of a great American, and it was most unfortunate the way it was done.

Now, let me ask you this, Mr. Secretary:

EXTENT OF RUSSIAN DOMINATION OF CHINA

Do you think that what has happened in China is really the conquest of that country by Russia, by its infiltration methods, through the puppet government in Peiping?

Mr. JOHNSON. If we get into the realm of speculation, I can sit here and tell you of eight efforts, of great strength, to take over China, and China absorbed them all, and was still China.

If that is what you are getting at, I wouldn't want to express an opinion as to whether or not this will stick.

I am hoping that communism isn't going to stick in Russia. I am hoping that in the peasant group of China, communism won't stick.

When I think back to the great cathedrals and churches that were in the Russia of yesterday, I still have a hope that the average man in Russia is going to come to the top again.

Senator SMITH. I think we all hope that.

Mr. Johnson. I still have hope that China is going to be herself, and there are some signs we read in the press that maybe she is. That is as far as I want to go.

Senator Smith. But, generally speaking, wouldn't you say as of today the Peiping government is being controlled by an external power, Russia, in the handling of the Korean situation and in her dealings with other countries of the world?

Mr. Johnson. I would say there is no doubt in my mind that Russia regards the Peiping government as a satellite government and is attempting to control it. I am hoping she doesn't succeed and that there may be disturbances.

Senator Smith. And that would be the reason, perhaps, that you would feel, as we do, that we cannot recognize the Peiping government—either that our Government recognize them or admit them to the United Nations while that situation exists?

Mr. Johnson. Talleyrand was once discussing diplomacy, and he said, "It was worse than a crime; it is a mistake." And we should not give a toehold for the Communists. To lose out by having somebody else working for them—if there was nothing left, as I see it, but the Nationalists, it would be worse than a crime; it would be a mistake against the national security of the United States.

DIFFERENT SCHOOLS ON CHINA POLICY

Senator Smith. The reason I ask those questions is because out of all this testimony, beginning with General Marshall, Secretary Marshall, and others, right down through, I seem to feel that there is far more to this whole situation in the Far East, far more to your resignation, far more to MacArthur's removal, than just what appears on the surface, than just the difference of strategy in Korea, the question of insubordination by General MacArthur, which I do not accept for one minute.

Mr. Johnson. Senator, there was no insubordination or lack of my loyalty to the President when and while I was in office, and this need not go into the record, but so far as I have seen, nobody has attacked my Americanism or integrity either before or since.

Senator Smith. There is no question about it. In my question, there is no question about that.

Mr. Johnson. I have a clear conscience on my part in it.

Senator Smith. I was not referring to yourself; I was referring to the charges that General MacArthur was insubordinate.

Mr. Johnson. I beg your pardon.

Senator Smith. Excuse me. I didn't mean in any way to refer to yours.

Mr. Johnson. Thank you very much.

Senator Smith. What I said was that it seemed to me I see related to your resignation and to MacArthur's removal something that is very profound going on in the Far East. There is a profound difference of opinion between two groups of thinkers. The way I worked it out in my own mind—and I wish you would follow this and see if I am right—is that there was a school, and let us say they are justified in their view, let us not argue with them, that believed the situation in China was the outgrowth of Sun Yat-sen's rebellion, was agrarian reform, and so on and so forth.

The Communists were traveling in on a wave of that kind and that was the way in which they would satisfy the yearning of the people for freedom. It was a revolt against everything that seemed to put any control on them.

The Nationalist Government did not get the spirit of that and, therefore, we, the United States would do well to turn over our support to that group rather than to stick by the Nationalists.

I find that through the testimony all the way through, that there are those differences, and we find in the breakdown that when General Marshall went out there, he was asked to get those two ideas together, the Communist Chinese and the Nationalist Government. We had a school of thought in our State Department which was evidenced by some of our representatives there—Service has been mentioned, and Davies, and that group—who favored that view, that we should get these people together.

The other school of thought, which is evidenced by General Wedemeyer's testimony, by General MacArthur's testimony, and to a certain degree by your testimony, seems to me, felt that any dealing with the Communists along the lines of coalition was not possible and, therefore, we have that cleavage, which seems to me to be behind the difference between the State Department, and many in the Department of Defense.

I think when I came back I reported to you that the feeling I got from talking to our defense people, Army and Navy and others, was that, for example, the Formosa situation could not even be thought of as getting out of friendly hands—just the position that you took—and that was the basis of a good deal of this cleavage in point of view there, with the consequences——

Mr. JOHNSON. It was only——

Senator SMITH (continuing). That those who favored the Formosa position which you are favoring and favor the Nationalist position——

Mr. JOHNSON. I never saw——

Senator SMITH (continuing). Disappear from the scene.

Mr. JOHNSON. I never saw any high-ranking military man who thought we would let Formosa remain in hostile hands, except when he was under political pressure on the other side, which is not his job, insofar as advising is concerned; as a citizen, he has a right to think as he wants.

Senator SMITH. That seems to confirm my thinking that from the standpoint of strategy, from the standpoint of the future of Asia, from the standpoint of resistance to communism, the military and naval group seemed to feel that certain precautions should be taken, one of which was not letting Formosa get into hostile hands.

The other school thought there was here an agrarian revolution and at all costs we should try to get peace in the area. All those differences seem to have led to the policy that brought us now into Korea and now into this stalemate we are in. I am just trying to think it through and see if I am right—that there was that slowly growing difference between the two groups which ultimately can be looked upon as possibly the background of the whole MacArthur explosion.

Mr. JOHNSON. It could be, but I don't want to express an opinion about it.

Senator Smith. I can see why you might not want to, but it seemed to me from your testimony that you felt, with the other Defense people, that there was a military question there, so far as Formosa was concerned, quite different from the political question of whether or not we should make any attempt to hold the island.

FRICTION WITH MAC ARTHUR

Let me ask you this question: Do you believe that long prior to the Korean episode there was a strong feeling in the Government here that MacArthur was not fitting the picture and that MacArthur would have to go?

Mr. Johnson. No; I don't.

Senator Smith. You do not think that? You would not date that before the Veterans of Foreign Wars speech? Weren't there frictions prior to the Veterans of Foreign Wars speech, which you said you had had some talk about?

Mr. Johnson. No friction of the type you indicate; no, sir.

Senator Smith. Well, then, if there was no question before that, then it would seem as though the chief reason for the removal of General MacArthur was the fact that he talked out of turn. It was not so much that there was a legitimate difference of opinion between the Joint Chiefs and MacArthur because he said he would be glad to withdraw.

Mr. Johnson. Senator, you can speculate as long as you will. I don't know about those things and I am not going to express an opinion.

Senator Smith. I didn't want to press you. I am just trying to recall, as I can, the evidence that has been presented to us for this summary removal of General MacArthur.

Would you agree that it was General MacArthur's personal desire to bring the war in Korea to an end as expeditiously as possible, thereby saving lives on both sides? That that was the motivation for his recommendations?

Mr. Johnson. I am sure he must have felt that way, but I have no knowledge of that period. I was out of the Defense Department.

Senator Smith. Was any thought given to consulting General MacArthur before the decisions were made at Blair House with regard to going into the Korean situation?

Mr. Johnson. He was not consulted and orders were for top secrecy everywhere, and until the second night, when I announced that, subject to the President's approval, we were putting MacArthur in charge, his name never entered the discussion, so far as I recall now.

VISITS TO MAC ARTHUR BEFORE KOREAN CONFLICT

Senator Smith. Could you tell me, if you recall, how many of the policy planners of either the Department of Defense or of the Department of State visited General MacArthur between VJ-day and the actual outbreak of troubles in Korea?

I know that after the Korean trouble a number of the Chiefs of Staff went out there, but were there any of the top planners in either State or Defense that went out to see him between VJ-day and the time these troubles began?

Mr. Johnson. They did.

Senator SMITH. Do you recall who they were?

Mr. JOHNSON. No; but I know they did during the period I was in Defense.

Senator SMITH. I have been trying very much to find out. You didn't yourself, I don't think.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. He just testified.

Senator SMITH. You mean you went yourself?

Mr. JOHNSON. I went the very first opportunity. It was postponed, General Bradley's and my going was postponed three times, and finally we just up and went, June 10.

Senator SMITH. That was——

Mr. JOHNSON. Just before Korea.

Senator SMITH. 1950.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Just before Korea. But I am speaking primarily of the time I was there, because General MacArthur made this comment to me. He said, "I am so happy that you or someone came out, because here I have been since VJ-day, with many problems, and, of course, I can well understand how we are concerned with Europe, but we don't seem to be as much concerned in Washington with the Far East."

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, Kenneth Royall was out there and Tracy Voorhees—I sent him out three or four times.

Senator SMITH. Tracy went out in 1949, after I got back.

Mr. JOHNSON. Tracy had just gotten back. I sent his report, this letter, Tracy's report of December 13, 1949.

Senator SMITH. I went out in September. He was there just before I was in September.

PREPAREDNESS OF SOUTH KOREA BEFORE ATTACK

Now, just one or two more questions. Was it the considered opinion of the Department of National Defense that South Korea was capable of defending itself against an attack from North Korea prior to the outbreak, June of last year?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't think it was.

Senator SMITH. Was it the opinion of the Department of National Defense——

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't think there was ever any opinion rendered by the Department of Defense in that field; so all I can answer is the Secretary of Defense, with these sorties every Sunday morning across the line, I thought they were doing a lot more in Northern Korea in equipping and furnishing troops than was being done in South Korea.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith, your time has expired.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson.

ENTERING AND WITHDRAWING FROM KOREA

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, did I understand you to say this morning that you thought the decision to go into Korea was a sound one?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; and I approved it then and now.

Senator JOHNSON. Sir?

Mr. JOHNSON. I thought it was right then and now.

Senator JOHNSON. Am I correct in assuming that as of the present time you would not pull out of Korea?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, was it your view in 1949 that the fall of Formosa was probable?

Mr. JOHNSON. I thought that the program then being followed by this Government made its fall in time certain, and that is what I was protesting against.

STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PAPER OF DECEMBER 23, 1949

Senator JOHNSON. Were you familiar with the State Department information memorandum dated December 23, 1949, which related to the Formosan question?

Mr. JOHNSON. Dated when?

Senator JOHNSON. December 23, 1949.

Mr. JOHNSON. December 18, wasn't it?

Senator JOHNSON. I think the 23d.

Senator KNOWLAND. December 23, 1949.

Senator JOHNSON. It is a memorandum the committee released the other day.

Mr. JOHNSON. I know what you are talking about. There is a date of December 23 on some of them and I think there was a date of December 18 on some of them, the same memorandum.

Senator JOHNSON. You were familiar with that?

Mr. JOHNSON. No. January 3—is that right—when did that break, UP?

Senator KNOWLAND. January 3.

Mr. JOHNSON. January 3, 1950, when that broke, Secretary Early brought it in madder than a wet hen because he had attended this conference on the 29th.

He checked our office, he checked the three Secretaries, he checked Bradley and the three Chiefs, and there were no copies of it on that date in the Establishment.

He called Secretary Webb, who assured him we had copies, even got up to the point later in the day we were supposed to have cleared it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What?

Mr. JOHNSON. We were supposed to have cleared it. I think that argument went on for a few hours, with Mr. Early getting more disgusted and incensed. I think he saw you down there that afternoon maybe [addressing Senator Johnson].

Finally the State Department, on our demand probably in writing, gave us a list of all the people in any way connected with Defense anywhere in the world who might have gotten copies and I think some lowly public relations man, not a top fellow, somewhere got copies, but none of us had seen it.

We didn't agree with it. I had probably brought about some opposition to myself in the State Department, because before that I had recommended that the Voice of America could never serve the purpose for which we all sought its use until it was separate from either Defense or State and under a group of men responsible only to the President, the ablest men in America, to run the Voice of America.

When this thing came through, I recommended that again. We were not responsible for it in Defense, didn't know it, didn't clear it, first heard of it when the UP released it.

Senator JOHNSON. I think you have probably answered my next question, but I want to ask it this way. Did you, to your knowledge, or did your deputy, Secretary Early, at any time express the point of view to the State Department that such a memorandum should be issued in order to minimize the damage of American prestige that might be occasioned by the fall of Formosa?

Mr. JOHNSON. I never heard that before. I am sure that nobody did. I heard, read in the evidence, that Wedemeyer was supposed to do it, and I saw his discounting of that.

If any officer or civilian in the Office of the Secretary of Defense had made such a suggestion and I had known about it, if it were a civilian, he would have been fired summarily, and if an officer, he would have been sent to Timbuctoo. I don't believe in playing the game that way.

I think America is very—I started to quote some poetry to you, but I won't do it.

DEFENSE PREPARATIONS

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, have your views changed since June 25, 1950, with respect to the kind and quantity of defense preparation that this country should make?

Mr. JOHNSON. You will find in my letter of resignation to the President, in the opening part thereof, that I say I have this day submitted to you the program for expansion of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the light of the then world conditions, and it was unanimously agreed upon by Army, Navy, Air Secretaries and Chiefs, Bradley, and myself.

Senator JOHNSON. You are generally familiar, although I am sure not down to the minutest detail, but you are generally familiar with our preparedness goal and I want to ask you as a soldier and as a man of great wealth of experience, and as a citizen whether in your judgment those goals are sufficiently high in the light of world conditions, 3,462,000 Armed Force, 95-group Air Force, 1,100 ships?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, I don't think it is necessary for this country to do everything to be in a readiness for full all-out war on a moment's notice. It will bankrupt us. It isn't necessary.

Senator JOHNSON. That is not our program.

Mr. JOHNSON. Any very substantial increase above the three million five mark will border on that. I don't quarrel with the 95 groups, but when you begin to talk 150-group Air Force, I think there ought to be an independent commission brought in like the Baker Board to look it over and study it because 150 groups, if you figure the cost of $100,000,000 a year for the groups, you will see where you are getting on the thing.

I want enough to defend America, but I don't want planners to run away in either the Army, Navy or Air on that which is essential for the security of America.

The Air Force is younger than the other services. There ought to be enough Air, but I wouldn't go for this great amount of Air that they are now talking about, until it has been doubly, trebly checked by some of the older fellows. Does that answer?

Senator JOHNSON. What would you care to say about the size of our Army, the number of our divisions?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, the divisions, with what we have taken on in Europe and we have over there, has got to be increased; I agree with that. I agree with the Air Force increase. I was tickled to death to see Sherman say with modernization they had enough Navy with these two new carriers. That is true.

Senator JOHNSON. I assume of course that you have not changed your long-time position on the wisdom of universal military training?

Mr. JOHNSON. You know, if we don't pass universal miiltary training, we are selling America short. Strategic air force is a great deterrent, but the greatest deterrent in the world to Russia would be the fact that you can mobilize 10 million men overnight who have had universal military training.

I feel so deeply about that, and if you remember my swan song to the American Legion on October the 9th, the last half of it is devoted to a plea for universal military service. I went further than training, I went to service, a year of service, and I believe in it with all my heart.

Senator JOHNSON. Now just one more question. I have asked this question of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and each member of the Joint Chiefs, and I would like to ask it of you.

In your judgment is the course that we are now following in Korea the course that is best calculated to give us victory for our objectives with the least loss of life and the least dangerous?

Mr. JOHNSON. At the moment, today, yes. Tomorrow we may have to be more aggressive.

IMPOUNDING OF AIR FORCE APPROPRIATIONS

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, when I questioned you this morning I read from a very hurried answer that General Mudge had gotten from the Comptroller of the Defense Department on impounding some funds.

Mr. JOHNSON. Who is a very excellent man, by the way, recommended by Herbert Hoover who appointed him there; an excellent man.

Senator JOHNSON. I want to read into the record at this time the statement of General Mudge secured during the lunch hour as furnished by telephone by Secretary McNeil.

> The President by letter to the Secretary of Defense dated November 8, 1949, directed the Secretary to place in reserve approximately 736 million which had been appropriated for the fiscal year 1950. The amount broke down roughly into 577 million for construction of aircraft, 130 million for maintenance and operation, 18 million for research and development, the remainder in miscellaneous categories.

That amounts to about 725, 736, and the additional 11 in miscellaneous categories. Now as I remember your testimony this morning, you did not make a recommendation that those funds be impounded.

Mr. JOHNSON. Neither asked to nor did.

Senator JOHNSON. Nor were you consulted in connection with them prior to the issuance of this letter?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, by Symington and Vandenberg, or Symington and Norstad, and gave permission to go over it——

Senator Johnson. But by the President?

Mr. Johnson. No, sir.

Senator Johnson. But you did make it clear that you had no objections to the Department's concern in carrying their protest direct to the President?

Mr. Johnson. I certainly did, and they will tell you.

Senator Johnson. And they carried it direct to the President; is that correct?

Mr. Johnson. Yes.

Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman Russell. Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you a question with several elements in it, and if you would prefer that I break it down, I will be glad to. I do not want to put in any sleepers in this question.

STATE DEPARTMENT CHINA POLICY

I wonder if this is a fairly accurate summary of a certain situation growing since the end of the Japanese war and which may have culminated in increasing disagreement or friction between the Department of Defense and the State Department, and that is this:

Is it fair to say that there was growing evidence that the State Department was following consistently a policy soft toward the Chinese Communists, disparaging toward Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Chinese Government, with indications that they would be willing or might be willing to recognize the Chinese Communists and let Formosa go by the boards to Red China, which would be of course a complete success for the Red Chinese in China?

If there was that growing apparentness, did that find itself in conflict, that is, in vigorous conflict, with the position of the State Department, which was anti-Red domination in China in the interests of the security of the United States?

Now that is a long question, if I have made myself clear. I meant the policy of the Defense Department, which was anti-Red domination in China.

Mr. Johnson. The Defense Department was in all aspects anti-Communist—everywhere. If there are any Communists over there I don't know, and didn't know it.

The Defense Department battled day in and day out to keep Formosa out of hostile hands.

Senator Hickenlooper. Now battled with whom?

Mr. Johnson. Anybody that wanted to sell the President on the idea that we had no interest in Formosa.

Senator Hickenlooper. And who wanted to sell the President on that idea?

Mr. Johnson. My understanding is from time to time, as I said this morning, the State Department did. I am not trying to tag any individual. I am laying away from getting into personalities just as deliberately as I know how in all these answers. I don't want to quarrel with State Department testimony here about agrarian reformers or about Marshall's visit over there. As a citizen they concerned me the way they developed. As Secretary of Defense I had to put that behind me and try to do the things that affected the security of the United States.

That explains the position we took, and it may explain why I am out of the Defense Department—because a lot of people didn't like it. But that is a surmise. I don't know.

I think I have answered your question of this morning and the double-barreled one of now.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I had no intention of making it a double-barreled one for any ulterior purpose.

Mr. JOHNSON. I didn't mean to imply that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Except for the basis of my question. And I agree with the query and the search expressed by Senator Smith a moment ago that there is some very fundamental friction, or has been, at least, in policy in the Orient, of which China, of course, is the great focal point.

Mr. JOHNSON Of which China is the victim.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; I think that is a very excellent expression—China is the victim. But surrounding China.

Now, I would like to clear up this matter if I can, because I have asked this question repeatedly of witnesses, a lot of times in vain.

IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR POLICY IN KOREA

I understand that we have, of course, a policy of peace in Korea; certainly, on the same theory that we are all against sin as a policy. But I have been concerned in the method or the program by which we expect or hope to attain the so-called over-all policy which everyone agrees with.

Now I am concerned with what is the end result in implementing that policy.

Do we merely stand as a wall and let communism, the aggressors, wear themselves out against that wall of flesh? Do we attempt to drive the aggressors out of Korea? Do we desire to punish aggression? Or can it be, like someone said about the bank robbers—if they rob a bank, you chase them out of town and then say to them, "Now, we have chased you out of town, away from the bank; don't you do it again"? And they say, "We won't do it again." And we let them alone.

Or do we go further, either as the United States or the United Nations, and make it most unpalatable for anyone to attempt aggression through punishment of it, which, of course, would involve perhaps attacking his bases from which he can regroup?

Mr. JOHNSON. I am no longer Secretary of Defense. I am a private citizen, and I am not going to do other than say that the same concerns that you are exhibiting and the other corollaries you are fixing to state I have the same concerns.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree, and I am not asking you for any intimately informed testimony so far as recent information is concerned the Government may have. But we are all citizens, and Members of this body and the House are expected, of course, to express their opinions.

We are asked: What do you think? What do you stand for? What is our purpose? What should we do?

We have to answer those questions, and citizens have to. I just value your views.

I frankly say that I have received no acceptable reason in the light of everything that has happened all over the world in the past several years, that is, the calculated risks that we have taken to resist communism—I have received no reason why the United Nations should not bomb the marshaling centers at Harbin, should not bomb the arsenals at Mukden, and their storage sheds where these fellows can run back over and take a shower and get some new guns and come on back over the Yalu again.

You spoke about reading Mein Kampf, and I think we have got to read the things that have happened in Korea, everything that has happened in the past. And knowing that communism's goal is ultimate control, and that that is their purpose, and that they say, "We will reel with the punch, we will give here but we will come back at the first opportunity," it seems to me that with the indecisive policy, or the indecisive program which we have right now gives no hope of any sound peace over there. Because these fellows can go back across the Yalu, and we will have to keep forces in Korea against the time when they will regroup and come back over.

We know they are getting equipment from the Soviet.

I am searching for what kind of a program we are following or what kind of a program is proposed, and I haven't got the answers. I don't know.

Mr. JOHNSON. There were pages and pages of testimony when the Secretary of State was on the stand from you and others on that score. I have nothing to add at the moment, because I think we are just drifting.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would suggest, Mr. Secretary, that there are pages and pages of questions along that line and pages and pages of answers along that line, but I defy anyone to get out of the answers any program that is realistic in any way.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am trying to be a good boy today, or I would talk on that subject, too.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I am just saying why I am asking these questions.

I think General Wedemeyer put his finger on it the other day when he said this matter in Korea is indecisive, or words to that effect—we are just fighting. I think General MacArthur said it is an accordion war.

Truly the United Nations—it's a United Nations affair, at least so far as its form is concerned, but the American people are quite concerned because it is American boys that are dying.

And, it is American money that is paying to make the mare go, over there, and while you may not have the answer, I may not have it——

Mr. JOHNSON. The answer has got to be found.

CALCULATED RISKS AND WORLD WAR III

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that an answer has to be given to the American people, and to the world; because communism can rest, just as it has in the past, with the probing of soft spots and pulling back, unless the United Nations has a policy that is understandable, and meets this test with vigor and with determination to have a decision of finality, at least in this area.

I know the calculated risk theory. They say there is danger of a third world war.

We have heard that for several years, that what we have done from time to time—yes, there is danger of precipitating the third world war.

I have no answer that there is any more danger of precipitating a third world war by destroying at least the substantial part of the potentials whereby Red China can make war—that is, ammunition dumps and supply dumps and arsenals and communication lines and so on—than any other of a number of very strong positions which we have taken in the world in the past, such as the Berlin Airlift; the Greece and Turkish business; the aid to Yuogslavia; and the North Atlantic Pact implementation by sending troops over there; and so on. Those are some of the answers that I have been trying to get, but I haven't succeeded up to this time.

How is my time, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. You have about a minute, Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I just want to ask you this question:

Did you find, while you were Secretary of Defense, that there was a tendency on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on occasions, to confuse their decisions or their determinations, from a strictly military standpoint, by pressure from the State Department, from a political angle?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir; and I have so testified today, and we have done everything to straighten that out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Sorry; I must have missed that testimony.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

WITNESS' RECORD AS DEFENSE SECRETARY

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I was out of town the day that your resignation was announced. Some of my colleagues on this committee made what I thought were exceedingly appropriate and deserved remarks on the floor of the Senate, commendatory of the services that you had rendered as Secretary of Defense.

Had I been in town at that time, I would have joined in those comments, and I am glad to have this opportunity now to tell you that I have always appreciated very much the cooperation which you always extended to this committee when you were Secretary of Defense.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you very much.

Senator MORSE. As you know, in various public places and on various occasions I have defended the policy that you followed as Secretary of Defense, and tried to answer what I think have been some gross misrepresentations of the so-called economy program that you put into effect because so many people have overlooked the fact that for the most part the so-called economy was the elimination of personnel that, on the record, following World War II, was no longer needed for the operation of the Defense Department in the period of time that followed——

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Senator MORSE. World War II.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Senator MORSE. And, I wanted to say that for the record.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.

SUPERCARRIER CONSTRUCTION DISCONTINUED

Senator MORSE. I am very glad that you made the statement that you made today in regard to this supercarrier matter, because I think it is another matter in which you have been grossly misrepresented by various forces in this country; and I want to pin that one down for the record, first, in my examination of you this afternoon.

Am I correct in my understanding, Mr. Secretary, that the kind of a carrier that you supported, was the building of a type of carrier that you thought would have much more strategic and utility value than what I would describe as the super-super type of carrier that was being urged at the time the carrier fight was going on within your Department?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Mr. Forrestal thought that that carrier was a show piece.

The two that I authorized the building of, Admiral Sherman assured me were utility carriers to do just what they wanted them to do.

I approved them on that basis and Congress appropriated the money for one.

I was convinced, sir, that the first carrier, carrying on its construction was not necessary, for the maintaining of the Navy's place in the sun and its carrying out its mission, it became a crusading thing with a lot of people. You remember the attack.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think the decision today was right, and you remember Carl Vinson rose on the floor and said it was right, and said it since.

Senator MORSE. I remember that very well. I was involved in the discussion of it at the time as a member of the Armed Services Committee. I thought you were right then, I think you are right now, but what I want to get pinned down in this record, your answer to this question: Do you agree with me that when some of the writers in this country, such as David Lawrence in recent writings of his, tells the American people that our policy has now changed and we have come to adopt the position that was rejected on the supercarrier, that he makes a misstatement of fact?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. It certainly, I think, needs to be told the American people, because I am aghast at the kind of misrepresentation that is still going on, as I have read in recent days by such writers as David Lawrence in regard to this carrier.

The carrier that we are building now, that has been authorized now, is the type of carrier that you fought for when you were Secretary of Defense, which is quite a different type of carrier from the super-super type of carrier that some of the Navy were insisting on and it led to the Denfeld fight. Is that not true?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

DISMISSAL OF ADMIRAL DENFELD

Senator MORSE. Am I correct in my understanding that although it was a matter of great personal regret to you at the time, and the kind of thing that you did everything you could to avoid and get ironed out without the action that was finally taken, that you did, however, concur in the change in the Chief of Naval Staff?

Mr. JOHNSON. The Secretary of the Navy advised me that he told Admiral Denfeld that he had no longer any value in the Naval Establishment. I accompanied him to the President with the expectation on his part, in fact, commitment from me to him that I would support him in asking for the change.

In the course of the discussion with the President, it seemed to me that it was better to let Denfeld stay in until after the hearings, which were to start in a few days, were over, and he had testified.

I brought that up in a conference between the President, Secretary Matthews, and myself, and there the thing we went over to do then was changed, and he was left in afterward.

In the course of that program—and that is the subject of a note which the President, which Matthews has, and which is locked up in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Admiral Nimitz came in and I ask him who was the best man in the Navy to be Chief of Naval Operations, and he asked me if Denfeld was going, and I said, "Yes." This is before the hearing started, as I recall, or the day they started, maybe.

He said, "Does Denfeld know it?" I said, "Yes." He then said "Forrest Sherman," and I said "Who is Forrest Sherman?"

I checked up on him; had him come to this country, without the knowledge of the Navy—at least I thought without the knowledge of the Navy; had Matthews interview him, and his impression was tops.

I never saw him. I sent him back to stay out of this fight, and as soon as the hearings were over, I sent for Forrest Sherman, and on the basis of the Nimitz recommendation, and reading of his record.

He was met, I believe, in Baltimore, because he was coming back by Navy transportation openly, and he was met in Baltimore and was brought over. He telephoned my office, and I brought him in, and I said, "Admiral"—I took a look at him; it was the first time I had seen him—"if the President offers you the post of Chief of Naval Operations, would you accept?" He said, "Yes, sir." And I said, "You have a date with the President. Frank"—Matthews—"will you take him over to see him?" And that is the story about the appointment—the story to get the best man in the Naval Establishment regardless of where he stood in the bracket. He was not the top man. That is how he was appointed.

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM

Senator MORSE. I am very glad to have that in the record, Mr. Secretary.

Now, in regard to this universal military service program, as you I know, since I have been a member of this committee, I have urged the adoption of the universal military service program; in fact, I was one of those who opposed the postponement of action on it about a year or so ago.

The question on it is this: Do you agree with me that the manpower bill, the military manpower bill, as it has just passed the Congress in respect to the universal military service program section of it is concerned, is inadequate because it still makes the matter not only a matter in future but it leaves it as really a matter of planning with ony a statement of approval of the general principle of the universal military program?

Mr. Johnson. I do agree with you; and even in my prayers, I pray for universal military service as the most important thing in the security of America.

PROPOSED CHINA LOBBY INVESTIGATION

Senator Morse. All right.

I turn to another subject, Mr. Secretary. We are both lawyers. As lawyers, we consider the matter of professional duty consonant with the availability of our time and our commitment to other clients, to give legal service to clients who, we think, have legitimate legal problems that need the attention of a lawyer if we find ourselves available for their service, and interested in the type of legal problem that they present.

We think that we have the competence to give them legal advice, and if we have no inconsistent obligations to other clients, we usually, at least, hear their case.

I think I will tell you nothing new if I tell you that there are in this day of smears—for all of us in public life are the victims of what seems to be a damaging development in this country of character assassination, and there have been stories to the effect that you are involved as a lawyer in some way in connection with what has generally been referred to as the China lobby; and that you represent some members or a member of the so-called Soong or Kung family.

Before I ask the question, I want to say that in my judgment as a lawyer, one would have a perfect right, not only have a right to do that, but I think a legal obligation to do it if he could give any American, any client, whether he is American or not, sound legal advice.

I thought you ought to have an opportunity through me, particularly, because I, being one that has urged that we have an investigation of the attempt on the part of any Chinese group—and I have joined in the suggestion that it ought to be true of any British group or French group or any other group that seeks to use lobby tactics illegitimately—and I am not so sure, to some extent, some of the so-called legal ones, too, as far as influencing foreign policy is concerned.

I say that I have joined in the suggestion that in order to clear the atmosphere on this matter we ought to have a Senate investigation of the so-called lobby activities of foreign governments.

Now, with that as a prefatory remark, I wish to give you an opportunity to make any statement that you want to make in regard to what I think is a viciously motivated smear in this country on the part of some toward you, which I want to repudiate here and now, that one of the reasons why you are no longer in the Defense Department is because you had some legal connection with the China lobby, and I hope that you will understand the sincerity of my motives in giving you the opportunity to make that statement, because I think you ought to make it in this record right here and now.

Mr. Johnson. Thank you very much, Senator Morse.

This morning I took the opportunity of saying that I had—in the record——

Senator Morse. I am sorry; I was not here.

Mr. Johnson (continuing). Seen the statement which had been called to my attention, that I was personal attorney or had been personal attorney for Dr. H. H. Kung.

I stated in as positive language as I knew how to make it that I had never been and am not now. I think that was pertinent to whatever question I was asked, but I then added on my own volition, because of these very elements you talk about, that if there was a China lobby, I did not know it; and that I am not and have never been a part thereof; and the nearest I have come to Mr. Kohlberg—if that is his name, and that is correct—is to receive some of the letters and literature that he has mailed out.

I made it unequivocal, sir, and I appreciate, though, the spirit in which you bring that up. I cannot give you the page——

Senator Morse. That is all right.

Mr. Johnson. Maybe the chairman has his finger on it there.

Senator Morse. I should have checked the transcript. This has been a very busy day, including a high-school commencement for a daughter this afternoon, and that is why I have been away from the hearing most of the day.

However, I made up my mind that I would give you an opportunity to make a statement.

Mr. Johnson. I would like to add one other thing to that, if I may.

Chairman Russell. You may, but Senator Morse's time has expired.

Mr. Johnson. This is still answering his question.

Chairman Russell. Yes, sir; you may on the committee's time.

Mr. Johnson. I have checked with my law firm. It has never lobbied on the Hill for anybody on any subject, sir, save the exception that on two instances Louis Johnson has lobbied on the Hill. The first was as national commander of the American Legion, when the cuts were made in 1933, when I was then national commander; and I fought every way I could, and with some measure of success, in restoring to the rolls, through legislative action and by Presidential Executive order, the people who were really service-connected and who had been hurt in those blanket orders.

And the second time I lobbied on the Hill, sir, and the only other time that I recall at all, was when I lobbied for the Department of Defense. There are no other instances that I recall.

Senator Morse. Which was your duty.

Mr. Johnson. That is right.

Chairman Russell. Gentlemen, it is now 20 minutes to 6. It is very evident that we cannot conclude with Secretary Johnson this afternoon, so we will be compelled to ask you to return in the morning, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Johnson. Are you sure they are not through?

Chairman Russell. Yes, sir; I have advices that there are still some questions to be propounded to you, and I think I should put you on notice when we get a witness here at 10 o'clock in the morning and the committees are fresh, he very seldom ever does get through until at least 1 o'clock, and I can't promise you we will be through by 1 tomorrow, but I sincerely hope so.

At this juncture we will take a recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon at 5:40 p. m. the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene on Friday, June 15, 1951, at 10:04 a. m.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

FRIDAY, JUNE 15, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:04 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, George, Smith of New Jersey, Green, Hickenlooper, Sparkman, Brewster, Bridges, Saltonstall, Johnson of Texas, Morse, Kefauver, Knowland, Hunt, Cain, Stennis, and Long.

Also present: William H. Darden clerk, Verne D. Mudge, committee staff, Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff, and Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman **Russell**. The committees will come to order.

Senator McMahon?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Sparkman?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Knowland?

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS A. JOHNSON, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE—Resumed

Senator **Knowland**. Mr. Secretary, before proceeding with some questions, just appropos of your statement on the demobilization that we followed under the so-called point system—while I have no desire to say a good word for the point system, I think that it is true that the men who had served 2, 3, 4, or 5 years in World War II, having come from a civilian economy were naturally anxious to return to their places of business or their farms and their families, which is perfectly understandable in a civilian army such as we have to put together in wartime.

DEMOBILIZATION AFTER WORLD WAR II

Would it not be fair to say that the fault was not necessarily in the point system but in the fact that we did not have a continuous replacement system so that men who had not given all of that time in helping to win the war might have replaced those who had the natural desire to come home?

I had thought that that as much as anything else accounted for some of the troubles we ran into.

Mr. JOHNSON. You may be quite right, Senator Knowland. We ought to have had the continuous replacement system or else we should have done what I think I would have argued to the Congress had I been in responsible Government position at that time.

We ought to have disbanded by units not less than regiments. I did not have with me yesterday, but I dug out last night, a speech I made on April 14, 1946, at Parkersburg, W. Va., which is typical of what I said that time. May I read the one paragraph?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. I said:

> The system of demobilization was not well thought out. Actually the method of demobilizing by individuals on the plan of points overnight reduced an Army which had been a splendid organization into an aggregation of individuals looking for the quickest way home. We now know that this was not the right system and we are paying a diplomatic price for it. Under that system an air squadron would suddenly find itself without pilots or a tropical base without malaria-control officers, or a tank corps without gunners or a regiment without officers.

And in this speech, which I am very glad to leave for the appendix, I elaborate in part to show that Russia took advantage of that complete wrecking of an effective military system. It was wrong. You may be right as to the answer.

I for my part would have done it by demobilizing maybe divisions, certainly not less, or units, and regiments, because the security of the United States from the standpoint of the military and from the standpoint of the diplomacy was much more important than any one individual returning home.

Senator KNOWLAND. Of course one reason I, like you, support universal-service proposal is it seems to me that there are a lot of people in our country who have never given any service in the Military Establishment who have an obligation of citizenship as well as getting the benefits of citizenship, and it is far more equitable that they should have been called up than the men that we did have to call up in this Korean situation who had already given 3, 4, 5 years of their life in World War II.

Now, those men don't object, in the event of all-out mobilization, to being called a second time, but it is a little rough on them, I think, to be called again when they are just trying to make up for the time that they lost in World War II, to be called back in the service again when there are so many young men who have given no service at all.

Mr. JOHNSON. I agree with you 100 percent.

PLANNING FOR THE INCHON LANDING

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, yesterday you testified, Mr. Secretary, relative to this Inchon landing, the fact that some considerable doubts had been expressed by General Collins regarding the advisability of it.

Did other members of the Joint Chiefs raise that same question?

Mr. JOHNSON. To a much lesser extent. Admiral Sherman raised some questions. It may be that he accompanied Collins on that trip.

Senator KNOWLAND. I believe he did.

Mr. JOHNSON. This is a long and tempestuous period I was over there. I am quite sure in thinking about it for a moment that he did.

The censor may strike this out, but what Collins was objecting to was not so much a landing in itself as it was a landing at Inchon, on account of the mud and the tide and the height of the tides.

[Deleted.]

But General MacArthur took the position that he wanted to land behind and at Inchon.

When the history of this generation and of this war is written, there is nothing that was more brilliant in its conception and execution—with even the weather and the fates playing with us—than the Inchon landing. Beautifully done.

Senator KNOWLAND. Knowing that you——

Mr. JOHNSON. The morning paper indicates that I told that story yesterday to take some credit for myself. That was farthest from my intent. I was answering the question and trying to give you facts. I seek neither to apologize nor explain nor seek credit. I just want to give you whatever other facts the question calls for.

Senator KNOWLAND. I understand that.

Knowing that you had been Secretary of Defense during the preliminary planning, and I have read the paraphrases of the messages that went back and forth, that was one reason, frankly, that I was surprised that you left the Department at the time you did, because while your resignation, you say, had been forwarded a few days before the Inchon landing, it did not take effect until 4 days afterward, and I have read the messages, and I know that this situation was pending for a period of a good many weeks prior to that time.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. So you and those responsible must have been fully acquainted with the preparatory moves that were under way.

Mr. JOHNSON. So I was, and I had kept the President fully informed; he knew the date and all.

FACTORS CONSIDERED FOR INCHON LANDING

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, I find on page 33 of the paraphrase furnished us by the Joint Chiefs, message No. 13, reading as follows:

> On 7 September 1950 the Joint Chiefs informed him—

that is MacArthur—

> that while they concurred in the desirability of passing to the offensive in Korea as early as practicable, they were concerned over the recent trend of events there. Accordingly, they requested an estimate of CINCFE as to the feasibility and chances of success of the projected amphibious effort if initiated as scheduled. This estimate was to be made in light of all the factors, including the apparent

> commitment of practically all reserves available to the Eighth Army. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded General MacArthur that all available trained Army units in the United States, with the exception of the Eighty-second Airborne Division, had already been allocated to him. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that a minimum of 4 months' time would elapse before the first of several partially trained National Guard divisions could reach Korea in the event it became impossible to achieve quickly a junction of the envelopment forces with the forces now compressed in the Pusan beachhead.

Now, that seems to me that they were throwing cold water and quite properly pointing out, at least, that he had to do it with what he had and could not expect to get anything else.

Mr. JOHNSON. It is a little deeper than that. General Collins was still not quite satisfied, and this is putting MacArthur on record as saying at this late date, when it could still be recalled, and about the time the ships began to move around the peninsula to that side, whether or not he still thought it should be done.

I knew of the message; I may have seen it. It was discussed with me, and I had no objection to that being done. I thought that was fair to MacArthur that the record show that he took the responsibility. I did make—I didn't make any record showing that I backed him up, but those are the facts.

Senator KNOWLAND. I think now it is extremely important not only in view of the success of the Inchon landing, generally recognized as an action which broke the back of the original North Korean enemy, and in view of some of the later recommendations that General MacArthur made, which were not followed, that I read the following into the record, and it is from paragraph 14 on page 34:

Paragraph 14, on page 34—in his reply——

Mr. JOHNSON. What date is that?

Senator KNOWLAND. This, presumably, is either the 7th or 8th of September, subsequent to that prior message I just read.

Mr. JOHNSON. I understand.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now:

> In his reply CINCFE—

and I say, parenthetically, that is MacArthur—

> stated that the proposed amphibious envelopment was the only hope of wresting the initiative from the enemy, and of creating an opportunity for a decisive blow. Otherwise, the United Nations Forces would be involved in a war of indefinite duration, of attrition, and of doubtful results, inasmuch as the enemy possessed potentialities of reinforcement far in excess of those available to CINCFE.

So, apparently despite some of the questions which had been raised, he felt the importance of bringing the war against the North Koreans to a successful conclusion warranted him to take the calculated risk of which he had been warned by the Joint Chiefs, and to try and bring the war to a successful conclusion; and of course the results speak for themselves.

Had the Chinese Communists not come in, the Korean War would have successfully concluded shortly thereafter.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that is a fair paraphrase of the message that he sent, at that time, in which there was no dodging the responsibility, as far as his recommendation was concerned.

STATE DEPARTMENT ATTITUDE ON NATIONALISTS AND FORMOSA

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to read, from Time magazine, of August 7, 1950, the following paragraph:

> Secretary of State Dean Acheson had persuaded the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, against the advice of General MacArthur, that the United States should not intervene in Formosa. He advanced the remarkable argument that if Russia had its way in Asia, the Communists would eventually become highly unpopular among Asian people and the United States would gain popularity for its nice-mannered nonintervention.

I would like to ask if, at any time during the period that you held the responsible position as Secretary of National Defense, any theory along these lines had been expressed by representatives of the Department of State?

Mr. JOHNSON. May I see that?

Senator KNOWLAND. Surely [handing document to witness].

Mr. JOHNSON. I never heard Secretary of State Acheson present this cockeyed argument. It falls of its own weight.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to ask this last question: During the period of time you were Secretary of National Defense, were there any indications that the State Department was giving consideration to either the de facto or de jure recognition of the Chinese Communist regime?

Mr. JOHNSON. I have read the testimony before you, and I testified yesterday that one of my great concerns was that they would not exercise the veto. I had a very definite feeling—I make it stronger: It was my understanding that the matter had been considered. I never knew of any decision by the State Department, despite the British talk and the British recognition, for us to recognize. But because of the things that were said in those days, I feared that we would not oppose their becoming a member of the United Nations, and then we would have to recognize them.

We of the military particularly worried about it because it meant another vote on the Security Council antagonistic to the fundamental interests of the United States and for communism.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

Senator HUNT. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. Good morning, sir.

PROCEDURAL QUESTION

Senator SPARKMAN. May I ask a procedural question?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. I thought we swapped from table to table.

Chairman RUSSELL. We do if there is anyone here to ask questions, Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did it start over here this morning?

Chairman RUSSELL. This morning I started over there and called the names of some seven or eight Senators and no one responded.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am sorry; I thought it——

Chairman RUSSELL. It started on the Foreign Relations but it had to come over where the membership was in attendance.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, as an accommodation to the Senator from Alabama, I would be perfectly willing if unanimous consent should be given to change places with Mr. Sparkman. He has given evidence that he is anxious to go to another meeting.

Senator SPARKMAN. The Banking and Currency Committee is writing up the Defense Production Act, and that is the reason.

Senator CAIN. If I were selfish, I would not make this unanimous-consent agreement request, because I understand the Banking Committee is going to write up a new rent-control act. So I can understand the needs of the Senator to be there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I might say that Senator Brewster told me he had to leave at 11 o'clock; he is going out of town. He asked me if I would consent that he could have my time, and I told him I would be glad to if it came my turn. I merely suggest that.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator has a very poor chance of having a turn before 11 o'clock, if any members on this committee have questions to ask.

Is there objection to the request propounded by the Senator from Washington?

Senator BREWSTER. I shall not certainly object, and I shall simply hope that some Democrat will be as kind to me as this Republican is to Senator Sparkman. [Laughter.]

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sure due note will be taken by all members present.

Senator Sparkman, you may proceed.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to ask but just one or two questions.

QUESTION OF MILITARY MISSION AND AID TO FORMOSA, 1949

Mr. Secretary, I think the only question I want to ask you relates to Formosa. I heard your discussion of it yesterday, and I was interested in it. I think we are all interested in the question of Formosa.

The thing that disturbs me—and I am sure you can set me straight on this—was your statement that indicated to me that both you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to send some kind of military aid to Formosa, apparently prior to December 10. I remember you used that date as the time in connection with the government move to Formosa. Yet in the memorandum——

Mr. JOHNSON. May I interrupt?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, surely.

Mr. JOHNSON. I did not say any time, any place, anything about sending military aid to Formosa. What I did say was that I thought to get a military mission sent over there to ascertain the facts upon which there could be intelligent American action because our information and the State Department information did not agree.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, now I believe you also said that in July of 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff turned down that proposal to send a military mission.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think, sir, I said that was around September.

Senator SPARKMAN. You are correct, September rather than July. That is right.

Mr. JOHNSON. And that I felt that that was under political pressure from the outside, and I asked them to restudy it.

THE WEDEMEYER MEMO OF 1949 TO STATE DEPARTMENT ON FORMOSA

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, now, General Wedemeyer testified here, and so did Secretary Acheson, that as of the early part of December 1949 the only aid available to Formosa was political and economic. That about that time Secretary Acheson said that he did not feel Formosa could be held only through economic and diplomatic measures, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff—I think I am correct in this—informed him that no military aid would be available. About that time General Wedemeyer wrote this memorandum as Assistant Chief of Staff or on the General Staff Corps—I believe he was Deputy Chief of Staff or Assistant Chief of Staff—to the effect that military help was not available, and that if Formosa could not be held through economic and political measures only, then he suggested we start slanting our news looking toward the loss of Formosa.

Now, if you could just clear up that situation for me, it would be quite helpful.

Mr. JOHNSON. General Wedemeyer was expressing his opinion and not that of the Chiefs of Staff or of the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs in September had acted on a mission pretty much as you indicated.

Just prior to or on December the 10th again they had, before the Generalissimo set up his headquarters, so it must have been a day or two before—those dates are verifiable—they had some doubts about the mission that I had argued for. I still thought that was following political considerations and not the military security of the United States.

I think it is on the 11th that they started another study and concluded in effect that we should send this mission. The memorandum that went to the President was dated December 22, but, as I stated yesterday when I believe you weren't in the room——

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes; I was here.

Mr. JOHNSON. That it was discussed in the papers not as the papers say on the 20th. My recollection on that is that I thought he returned to the airport from Key West on noon of the 20th, and I spoke in New York on the 21st, and my recollection was, which I confirmed, that I had luncheon with him on the 22d and at that time I discussed it and made plans to go away for a few days.

The discussions in the Security Council and the discussions with the Secretary of State never reached the stage of any determination or argument about whether or not we had the troops to do the thing. The argument was on sending a mission to ascertain what the facts were as to the strength and equipment of those forces so there could be then intelligent consideration of what, if anything, America should do. May I say something else there?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. The morning papers, one of them I saw, indicates that I kept talking about Formosa yesterday to the exclusion of other things. I hope that by this reference it will be pointed out that the questions come to me about Formosa, and on yesterday I said Formosa is but one of the many facets of the things we had over there, and from the number of questions here, it is out of proportion, and some of the newspapermen have been misled unintentionally by those questions

Senator **Sparkman**. Well, I think perhaps that grows out of this feeling that the matter is not straight in all of our minds. I was confused about it myself. I realize you were making it just as one of many points.

POSITION AND AUTHORITY OF WEDEMEYER IN 1949

Now you trouble me some with your statement that General Wedemeyer was speaking his own personal opinion when as a matter of fact the memorandum was an official memorandum sent from the office of the Chief of Staff, if I remember correctly, in which he said—now I will remind you he did use one term which may be very significant. He said "overt" military aid was not available.

Mr. **Johnson**. The official set-up was that General Wedemeyer was without authority, under the directive I discussed yesterday, approved by the President, and arrangement with the Secretary of State, to be giving opinions of that type, that had not come through the Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense and been properly transmitted, after coordination by General Burns.

I never say any such document, as far as I recall, when I was over there; and it was in no sense an official expression of the Military Establishment and could not have been, and thank Heaven, I told you the procedure yesterday.

It is also in your record that he advised the issuance of this false document of December 18 or 23.

Senator **Brewster**. Twenty-third.

Mr. **Johnson**. I think, sir, you will find copies with both dates on them. I am speaking from memory on the discussion with Mr. Early, who handled that investigation at that time. I haven't checked with him since. There was the 18th date on some of them, I think, and the 23d on some of them.

Senator **Sparkman**. The only other questions I want to ask you, because you said something about it this morning——

Mr. **Johnson**. Did I satisfy you on that? I hope I did. I am trying to give you all I know about it.

Senator **Sparkman**. I think it clears it up to some extent. I will say very frankly, though, it still leaves me rather troubled, because here is a document before us that looks like an official document, which you say General Wedemeyer had no right to issue. I think we ought——

Mr. **Johnson**. Had no right to issue as a policy of the Department of Defense, which includes all three services. If on some board or group he was serving he gave that, it is still not the official opinion of the Defense Establishment.

Senator **Sparkman**. It appears to be, on the face of it, and it seems to me we ought to be assured we are not going to have anywhere in the Government some official who purports to speak officially issuing documents which actually are not official.

Mr. **Johnson**. I am awfully glad to hear you say that, because I talked at length yesterday of how we tried to correct that situation of being confronted by documents sent to the State Department from some bureau head or some non-policy-making board or group which was represented as the position of the Defense Department.

What happens there is that the Navy has a position, the Army has a position, the Air Force has a position, but somebody in one of the three services says something like this, and unless that is coordinated from all three services, as we attempted to do, there would be confusion, and there could never be what we have—thank God—unification. Therefore, it had to be done; therefore, that was not, so far as I know, an official document that ever went through my office.

If it did, you will find the initials of General Burns on it, General Bradley, I think, and myself, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much. I was here yesterday when you told about the trouble you had in trying to get this matter straightened out in there.

I was going to ask you another question about our demobilization, but you discussed that some already, and I will not take more time at this time.

I do want to express my appreciation, Mr. Chairman, to Senator Cain and to the committee for letting me come in for these few minutes out of order.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you from my point of view for bringing out that point, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

REASONS FOR JOHNSON'S RESIGNATION

Senator CAIN. Mr. Johnson, during your testimony of yesterday, and on page 6894, you said to the Senator from California, Mr. Knowland, this, and I quote:

> I can tell you if you were asking why I was ousted from the Defense Estabishment my answer is truthfully under oath, I don't know; I don't know to this day.

Mr. Johnson, it is important to our consideration of the complicated questions before us—at least I believe it to be so—to have you relate what you think were the reasons why you were replaced as Secretary of Defense.

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator Cain——

Senator CAIN. I just cannot let the record go, sir, with what you said yesterday if I can prevail upon you to amplify, sir, your remarks a bit.

Mr. JOHNSON. I practiced law too long and actively to be dragged into speculation here today. I am not going to answer your question.

Senator CAIN. I do not resent that.

Mr. JOHNSON. I told you the truth yesterday. I was embarrassed in telling you the truth, but I told you the truth, and that is all there is.

Senator WILEY. So help you God. [Laughter.]

Senator CAIN. I merely wanted to provide you with an opportunity to discuss the reasons, if you have reasons to believe it. The record will remain very clear on the subject that the Secretary did not know or does not know, and remains uncurious as to——

Mr. JOHNSON. I am sure, Senator Cain, if I had sitting at my right side an aide or two or three, as I understand the rest of the witnesses, except myself have had, he would be whispering in my ear, "Don't answer that one." [Laughter.]

Senator CAIN. I will again say, by way of compliment, that you do not have reason to do that; you do not need sitting on either your right or left anyone to tell you what to say; you say what you want.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is because I am trying to tell you the facts.

Senator CAIN. And what is interesting, on occasion you do not say what you do not want to relate, and I think that is quite proper from your point of view.

Permit me another inquiry against something that you said yesterday, and I have no intention of pressing this either, Mr. Johnson, but I want to ask you a question.

DISCUSSIONS WITH STATE DEPARTMENT ON POSSIBLE MISSION TO FORMOSA, 1949

At the end of my period of questioning yesterday, on page 6910 we were discussing the conversation which you had with the Secretary of State during which he expressed apparently in very brief form, his reasons why he would not concur or support your recommendation that a military mission be sent to Formosa in order that the Military Establishment in this country could be apprised of what the actual facts were.

One of the reasons you related as being given you by the Secretary was a simple sentence or more properly, a part of a longer sentence, "that he really wanted to have nothing to do with the Nationalist Government."

I asked you, Mr. Johnson, if you would amplify that section in that sentence, and you merely responded, "I can't amplify; that is all I know."

My inquiry runs in this direction: I want to try to understand, if I can, the circumstances surrounding that conversation. Was it so, that you may have said, "Mr. Secretary, my recommendation is that we do send a military mission to Formosa," and that he responded just as briefly as you had indicated, and that there was no further conversation on the subject of any kind?

Mr. JOHNSON. No; you are incorrect in your assumptions as to the question and the answer at the end.

ISSUANCE OF THE WHITE PAPER

I don't think I can amplify that further than to refer you to the white paper gotten out by the State Department, the issuance of which, before it was decided by the President would be issued, I protested——

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. In writing, I believe; and then, when it was decided that the State Department could go ahead and issue the white paper, I raised the question of its accuracy, and said that I think the files of the Defense Department contained things that conflicted with proposed things in the then draft; and pursuant to that, people came over and went through the files made available by the Joint Chiefs of Staff——

Senator WILEY. What date?

Mr. JOHNSON. And General Gruenther, and some corrections were made.

It was approved for issue and in the clearance that I gave the State Department, the clearance would be—I again raised the question of the political advisability of the document, all of which, consonant with what I said to you yesterday, that it be at the recommendation of either General Bradley, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its Chairman.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Johnson, your answer is most helpful to me because you have indicated where I can go for research, the research required to more thoroughly understand the situation, and I do thank you.

Mr. Johnson, because of my deep hope that collective security will be more effective and more rapidly set in motion should any future need arise, I want to know more, with your help, of what our American leaders and our allies were actually thinking about in the early months of the Korea War.

My first question:

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT EFFORTS FOR GREATER ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS

How long was it after the Korea War began, in June, late June 1950, that you, as the Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Steve Early, your executive assistant——

Mr. JOHNSON. Deputy Secretary of Defense, with more power than an Under Secretary has.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

When did you two begin to urge our allies in Western Europe to commit fighting forces to Korea?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is a matter you can get from the Defense Department, because you will find communications and reports to the State Department and to the President, maybe sometimes signed by me, but mostly by Mr. Early, who was in charge, recording for the President's information what had been furnished from time to time, and adding to it as they came in, and it was pretty slow.

Except for the pressure exerted by the military people, Mr. Early, who talked to everybody who came in from any of these governments, there would not have been much.

The credit is due to Mr. Early, more than anybody else in the world—Mr. Early acting for the President and the Defense Department—that they began to furnish things over there, and there still isn't much.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Johnson, I am trying more fully to understand the influence of our American Defense Establishment in a time of military crisis.

And, against that, I wish you would give us another word on the methods that you and Mr. Early and the Defense Establishment followed to bring the need for fighting troops in Korea to the attention of the Allied Nations concerned.

What I want to know is whether or not, on its initiative, the Defense Establishment had any conversations with foreign governments, or whether the position of the Defense Establishment can only be channeled to those foreign Allied Governments through our American State Department?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, maybe the exact procedure would have been that the efforts should only have been through diplomatic channels. That was not the situation, here.

I personally talked to representatives, and the records over there will show who they were, of a number of governments involved in collective security of the United Nations who were in position to furnish equipment, and I am sure Mr. Early did the same, and you will find in the files where we reported to State that we had seen so-and-so, or reported to the President, maybe, that we had seen so-and-so, prime ministers, or military attachés or ambassadors, when they came over to see us, some of them; but the situation—it became our problem; but don't read into that that the State Department didn't cooperate. I am sure that they wanted to help on that, and did do some help; but the lead, and laboring oar was carried by Mr. Steve Early.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Johnson, I want to pursue this one step further, and, I think, very legitimately.

After 2 months of study of the hardest character from which I individually have ever benefited, or enjoyed in Europe, last summer——

Mr. JOHNSON. May I interrupt to thank you publicly for the help you gave to the Defense Department in that very long conversation with me and the generals and the admirals that happened after you returned and very promptly, and—it was very helpful.

STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT EFFORTS FOR ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS

Senator CAIN. Mr. Johnson, you are a very thoughtful man, all of us are trying to help our country in a time of need; and that is why I want to pursue this a little.

Shortly after my return from that trip, during which some of that time—I think I was the only living American who had ever visited every one of the countries with whom we do business, within the North Atlantic Treaty area or the Mediterranean—I came to your office on the 5th day of September, sat with you and Mr. Early and several selected members of your staff, and talked about what appeared to be so to me overseas.

During that conversation I told all of you gentlemen that I found not a single solitary American embassy that had been informed by the State Department as to what need, if any, there was for those embassies to appeal to the governments to which they had been accredited, to send fighting forces to Korea. The date of this conversation was in early September.

I further told you, sir, that it was my own judgment that every embassy, without exception, wanted to be of assistance in this problem, and they wanted advice.

And in a word, what every one of them said to me, with one exception—and that was in England where Ambassador Lou Douglas didn't need anybody to tell him what was obvious—they said, "If you have any opportunity at home, please prevail upon our officers to send us the word as to what they want us to do."

I have never forgotten the exclamation of one of your chief assistants in that meeting, who just threw up his hands in holy horror and said, "Well, there we have part of the answer—that we have made one request after another to the State Department; and, Senator Cain, you are saying, rightly or wrongly, because we haven't had a chance to look into it, that our embassies abroad are not making requests of foreign governments because our American State Department just hasn't required them to do it."

I have this question: After telling the Military Establishment of my study and of my great distress over this, I wonder if Mr. Early to your knowledge took it up, as I assumed that he would do, with the State Department to get cracking on this matter of securing assistance from our friends overseas.

Mr. JOHNSON. He did; and you did say in substance what you have said here today. That is like other instances of the very vivid memory of mine—that conference.

Senator CAIN. There are some things, Mr. Johnson, you and I will agree we will never forget, and that was one of them. I appreciate your indulgence——

Mr. JOHNSON. I am glad you didn't say in the record who made the exclamation. It was made, and I did not make it.

Senator CAIN. Yes. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, under the circumstances confronting the Senator from Maine, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield my time to him.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, reciprocity is observed, and the Senator from Maine may proceed.

Senator WILEY. Magnanimous. That is wonderful.

Senator BREWSTER. I want to record, Mr. Chairman, my very great appreciation of the consideration of the Senator from Mississippi.

I may add that I am going on a mission to give an honorary degree to my Democratic colleague, Senator Douglas of Illinois; so my mission is thoroughly nonpartisan.

WAR PLAN FOR KOREA

Mr. Secretary, I shall never forget my experience at San Juan Naval Base, December 7, 1941, when the communication came in:

> Execute War Plan 46 against Japan. This is not a drill.

If that ought to be censored, the censor will take care of it.

Mr. JOHNSON. That should be censored.

Senator WILEY. Read it again.

Senator BREWSTER (reading):

> Execute War Plan 46 against Japan. This is not a drill.

Incidentally, there was an interesting aspect of unification, as we were not then unified, and 2 hours later the commanding general there, who was the ranking officer, had not received the message from his naval friend, which was another interesting illustration of the value of unification.

But that illustrates a point which I want to bring on or off the record, censored or uncensored. Was there on June 25 last a war plan for Korea?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. You have already testified that a——

Mr. JOHNSON. If there was, I had no knowledge of it and was informed later there was none.

Senator BREWSTER. I am informed, I think on equally reliable sources, there was none, and that a war plan such as is customary among all the nations does require probably at least a year in preparation—the study of all the aspects.

Mr. JOHNSON. A year or longer.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. And you have already testified, I think, in response to my question that there was also no time to prepare an estimate of the military requirements that might be involved in this proceeding, this program for Korea.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. So it was a case of rather shooting from the hip.

Mr. JOHNSON. Of doing with what we had in that area at that time, what could be done, and everyone recognized that situation.

Senator BREWSTER. Moving into the broader sphere now, there were complaints of Soviet aggression against China presented in the United Nations in 1949. Those were referred to the Little Assembly, and the following year they were referred again.

From your knowledge of the situation, do you now believe that there was considerable warrant for those complaints by the Chinese Nationalist Government as to Soviet aggression against their Government through the medium of the Chinese Communist forces?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, hindsight I should think the answer has to be "Yes."

THE VETO AND SOVIET DOMINATION OF CHINA

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. I think the Secretary indicated that also, Secretary Acheson. The point which concerns me a great deal is in connection with the question of the exercise of the veto, of the reference of the problem to the World Court, that if there had been a consideration and determination that the Soviet were using ultralegal means to acquire an undue influence in China, it would very greatly simplify the question of our attitude regarding the recognition of Red China or its admission to the United Nations. Would that be an accurate statement from your knowledge?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that is, sir; but the question of the World Court I never heard of until I read some testimony here in this connection, I mean.

Senator BREWSTER. That I think is rather a weak reed upon which to lean, particularly as our own Government repeatedly has stated that they had their own doubts as to whether a veto did exist, but if the complaints of the Chinese Nationalist Government against the Soviet authorities were found to be justified at any time in the past or in the present—and the complaint is still pending—that automatically as I understand the Charter of the United Nations would make recognition of such a Soviet-dominated government at least in violation of the Charter of the United Nations; would that be your understanding?

Mr. JOHNSON. I am not an expert on United Nations, and I couldn't either affirm or deny that. My general impression, without the expert qualifications, is that that is a correct statement.

Senator BREWSTER. I want to move to another point now, the far broader question of growing pains through which this Government has been passing in the unification of our Defense Establishment, in which you have participated, and I think very gratifying progress has been made.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator.

RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACTIVITIES OF STATE DEPARTMENT

Senator Brewster. I appreciated your evidence that without it you thought our situation would certainly be much worse than it is today, but I want to proceed to the next point which is the growing pains in the relationships between the Defense Establishment and the State Department as we move into the realm of our obviously greatly increased global responsibilities.

The State Department. representing our relationships with foreign powers in time of peace in essence signs notes on our Military Establishment by the commitments which they make, is that a correct statement, when we agree with some foreign countries as to what we will do in some quarter of the globe; why the Defense Establishment are the ones in the final analysis that have to back that up, pay the check.

Mr. Johnson. But in ordinary life there is such a thing as ultra vires, beyond the power, and I don't think that the State Department generally speaking without the approval of Congress or in some fields the President, has authority to bind any of us.

Senator Brewster. Well, that, of course, is a field of great speculation. The dictatorships, particularly the one with which we are now concerned, suffer from no such limitations or inhibitions; they make commitments and they have a supreme authority.

Mr. Johnson. That is correct.

Senator Brewster. Under our constitutional system the President has certain powers in peace, and broader powers in war, the Yalta agreement, for instance, as to Presidential power to commit the transfer of these lands.

As to whether it binds our country, that undoubtedly will be very widely discussed when the peace treaties come up, but I prefer to keep this I think in the philosophical field because of your experience in this field as Secretary of Defense and as former Assistant Secretary of War, as to how you feel this relationship can be practically adjusted.

[Deleted.]

In what way can these situations be practically adjusted as to how far the State Department may or should go in a particular situation with reference to the military responsibilities that may be perhaps involved?

Mr. Johnson. It is a very difficult situation. I think the military ought in the first instance be kept in the military field.

There are those who disagree. I think the State Department ought to be kept in the diplomatic field. The State Department has in the period of years—I am not now talking about the present Secretary of State—but over a period of years the State Department has been growing and expanding.

You will find in foreign countries, if you check the lists, agricultural agents and representatives from Brannan's office—Secretary Brannan—and from the Department of Commerce. All these people added in and put under the diplomatic field to the point that those departments have somebody abroad expressing policies and probably not coming back.

I think the State Department some day has to be reorganized to be the diplomatic agent and not be all over the lot, handling economic aid and everything else.

I don't think it belongs in that field, because that of itself is bound to warp the political objectives, it seems to me.

Further than that I don't want to go.

PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES OF UNITED STATES

Senator **Brewster**. I think you represented this Government in a mission in India at some point, did you not?

Mr. **Johnson**. I did, sir.

Senator **Brewster**. What time was that?

Mr. **Johnson**. 1942.

Senator **Brewster**. Were you familiar at that time with the activities of, whatever it was called, the Voice of America, or whatever our propaganda agency was called at that time, in India?

Mr. **Johnson**. If there was any Voice of America at that time, I never heard of it.

Senator **Brewster**. There was a propaganda agency. I think we had very extended evidence on it from——

Mr. **Johnson**. There was a propaganda agency when I was over there, but it wasn't American. There were some boys, some men, who came down, good men, from China and other places, who met me there; and we were working with Wild Bill Donovan or some economic set-up we had.

Senator **Brewster**. Wasn't Donovan then in the Government?

Mr. **Johnson**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Brewster**. That is the agency I referred to. We had extended evidence before our Defense Investigating Committee—I think at the time the Senator from Texas was also a member—regarding their publicity in India to supplement the British situation, when they were then in difficulty, you will recall, with both Gandhi and Nehru.

Mr. **Johnson**. Yes, sir; that group I knew, worked with, they were very helpful and a very fine group, during the period I was in India. But that wasn't like Voice of America.

Senator **Brewster**. That represented a further extension of activities of government with representations as to American policy, which might or might not be later substantiated. I speak of this because these particular instances have come to my attention.

CLARIFYING STATE DEPARTMENT FUNCTIONS

Do you have any suggestions as to how, through the National Security Council or other means, this situation may be further coordinated so that what I would term our bank account of our military resources shall not be overdrawn?

Mr. **Johnson**. No; not in the limited time here would I want to go into that. I have a conviction on the subject, and it was so deep that when the suggestion was made that upon the expiration of the appropriations for ECA, that there be added to the military budget some billions of dollars to assist certain countries abroad, I protested it very strongly and very bitterly for the same reason I gave you before, because the minute you begin to conceal in military budgets moneys that are not for actual military purposes, the Congress and the public can't know what is going on.

There has to be a division of authority of everybody in their own fields or else you on the Hill cannot know what we are talking about.

Senator BREWSTER. That is a very interesting illustration, and we have the same problem in the Congress of the two committees here representing military affairs and foreign relations.

We give military aid; we have been giving economic aid, and we now propose to give military aid. Here again we have what I would term in the evolution of our constitutional system, a distinct aspect of what, I think, the medical people call schizophrenia, a division of our functioning in our divisions of our Government in legislative, executive, and judicial, and then even within the executive department this difficulty between your state and your military, which has come to a head, as we have two strong men at the head.

Mr. JOHNSON. The illustration that you might pick up currently that ought to give you concern is the placing of the military aid under the North Atlantic Treaty arrangement, and so forth, under the State Department.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. That has happened since I left over there, but it gives me grave cause for concern because military matters ought to be handled by the military brethren.

Senator BREWSTER. I shall not undertake to solve this problem this morning, but I think that while we have been spending most of our time looking backward necessarily in this matter, we also should begin to turn our faces ahead and not be too much discouraged because we do find difficulties.

The difficulties are going to increase as we grow up, and it is growing pains all around; but I think those with experience, like yourself, do owe a great debt to the country in or out of office to assist in its solution.

Mr. JOHNSON. I want to be helpful, but I don't want to be accused of sour grapes, or being unduly critical, but you struck a note at the end that I do want to make a comment about separate from that.

A long time ago there was a stone dug up in or near a cemetery at Bray, England; that is in Berkshire, as you know.

On that stone was something that impresses me as something that Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, and all of us ought to look into. It was very short. It said, "Fear knocked on the door."

Senator WILEY. What?

Mr. JOHNSON. "Fear knocked at the door. Faith answered, and there was no one there."

Senator BREWSTER. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. I might say—I did not want to interrupt you gentlemen, but I think one of you was talking about OWI and the other, OSS a few minutes ago.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that is correct. I am glad to have it clarified.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think you were talking about OWI, and the witness was talking about and discussing OSS.

Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I thought I had waived my round.

Chairman RUSSELL. I thought you had exchanged places.

Senator KNOWLAND. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Mississippi proceed.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator has a right to either pass or proceed. He is entirely within his rights.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is right; but I did not want him to feel that he was taking any advantage of the committees, and I ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to proceed.

Chairman RUSSELL. He may pass or proceed, as he chooses.

Senator WILEY. Boy, is there harmony!

Senator STENNIS. Under the circumstances, I will pass, with appreciation for the attitude of the committees and Senator Knowland.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman, out of order, might I have unanimous consent for 2 minutes?

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there objection? Senator Hunt was present and passed, and now he wishes to employ 2 minutes. He was not absent; he was here but passed.

Senator HUNT. I think, Mr. Chairman, that will make a total of about 15 minutes I have taken in all of these hearings.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator is recognized.

CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION IN DECISION TO ENTER KOREA

Senator HUNT. Mr. Secretary, I understood on yesterday in answer to a question with reference to "Was the Senate Armed Services and House Armed Services counterpart consulted before decision was made on Korea," that your answer was that Senator Tydings and Senator Bridges were called in and were informed and advised with reference to the discussions under way; is that the fact?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir; I did not say that. I said the decision was made on Monday night, the second of the Blair House conferences, and a list was made up, and a group was invited down to meet in the Cabinet room with the President on the next morning.

In my language I referred to this group generally, and the chairman corrected me and named the people who were there from these two committees.

Senator HUNT. Now, that was after decision was made?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator HUNT. I ask that question, Mr. Secretary, for this reason: My mail, and I am sure the mail of all the other Senators, in the last 2 or 3 months has indirectly accused the Congress of not taking advantage of its prerogatives or of not playing the part that we should play in these very, very important matters, and I would like to ask you this question—you may not answer it if you would rather not—Don't you feel in such tremendously important matters that the members of these two committees, who actually represent the people, should definitely be conferred with and consulted with and taken into confidence by the Executive before such tremendous and important actions are taken?

Mr. JOHNSON. I said yesterday to Senator Johnson that I was surprised at the question that came from him on that side of the table, and I am surprised at that one.

I am still a member of the Democratic Party. You are asking me a political question that calls for an opinion on my part, which can be the first of the answers I have made that has a political approach. Won't you withdraw the question?

Senator HUNT. May I be allowed to answer my own question?

Mr. JOHNSON. When I became Secretary of Defense I said in West Virginia at my homecoming that there would be no politics of a partisan nature in the Defense Establishment so long as I was there; so help me God, there were none, and I don't want to be over a barrel.

Senator HUNT. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. We have tried to keep politics out of this committee so far as we could, Mr. Secretary. For my part, I think it is a perfectly proper question that Senator Hunt has propounded. If he wishes to withdraw it, he can.

Senator STENNIS. It is a constitutional question rather than a political one.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have stated that it is a proper one.

Mr. JOHNSON. Let me state it this way, Senator Hunt. You are privileged to cross-examine me again; you used to do that in the Armed Services Committee. If it were a matter that I had been handling of that importance, the records of your committee will show that we came up and talked about it before we moved. That is as far as I want to go.

Senator HUNT. I realize your condition, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am a private citizen now.

Senator HUNT. I am completely satisfied with what I have gotten into the record.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the committees for allowing me to do it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe that these consultations with the Members of Congress did take place before any public release of the decision, did they not?

Mr. JOHNSON. You were handed before you left a copy of the things that had been written out.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was not there. You mean the Members of Congress who were present?

Mr. JOHNSON. Correct it then. There was passed out to each of those present as you left the meeting the statement I referred to yesterday, on which the staff had worked until 2 o'clock in the morning, and when General Bradley and I went to the White House with corrections to make, there we found the President had rewritten it. That was mimeographed and handed out at that time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not any Member of the Congress who was present protested the decision that had been made?

Mr. JOHNSON. No one protested the decision.

The question of taking it up with Congress was raised by Senator Smith, and Senator Connolly made a little speech on it, answered by the Secretary of State; and it just, as I said yesterday, died a-borning.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have a few little odds and ends here that occurred to me during the course of this testimony.

AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC VALUE OF FORMOSA

You stated yesterday that you never saw a military man who had not yielded to political pressure who did not insist on the strategic value of Formosa. That intrigued my curiosity because I had never seen a military man of any rank who had not said it had considerable strategic value.

Did you have any individual in mind when you made that statement?

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, you must have misunderstood me. What I meant to say and think I did say, although I have not had access to the transcript, that I didn't know of any military man in the upper echelons, or in the lower, for that matter, who did not feel that Formosa in hostile hands was inimicable to the security of the United States.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes; you said that; but if my recollection does not fail me very badly, you also said something about who had not been subjected, or who had not yielded to political pressure, and that was the part of your statement that intrigued me and excited my curiosity.

I am quite confident the record will bear that out, though I haven't referred to the record, because I made a pencil notation of it.

Mr. JOHNSON. You are correct, Mr. Chairman, when you change it to the framework of not strategic value but the framework of in possession of unfriendly powers it would be inimicable to the security of the United States.

What I meant was that I thought that it was the argument that came from the second and lower echelons in the State Department to our people on the Joint Staff and others responsible for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September, and maybe on December 10, saying there was no need for a mission to go to Korea. That was the framework.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean Formosa instead of Korea?

Mr. JOHNSON. Oh, yes; of course. Please correct that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did that cause the military people to yield their views, their opinion? That was the thing that I was worrying about and wondering about when you made the statement.

Mr. JOHNSON. Rightly or wrongly, I felt it had a bearing in those several decisions not to send a mission—fact-finding mission.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, that decision was not made within the Defense Department, was it?

MISSION TO FORMOSA

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. There were a couple of instances, September, and I think early December, when the Joint Chiefs recommended to me against a mission—a thing they reversed themselves on shortly thereafter.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, that puts an entirely different light on it. I did not understand that. I understood from the testimony the military had always felt that the mission should go to Formosa.

Mr. JOHNSON. Wait a minute.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, you stated to Senator Cain that you protested the——

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, if I may say——

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes; excuse me.

Mr. JOHNSON. On September 23 I think is the correct date the Joint Chiefs considered sending a mission to Formosa and said no mission; didn't recommend for it, I mean.

Chairman RUSSELL. That was 1949?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. On December 9 the same question was up again, and December 10, when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek went there from the mainland and established headquarters, then they began to restudy it, reversed themselves, and said there ought to be this fact-finding mission. That is the thing that came to the Security Council and passed on the 29th, about which the President advised me previously.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think that clarifies it.

ISSUANCE OF WHITE PAPER

You stated to Senator Cain that you vigorously protested the issuance of the white paper. What was the basis for that protest?

Mr. JOHNSON. I didn't think it was accurate and thought it was politically unwise.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was any correction made to improve the accuracy of the document as a result of those protests?

Mr. JOHNSON. Definitely. The State Department, after my protest on the score, sent over someone—I had better not say who because I am not absolutely positive—and they worked with people in our Joint Staff in looking at papers that we had that didn't agree with things that were in the draft of the white paper. Some corrections were made, but not all the corrections our people on the Joint Staff thought should be made.

Chairman RUSSELL. Why did you not think it was wise politically to issue the paper?

Mr. JOHNSON. Why, I could answer the chairman's question by asking him a question.

What purpose was to be served at that juncture of world affairs by the issuance of such a document which had as its one seeming object to destroy a government there that was established and which afforded the only hope?

Chairman RUSSELL. The reason I ask the question was that you had stated yesterday that you saw no reason for withholding the Wedemeyer report. That was the important part of the white paper, yet it disparages the Government there as much or almost as much as any other part, and that is why I did not understand.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, releasing the Wedemeyer report—I feel that if any part of the document were to go out, that then Wedemeyer was entitled to have his report go out too, that he was entitled to that and the country was entitled to that. That is the basis of my answer.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, would you have released the complete Wedemeyer report then?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that if that were released then the entire paper should go out. I would not agree with releasing a part of it, the Wedemeyer report and not the rest.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, do you see any hopes of the success of the United Nations as a collective organization to preserve world peace?

Mr. JOHNSON. Read that back, will you?

(Whereupon, the question was read by the reporter.)

Chairman RUSSELL. I ask that question merely because the United Nations and its value and its potentialities and its weaknesses have been discussed at great length by other witnesses here, and you have not been asked any questions about the United Nations.

Mr. JOHNSON. William Blake says in his Auguries of Innocence:

> If the sun and moon should doubt they would disappear immediately.

I have not liked their indecision. I have not liked a lot of things they have done. I am hoping that they will be able to make a great contribution to world peace along the lines you question me.

I have my worries about it, when I look at some of the things that some nations are saying and the lack of support for the interest of freedom in which we of America are so concerned and to which we give our boys' lives and our treasures—they are ignored or are so long delayed as to militate against the doing of the things that it seems to me should be done promptly.

Chairman RUSSELL. I may say, if I can express my own view of the United Nations, that it seems to be very limp and halting and at times almost impotent. But it seems to be the only hope we have for collective action to preserve world peace.

Mr. JOHNSON. I agree with you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you think then that we should use every means at our command short of inviting disaster to utilize the United Nations as the means of world collective action not only in Korea but to preserve the future peace of the world?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do completely, and I support it thoroughly, and hope it will not discredit itself.

COMPARISON TO DISMISSAL OF ADMIRAL DENFELD

Chairman RUSSELL. Now one other question. You mentioned in the course of examination during yesterday afternoon the case of Admiral Denfeld. The removal of Admiral Denfeld has been mentioned by some Senator in the examination earlier in this hearing.

On yesterday I thought I understood you to say that Admiral Denfeld had received notice that he would be removed from his command before the order was actually issued. Was I correct in that understanding?

Mr. JOHNSON. Almost, not quite. The statement I referred to was in existence, and will show that Secretary Matthews said to him maybe these words or words to this effect: He lost his usefulness as Chief of Naval Operations.

Chairman RUSSELL. While sitting here listening to all this testimony, I could not help but reflect on some of the evidence submitted to the Armed Services Committee at the time Admiral Denfield was removed, and I had noticed a parallel between that and the facts in the MacArthur removal.

I got a copy of some of those hearings and the distinguished Senator from California, Mr. Knowland, who is one of the most diligent Members of the Senate, not to speak of this committee, had quoted this statement from a national periodical:

> Last October, on the date which was formerly Navy Day Admiral Louis Denfeld, after 40 years of distinguished service to his country, in peace and in war, was kicked out of his job as Chief of Naval Operations. The Admiral learned of his firing from an aide, who read about it in the newspaper.

Do you know whether or not that statement was correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't know whether that is correct or not. It can still be and not be inconsistent at all with what I said.

Chairman RUSSELL. I did not think you touched on it. That is the reason I was asking you about it today.

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't know about how he found out about it. That could relate to the Executive order rather than to the thing I was talking about, Senator Knowland, yesterday of the history of the thing and my discussions with Admiral Nimitz. I didn't touch on this point and have no personal knowledge of it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was interested in the parallel there. General MacArthur apparently heard about it through an aide.

Mr. JOHNSON. The memorandum I referred to yesterday is in existence and is available.

Chairman RUSSELL. Who made the decision to remove Admiral Denfeld?

Mr. JOHNSON. The recommendation was from the Secretary of the Navy supported by me and approved by the President of the United States.

Chairman RUSSELL. Why was he removed?

Mr. JOHNSON. He wasn't removed in that sense. He was not given a continuation of 2 years which was in contemplation when this decision was made by the Secretary of the Navy not to reappoint him for this period.

He had received without the knowledge of the Secretary of the Navy, delivered to him by the President's aide, a certificate of appointment, as it later developed, but that according to legal opinion was worthless and of no value until he was sworn in on the job, and before the time of the swearing in came, the President revoked the new certificate. That is about the history of what happened.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir; he had been confirmed by the Senate, his nomination had been sent to the Senate, he had been confirmed by the Senate, but he never had a legal and authorized delivery of his certificate of appointment.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Chairman RUSSELL. To carry the parallel further, are you familiar with this testimony delivered here by Secretary Matthews:

> I believe that in the Military Establishment you must have authority, there must be top authority and whoever is in authority is entitled to be supported by subordinates who are in accordance, in sympathy and belief in the policies of whoever is in authority.

Did he fail to receive that certificate because of his lack of sympathy with policies of those who were in authority?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think it had a lot to do with it. He was not for the kind of unification that the Congress had ordered, in my opinion, and that is why I supported the Secretary of the Navy.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I am advised by Dr. Wilcox my time has expired. Senator Connally.

PROCEDURE ON APPOINTMENT

Chairman CONNALLY. Right on that point, the procedure on an appointment is that the President nominates and the Senate confirms, and the actual appointment is made after all of that procedure; and if the President then changes his mind, all he has to do is not make the appointment.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is the law.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think, in justice to myself, I should have the record show I hadn't raised any question as to the legality of it.

I was discussing the reason for it.

Chairman CONNALLY. I wasn't criticizing the chairman.

Mr. JOHNSON. I so understood, Mr. Chairman, and my answers were in that light.

Chairman CONNALLY. I was just trying to arrive at the way this thing happened. After he had gotten his certificate, he could still not be appointed, after he is confirmed, until he gets the appointment from the President; is that right?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Chairman CONNALLY. Which takes place after his confirmation.

Mr. JOHNSON. But Chairman Russell was correct, because there was delivered, not through channels but by an aide, what purported to be a designation.

Chairman CONNALLY. I wasn't criticizing the chairman. I was just trying to get in my own mind the procedure.

Chairman RUSSELL. If you will pardon me, I didn't raise the issue about the commission having been delivered.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am in the middle. I will shut up.

Senator WILEY. You are right in the middle.

Chairman RUSSELL. If the Secetary raised that issue, it was correct. The evidence developed the facts before the Armed Services Committee.

I was merely discussing the reason for it, because it had been mentioned in the testimony on yesterday.

Senator WILEY. Did you hear MacArthur last night? That is more pertinent.

Chairman CONNALLY. Yes; I heard him. Off the record.

(A discussion was had off the record.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, you can go back on the record, Mr. Reporter.

Chairman CONNALLY. I was not here yesterday afternoon, Mr. Secretary, and I did hear your testimony the other day, which was very good, indeed.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. And, I pass, Mr. Chairman; I won't interrogate, unless the Secretary has some questions he wants me to ask him.

Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges has just been called over to the Appropriations Committee.

Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. He, also, is in Appropriations Committee, and advised me to that effect.

Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I have very few questions left that I want to ask you; but I do have two or three, however.

POSSIBILITY OF WAR WITH RUSSIA

Do you think, Mr. Secretary, that there are ways of avoiding a war with Russia, or do you think that a war with Russia is inevitable?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not think it is inevitable.

I do not think that Russia is ready for war, although a pistol shot might start one.

I think the growing might of America, plus the continued development of the strategic air command and our knowledge of atomic weapons will prevent a war for a reasonable length of time; and in that time, I hope that the great moral forces of the world, and the moral forces which I believe exist in the echelons below the Kremlin in Russia, will come into play.

I believe there is a God in Heaven, and He will help us, but I want to keep our powder dry, and keep adequate equipment and arms in America.

Senator MORSE. May I say, the statement you just made, in regard to the matter of the probability of a war with Russia, and the possibility of avoiding it, represents identically the point of view that I have expressed for a long time, and which I was aware you shared.

My next question is:

Do you agree with me, that if the officials of this Government, and the people of this country, will only proceed as rapidly as they can with a united mobilization program aimed at getting ourselves as strong as common sense dictates we ought to get strong in the immediate future, that we have some chance, by that very strength, of making clear to Russia that she will have everything to lose and nothing to gain by a continuation of a course of aggression, acting through her satellites.

Mr. JOHNSON. I agree with you, Senator Morse, and I think the thing that the country needs is faith in its institutions and its processes; that we need unity—I can't tell you where it is, you can probably tell me—but it was said that the time has come to take counsel of our faith, not of our fears.

That time is here. I, for one, have faith in our way of life, faith in our institutions, and this turmoil we are living through now, this confusion, you, on the Hill, must help the American people who are confused, to resolve in a way that we go on to what I think, as Roosevelt put it, is "a rendezvous with destiny."

Senator MORSE. Well, Mr. Secretary, I share that faith.

I am concerned about one problem connected with our present disunity, and that is—that although I think we could lick Russia right now, if she wanted to pick a fight with us——

Mr. JOHNSON. I do too, and I am sorry to see statements that indicate we can't do that.

The industrial might of this country is a thing that Russia fears and respects, and, with the strategic air force, will avoid war.

Senator MORSE. I am satisfied we can lick her right now.

SPEED ON MOBILIZATION

I am, however, satisfied from the information that has been given in this committee, both the joint committee and the Armed Services Committee separately from the joint committee, from time to time, that we would suffer much fewer casualties and much less damage in a war with Russia, both at home and abroad, if we first get ourselves stronger than we are at the present time; and it has been my understanding that what the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been trying to tell us is not a story of defeatism at all, but trying to make clear to us that we can take her on and, if we have to take her on, we will lick Russia; but that from the standpoint of our country and of our allies, we ought to first get ourselves stronger than we are at the present time, to absorb the first shock of the first few months of that war which, as I interpret their point of view, would result in casualties that we need not suffer to any such degree that we probably would, if we worked a little faster at this whole job of mobilization, and get ourselves stronger.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff might well be disturbed at the lack of speed in getting things done, now that you are giving them the money to do it and all; but the Joint Chiefs of Staff, collective and individually, are not defeatists, as you sometimes gather from the testimony they gave on the Hill, as interpreted in the magazines and in the press—they are a grand, competent group of men.

Senator MORSE. I don't think their testimony is entitled to a defeatist interpretation.

Mr. JOHNSON. I have seen it so stated in the press.

Senator MORSE. I know, but I think their testimony is entitled, on the other hand, to the interpretation of stark realism on their part.

Their job is to get us as strong as we can, to meet this Russian threat, if an all-out war is going to come.

EMPHASIS ON ASIA AND EUROPE

Now, with that point of view, based upon a faith that you and I share in the potentialities of our country, and our ability, if we have to, to lick Russia, I ask you if you disagree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their testimony, and I give you my interpretation of it—that at the present time, in view of our defenses, in view of our present ability to deliver the necessary striking power in Asia, and in view of some of our allies, Great Britain in particular, whose trade with the Red Chinese I not only deplore, but resent, and have said so on the floor of the Senate—do you think the Joint Chiefs of Staff are sound and right in their advice to our Government, which I understand they have been giving, that we should avoid following a course of action at this time in Asia, as recommended by MacArthur, which would have included the bombing of the Manchurian railroad and other bases in Manchuria, and the imposition of a naval blockade that might have been looked upon, not only by Russia, but even by some of our allies, as an act of war?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, philosophically, if that be the word——

Senator WILEY. Louder, please.

Mr. JOHNSON. Philosophically, if that be the word, we know now, as we didn't know yesterday, that the vital interests of the United States are tied up with what lies beyond the seas, and that we can't leave the world alone, because the world won't leave us alone.

You are saying, very delicately—are the Joint Chiefs of Staff right in giving preference to Europe as against Asia, I think——

Senator MORSE. It is involved.

Mr. JOHNSON. To me, it doesn't do any good to save Europe, if we are going to wash out our west coast, and everything that goes on to the Orient.

One reason I am for more preparedness is so that no competent military man can say there isn't enough existing strength to do both of these jobs.

If there had been rectitude and righteousness at one time that if Asia goes and Japan and the Philippines and all, we can and will defend Europe and then go back there, that posture of sovereignty and respect was altered the night the President made the decision to go into Korea.

Having gone into Korea, we crossed the Rubicon, in my judgment. You cannot take the philosophy of promising for the defense of Europe to the point of saying you desert the Far East.

I would agree that there is a seniority and call to the Eisenhower forces, but in my opinion, we have now reached that stage, particularly if they call out three or four more divisions, where the United States can and must keep its responsibilities, which it assumed in the Orient on the Korean night, and which we have done in the Atlantic under the Atlantic Treaty. Do I make myself clear?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. I didn't come prepared to talk about that, but you are leaning back in the chair and dreaming. I dream with you, but realistically.

Senator MORSE. We are fundamental, and I don't think we are dreaming so much. I think we are faced with pretty stark reality.

Mr. JOHNSON. But you are speaking as a United States Senator. I am speaking as Louis Johnson, private citizen.

PREPAREDNESS TO DELIVER A BLOW AGAINST RUSSIA IN ASIA IF NECESSARY

Senator MORSE. I am willing to discuss it with you as a private citizen, though as a Senator from the west coast, with a record I will stand on for wanting to do everything we can to defend our defenses in the Pacific, I want to be sure, as a Senator from the west coast, that we don't follow a course of action in Asia prior to the time that we are ready to deliver the blow that needs to be delivered in Asia to prevent successfully devastating blows from being delivered on the west coast, which I think is an understandable attitude.

Mr. JOHNSON. It is time for all Americans to be on guard, I said in my farewell speech. It is time for the men like yourself from the west coast to realize the west coast's relation to that part of the world. And the west coast is just as much a part of the United States as the east coast or any other part.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

Mr. JOHNSON. And there are propaganda forces abroad in this land that would seek to say we should take everything and give it to the defense of Western Europe at the expense of the Orient. That is something that, if I may say it, I resent.

Senator MORSE. I am glad you raised the point, because your resentment can't begin to approach mine.

But what I want to find out——

Mr. JOHNSON. You brought it up. I didn't.

Senator MORSE. That is right. I brought it up, because I think the American people had better get just the kind of information that you are presenting here.

What I want to find out is to what extent are we in a present defense position to deliver the blow in Asia to protect the west coast that I think we are going to have to deliver if we get involved at the present time in an all-out war with Russia in Asia, if England and France and some of our other allies should sit on their haunches, so to speak, or talk in terms of neutralized policy.

I want to be sure my country is ready to deliver. I don't see how anyone can read the transcript of this record and be very enthusiastic about the assurances that the Joint Chiefs of Staff give us as to our ability to deliver at the present time, in view of our far-flung commitments.

That is what concerns me as a Senator from the west coast, and that is why I am urging that we speed ahead faster with this mobilization program so that we know we have got the stuff with which to deliver that blow.

Mr. JOHNSON. I should like to borrow, if the chairman would let me have it, a copy of this record and go through it. I have not had access to it.

Chairman RUSSELL. We will be glad to get one for you.

Senator MORSE. One final question. If, following MacArthur's and Wedemeyer's recommendations now would be the spark that would start off a full-scale war in Asia with Russia, do you think that we are justified in following that course of action at the present time in view of our present defenses?

Mr. JOHNSON. That question is easy to answer, as you fairly phrased it, if it would spark the world war, I think the answer is, I think not.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired.

Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. Mr. Johnson, I have listened this morning and got quite a bit of pick-up from this exchange on the philosophical or spiritual basis; this idea of faith is, of course, fundamental. Even the Good Book says, "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen."

Now, I give primacy to faith, but I am sensitive to the fact that our policy in the east, Far East, has already been definitely laid down apparently by the Government.

I am also cognizant of the fact that MacArthur, like you, got the ax. The only question with me now is, Where do we go from here? Whether or not MacArthur was right or the Government was right in its decisions probably will have to be determined by subsequent events.

[Deleted.]

ACCURACY OF THE WHITE PAPER

Senator WILEY. I took a few notes here that I want to refer to in questioning you. You mentioned something about the white paper. There were parts of it that you thought were inaccurate.

Are you able quickly to designate what parts you thought were inaccurate?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir; that was, the inaccurate parts were in a draft preceding the draft finally issued, they were the ones that I have reference to; but my objections came as a result of a study made by military personnel that pointed out things which were communicated to the State Department.

DETERMINATION OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL POLICY

Senator WILEY. As you know, there has been criticism of our policy-making machinery on the ground that the State Department has been probably too influential in determining what might be called military policy. Have you any reaction to give us on that?

Mr. JOHNSON. None, other than what I have given, sir. I think that is in the process of being straightened out. I am sure the President is fully conscious of it from the analysis I gave you of the function of the two Departments, I think, replying to your questions of yesterday.

Senator WILEY. In other words, as Secretary of Defense you formed the impression, did you, that our military policies were being determined by the State Department?

Mr. JOHNSON. Were being influenced by the State Department prior to a simon-pure decision by Defense as to military power, as distinguished from political objectives, the latter being the definite responsibility of State and the former being the definite responsibilities of Defense, each of which should come up to the top level in the two Departments without influence unduly from the other.

Senator WILEY. Of course, I got the impression from your testimony, and other testimony here, that during your incumbency there was, we probably might call it, a little lack of cooperation between the two Departments, if I am correct in my conclusion.

What, in your judgment, is the way to get more of the cooperativeness——

Mr. JOHNSON. I didn't say lack of cooperation between the two Departments. I would say that you may have put that construction on what I said. It goes a little farther than what I said.

I pointed out the troubles we were having in Defense, and gave in detail the machinery set up in the letter I wrote to the Secretary of State, with the approval of the President, whereby General Burns became the clearing agent to and from the State Department, and Dean Rusk—I don't believe I said yesterday—became and was designated by Secretary Acheson, on the other side.

I think that has been working very, very much better since then, and I know I said further that the illustrations—the instances that arose after that when men of the lower echelons of State went on to influence things in State and Defense, they were reported to the Secretary of State, and he promptly and aggressively corrected that. If that policy is continued I am sure that policy will continue to work.

Senator WILEY. Was there a conflict of personalities?

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you mean between the Secretary of State and myself?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. As to personalities, I think not.

Senator WILEY. Then there was simply a difference in what policy should be, is that what you mean?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

Senator WILEY. Now a question was asked and there was some comment about the United Nations.

Mr. JOHNSON. I might well have added yesterday when I was saying during the 8 months since I have been out of the Defense Department I haven't discussed things, I could have included Secretary Acheson as one of those I have not discussed during that period.

Senator WILEY. The discussion here this morning in relation to the United Nations——

Mr. JOHNSON. And through my discussion over here I haven't been grinding an ax against any individual in the world. I have been trying to answer your questions factually.

EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITED NATIONS

Senator WILEY. All right, we will get off of that subject. Now in relation to the United Nations, isn't this our big problem in the United Nations, that we have got a pretty good mechanism there but there are very few mechanics that are willing to look after it and run it as it should be?

In other words, the various nations of earth with their conflicts, political, economic, and so forth, are not really cooperating as they should. A good machine operated by a bum mechanic does not get anywhere; is that right?

Mr. JOHNSON. I have the opinion, sir, not quite that, but until nations themselves arrive at a point where they can for the peace of the world be above their own selfish interests, the United Nations is going to have a very difficult time, and I hope that America's conduct will be such that it will stimulate other nations to arrive above their own immediate selfish interests and fight for a world fit for all of us to live in.

Senator WILEY. Well, don't you think that as a matter of, well, let's say basic common sense, that what we are trying to do is amalgamate people who are on different levels of political and economic understanding?

Mr. JOHNSON. Of course we are, and therefore to a certain extent America must make concessions that other nations don't make, but I sometimes get worried that America concedes too much for its own security.

Senator WILEY. You say she concedes too much?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

EFFECTIVENESS OF INTELLIGENCE

Senator WILEY. I think this question may have been asked. What impression and experience did you gain about the effectiveness of our Intelligence both at home and abroad while you were Secretary of Defense?

To me this matter of Intelligence is more important now probably than any other time in the world's history because of the very effectiveness of the Kremlin in taking over peoples and states and infiltrating as we know it has done in this country.

Mr. JOHNSON. You and I will not get into any argument about that. Yesterday afternoon I detailed the steps that we had taken while I was in Defense to try to improve it. I have no knowledge about it since I left over there, but I am sure if the programs then under way were followed—and I have every reason to think they were—that Intelligence will get better and better.

POLICY TOWARD CHINA DURING AND AFTER THE WAR

Senator WILEY. Now I want to get back again to this matter of the far-eastern policy. See if I understand the situation, and I would like to get your reaction. Back in the days when the Nationalist Government was fighting Japan, and then when we got into the war, the attitude of our Government was at the beginning and during those years that Nationalist China and ourselves were partners, and we were fighting the same enemy.

Then there came a time when the Commies came into the picture and our Government seemed to feel that there was an opportunity to weld the two Chinese elements into one group.

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator Wiley, if you will pardon me, I am not an expert in that field.

I was not in the Government when these items which are the subject of controversy in the testimony as reported from here were in the newspapers. I am not going to express any opinions as to that far-eastern situation that antedated my connection with the Defense Department.

Senator WILEY. All right, then I will ask the question which I was leading up to.

While you were in the Department of Defense have you any opinion to express as to the influence of those who were of the opinion that the Communists of China should be the dominant power in China?

Mr. JOHNSON. There were none in the Department of Defense who thought that the Communists should be the dominant power, and personally I am against—I repeat from yesterday—against communism anywhere in the world and our Government doing anything to aid the growth or spread of communism anywhere.

Senator WILEY. Well, maybe my question was not specific enough. Are you willing to give your opinion, while you were in the Government, as to what the effect was of those in Government who were Communists, as we know there were plenty of them at the time, or those who were Communist sympathizers—what their effect was on the policy that was attempted to be arranged?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think it was successfully resisted, if such there was, during the period I was in Defense.

SECURITY OF RECORDS FOR COMMITTEE

Senator WILEY. Before the Foreign Relations Committee while you were Secretary you stressed especially the importance of security and the need for secrecy of information given to the committee. Since leaving the Government have you formed any conclusion on how Government information can be protected in a better way than at the present time?

Mr. JOHNSON. I remember the discussions and that I got off the record before your committee; and I am still of the same general opinion as then. I have nothing to add.

Senator WILEY. Nothing further to give us on that subject.

Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Johnson, I was interested in what you had to say about the relationship between the Defense Department and State Department.

STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT COORDINATION

We of course recognize that the problems of the two departments are inextricably interwoven and that one has to operate in conjunction with the other.

You stated that after General Burns was appointed by the Defense Department and Dean Rusk, I believe, by the State Department, to work out operations and to bring about understanding and working arrangements between the two departments, that things went along very smoothly. Is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. I said there were instances when the policy was deviated from but when they were called to Secretary Acheson's attention he promptly corrected them. There was a will on his part, as on our own, to make the policy work.

On the first part of your question, I agree completely that the policies of the Government in the fields affecting Defense and State must be hybrid policies.

But what I was talking about was preserving the integrity of staff work as a military power in Defense, and preserving the political objectives to State, until they reached the top echelon where they if they cannot be reconciled and carried out, then the President had the determination.

Senator KEFAUVER. Does the State Department have any similar set-up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that you have in the Defense set-up for over-all consultation of their programs and policies?

Mr. JOHNSON. They are divided into a number of compartments, and there is a machinery over there for coordinating those things that is not unlike the Joint Chiefs, or not unlike the joint staff which works under the Joint Chiefs; and I think the Secretaries, as shown on their arrangement chart, constitute a coordinating body in different aspects somewhat like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although those groups do not have the statutory authority and responsibility that is given to the Joint Chiefs.

The Joint Chiefs are made the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense. There is no like provision in the State Department set-up.

Again, though, I am not an expert on their organization.

INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Johnson, I know the importance that you place in maintaining working arrangements with our Democratic allies, particularly those in the North Atlantic, and the support that you gave to the North Atlantic Pact at the time it was before us.

Mr. JOHNSON. I supported it wholeheartedly, as you know, and still do, and visited and worked with it.

Senator KEFAUVER. I believe you feel, of course, it would be very bad in the interest of our own security and world peace unless we can work out things together with nations that also believe in freedom?

Mr. JOHNSON. If we do not work with the other nations who have cooperated and believe in freedom, we serve the interest of the Kremlin.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, that is a very good statement.

Now, Mr. Johnson, has the method of having a staff working out things together for the defense establishment of the 12 nations in the Atlantic Pact caused you much concern, and do you have any views about how that could be done better in order to give a more stable and better political government back of it?

Mr. JOHNSON. What I think, the only suggestion I have, is that you can't put unknowns in charge of the coordination of the efforts of these North Atlantic Pact nations in positions of top responsibility to do the coordinating.

I think the time has come when the very finest men in America, men known and trusted by Americans and respected abroad, are put in key positions, just as on my recommendation Eisenhower was given the top job.

Senator KEFAUVER. But, of course, the other nations, if they are going to make, and we of course expect them to make, their share of the joint effort for the defense of the North Atlantic, want their key men in it too and are entitled to have them.

What is your plan or your suggestion for working out staff work and financial arrangements and unity of command for the armies of the nations who will be fighting, or who will be ready to fight together?

Mr. JOHNSON. Of course, I have no plan now other than the one we had then. There was a feeling on the part of some of the nations not so large as England, France, and the United States they weren't given the forum to present their views that was given these nations, and we tried to establish the procedures whereby every country was represented and had a right to be heard. I think that is working pretty well. I have heard no criticism about it.

Senator KEFAUVER. Do you feel that this 12-man foreign ministers council, which is the outfit that General Eisenhower eventually reports to, is satisfactory?

Mr. JOHNSON. I am not sure. I have the greatest confidence and respect for General Eisenhower. Since he has gotten on the job, I would go along with pretty much what his recommendation is on that.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, I am sure that we all join in that confidence and respect.

But one thing that bothers me is that Iceland and Luxemburg, for instance, have the same voice on this council that we do. I am just wondering if you had any ideas of a better arrangement we might make to have the council or the governing body more representative of the real contributions being made by the various countries?

Mr. JOHNSON. The problem you discuss is one we worked on at great length. But Iceland is entitled to be heard and to be represented just the same as the United States is entitled to be heard and represented in a forum where the free nations express themselves.

I have a feeling that if the organization is handled correctly, without America asserting authority that grows from its wealth and power, and particularly its industrial capacity, that there won't be any friction arising between men of good will out to bring peace to the world.

Senator KEFAUVER. Now, Mr. Johnson, my time is about to expire, and I want to ask you a question that may take you a little time to answer.

PROGRAM FOR PEACE

You are a distinguished civilian and you have had great experience in and out of the Government. Would you outline for us as quickly as possible the steps that you think we ought to follow in working toward a program for protection and peace for the United States and for those who are associated with us?

Mr. JOHNSON. I appreciate the implied compliment in that question, Senator Kefauver. If I were to attempt to answer that, we would be here until 6 o'clock this evening.

I had intended when these hearings were over to quit talking again publicly and privately. But let me think about putting that together, either in the form of a memorandum to these committees before it shall have adjourned or maybe in one speech somewhere. That calls for an answer worthy of the confidence the question implies, and I can't answer that here.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, we need the advice of distinguished civilians and people like you.

Now, Mr. Johnson, I am glad to hear you sound a note of confidence and of optimism in the strength and the ability of the United States to do things when we are called upon to do them, and also in the personnel at least of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who have a primary responsibility.

CRITICISM OF OUR PUBLIC OFFICIALS

I wonder if you do not have a feeling that we have too little regard for ourselves and that we are too much inclined to run down and to criticize people whom we have in responsible positions at times.

Mr. JOHNSON. Having been the victim of the latter at one time, I could make a speech on that subject, but I have even refrained from that. Nobody probably has been lied about more than I have, but you will remember I never replied to any of the things that time has proven to be false, except some of the things that have come out in this record.

The background for that is when I was Assistant Secretary of War—Senator George, you were here and Senator Kefauver was not.

Senator KEFAUVER. I was.

Mr. JOHNSON. In the Congress.

Senator KEFAUVER. Not in the Senate.

Mr. JOHNSON. I remember now. I caught more hell, more criticism, pretty much from the same people, the type of people, then than I received when I resigned as Secretary of Defense, but time showed the record then was all right; and I have every confidence that the work we did for unification and the work we did in getting the Military Establishment ready to receive these additional appropriations some day will be, even by the severest critics, recognized as not a disservice, but, to whatever extent they want to admit it, as a service to the thing I dedicate my life to—the security of America.

Senator KEFAUVER. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

BEING PREPARED FOR EVENTUALITIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I would like to call your attention to some of the closing remarks that General Wedemeyer made when he testified.

He quoted Demosthenes' message to the Athenians about 350 B. C., and he quoted Demosthenes as follows:

> Shame on you Athenians * * * for not wishing to understand that in war one must not allow oneself to be at the command of events, but to forestall them. You Athenians are the strongest of all the Greeks, in ships, cavalry, infantry, and revenue, and you do not make the best of them.
>
> You make war against Philip like a Barbarian when he wrestles—if he suffers a blow, he immediately puts his hand to it. If he is struck again, he puts his hand there, too, but he has not the skill or does not think of parrying the blow aimed at him or of evading his antagonist. You, likewise, if you hear that Philip has attacked the Chaerena, you send help there; if he is at Thermopylae, you run there; and if he turns aside, you follow him, to right or left, as if you were acting on his orders. Never a fixed plan, never any precautions: You wait for bad news before you act.

That is the close of the quotation from Demosthenes, 350 B. C.

Now, it occurs to me, Mr. Secretary, that one might well draw a lot of parallels in that we wait for bad news often before we act.

Mr. JOHNSON. Much better than the parallel from that isolated instance, if you have read the Philippics, you can draw the parallel of Philip, referred to in the quote, when Philip took the nations of the world who wouldn't cooperate and picked them off one by one until finally when Athens was ready to stand up and do something, they found Philip in the market place and Athens and Greece without friends or allies; and Greece fell because of that.

That is better than what you quote there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is very apt.

Mr. JOHNSON. Parenthetically, I made a speech on the Philippics once, and that is why I talked about it this morning.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, that is very apt. The point I am drawing is this, and the point I have been pursuing is that I think we must know what our plans are and what our action is going to be.

Mr. JOHNSON. For most of you Senators on the Hill and we in the country, we have got to get these questions thrashed out and get unity, and then proceed with a united front in the world so that the world will know what——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Exactly; and we must get equality; that is, equality from an equitable and commensurate standpoint.

Mr. JOHNSON. When Philip was abroad, the nations looked to their selfish interests, and Greece did not furnish leadership, and that brought us down to the same thing that America can go to unless we of America have unity and understanding and love of freedom and peace that control us when lesser differences arise.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you feel that we——

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't know why, Mr. Chairman, I am testifying about these things; I am not an expert on these subjects. I am speaking just as Louis Johnson.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper has an active mind which operates in many fields, so he can ask you most anything.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I will get back to the story I told General Wedemeyer the day before yesterday about the Indian who said, "The white man fool me once—shame on him. White man fool me twice—shame on me."

Now, I am just concerned——

Mr. JOHNSON. We must not get into the position of the story that is going the rounds now of the colored man down South who was going on the road carrying a piece of rope, and his friends met him and said, "What's the matter with you?" And he said, "I am confused." "What's the matter with that?" He says, "Well, I don't know whether I lost a mule or found this rope."

Sometimes, I think some of us in America are darned near in that position. [Laughter.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I merely raised this for the suggestion that we still do not have a program to meet possible contingencies in advance. We, in the language of Demosthenes, wait for bad news before we act on too many occasions; that was the purpose of that.

RALLYING ANTICOMMUNIST FORCES

I want to get to one other thing. Was it not your policy, Mr. Secretary, that in resisting communism we should undertake to rally on the side opposed to communism every practical force and country that we could?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right; even to the extent of helping Tito.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. All right. Were you, in keeping with that policy, of the opinion that regardless of what we in America might think about Franco's government in Spain, that it was very desirable from a military standpoint that Spain be on our side; that is, the strength of Spain, and its strategic location be on our side in this resistance to the encroachment of communism?

[Deleted.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. All right. Let me ask you this: Some time during August or September of 1949, I believe, the Navy desired to visit a port in Spain, the port of Almeria, or some other port. It was to be a call by a squadron under the command of Admiral Conolly. Is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is my recollection.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will ask you whether or not that met vigorous opposition on the part of Mr. Acheson and the State Department and an attempt to block the proposed call of the squadron at that port.

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not know whether it was Mr. Acheson, but the State Department vigorously opposed it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. Now, did the State Department oppose it to the extent that the State Department refused to use their facilities, that is the facilities of the State Department in Spain to make arrangements for this call, and that the Navy was forced to use whatever Navy personnel they had to make these arrangements?

Mr. JOHNSON. I only know the Navy side of that story. I have never heard the State Department part of that so I had better not testify. But from the Navy information, that is substantially correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. Now, I take it that from your theory it is and has been desirable from the standpoint of resisting communism and uniting the anti-Communist peoples and forces of the world that Turkey, for instance, be firmly on our side.

Mr. JOHNSON. I will not only agree that that is true but I think Turkey has been materially helpful, and Turkey is pretty strong and Turkey thinks like we think—and I am choosing my language carefully—and Turkey has in one instance indicated that if its freedom and its way of life are interfered with it will fight.

They constitute a great element in the preservation of peace at the present time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then, I go a step further—

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, I am not going to answer your next question as to the political policy or bringing them into the Atlantic Pact.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is my next question.

Mr. JOHNSON. I so realize, and I am not going to answer that because I do not have the current information as to the dispositions of England and France and other countries toward that and I would not embarrass for the world the Turks. The Turkish Government has been too fine.

RELATIONSHIP OF CHIEF OF JCS TO PRESIDENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me just a moment, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask you this question based upon your experience. If a Chief of Staff, knowing that the Commander in Chief either practically had decided or had decided or desired to relieve a theater commander in the position of General MacArthur——

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, you needn't go any further as far as I am personally concerned.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am going to ask the question.

Mr. JOHNSON. You are not going to get any answer.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would like to complete my question.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir; you may.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If that Joint Chief of Staff knew those things and had the temerity to stand up and object and resist that desire, how long do you think he would have his official head on his shoulders? Would he dare do that and not resign? Would he have to resign?

Mr. Johnson. General Bradley would, sir. You do get an answer.

Senator Hickenlooper. He would what?

Mr. Johnson. Stand up and express his opinion.

Senator Hickenlooper. And if he did so, would he resign, or should he probably under the code?

Mr. Johnson. Oh, I think it depends on the nature of the situation and the type of thing on which he differs. There are things on which you just can't differ with the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States or the Secretary of War or Navy, whatever the situation is.

There are things that you just can't do and not resign, or else get fired.

Senator Wiley. You know.

Mr. Johnson. What I said has no application to me whatsoever. I was never guilty of anything of that type or character.

Chairman Russell. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, sir.

Chairman Russell. Senator Knowland.

Senator Knowland. Mr. Johnson, I want to very quickly go through here to try and just clear up a few things which I do not think are clear in the record.

BLAIR HOUSE DISCUSSIONS ON FORMOSA, JUNE 1950

Calling your attention to the President's statement of June 27, 1950, regarding which you had previously testified which was a public release at the time of the Korean outbreak, after discussing what had taken place, the action of the Security Council and the fact that under these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and the United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area:

> Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa.

Now down to that point the statement is very clear, but I am not clear how this language got into that statement. It says:

> As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland.

I raise no particular question about that because that would presumably be the action of one sovereign government to another sovereign government trying to work out a mutually satisfactory arrangement, but beyond that it reads:

> The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done and the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan or consideration by the United Nations.

Was that particular part of the statement added at the suggestion of the Defense Establishment, the State Department, or by whom?

Mr. Johnson. I think the original draft of that part is State Department, but I subscribe to it completely. You find in the first part action taken under the authority of the United Nations.

What you have read is action taken by this Government separate and distinct from the authorized action of the United Nations and taken in a field that seemed necessary to prevent trouble arising there while you tried to solve the thing upon which United Nations had acted. That is the history of it.

We of the military subscribe to that part of it completely, and a part of the language I imagine is the Joint Staff's language. The original concept of that phraseology is State Department and I support it utterly.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I am not raising the question as to the need of the immediate emergency of neuralizing Formosa from the point of view of not having an engagement start there while we were heavily engaged in Korea, but the Republic of China was still a member of the United Nations. It was a sovereign government.

We had recognized it as such. I think there would have been no question had the American Government requested the Republic of China to cooperate. The only point I am raising is this particular language seemed to raise a situation which might cause a loss of face to the Government of the Republic of China out there, and in view of the white paper and other documents, I was wondering whether that phase of it could not have been handled in a little different way.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now you make me go further than I really wanted to go. United Nations took its action. It was a little later in my opinion that we decided to do something to protect the situation of Formosa getting into hostile hands. This is a solution of that of the Monday night.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now as I understand it, on Sunday night the representative of the State Department was not prepared to include the protection of Formosa. On Monday night, after the statement that General Bradley had read from General MacArthur and the other statements made, on Monday night he did include Formosa in his motion; am I correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. On Monday night most graciously and happily the Secretary of State included Formosa. On the preceding night I identified, contrary to the way it is in some of the papers that I read his statement—I am sure the record must show that I said that General Bradley read it at my instance.

Chairman RUSSELL. It does.

Mr. JOHNSON. There were some private words between the Secretary of State and myself which I referred to without quoting, which indicated that there was a reversal by Monday night and the language in there takes care of a situation which had not on Sunday been presented to the United Nations. I want to be absolutely fair about it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes, I understand. I want to be fair, too. We are merely seeking to get the facts on the situation.

UNITED NATIONS' OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

Now on page 35 of the paraphrased messages furnished us by the Joint Chiefs, paragraph 17 reads as follows, and this deals now with the subject of the mission of General MacArthur and the American and UN forces in Korea and the possibility of their going into North Korea. Paragraph 17 reads as follows:

> On September 7, 1950—

I say parenthetically that was approximately 8 days before the successful Inchon landing—

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their recommendation on United States courses of action with respect to Korea. They stated that after consultation by two of their members with General MacArthur, they agreed that the initial objective to be obtained by the offensive was the destruction of the North Korean forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion that after the strength of the North Korean forces had been broken, which they anticipated would occur south of the thirty-eighth parallel, subsequent operations should take place both north and south of that parallel.

Now that was on the 7th of September. There was a period, a "marking-time" period—I might use that expression—where apparently the United Nations was trying to make up its mind as to whether the thirty-eighth parallel should be crossed. That decision was made on the 7th of October 1950, by the resolution which at your request had gone into the record and is part of the appendix, so that on the 7th of October exactly, by coincidence 1 month from the date of this message in which the Joint Chiefs indicated that they thought we should go north of the thirty-eighth parallel, we did.

Now the only question which occurs to me—and I would like some clarification if you can give it—is that after the success of the Inchon landing was apparent to the whole world, and some weeks had passed so that there was no doubt but what the back of the North Korean movement had been broken, then the United Nations apparently felt it was ready to go into North Korea, and passed a resolution, because the fact of the matter is that the resolution of October 7 to proceed with both the pacification and the unification of all of Korea was introduced by the British Minister of State, Mr. Kenneth Younger, and the United Kingdom was joined by two Commonwealth members, Australia and Pakistan.

It is further noteworthy I think at this point to review the fact that the British Foreign Minister, Mr. Ernest Bevin, then in New York, declared in the future there must be "no South Koreans, no North Koreans; just Koreans."

In view of that fact and that record, how in your judgment can the position now be taken that we would meet our objectives and we would win a great victory by stopping at the thirty-eighth parallel?

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, I can't answer that.

MAC ARTHUR MEMO OF JUNE 14, 1950

Senator KNOWLAND. Now I would like to just clear up one other point. At my request the Defense Establishment did send over this memo which General MacArthur had given to you. I will not read it for two reasons.

One is that it is still classified as top secret, though frankly I do not know why because I have read the memo, and secondly——

Mr. JOHNSON. May I see it?

Senator KNOWLAND. Because of the length of the memo, the time it would take to go into it.

However, I merely want to say for the record that the date of it is June 14, which you had indicated you thought the date was earlier than the actual time it had been handed to you.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now I do find in doing a little further exploration that on the 23d of December, 1949——

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, this is it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes, sir. On the 23d of December 1949 the Joint Chiefs had recommended a mission to Formosa.

Mr. JOHNSON. What date?

Senator KNOWLAND. December 23, 1949.

DATE OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINAL SENDING OF MISSION TO FORMOSA

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, they may have recommended at other times, too, but on that date they recommended it. By strange coincidence, that happens to be the date, at least on the public document which is now public, which the State Department issued to its representatives abroad, that Formosa had no strategic value.

Mr. JOHNSON. Isn't that dated December 22?

Senator KNOWLAND. No, December 23. That is the date on it. The document may have come out, but by a strange coincidence it happens to be the same date of the famous policy information guidance paper of the State Department.

I also find that on the 4th day of May 1950, which was prior to the outbreak of the Korean hostilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had renewed their recommendations on a message being sent out——

Mr. JOHNSON. What day?

Senator KNOWLAND. The 4th of May 1950.

Mr. JOHNSON. Fifty—yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, I don't say that there may not have been recommendations in-between, but I do believe that on that day, they were again renewed.

Mr. JOHNSON. There were discussions in-between, on more than one occasion, about sending this mission. We were convinced, in Defense, that it should be done; and we were continually plugging for it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Then, on the 14th of June, General MacArthur made these recommendations which were given to you on the 23d of June.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. The Korean outbreak took place, as we know, on the 24th, American time, the 25th, Korean time.

Mr. JOHNSON. General MacArthur read the first draft of this top-secret document dated June 14, on the day of our arrival. It was finished before our departure, completed, and given to us the day we left.

Senator KNOWLAND. The question I want to raise now, and I realize the difficulty of your giving a categorical answer, in view of that long record of strong recommendations that a mission be sent for the purpose of gathering information so that we at least might determine whether it was advisable to take additional steps or not, even prior to the outbreak of the hostilities in Korea, the subsequent recommendations which were made by the Joint Chiefs in regard to this matter, the outbreak of the Korean hostilities themselves—why is it that it is not until approximately 1 month ago that the Defense Establishment finally is able to send the so-called Chase Mission to Formosa?

Obviously, the resistance was coming from outside of the Department of Defense.

Mr. JOHNSON. My answer is a question to you:

Would not the best interests of the country have been served if, at the time we had moved into Korea, we had the information that that mission would have brought to us?

Senator KNOWLAND. I will give you a categorical answer:

I think there is no question but that we would have been better off, and that the dangers which exist in that area of the world might have been greatly alleviated, had we had that information at that time.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is why I kept fighting for it, even though I was continually smeared for keeping up the pressure for it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain.

PROCEDURAL QUESTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I raise a procedural question before Senator Cain starts, Mr. Chairman, so it will not come out of his time?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is the chairman's—I may say I shan't ask any more questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair was earnestly hoping that we might complete the testimony of Mr. Johnson this morning before we recess. I hope that we may do so even if it is necessary for us to stay here later.

I had thought that most of the Senators had about exhausted their questions, but the Chair is prepared to stay and I am sure the witness is.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I said to the Chair I don't propose to ask any more questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. The reason for that is that we have reached that stage in the progress of these hearings where it is very important that the subcommittee that has been appointed by the Chair get together and arrange the agenda for the remainder of these hearings. I had hoped that we might be able to do that this afternoon.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is the plan for holding a session tomorrow or going over to Monday?

Chairman RUSSELL. If we can finish within a reasonable time here, I have no intention of having a session tomorrow.

POSSIBILITY OF AMALGAMATING COMMUNIST FORCES WITH OTHERS

Senator CAIN. Mr. Johnson, permit me the better part of a minute in which to lay the foundation of a question I have in mind, sir.

Our Government attempted in 1945 and 1946 to assist in amalgamating and integrating Chinese Communist and Nationalist armies. When he was before our committee, I expressed to the Secretary of State my own belief and fear that any such attempt was foredoomed to complete and tragic failure, because of my knowledge that the Communist military leadership would strive always to poison and destroy the character and effectiveness of the Chinese Nationalist military leadership and forces.

The Secretary told me that if there was any validity in my expressed fear, that that would have been the problem of the Ministry of War of the Chinese Government, which was being set up.

His answer remains without meaning or sound reason to me, but that is not the point I have in mind.

In pressing with the Secretary just a bit and in concluding our colloquy, I said approximately this, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. When is this? In this hearing?

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir. I said:

> I find it difficult to understand why we as Americans, who are convinced that Chinese Communist leadership is Marxist trained, should advocate giving it an opportunity to destroy the larger whole, which would have been the Nationalist armies in China.

The Secretary responded, and against this I wish to ask my question:

> I have already pointed out that the same thing was done in countries in Western Europe without bringing that result about.

Against your background as the Secretary of Defense, I want to ask you in which countries, if any countries, in Western Europe did we endeavor to amalgamate political and military forces, which we had every reason to believe were completely antagonistic to the existence of each other?

I am just not clear in my own mind what the Secretary was talking about when he suggested that we had endeavored without bad results to amalgamate Communists and free forces in certain Western European countries.

Mr. JOHNSON. If there was a like situation in any European country comparable to the situation you have been discussing, I can't at the moment think of it. If I do think of it, I will drop the chairman a note; but I don't recall any.

Senator CAIN. I would appreciate it.

Mr. JOHNSON. And I don't know quite what he is talking about. But on that I would like to take a map and do a little figuring. But offhand, and I have a fairly good memory, I have no recollection of such a thing during my incumbency.

Senator CAIN. I think every member of this committee has found reason during your testimony to agree that you have an excellent memory.

You were the Secretary of Defense at a time when we were creating the North Atlantic Treaty?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. And against that background you know of no attempt of amalgamating antagonistic forces of any of the countries we do business with?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't recall any such.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

FUNCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES POLICY COUNCIL

Mr. Secretary, on yesterday you told us that during your tenure of office as Secretary of Defense you had worked out an arrangement which concretely and properly coordinated the activities of the civilian Secretaries of the three military services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with reference to your comment on the subject you said:

> This was a thing I started about 6 or 7 months after I went over, after full discussion with the Armed Forces Policy Council.

Mr. JOHNSON. In the Armed Forces Policy Council.

Senator CAIN. Well, for the benefit of the record and our joint education, would you give us just a word or two concerning what the function of the Armed Forces Policy Council is, and why you turned to it in a case of that character?

Mr. JOHNSON. The Armed Forces Policy Council under the unification law you passed in late August, I believe, 1949, took the place of the War Council. It included the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary, the three Chiefs, the three Secretaries, which I should have named first; and in its actual operation it included the Chairman of the Munitions Board, Personnel Policy Board, Research and Development Board, and several other of the important agencies who got together once a week at an early hour in the morning, with the whole day set aside, if it could be, for each of those groups to bring to this gathering anything that called for a decision on top level.

Prior to the adoption of the amendment to the Unification Act, after I went in, as recommended previously by Mr. Forrestal, you had a unique situation. Mr. Forrestal did not agree with me about it. But the law as in existence at that time read that the Secretary of Defense could in the War Council make a decision; and therein was the power of the Secretary of Defense to unify.

Mr. Forrestal did not agree and did not exercise, and we got the over-all amendment. But in getting the over-all amendment on unification giving power, control, and direction to the Secretary of Defense, I don't think you enlarged one whit the power that was already vested in the Secretary of Defense when he acted in the War Council. So that the supreme authority in the Military Establishment under the Secretary of Defense is the Armed Forces Policy Council, and it was the most helpful and invigorating institution when we got it going at full steam over there because everybody brought the problems that affected the peace of the world from the military standpoint and affected our own Military Establishment.

There, as the records will disclose, were most of the decisions made on strength, command, and so forth.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Johnson, that answer of yours just given has added substantially to my understanding of the workings of our Military Establishment.

Against what you have said, may I ask you if reason wouldn't suggest that a change in command such as the MacArthur question ought not to have been considered by that policy board because the question involved high level policy, and sitting on that board are those highly placed civilian Secretaries?

Mr. JOHNSON. It might have been as far as I know.

Senator CAIN. The testimony indicates, sir, that no consideration was given to the question within the Council board nor was the question referred to it, and in our trying to think about the future I am trying to determine which of our many Federal agencies, such questions of policy ought to be referred to if they come up again.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think it all depends upon the Secretary of Defense as to the use he makes of that group, and regardless of any statutory language; and I don't know what has happened to it since I left there.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Permit me to ask you very briefly to give us a definition of the National Security Council and its prime function with reference to military considerations.

I have been led to believe that the National Security Council is, with reference to high level military and political matters likewise, the most important policy-making board in the United States.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think it is, sir; it is where the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Staff, who always attends with him—that is, in my time—the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury who actually operates upon designation of the President, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, who, with the first two Secretaries constitute the membership of the Board, meet and try to iron out the differences that have come up to them that have not been reconciled or where they seek to have for their own guidance a determination of the policy; and when it is a very important meeting and a major policy is up the President of the United States usually attends and presides.

It seemed to me that they got more important the longer I attended them. They were just sort of getting organized, and were really constituted by the amendments to the National Security Act.

It was not adequately staffed when I first went over there. I think Jimmy Lay, following Admiral Souers, has a good staff; I don't think it is dominated by anybody.

Senator KNOWLAND. Will the Secretary pardon a brief interruption? The Vice President of the United States is also a member by statute, a member of the Security Council, because I happened to have offered that amendment myself to make him such.

Mr. JOHNSON. You are quite right, and I should have stated it; but I was trying to think of the Secretary of the Treasury—he is not, but he is in there by invitation of the President.

The Attorney General attends whenever a legal question comes up, and is notified by Lay to do so; but John Steelman attends frequently; other Cabinet officers are called in if there are angles that affect them, and it is a very healthy, sane organization.

When the President finally speaks and makes a decision I never observed anybody undercutting or deviating. I don't know how you could improve the congressional authority for a thing of that sort. I think it is all right.

Senator CAIN. Well, I am very pleased, sir, by your description of the National Security Council.

All of us are in agreement, I think, that the question of removing CINCFE was a vitally important policy matter. I wonder, again with reference to the future, if such a question is raised should it not be referred to the National Security Council?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, if it was my responsibility I think I would consider it there, but that is a matter for the President, and that is his judgment.

What is disturbing you is an article—somebody sent it to me the other day—which said that Louis Johnson tried to dominate the Security Council. Is that what you are talking about?

Senator CAIN. No, sir; I have not seen the article to which you make reference.

Mr. JOHNSON. I did not seek to dominate, but where something came up where the Joint Chiefs or the Secretaries had an opinion and had made a recommendation, and they had that, I was never denied the right of fighting for and contending for, within proper limits of gentlemanliness and respectability, for those points, and I never was a yes-man, but when the President finally made the decision, the record is clean cut that Louis Johnson conformed to that decision.

Senator CAIN. Certainly.

Mr. JOHNSON. And he always would—or get out.

CONSULTATION OF TOP POLICY-MAKING BODIES ON MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator CAIN. Well, Mr. Johnson, this is the only point I am driving at. For the better part of a month and a half 26 Members of the Senate have been trying to understand comprehensively the reasons which led to the removal of CINCFE.

I think that the question of removing him and had the decision been rendered by either the Armed Forces Policy Council which you have so well defined a few minutes ago or the National Security Council, that the whole Nation including this committee would have found to its complete satisfaction why and all the wherefores about that question.

So I am hopeful just as one citizen that if we ever have a problem of this character to go through again that it will be considered by either of those two agencies which encompass completely civilian and military attitudes.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right as to those others, but not the Secretary of Defense. As I told the secretary of the bar association, they are expendable as well as the sergeants and the privates.

Senator CAIN. Well, that does not happen to be the question before us, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Senator Long?

DEFENSE BUDGET AND ECONOMY

Senator LONG. Mr. Johnson, I first of all want to congratulate you on the job you did while you were in the Defense Department, particularly in trying to get as much dollars for defense money as you could, which was difficult during that time. I know that in my own State we had then a wave of economy-mindedness, and they were complaining about the money for defense in the State, and to those that asked me about it, I gave the information that was what was recommended and we ought to go along with it.

So, I wanted to congratulate you before I questioned you.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am deeply grateful to you, sir.

Senator LONG. I think your work really had merit.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am deeply grateful to you. There were not too many words of praise in my later days in the Defense Department, so I appreciate that, sir.

Senator LONG. Is this not true, that there is no way you can tell exactly how much money you need for defense, no matter how carefully you spend every dollar? If you are in danger of war, you need enormous amounts; and on the other hand, if war does not occur then almost all of that money or certainly the greater portion of it would be considered completely wasted.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Senator LONG. And so when you get back to that time when we had this $13 billion defense budget, if we had been able to maintain at that time complete world peace and the Russians had cooperated with us, then if there had been a stable international situation, that $13 billion would have been wasted Government expenditures.

Mr. JOHNSON. As Congressman Mahon said on the floor in connection with the $13 billion budget, if there was peace this was entirely too much; and if there was war this was entirely too little.

Senator LONG. I was campaigning in my own State at that time and there was quite a bit of criticism then on the ground that the national budget was too great, and they were attempting to cut and wanted to know where to cut; and I found that very few people realized how much was being spent for national defense. And the opinion was it was entirely too much that went for defense.

And then I think 1 month from the time that the campaign started, the Korean attack broke out and from that time on that question stopped, and now they asked why it was we had not appropriated more. But up until that time they had tended to say we spent too much, there was no need for it, and they criticized us for having appropriated or budgeted so much.

Mr. JOHNSON. In that connection—I shall not read this, but in the semiannual report of the Secretary of Defense for January 1 to June 30, 1950, is an explanation of where the $90 billion that was involved in this campaign you talk about had been spent. I give the reference so if anyone wants to know the breakdown he will find it. Less than half of it ever got to military expenditures.

Senator LONG. What figure did you mention, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. JOHNSON. As stated in the earlier part of this record, $90 billion was appropriated for defense in 5 years, the 5 years before I went to the Military Establishment, except 1; and the breakdown of those percentages is included in this report in a reply to a letter from Chairman Vinson, who asked for the figures.

LIQUIDATION COSTS OF WORLD WAR II

Senator LONG. Well, the people who referred to that figure and wanted to know why it was so high since there was no attack then from an enemy or a facing of the possibility of a third world war, were for the most part ignorant of the enormous expenses involved in warfare or preparing for warfare.

Mr. JOHNSON. This shows the amount of money that was necessary to clean up the old war. That represented nothing for the military. The liquidation costs incurred in the fiscal year 1946 took half of the $90 billion.

Senator LONG. What was that?

Mr. JOHNSON. The liquidation costs because of all the contracts and so forth that were left over when the war was over took half of the total appropriation of $90 billion.

Senator LONG. For liquidating costs that had been incurred in World War II?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Senator LONG. So that only half of it could be put in the military effort for the future.

Mr. JOHNSON. Maybe I had better read it.

Senator LONG. Maybe it would be helpful.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am quoting from the semiannual report of the Secretary of Defense prescribed by law, for January 1 to June 30, 1950, page 48 thereof:

> The magnitude of the task with which we are faced can best be illustrated by quoting from a letter which I sent to the chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services on July 28, 1950. In this statement I reviewed the use that has been made of military appropriations for the last 5 years.

Then, quoting from the letter to Vinson:

> "The aggregate amount appropriated for the Army, Navy and Air Force for the five fiscal years of 1946–50 totals $90 billion. Of this amount, approximately $42 billion, or 45 percent, went to pay for the cost of liquidating World War II. This liquidation cost includes the amounts paid for terminal leave to military personnel who were demobilized, the amounts paid to contractors whose wartime production contracts were terminated, and so on. A single item in the liquidation category—terminal leave for enlisted personnel who were demobilized—accounted for $2¼ billion which was paid out during fiscal year 1947 and 1948, in accordance with a statute which Congress enacted on August 9, 1946 * * *.
>
> "During the postwar years we have incurred heavy costs for maintaining the peace in distant lands. Nearly half of our Army has been overseas in occupied countries in Europe and in Asia. We have had to bear the costs of having substantial portions of our Navy in the Mediterranean, in the interest of maintaining world peace, and we have had to bear the costs of saving Berlin with the airlift.
>
> "Because most of the liquidation costs referred to above were incurred during fiscal 1946, that year alone accounted for approximately half of the 5-year total of $90 billion.
>
> "During the past four fiscal years the money needed to pay, feed, and clothe the men and women in our Armed Forces has cost an average of $5 billion a year, or 41 percent of the 4-year average of approximately $12 billion a year.
>
> "An average of $3 billlion a year, or 26 percent, has gone to meet the cost of operating and maintaining the aircraft, ships, tanks, and military installations that go to make up our military strength.
>
> "Major procurement—the purchase of hardware—aircraft, ships, tanks, and other weapons—has accounted for approximately 2¼ billion a year, or 18 percent. It is worthy of note that the percentage of the annual total that has gone into a major procurement has increased from a low of 6 percent in fiscal 1947 to a high of 19½ percent in the fiscal year that ended last month. It is

also worthy of note that 60 percent of the President's recently recommended $10½ billion supplemental budget is for major procurement.

"Over the 4-year period, research and development on new weapons accounted for approximately 5 percent, or an average of slightly more than one-half billion a year.

"The remaining 10½ percent was made up as follows:

"National Guard and Reserve costs, 4 percent;

"Service-wide and classified projects, 3 percent;

"Retired pay of military personnel, 1½ percent;

"Military public works, including housing, 1 percent; and

"All other costs, 1 percent."

Any analysis of this statement reveals the need to reduce the high cost of what might be called the housekeeping functions of the Military Establishment and to increase the money available for weapons. It also illustrates in concrete terms the objectives of the Department of Defense in its drive to secure a maximum of national security at a minimum cost.

ARMED SERVICES EQUIPMENT

The American public just doesn't understand that only 2¼ percent in that 5-year period, up to last year, when it was 19 percent, went into this equipment that we needed. The money just wasn't there after we did these other things.

Senator LONG. You say in your last year you managed to devote 19 percent of the money to new equipment? Is that the figure you gave?

Mr. JOHNSON. Approximately 19 percent.

Senator LONG. And up to that point only 2½ percent of that money was going actually to get equipment.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is the tragedy of the picture.

Senator LONG. If we should find ourselves embroiled in an atom war and many of our major industries were knocked out, we might have great difficulty in acquiring equipment thereafter. Isn't that a possibility?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator LONG. Therefore, it would behoove us now to be acquiring as much equipment as we could, at least to attempt to have modern equipment to use in the event that event should occur.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is corrert, but you have a different situation from what you had in 1940. Your fleet is built. There are forty-some-thousand aircraft. The charges on the economy will be different from what they were before, and to some extent less disruptive.

Senator LONG. Isn't it true that the aircraft carrier would be obsolete?

Chairman RUSSELL. He did not finish. Please allow him to finish,

Mr. JOHNSON. You don't have to worry about the military services asking enough of all these things. What you of the armed services have to worry about is that they will ask you for more stuff than is necessary for the safety of America, and you can't blame them much for doing it.

Senator LONG. That is a very interesting conclusion. We were advised that at the present time the Russians have a better engine in their latest fighter aircraft than we have. Isn't it true that most of the airplanes that you have had more than just a few years rapidly become obsolete?

Mr. JOHNSON. When I went in as Secretary of Defense, I soon found we had a lot of planes, many thousands of them, that didn't show on the reports to Congress.

I found out that in one branch of the service when a plane was so old, 3 years on a fighter and 5 years on a bomber, even if nothing better had ever been produced, they wiped those out; or whenever they got a new ship, if it was better than one of those, they wipe those off.

Korea, regardless of what the brass tell you, demonstrated that a lot of ships that were stored in the desert were brought out and proved most helpful and useful and were good work horses in Korea.

Those things constitute elements of the defense of America, and you have to look at these requests when they come up where because of a little better ship, that you want to wipe out a lot of airplanes that are still better than anybody else's airplants, just doesn't make sense, and I have so testified before the Armed Services Committee.

[Deleted.]

Senator LONG. You recommended a careful analysis of it?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do, because the military, and I used to defend them here, and I still will fight for them, they want too much of things, and they think they can get the money from you easily.

I want to let them have everything we need for the security of America, but I am concerned, as I said yesterday, still that we can spend ourselves into a climate that will be what Stalin wants.

[Deleted.]

Senator LONG. Yes, sir.

The point I have in mind is—with the improvements of new equipment, it won't do us much good to try to defend our cities with the fighter craft that couldn't catch the bomber that might bring in bombs to attack our targets.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, we mustn't be perfectionists in the sense that because there are ships better than the B–36's, and so forth, even though they cost $5 million apiece, that you are going to throw all of those away when nobody else has a ship that approximates it.

The best that the Russians have is their own version of our own B–29, and we have got thousands of B–29's that are a lot better and that I wouldn't charge off the books to get more B–36's, and more of these ships, except for special missions.

If you do, you will wreck America.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long, your time has expired.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Senator Long; but I hope the censor cuts out a lot of this, or you and I will get shot by the Air Force.

Chairman RUSSELL. The chairman passes.

I will not call the names of all the members who are absent.

Senator George, do you have any questions?

Senator GEORGE. No questions.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have one that I do not think will take more than a minute.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, sir.

SOUTH KOREAN CONTRIBUTION AND CONSULTATION ON A CEASE-FIRE

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, since you have been out of the Department, you perhaps have not been able to keep abreast of the various contributions of UN members; but we have had the exact figures in our record, which have been censored, and I do not intend to use those again except to say, in general terms, that the United States contribution to the Korean effort exceeds 300,000; the Republic of Korea which, as you know, is not a member of the UN because the Soviet veto kept them out, has supplied more than 150,000 and all of the rest of the UN members who were contributing to the effort, have supplied a figure of approximately 30,000.

Now with those facts in mind, do you not believe that in any discussions on a cease-fire or in the ultimate peace negotiations, that the Republic of Korea, which itself has furnished more armed forces, five times as much in the way of armed forces as all of the rest of the UN members put together outside of the United States, should be a full participant in any of such discussions?

In addition to their contribution in armed forces, they, of course have suffered tremendous damage to their country and their civilian casualties I doubt have ever been correctly estimated. They must be terrifically high.

Do you not feel that equity would demand that they at least have an opportunity to participate in any such negotiations?

Mr. JOHNSON. I know what you are driving at and I know the point that is under discussion. If I were a member of the Government I think you would have a right to have me answer that.

I am not going to answer it, being a private citizen, because it projects me into an argument that the answer might not serve any good purpose. I can only say that I feel awfully sorry for the Korean people.

I know how terrible the destruction has been in their land and how great the casualties are, and I think in the final conclusions that are arrived at, the interests of Korea are interests that have to be considered. I don't know what the procedure would be, and which would bring them in for the discussions, but they certainly ought not to be ignored.

Senator KNOWLAND. You say they should not be ignored?

Mr. JOHNSON. Should not be ignored, but I don't go so far as to take the position that they ought to sit as equal participants. I don't know what that does under the charter——

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I do not want to press you on it except to express the viewpoint of one Member of the Senate that when we have among our 14 allies in the UN nations which are putting up less than one-half of 1 percent of what we are putting up in the UN, passing judgment upon recommendations of our own Joint Chiefs of Staff as they did on the question of hot pursuit, and by their action vetoing in effect the unanimous recommendation of our Joint Chiefs, it seems to me that the equities of the situation would require that the people of the Republic of Korea, who have made such great contributions in armed forces and in sacrifices, should be fully consulted on any cease-fire or peace negotiations, and that they should not be circumvented and presented with a fait accompli before they have had a chance to fully express their views for their sacrifices.

Mr. JOHNSON. You and I both have seen President Rhee's statement on that subject in the last few days.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. Mr. Johnson, I have long had a very high respect for your integrity and very generally for your judgments. Against this feeling of mine, I wish to ask you this question.

ADEQUACY OF DEFENSE PLANS FOR UNITED STATES WEST COAST

As the Secretary of Defense, were you satisfied that plans had been designed or were in preparation for what you would consider to be an adequate defense of the west coast?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think so. Certainly there was nothing during my time that discriminated between one part of the United States and another. And the very fact that I lived on the east coast made me try to find out all the more about the west coast and about Alaska's problems.

Senator CAIN. It is obvious, sir, that——

Mr. JOHNSON. The plans were all right in that field. I find no ground to criticize and never saw any disposition to distinguish among the services. In fact, there were some things that were done on the west coast in my term that could have been done on the east coast a little more advantageously, but it served the future interests that they be done on the west coast, and they were done there.

Senator CAIN. I ask the question partly because it seems obvious to me that during your tenure of office, and because of the question of Formosa and the Far East generally, that the Defense Department must have been very conscious——

Mr. JOHNSON. It was.

Senator CAIN (continuing). Of the defense requirement and need in the future of the west coast.

Mr. JOHNSON. It was.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Here is a question and the answer, too, as far as I am concerned, that probably the censors should eliminate, but I wish your views, sir.

[Deleted.]

Senator CAIN. All right, sir; I thank you.

DRAFT OF PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 27, 1950

Yesterday you mentioned that the release which was to have been published shortly after we were committed in Korea was unsatisfactory to the Defense Establishment and to you, as Secretary, in, I think you said, several respects. Would you care to tell us what those exceptions were so that we again could better understand what the problem was in the early days of the war?

Mr. JOHNSON. They were in the interest of clarification pretty much on that Formosa picture. But without having before me the 2-o'clock-in-the-morning draft—if that is in existence, if I could find it—I don't want to reach back for that.

Senator CAIN. The question only indicates, Mr. Secretary that I and other Members of the Senate read this record very carefully, and always in an effort to determine what the witness is really talking about.

UNITED STATES PREPAREDNESS NOW

Mr. Secretary, in terms of a firm foundation from which our Military Establishment can rapidly expand, has America, short of global war, ever been so able or prepared to satisfy any responsibility or obligation?

Mr. JOHNSON. Never before. And I put in the record yesterday that when I left the Defense Establishment it was in the best shape, the strongest shape, since the point system went in.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Secretary I ask that question partly because I have been literally amazed through the long course of these hearings by the repeated expressions of fear of something expressed either in the newspaper or perhaps by witnesses and members of this committee, and I have not been able to understand those expressions, and I wanted to see if my view was in accordance with yours.

I have an observation, Mr. Secretary, to make. It comes at this time partly because you were about to take off and partly because of something the Senator from California said a few minutes ago.

I would like to say it in this way: When it comes to war and its awful misery, the Senator from Washington tries to judge men and policies solely on the basis of capacity and results. Nothing else makes any difference. This constrains me to make a very brief comment about our earlier conversation of today on the question of allied fighting contributions to the Korean War.

ALLIES CONTRIBUTION TO KOREAN CONFLICT

Because of my conviction, which runs real deep, and belief that Americans have unnecessarily been hurt and killed in Korea as a result of the failure of our diplomatic leadership to impress sufficiently upon all allies the imperative need for them all to commit fighting forces to Korea, I wish to read for the record a cable which I sent from Germany last August to the Secretary of State in Washington, D. C. And a copy of that cable went to the then Secretary of Defense, which is yourself.

> After conferring with responsible persons in all of the MDAP title I and II nations, I am completely distressed that so few ground troops have been committed to Korea.

Parenthetically, I want to say to you, Mr. Johnson, what I think you know and believe, that that is true. I have never been in an Allied country since this war began but what the desire of the people was to contribute to our common cause in Korea, and without exception they were all surprised and without understanding as to why they should lag by the wayside.

> With no desire to embarrass your difficult labor, I want to make an observation and suggestion. People everywhere believe their country ought to offer ground force aid to Korea. Governments are hesitant for many reasons but primarily because your representatives have apparently not been instructed to urge assistance in positive fashion.
>
> It is my firm belief that every nation would make a political commitment for token ground forces if your agents encourage them to do so. This would be particularly true should you let is be known that General MacArthur, after consultation with government concerned, would determine if the offer should be accepted. I am convinced that this approach would find favor everywhere. People understand that if they fail to offer to help America now in name of United Nations, that America may be unable to help them should trouble break out elsewhere after the Korean War on the ground has been won alone and by and exhausted America. Europe has no defense establishment worthy of the name, but I know of no nation which is incapable of making a reasonable and worth-while ground force contribution. Because these contributions are lacking after weeks of war, the Russians are employing devastating European propaganda against us. Your representatives abroad are splendid and respected, and they will secure the commitments so imperatively required if our national policy will give them the green light to go ahead. Europe looks

to America for direction in this question and thus far that leadership has been lacking.

Mr. Johnson, in my view, sir, this cable was valid last August; its constructive criticism remains valid today, when after almost a year of war our fifty-odd allies have about 30,000 combat foot soldiers in the Korean War.

Despite my hope in and support for the United Nations, I am heartsick and remain indignant that so many have done so little in sharing the sacrifices and blood-letting demanded by a common cause.

Mr. Johnson, I personally have benefited largely from your testimony, and would like to bespeak my gratefulness.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Senator.

CAN WE HOLD EUROPE NOW?

Senator LONG. Mr. Johnson, from the experience you have had as Secretary of Defense, are you of the opinion that we would be able at this time to prevent the Russian Army from taking Europe if a third world war did break out?

Mr. JOHNSON. Off the record; I am not going to answer it on the record.

Senator LONG. I understand; it should be off the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. It has been answered on the record, Mr. Secretary, by some of the highest military men, who have answered it.

Mr. JOHNSON. My judgment is to the contrary. I do not want to answer that on the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I do not know what fate overtook it when it got out at the end of the censoring, but I know military men here have within the walls of this committee answered that question.

Mr. JOHNSON. Of course, I am not going to get in contempt of the committee, but I don't think the military men should have answered it, to allow it to get outside, and I am not going to answer it.

Senator LONG. I personally do not care to publish it. I would just like to know for my own information; and I will ask unanimous consent that the witness might answer that and that the censor might simply delete that from the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I assume the censor would delete it if it is of that high significance, but we certainly asked it of General Bradley, and I am confident—my recollection is not as firm with respect to Collins and others as with Bradley—but the question was certainly asked and answered.

Senator LONG. I ask unanimous consent that the answer be deleted from the record for security reasons, if Mr. Johnson would care to answer it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I guess it could be done by unanimous consent. We have a procedure adopted to protect security on these matters, but the range of unanimous consent is a very wide one.

What is the need of putting it up to the censor if you instruct him to take it off the record? Why don't you let him answer it off the record?

Understand, I am not advising you to do that. I think you have a right to insist on your question if you desire, as a member of this committee.

Senator LONG. I am of the opinion, Mr. Chairman, that in the matter of fact the witness can be compelled to answer; but in the matter of opinion, I am somewhat in doubt as to whether we have the right to in good conscience require a witness to state opinions.

It is perfectly agreeable with me to simply have the answer off the record, but I would like to know because Mr. Johnson is a former Secretary of Defense, and I know his judgment would be very helpful on that subject.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection then, if that is your desire that you ask unanimous consent that it be answered off the record——

Senator LONG. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. You will not take this response, Mr. Reporter, no objection being heard.

(A discussion was had off the record.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long, do you have anything further?

IS TIME ON OUR SIDE?

Senator LONG. I would like to ask this on the record. Looking at the over-all picture, it has been my impression that time is on our side if we take proper advantage of time. Now of course that question of what is taking the proper advantage of the time we have is a question mark in my own mind. I wonder if you size the situation up in that fashion?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; I agree with you. I don't go to the theory of those who say, "Well, we are in better shape today than they are relatively, we ought to get this thing over with.

I have never subscribed to that school of thought. Time, if we continue to use it judiciously, is in our favor in my opinion.

Senator LONG. Do you believe that the enemy has used time better than we have during the last several years?

Mr. JOHNSON. No.

Senator LONG. Would you care to elaborate on that answer, Mr. Johnson?

Mr. JOHNSON. No.

Senator LONG. No further questions. Thank you very much.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. I want to thank Mr. Johnson for appearing before the committees, and I can see, if I may be permitted to say so, why he should not answer some questions in view of his former relationship to Government, and in view of the security elements involved now.

I think this, however, Mr. Johnson. You would agree that while we might not be able to hold any particular line, America should have enough faith in itself to be able to know that it could hold a line.

Mr. JOHNSON. That faith I do have. Those things I think I know, and I discount a lot of the statements that America can't take care of itself.

Senator GEORGE. I agree with you, fully agree with you.

Chairman RUSSELL. When I undertook to present Mr. Johnson to these committees, I stated that in my opinion he had served his country well in time of war and he had served it well in time of peace. I likewise stated that I knew him to be a man who speaks candidly and forthrightly on any subject.

His presentation to these committees has in my opinion completely justified those comments. You have been a very helpful witness, Mr. Johnson, and on behalf of the committees I wish to thank you for your assistance and for your attendance here.

Mr. Johnson. And may I thank the committees for their kindness and their consideration and the way they have handled the questions they have asked me throughout. I deeply appreciate it.

Senator Knowland. A procedural matter. When do we adjourn to?

Chairman Russell. Just a moment. I am prepared to make an announcement on that. This afternoon the subcommittee to discuss and present to the full committee an agenda for the future conduct of these hearings will meet.

Tomorrow morning the Senate Committee on Armed Services will meet in a rather important meeting, and I hope that as many members as possible will attend.

The joint committee stands in recess until Monday morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 1:35 p. m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene on Monday, June 18, 1951, at 10:10 a. m.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

MONDAY, JUNE 18, 1951

United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:10 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, George, Smith (New Jersey), Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Sparkman, Bridges, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson (Texas), Knowland, and Flanders.

Also present: William H. Darden, clerk, Mark H. Galusha, and Verne D. Mudge, of the committee staff, Committee on Armed Services; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

PUBLISHING THE DISCUSSION ON WITNESSES

Chairman Russell. The committees will come to order.

Gentlemen, before we present the report of the subcommittee I should like to get the views of the members of the joint committee as to whether or not the discussion this morning of the agenda and the further procedure of this committee should go out as has all the other records. I did not know whether the members of the committees would want that to go out or not. The press is very much interested in having it.

Senator Bridges. I would think, Mr. Chairman, that the record be kept but be part of our own records rather than given out publicly, and you give a conference when we get through as to what we agreed upon.

Chairman Russell. Well, you heard the suggestion that Senator Bridges made.

Chairman Connally. May I ask a question? What do you mean? Do you mean if we should give it out to tell what witnesses we had choked off?

Senator Bridges. Oh, no. I mean that the chairman would just report the conclusions we had reached and the witnesses that we were to call.

Chairman Connally. The conclusions we reached on what?

Chairman Russell. As to the further procedure of the committees.

Senator Bridges. The procedure as we finish. I think that would be the simplest. It is not material to me, but I think that would be the simplest.

Chairman RUSSELL. It does not matter to me; I would just as soon have it go out as not, but I did not know whether the members of the committees might have some comments they might make with respect to witnesses and procedure that they would prefer not to go out. For that reason I am seeking to get the opinion of the committees on that point.

Is there any objection to Senator Bridges' suggestion that the record be made as in the ordinary course of executive sessions but not go out to the press? Or we can have the people stand by and if we decide at the conclusion of the meeting this morning, which should not take too long, that it could be released, we could then let them process it in the usual way.

What do you think of the suggestion that we wait until we conclude the hearing to determine whether the record should go out?

Senator KNOWLAND. That is all right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is that agreeable?

Senator SMITH. In that case, Mr. Chairman, you would have to instruct the reporters not to give any material out until the meeting is over.

Chairman RUSSELL. They would follow that course, I am sure, if the committees were to take that action.

If there is no objection, then we will determine after we have concluded the discussion of procedures as to whether or not the record will be released.

REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON WITNESSES

Now, gentlemen, the subcommittee appointed pursuant to the order of the full committee to recommend a future procedure for these hearings and the witnesses to be heard before the hearings are concluded met on Friday afternoon.

The subcommittee reviewed the hearings to date.

We discussed, in some detail, the list of witnesses which had been suggested in writing, in accordance with the committees' procedure. Only 34 were formally suggested, though a much larger number had been mentioned orally.

The members of the subcommittee came to some unanimous conclusions after reviewing the witnesses and the work of the committees.

We decided to recommend to the full committee that it complete the record of these hearings as expeditiously as can be done, in order to bring these hearings to a conclusion as speedily as possible.

NEED FOR ENDING HEARINGS AS SOON AS PRACTICAL

I think that I can say, without patting the members of the committees on the back, that no committees have ever been more diligent than these two committees have been in the conduct of these hearings.

We have met in the mornings and afternoons on nearly every working day, including Saturdays and holidays, and we have met, on occasion, at night.

The work of the committees has been remarkably free from partisan bickering. Despite the depth of feeling on the issues involved and the wide divergence of opinion entertained by the members of the committee, I think it can be fairly said that we have practiced selfrestraint and shown consideration to the rights of others. We have functioned as a committee should function when it is charged with such responsibilities as ours.

Now, there are many sound reasons why these committees should finish their work. Twenty-six Members of the Senate are members of this joint committee. Since May 3 they have directed their energies to these hearings. We cannot blink away the fact that the work of the Senate as a whole has not been aided; in fact, it has suffered as a result of the time and energy that all of the members of these committees have been required to give to these hearings.

Our time has been so occupied that two of the most important committees of the Senate have been unable to proceed in a normal fashion to consider legislation that is before them.

In addition, the members of these committees are members of other committees and other important subcommittees.

The work of these committees has diverted them from the duties imposed by membership on other committees. We have earnestly sought to fulfill our obligation to the Nation by the careful and exhaustive hearings we have conducted on the subject before us. The time has now come for us to consider other duties we owe to the Senate and to the country.

We can by bringing these hearings to a conclusion lend our efforts then to legislative matters that are of great importance to the Nation—indeed, that are necessary to keep the Government functioning. It should be obvious to everyone that almost every salient fact or issue involved in the MacArthur controversy or in our far-eastern policies has been dealt with by some one of the witnesses who have appeared.

THOROUGHNESS OF HEARINGS

Some light on every fact involved in the relief of General MacArthur has been shed by one or more of the principal actors of that great drama. We have had the views of those holding conflicting opinions on every phase of American policy in the Far East.

This is true as to all aspects of policy, whether diplomatic or in the military field. Any evidence presented in the future will be largely cumulative in nature. It is very interesting to hear the views of the outstanding personalities who might be brought before the committees, but the condition of the work of the Senate would not justify us in building up a great record of merely cumulative evidence.

Members of these committees have had opinions on these matters before the hearings opened, and opinions will not be changed, nor will the country be benefited, merely by proceeding indefinitely and trying to pile up a larger number of witnesses on one side or the other of this controversy. The numbers of witnesses who could be brought here are almost without limit.

The time required to hear them would not only delay the work of the Senate to the detriment of the national interest, but I doubt very much if it would be helpful to these committees in any material degree in finally making a report of our views.

We know the action that was taken, we have heard the reasons for the action. We are aware of the differences of opinion on the policies, and have heard informed witnesses relate their views with respect to these policies.

As Senators we can make up our own minds as to the correctness of the conflicting opinions and varying viewspoints. After reaching the decision to recommend that the hearings be concluded as quickly as possible, the subcommittee reviewed the entire list of witnesses submitted in accordance with the committee's procedure.

RECONSIDERATION OF HARRIMAN APPEARANCE

In addition, it considered the action of the full committee in requesting Mr. Averill Harriman, special assistant to the President, to appear as a witness.

Pursuant to the earlier action of these committees, I had written Mr. Harriman on June 6 of the committees' decision to call him as a witness. On June 8 Mr. Harriman replied as follows:

> DEAR DICK: I have your letter of June 6 inviting me to testify on the current investigation by the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations regarding the military situation in the Far East and the removal of General MacArthur.
>
> I shall be pleased to hold myself at the disposal of the committees. I expect to be in Washington continuously, with the exception of Tuesday, June 12, when I am scheduled to give the commencement address at the Virginia Military Institute.
>
> I appreciate your offer to try to give me at least 24 hours notice.
>
> With warm regards, I am
>
> Sincerely,
>
> W. A. HARRIMAN,
> *Special Assistant to the President.*

The subcommittee, in dealing with this question of witnesses to be heard in the future considered whether Mr. Harriman's evidence was likely to be cumulative in nature to that which had already been submitted by other witnesses.

By agreement with the other members of the subcommittee I telephoned Mr. Harriman that the subcommittee might decide to recommend to the full committee that it reconsider its decision to call him as a witness.

Mr. Harriman made clear to me his complete readiness to appear and testify at these hearings. He indicated, however, that all of the points on which he would expect to testify had already been covered by previous witnesses, many of them in great detail.

He stated that if the committee should decide not to call him at this time, but should subsequently wish him to testify, he would be glad to do so.

In view of Mr. Harriman's statement that all of the points to which he could be expected to testify had already been covered, the subcommittee decided unanimously to recommend to the full committee that Mr. Harriman not be called before the committees unless future developments should cause the committees to desire to hear him.

PRINCIPLES FOLLOWED IN REDUCING THE LIST OF WITNESSES

We then proceeded to consider the list of witnesses suggested, and sought to adopt a fair policy to apply to the list of witnesses in order to pare the list down to a minimum.

This action will require the removal from the list of many eminent and outstanding Americans whom it would be pleasant to hear but whose evidence is either available to the committee in some other form or would be strictly cumulative in character.

In adopting a policy, we decided to eliminate all of those belonging to the four following groups:

First, the names of distinguished nationals of foreign countries had been suggested as witnesses. Some of them are well-known figures of contemporary history. However, the reason for these hearings arose out of a matter which relates to American citizens and to the armed services of the United States.

We, therefore, recommend that the committees not call any witnesses who are not citizens of the United States.

2. The names of a number of outstanding newspapermen and writers in other fields who have either been with our forces in Korea or the Far East during the hostilities in Korea, or who are experts in the field of Far Eastern policies or of military science had been suggested.

All of those named would be interesting and informative witnesses. However, the views of most of them have been recorded in the public press or other media, and are available to the committees.

Their views and opinions would carry weight, as many of them have actually witnessed events of great import. However, the subcommittee also decided that to open up this field would result in greatly lengthening the hearings.

We did not wish to undertake to select a few of the proposed witnesses who fall in this category and eliminate a large number of others.

In order to adhere to our purpose of avoiding evidence that was merely cumulative in character and to bring the hearings to a conclusion, the subcommittee recommends to the full committee that no witnesses in this category be called.

3. Suggestions had been made that the committees call a number of distinguished Americans who are either heads of veterans' organizations or who are connected with such organizations. Many of these men are among our first citizens, and all of them are engaged in devoted and patriotic service to the national welfare.

However, the subcommittee did not wish to be placed in the position of hearing from one representative or one organization without hearing from all. The opinions of these men are valuable, but their evidence would, of necessity, be cumulative expressions of varying opinions. The subcommittee, therefore, recommends no one falling within this category be summoned before the committees.

4. The subcommittee faithfully examined the list of all those who had submitted personal requests that they be permitted to appear as witnesses before the full committee. After consideration, the subcommittee determined to recommend to the full committee that none of those requesting to be heard be invited before the committees. The subcommittee so recommends to the full committee.

WITNESSES TO BE HEARD

The subcommittee then again reviewed the list of witnesses in an effort to balance the number of those witnesses presenting views which are sure to be in conflict with those already presented by witnesses who favored the viewpoint of the administration and at the same time to confine the list of those yet to be heard by the committees to those who had had some direct relation with the events and the policies under investigation.

The subcommittee has boiled the list down to the following witnesses. We recommend that the full committee invite and hear the following: Maj. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, Vice Admiral Oscar C. Badger, Maj. Gen. David C. Barr, the Honorable Patrick J. Hurley.

The subcommittee recognizes that on issues of such gravity and importance there are many outstanding Americans who might be helpful to the committees. The subcommittee felt, however, that in view of the over-all situation existing in the legislative branch of the Government today, it is in the public interest to confine witnesses to be heard in the future by the full committee to those I have named, and the subcommittee recommends that the full committee approve of its recommendations.

POSSIBLE REBUTTAL OF MAC ARTHUR

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, was it the thought of the subcommittee to call General MacArthur back again?

Chairman RUSSELL. I addressed a letter to General MacArthur—do you have a copy of that letter here—on Friday. I might say that the subcommittee took action on this matter. I brought it to their attention and action on it was unanimous. I did not feel that we should summon General MacArthur before the committees, at least the subcommittee did not feel we should summon General MacArthur before the full committee, but we did feel that he should have an opportunity to testify again if he so desires, so I addressed a letter to him which I shall read into the record:

> General of the Army DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,
> *Hotel Waldorf Astoria, New York, N. Y.*
>
> DEAR GENERAL MACARTHUR: The Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations are endeavoring to terminate as soon as possible the series of hearings which began with your appearance before the committees on May 3.
>
> As you were the first witness before the committees, the testimony presented by you during the first 3 days of the hearing was available to succeeding witnesses. You had no knowledge of the testimony of the succeeding witnesses at the time of your appearance before the committees. I am sure that the committees will feel that you should be afforded an opportunity to again appear before the committees to present any rebuttal testimony that you may think desirable.
>
> If you wish to appear before the committees again, I shall appreciate your advising me of your decision as promptly as possible.
>
> With assurances of esteem, I am
> Sincerely,
>
> RICHARD B. RUSSELL.

That answers your question.

Senator SMITH. That answers my question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCMAHON. Senator, could I ask the basis for the calling of General O'Donnell?

AGREEMENT ON FOUR WITNESSES

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes. I undertook to touch on that briefly in my statement. His name had been suggested by Senator Knowland. I might say that Senator Knowland had suggested quite a number of witnesses, some 10 or 15, and before the subcommittee had its meeting, I went to Senator Knowland and he agreed to withdraw about 60 percent of those he had offered. General O'Donnell was on the list of those that Senator Knowland wished to be heard.

I referred in my statement in a way to balancing the number of witnesses, and General O'Donnell was among those that, after consultation with members of the full committee who had suggested names, the subcommittee recommended.

I really do not know as to what General O'Donnell will testify. He was in command, however, of the air forces, at least the strategic air forces, in Korea, I believe, was it not, Senator Knowland?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Until recently, and returned to this country.

Senator McMAHON. That is what I was trying to get—the basis of his testimony, and the testimony would be on the basis of his experience out of which his testimony would come.

As I understand it now, he was in charge, and I remember now he has been in charge, of our strategic air forces in Korea and he has since come home, and I believe is home now.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is correct. I think his command now is in charge of the strategic air base at Fairfield-Suisan.

Senator McMAHON. Now the Honorable Pat Hurley testified here at considerable length in the investigation of the Foreign Relations Committee. Has he been in China or does he have anything to add since then that the chairman knows about?

Chairman RUSSELL. I could not answer that question; I do not know. His name was left on the list pursuant to the general policy I just undertook to outline.

Very frankly, Mr. Hurley and General O'Donnell and Admiral Badger were three witnesses who I assumed, as a member of the committee—I do not know what they are going to testify. I assumed they were presented because their evidence would not confirm that presented by administration witnesses.

General Barr, of course, was in China and he has also been heard by the Foreign Relations Committee on prior occasions as I understand.

Senator WILEY. How many names were there—four or five?

Chairman RUSSELL. Four.

Senator WILEY. There were five, I thought.

Chairman RUSSELL. No. There was another one who was on there tentatively, if you recall, Senator Wiley. Senator Bridges suggested him and said he would discuss it with the Senator who suggested his name, and that Senator has reluctantly, I understand, but has agreed he would not insist on his appearing.

Senator WILEY. All right.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I move we adopt the subcommittee's recommendation.

MOTION TO ADOPT SUBCOMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I second the motion. I think they have done a good job with a very difficult problem. I think they have been fair about the situation. While we might sit here and argue all day as to what one other witness or two others might suggest. I do think the chairman has made a very constructive statement this morning as to the needs of the occasion. As far as I am concerned, I am willing to abide by the decision of the subcommittee.

Chairman CONNALLY. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Chairman Connally. Does the motion mean that we do not have—how many witnesses?

Chairman Russell. Four.

Chairman Connally. That is in addition to what we have already heard?

Chairman Russell. That is right.

Chairman Connally. And that will be all?

Chairman Russell. Of course, the committees I do not think would deny themselves the right——

Chairman Connally. I know, but I mean at present that is the plan.

Chairman Russell. That is right.

Chairman Connally. The committees are always free to reconsider it and——

Chairman Russell. Reverse its decision.

Chairman Connally. Reverse the decision. But I am talking about the present plan. If you vote for this motion, the present plan would be to have only four more witnesses?

Chairman Russell. That is correct.

Chairman Connally. Besides what we have already had?

Chairman Russell. That is correct.

Chairman Connally. And those four are—do you mind naming them?

Chairman Russell. Maj. Gen. Emmett O'Donnall, Jr.; Vice Adm. Oscar Badger; Maj. Gen. David C. Barr; and the Honorable Patrick J. Hurley.

BALANCE OF TESTIMONY

Chairman Connally. And your idea is at least three of those four will not confirm what the administration witnesses have testified?

Chairman Russell. Well, that was the general assumption, Senator Connally. I don't know what they will testify. I imagine that in some respects they will agree, because there are some matters that have been before this committee on which nearly all the witnesses who appeared were in agreement, but they were not considered as friendly to the viewpoint of the administration.

Senator Green. Does that omit Mr. Harriman?

Chairman Russell. Yes, sir; it does.

Chairman Connally. I had understood we were trying to keep a balance there.

Chairman Russell. That is right.

Chairman Connally. Three to one is not a very accurate balance.

Senator Bridges. May I point out that of the previous witnesses General MacArthur, Wedemeyer, and Johnson might be considered as not pro administration, while the pro administration would be considered General Marshall, Secretary Acheson, General Bradley, Admiral Sherman, General Vandenberg, and General Collins.

Even by this the administration witnesses would have the numerical advantage. But there was a great deal of discussion. For instance, I wanted very much certain witnesses, and other people did, but if we are going to close this up, it seemed to us we had to give some, give and take, and it was a reasonable basis.

Senator Wiley. Mr. Chairman, I think in our discussions in the subcommittee there were several other names submitted by Senators. Have those Senators been contacted and are all in agreement?

Chairman RUSSELL. They have.

Senator WILEY. That is fine.

HARRIMAN TESTIMONY

Senator CONNALLY. I don't quite like the Harriman—I am afraid Harriman is going to feel like he was displaced. Somewhat like MacArthur was.

I am not going to insist on it, but it seems to me he is a very important personage.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator was present in the subcommittee when this matter was handled.

Chairman CONNALLY. I was.

Chairman RUSSELL. I discussed it with Mr. Harriman on the phone. Mr. Harriman stated that he was ready to testify to the committee. I told him we were endeavoring to close the hearings and I asked him if he thought he was prepared to bring any new matter before the hearings that had not been presented.

He stated that all of the points to which he could testify had been discussed by other witnesses and that his evidence would be cumulative in nature, that he was ready and willing to testify, but was perfectly willing to be excused from attendance on the full committee.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is all right with me.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think I can safely state for the record Mr. Harriman will not be offended by not being called.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I think, of course the subcommittee is wise in bringing these hearings to a close as early as possible.

NO FORECLOSURE ON FUTURE WITNESSES

I am not opposing this move. I merely want to make it clear or have a clear understanding that if some other witness, if there is some other witness, perhaps not known now, possessing facts of which we don't know now, should become available prior to the close of this hearing, that it can be submitted to the committees for the committees' decision as to whether or not to call this other witness without having the fact that the committee has acted imposed as a block toward calling that witness.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, of course, we do not intend to be highly technical about this matter, Senator Hickenlooper. If the majority of these committees desires to call any other witnesses, why, they most assuredly would have the right to do so.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I merely wanted to get that straight.

Chairman RUSSELL. I would be less than frank if I didn't state that I hope the majority of the committees does not see fit to do so, but that certainly is their privilege.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not have any witness in mind.

PUBLISHING THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION OF WITNESSES

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I am glad to support the report, and I suggest that we could not do better than to have the report, as outlined by the chairman, given to the public.

There have been rumors that this fellow was going to be called, and that one, and unless this course is followed, and the reasons given to the public, as to this classification of witnesses, it might be misunderstood.

I think this has been handled excellently, and I want to commend the subcommittee for the work that it has done.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman.

Senator FLANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to say, on the question of how much of this should be made public, I think not only the report of the subcommittee, but all of the discussion is quite creditable and I don't know why it should not all go out, verbatim.

Chairman RUSSELL. This is off the record.

(There followed a brief discussion off the record.)

Chairman CONNALLY. May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, in connection with what was proposed by the subcommittee, if you publish now that we have cut all the other witnesses off except these four, and put that in the paper, you are going to be harassed to death by people that want to get something in, and that you ought not to have done that, and that you displaced so-and-so.

Why won't we wait until we get about through, and then chop it off?

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest, right at that point—it seems to me that if, as suggested by Senator Smith, the very able statement of our chairman this morning could be released, which it will be if we release the whole record, and then if, by chance, this committee, which I hope it can, could act unanimously, I think that would tend to eliminate any discussion that there was a controversy, or that there was somebody else being suggested on it; and if we could get a unanimous endorsement of the subcommittee's action, plus the chairman's statement, I think that would tend to discourage other witnesses from coming in, frankly.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think these committees, if they take this action this morning, will not be as likely persuaded to continue the hearings by calling other witnesses; and I do think it would have a deterring effect on those who might want to suggest other witnesses, if this announcement went out.

ENDING THE HEARINGS

Senator BYRD. When does the chairman think we will conclude the hearing, under this program?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd, of course you know that any prophet would risk his reputation if he undertakes to predict the length of time any witness should be on the stand.

I think we should be able to conclude these hearings by the middle of next week, at the latest, if we adopt this program.

Senator KNOWLAND. Even if we had some night sessions.

Senator BYRD. That will be nearly 60 days, on May 3, on these hearings, right in the busiest part of the session. I think they should be concluded at that time.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think they will; and if the members of the committee will stay here with the chairman, as diligently and faithfully, as they have in the past, we will press along to get these hearings closed.

Senator BYRD. It seems to me that every available avenue of information has been explored, and we should cut down on the repetition.

Chairman RUSSELL. There is no doubt in my mind that the announcement will be welcomed by the people of the United States.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Might I say, as a member of the subcommittee, that I am unanimously in favor of the chairman's statement.

I would like to add that Senator Lodge sent me a message, he expected to be here this morning, stating that he was in favor of winding up the hearings as promptly as possible, and is in favor of those witnesses whose names you have read here, and whom I reported to him.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is very gratifying, because Senator Lodge had some witnesses on the list in which he was very much interested.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I thought you made a very excellent statement; and I understood from your statement that all of the members of the subcommittee recommended this particular program, and these four witnesses.

Chairman RUSSELL. They did.

Senator GEORGE. They did.

Chairman RUSSELL. The subcommittee of seven, composed of the chairman——

Senator GEORGE. I think they did.

Chairman RUSSELL. There was no question about that.

Senator GEORGE. We all recommended it.

Chairman RUSSELL. If any of them did not recommend it, I would like to hear about it. I understood that it was unanimous.

Senator JOHNSON. I move for a vote on the motion.

Senator KNOWLAND. I second that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Those in favor of the motion that the program outlined, as recommended by the subcommittee, be adopted by the full committee, will say "aye."

(There was a chorus of ayes.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Those opposed?

(There was no response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The ayes have it unanimously, there being no vote in the negative; and the program is adopted.

The Chair does not know which of the four witnesses can be secured for tomorrow morning, but the one who can be on hand at 10 o'clock in the morning will be here; and we will now recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 10:45 a. m., the committees stood in recess until 10:09 a. m., the following morning, Tuesday, June 19, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 1951

United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:09 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Green, Sparkman, Wiley, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Brewster, Johnson (Texas), Bridges, Saltonstall, Knowland, and Cain.

Also present: William H. Darden, clerk, Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff, Committee on Armed Services; Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committees will come to order.

Gentlemen of the committees, our witness today is Vice Adm. Oscar Charles Badger, who is now the commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier.

Admiral Badger is a distinguished naval officer who has served in two major wars. During World War II, he was one of the ranking naval commanders in the Pacific. He was one of the men who led America's attack directly on the heartland of Japan.

Admiral Badger has had extensive experience in the Far East, the theater which is under study by our committees. He should be well qualified to advise with us on many of the matters that are under consideration.

Admiral Badger, the committees have directed me to administer the oath to all witnesses.

Will you please rise and raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give to these committees upon the issues pending, shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Admiral Badger. I do.

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADM. OSCAR CHARLES BADGER, UNITED STATES NAVY, COMMANDER, EASTERN SEA FRONTIER; ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COMDR. JAMES J. LYONS, UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

Chairman Russell. Admiral, will you give us the dates, and the nature of your most recent service in the Pacific, prior to your present assignment; or, do you have any statement you desire to make, any prepared statement?

Admiral **Badger**. I have no prepared statement, unless you wish one; but I want to remind the committees that on March 14, 1951, I was called before the National War College, and made a statement entitled "The Far Eastern World Strategy." In that, I covered the Far East as well as I could, in a period of about 30 or 35 minutes.

Senator **Wiley**. What date was that?

Admiral **Badger**. That was March 14.

Now, that statement included certain recommended action. It covers the Far East, and something of the background which relates directly to the present situation, and has been well received.

Senator **Knowland**. Mr. Chairman, I think it might be helpful—all we are seeking here is knowledge and background—if the admiral could read the statement into the record.

Chairman **Russell**. You are certainly at liberty to do that if you desire, Admiral.

Admiral **Badger**. I believe it is not directly bearing on what I understand the purpose of these committees' investigation is, but as far as I am concerned, it gives me an opportunity to present to you some of the things that are most important to understand about the Far East and also the best I can do in the way of what we should do from now on.

Chairman **Russell**. I think we would be interested in hearing that if you desire, Admiral. We would be glad to have you read it.

Admiral **Badger**. I would like to have the committees know that this talk was made before the relief of General MacArthur and I am willing to present this without any modification because I haven't seen any reason to change my mind.

Chairman **Russell**. Very well, sir.

WITNESS' EXPERIENCE IN THE FAR EAST

Senator **Smith**. Mr. Chairman, might I ask the admiral how long he was in the Far East, how long his experience was there?

Admiral **Badger**. I have been in the Far East a total of over 3 years, with another 3 years of going there every 6 or 7 weeks on various missions.

At the end of the war you remember, Mr. Senator, I was closing up the Pacific, had charge of the demobilization and closing up of the bases and had to go to China frequently in connection with the shipping and the disposition of that surplus material sent out to the islands.

After that, why I came back for a brief period in the United States and then went out as commander of the forces in the western Pacific which I think should be clear to you gentlemen that that constituted the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Far East exclusive of the MacArthur area of command which was occupied Japan and Korea.

Chairman **Russell**. What were the dates, Admiral?

Admiral **Badger**. I went out there in December of 1947 and came back in October, I think, of 1949.

STATEMENT BEFORE THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE, MARCH 14, 1951

Chairman **Russell**. We would be glad to have you proceed with your statement if you desire.

Admiral **Badger**. I think it would lay a foundation here. I really do.

The subject is the Far East and world strategy. It is an extremely wide subject involving a great many factors, points of view, and, of course, differences of opinion.

Our major strategic objective is to create and maintain world conditions so that Russia will deem it unwise to undertake world war III.

Secondarily, we should initiate promptly and undertake those political, economic, humanitarian, and military objectives which, in case of war with Soviet Russia, would permit us to engaged under the most favorable terms.

I would like to divert for a minute to say that everything that is in this paper has to do with the basis of any war plan, which is the assumptions of the war plan.

In other words, the state of the world at the time of the beginning of war is the basis on which the war plan must be set up. Therefore, if there is reference to political, economic, humanitarian, as well as military objectives, I remind you that they all have to do with what I consider important control of certain parts of the world in connection with communications and other things.

Conflict between Communist and western influences already exists to an intensified degree throughout Asia. In some areas it is by nature political, in others economic, and in others military.

The problems are serious and extremely varied. The best that I can hope to do in the time available is to present sufficient facts and ideas to assist you in your studies and estimates of the situation.

In terms of broad strategy a glance at the map of Asia is sufficient to indicate the great advances that Communist forces have made in a comparatively short period of time. Southeast Asia looks pretty small compared to the area of the rest of Asia under dominating Soviet influences.

MAJOR DIVISIONS IN ASIA

Existing situations automatically divide the entire area into three major classifications:

First, the area including Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and, possibly, North China, which is generally deemed to be securely under Communist control and definitely subservient to Moscow.

Secondly, the area of China to the southward of such definite control in which there is still a chance of revolutionary repercussion against Communist tyranny and imperialism.

And third, the areas south of the border of China which are still outside of the iron or bamboo curtain, the vast majority of whose people stand strongly against Communist aggression and also against any form of colonialism, in favor of their own complete independence.

ANTI-COMMUNIST FRONTIER IN ASIA

It would be a waste of your time for me to argue the strategic difference between maintaining an anti-Communist frontier in Asia and permitting the entire area to fall under Communist domination.

Any important anti-Communist frontier in Asia presents continuous and serious problems to the Communist regime in Peking or Moscow so long as it exists. I would like to emphasize that; that we do not have to feel too badly about not having a way to turn because that present frontier is on the south border of China instead of the north border.

In case of war, it cuts off the availability of many important strategic material and, on the other hand, would impose the burden of flow from Russian sources of such materials and of arms and of ammunition, instead of providing a source of supply flowing in the other direction.

Under the same conditions, of course, products of eastern Asia would be available to the western world and would permit the strategic use of these favorably located land and water areas in the exercise of world-wide military operations.

I would like to emphasize that, because I have often looked at the map and if they were to get down and control Indonesia and southeast Asia, it would certainly make communications between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean very questionable, requiring shipping to go to India, for instance, around Australia, or probably around the Cape of Good Hope. If you will look at the map under those conditions you will see that India looks lost.

AREAS UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL

Let us first consider the areas which I have classified as those presently under the dominating control of Moscow through the various intervening Chinese Communist governments.

This discussion may be a little lengthened by my attempt to point out the value of taking the initiative and which Russia in this case has maintained and cleverly exploited for a considerable period of time.

To the students of the Far East it has been evident that the strategic value placed by Russia upon North China, including Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang has been very pronounced for many years—150 years.

By recent developments the U. S. S. R. has not only obtained control of these vast areas important to herself, but no less authority than the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, has stated that they have been successful in detaching these areas from China and attaching them to the Soviet Union.

Personally I do not believe that we can reduce Soviet domination of these areas short of war or of violent and successful revolution against the existing Soviet or Communist governments of Moscow and Peking. I sincerely hope there is some other way.

At this point consideration should be given to a few recent historical facts.

At Cairo in November 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff were considering the advisability of Russian entrance as a declared belligerent in the war against Japan. Because of the meeting with Mr. Stalin in Tehran, which was to follow the Cairo conference by only a few days, an immediate decision was necessary in order that they might advise Mr. Stalin accordingly.

LOGISTICAL WEAKNESS OF SOVIET IN FAR EAST IN 1943

The Allied logistic agencies, with plenty of accurate and conclusive evidence and statistics at their disposal, pronounced the U. S. S. R. as being so weak logistically in the Far East, that even the support of their defensive forces being maintained there, including those on the border of Manchuria, were dependent on overseas support from American Pacific coast ports. This was made available by the continuous operation of approximately 100 to 150 merchant vessels under the Soviet flag bringing supplies from Seattle and Vancouver, across the Pacific. Of course, to reach Vladivostok, those ships had to pass through Japanese-controlled waters.

Because the movement of these Soviet ships through these waters would have been immediately cut off by Russian entry into the war in the Far East, the logistic staff recommended that the U. S. S. R. be advised not to enter the war against Japan. In other words, weakness in the Far East of the Soviet Union was definitely recognized, was definitely a fact, and their participation in the war against Japan at that time was undesirable.

Senator SMTH. Admiral, might I ask the date when the Chiefs of Staff thought it was undesirable?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; that was in November or December of 1943.

SOVIET DEMANDS FOR ENTRY INTO WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Since my return from Asia, I have heard considerable discussion and have received many questions regarding the decision at the Yalta Conference regarding Russian rights and privileges in Chinese Manchuria. During the war a great many people were trying to predict the price that the Soviet Union would demand at the end of the war for her participation. In general, those predictions were limited to three. All pointed toward the acquisition of warm-water ports as outlets for Soviet world trade. I think the general consensus of opinion pointed toward the possibility that Stalin might demand all three, but if not, they would be made in the following order of importance:

First. Soviet control of a belt extending to the Persian Gulf;

Second. Soviet control and access to the Dardanelles, with definite rights to adjacent territory; and

Third. Soviet commercial and military rights in the ports of Port Arthur and Dairen, with commanding control of those ports and the land approaches to them, including the Manchurian railway.

To many, it was a considerable surprise when Soviet demands pointed merely to the third, or Manchurian factor. On the other hand, I think that, among western powers, this demand was received with considerable relief as being the lesser of the three evils. I was not at the Yalta Conference.

Maybe and probably the decisions of the Soviet Union in this regard were based on the fact that she recognized her strategic weakness in the Far East, that eastern Siberia was not an area adaptable to any balanced economic and industrial development, that, cut off from the sea, she was too dependent upon the Trans-Siberian Railway, and that, therefore, the best way to obtain greater strength in the Far East was to acquire the potentially great and well-balanced indusrial capacity of Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia. This would not only strengthen her logistics position in the Far East, but would safeguard her principal industrial areas against direct attack from nearby bases.

It is unfortunate that postwar developments turned over this strategically important area from one potential disturber of the peace in the Far East—Japan—to another, the U. S. S. R. It is unfortunate that our lack of insistence on safeguarding measures resulted in this unfavorable exchange of control, and actually transferred the industrial benefits of this area from a democratic China to the Soviet Union as a means to build up their Far Eastern security and to strengthen and balance the Soviet industrial potential.

I did touch in this speech on the fact that that is potentially a stronger industrial area than any other like area east of the Ural Mountains.

CHINESE AREAS WHERE REVOLUTION AGAINST COMMUNISTS IS POSSIBLE

Thus, passing now to the second area of broad consideration, we might consider China from the Great Wall to the borders of Burma and Indochina as being an area of possible revolutionary repercussion against their present Communist masters.

The northern part of this area from the Great Wall to the Yangtze River is an area of industrial potentialities but one which suffered such immeasurable damage during 20 years of disturbance and war that the existing capacity is greatly reduced.

My estimate when I was out there, it was reduced to not more than 20 percent.

Senator GREEN. Twenty percent of what?

Admiral BADGER. Twenty percent of its capacity in 1936.

Senator WILEY. Industrial capacity you are talking about?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, and mining capacity, coal and so on.

About 3 years ago a reliable commission of Chinese with American and British representatives sought to use available barterable goods in North China in exchange for certain essentials. In this area, representing about 75,000,000 people, they succeeded in locating less than $2,000,000 worth of acceptable items.

Although this area is now dominantly under the control of the Chinese Communists, an important percentage of the population would enthusiastically welcome the return of some of their former local leaders.

Under the latter they had fought hard for three full years to keep the Communist armies north of the Great Wall, but the hopelessness of the situation, the extent of the effort devoted to the military with concurrent cost to economic and industrial recovery, and the glowing Communist propaganda, caused collapse and surrender which in turn presaged the collapse of all resistance all the way to Canton.

That was predicted in 1948 that entire China would fall if we lost North China.

Although the people of North China proper are generally regarded as the most progressive and capable in that country, there is no question in my mind that they are desperately unhappy at their present lot. It was only about 3 years ago when American friendship and aid was evidenced by the presence of outstanding American ECA officials who were planning the restoration of destroyed or defective facilities and the establishment of improved agricultural techniques. These officials were welcomed enthusiastically and with appreciation by high and low alike. I saw that with my own eyes, thousands. It is too bad that this organized effort came too late, but I believe that the seeds of appreciation of American friendship which were seen at that time are still alive.

As we move south to the Yangtze and into South China we find less activity which we think of as industrial. The soil provides for almost all of the needs of life, but is generally far short of necessary capacity. Reliable reports indicate that the Communist reallocation of land, the liquidation of land owners, have brought about no perceptible advantages and, in many areas, result in a lowering of conditions under which the majority must endure.

These people need improved technique rather than land distribution. Again, it is too bad that the ECA program in this respect was cut off in 1949 almost before it got underway.

PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Of the numerous acquaintance of many nationalities who still keep me informed of their observations in the Far East, all seem to agree that the problems existing behind the bamboo curtain must really be staggering.

There is also agreement that the Chinese are overwhelmingly sick of the central Communist methods of control and they would, if they could, throw them out in favor of local leaders of their choice.

Only yesterday I received a letter from an extremely active and well-informed observer. In discussing the possibility of an anti-Communist uprising in South China he said:

> People who have been in China lately are divided in opinion. One school thinks that a Nationalist landing from Formosa would spark and gather widespread and effective support, even to widespread desertions from Communist armies in South China. The other school thinks it would not. There is no doubt that a show-down of that sort would require a desperate decision on the part of each individual no matter how sick he may be of the Communists. The life of everyone who displayed the slightest leaning against the Communists or toward the Nationalists would be forfeit if the attempt proved abortive or even faltered momentarily.

Thus, these people are the slaves of fear and tyranny. Strategically thinking, they cannot avoid being tools of the aggressive ambitions of the Communist Governments at Moscow and Peiping. They, with their great numbers and shortages of goods, definitely belong to the "have-nots," and they constitute a threat to all border nations under strong and effective coercion.

OPPOSITION TO RECOGNITION

Naturally, the question of Hong Kong and British recognition of Communist China comes importantly into the considerations of this area in seeking the most favorable solutions to the western problems.

I am opposed to the recognition of the present Communist Government of China. Briefly, I believe that the unanimous stamp of approval by western nations of a a government so unpopular, so tyrannical, and so at odds with all acceptable principles of civilization, would result in loss of western prestige and would result in the encouragement of similar movements by minorities in other world areas and the further spread of Communist tyranny and slavery among people who basically seek peace, independence, and the opportunity to establish for themselves a better way of life.

OUR BEST COURSE OF ACTION IN THAT AREA

In my opinion, the high percentage of anti-Communist feeling in south China gives the possibility of rolling the iron curtain back at least to the Yangtze River and of relieving the pressure from the border nations of southeast Asia. The recent Chinese reverses in Korea are strengthening these chances. The remarkable increase in the welfare of the people of Formosa during recent months is known widely on the mainland and is a spur to reaction.

But lacking any real opportunity for direct contact with the mainland Chinese, it seems to me that our best course of action is toward the prompt establishment and maintenance of strong moral and economic support to the free communities of Asia, including Formosa. Not only will this action tend toward a stabilization of friendship in these areas for western powers but reports of these actions and of their benefits will undoubtedly infiltrate into a dissatisfied China and may affect the actions and destinies of these unhappy people toward more favorable circumstances.

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Relying generously on the recent reports of my friend and associate of recent periods in the Far East, Mr. Allen Griffin, I wish to point out the wide scope and varied characteristics of problems existing in various localities of southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia stretches from north Burma to New Guinea, in a long 4,000-mile barrier between the western Pacific and the Indian Oceans. The resources of that barrier, plus its physical location, would give a totalitarian holder domination of most of Asia and would be a power affecting the destinies of India, the Philippines, and even Japan.

Although the dollar value of such important items as oil, rubber, and tin is quite considerable, it is the less valuable item of food which is of the utmost importance because of its value in terms of political power. This latter is the immediate target of Communist endeavor.

Therefore it is important, in our considerations of southeast Asia, that we do not make the common mistake of classifying this area with China as one of more people than there is land to support them. In fact, the surplus rice production of Siam and Burma is, in my opinion, why a Communist China, unassisted economically and by modern productive technique, might ultimately be coerced to invade and establish control over these rice bowls of the Orient.

Although war and insurrection have reduced the annual export of rice from the Irrawaddy, Sittang, Menin, and Mekong River areas from the 5,000,000 tons of the late thirties, to 2,500,000 tons during the past year, it is easy to see the political impact of any despotism able to sell or deny this rice at will.

These food considerations, plus the fact that Malaya and Indonesia produce most of the world's natural rubber and tin and generous amounts of petroleum, sugar, bauxite, copra, palm oil, and other products, classify these areas as not essentially an area of poverty, although much individual poverty exists. Under such circumstances they exist as areas of opportunity to us in the attainment of our objectives as well as to the native populations.

Now, to examine a few local problems for a moment:

CONDITIONS IN INDOCHINA

Indochina is potentially an area of food surpluses under peaceful conditions. Now it is an area of chaos and misery. Like all other people of southeast Asia, they are violently anticolonial, and therefore we have the peculiar situation where both the Communists and the anti-Communists desire the withdrawal of French colonial control.

France is maintaining about half of her regular army in Viet-nam in attempting to prevent the Communist-led Viet-minh forces and Chinese Communist invaders from taking over this key to southeast Asia. Here, as well as in North Korea, Russia has native people unwittingly fighting for Soviet imperialism that most of them believe is only for independence from French colonialism.

Here we have the elements of almost unbelievable political confusion and difficulty. For instance, the governments and people of Burma and Indonesia are strongly anticolonial. They have only recently thrown off the yoke of British and Dutch controls, respectively. Therefore, these governments refuse to recognize Bao Dai, the leader of the Nationalist Government, because they regard him as a puppet of France and, therefore, a proponent of continuation of colonialism in the Far East.

On the other hand, they view the opposing Communist-trained leader, Ho Chi Minh, less in the light of being a Communist than in the light of his being a champion of the people attempting to throw out the French.

So far as the United States is concerned, our position is a difficult one under these circumstances because we are looked on as a friend and ally of the French colonial government that is imposing its strength upon a part of Asia.

Although our own skirts are pretty clean on the question of colonial imperialism, we are still subject to distrust because of our associations, past and present, and Russian propaganda makes much of these facts, plus the fact that we are providing military support to the French colonial and other native puppets in furthering these unacceptable conditions.

I can offer no realistic solution to this problem, but will impose the thought that time is of major importance. If we are going to continue our present policy of building up the political and military strength of Bao Dai to a degree that, in the eyes of the people, he truly represents their welfare and the independence they long for, we must do it fast and effectively.

This, of course, involves a continued use by France of a large portion of her share of our European recovery program in the support of her armies in Indochina; and it also means, effective action in providing reasonable economic and humanitarian relief for the people of this nation who are fighting to defend this critical area against the threat of Communist expansion and slavery.

I doubt the possibility, but can recognize the advantages, of this becoming a United Nations effort, rather than primarily French, accompanied by promises of early independence following success.

PROBLEMS IN BURMA

Burma is an extensive area involving a youthful and inexperienced government lacking effective control over widespread disorders and disorganization.

Only recently they obtained their independence from the British. The native government had hardly been formed and its leaders were engaged in one of their early meetings when the President and six or seven of his most trusted advisers were assassinated while sitting around the conference table. Since that time, Burma has been the scene of insurrections, interparty fighting, which has only abated to a degree during recent months.

The Communists have not entered largely into the Burmese picture, possibly because there is too much rice in that country to interest the people in Communist ideologies. However, there are Communist groups in Burma causing the usual local unrest and disturbances and ready to take more active steps if Communist support were indicated as becoming available from beyond the Burmese border.

As previously stated, the Chinese look with some longing on the rich rice paddies of Burma and might be coerced by Moscow to extend control of the Chinese Communists into that country. This is a threat that cannot be overlooked.

INDONESIA

Indonesia involves a nation of over 70 million people. The island of Java is about the size of the State of West Virginia and is nearly equally as mountainous. However, by a most remarkable system of irrigation anywhere in the world, and by virtue of obtaining three rice crops a year, over 50 million people are supported in this small mountainous country. In the islands of Java, Sumatra, Celebes, and others, petroleum products, rubber, sugar, bauxite, tin, and so forth, were exported in even the midst of insurrection to a value exceeding one-half billion dollars a year.

Communist influences in this country are weak but the government has many serious problems involving differences between the Dutch, the Moslems, the Islamites, and others, who feel seriously enough about the situation to back frequent insurrections.

NEED FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Collectively strong, the greatest need of all of these nations of southeast Asia is for technical assistance, for the improvement of agricultural technique, health, transportation, education, exploration of natural resources, and other developments for the restoration and improvement of the economies of these countries which require not only foreign technicians to work in the field and to train senior technicians among the natives, but in some instances require technical leaders of considerable experience and prestige.

A fair example of what can be done along these lines can be viewed in the recent political and industrial developments in Formosa.

Here, with a Nationalist treasury of approximately $200 million and with economic aid from the United States amount to about $25 million during the last year, there has been sufficient money to under-write contracts with leading American engineering firms and to create a source of expert counsel directly available to the planning ministries of the native government. Backed up by a popular system of government and by the assurance of relative security, the electrical power almost entirely destroyed by American bombing during the war has been restored.

Improved agricultural technique has increased the production of rice, sugar, and other staple products by more than 300 percent. By a new system of irrigation the production of sugar per acre during the coming year will again be doubled. This has been done in spite of the fact that nearly 600,000 men of the total population of 7,000,000 are still retained in the Armed Forces and that these forces have been maintained in spite of a general and considerable reduction in tax rates. Thus, we can realize the possibilities of positive action toward assisting these people in the Far East toward the betterment of their conditions of life, and toward their appreciation of western principles of civilization. I am sure that the members of the committee are familiar with the improved state of mind as well as state of life in Formosa.

It has been my experience, and the experience of hundreds of others, that no western people are more cordially accepted or have greater opportunity to win good will throughout the Far East, than the people of the United States.

We represent to them the methods, the enterprise, the optimism, the readiness, the capacity to get things done and, generally speaking, our approach has been fair, friendly, and democratic.

They believe that in the technical sense we can help them more effectively, as well as more generously, than any other country. These factors, I believe to be the basis of our fight against communism in this part of the world.

The successful developments and improvements in Formosa, as cited above, are becoming well known on the mainland of Asia and constitute a beneficial propaganda second to none.

Again, the recent action of the United Nations, for which there is the profoundest respect, in the Korean situation against the Communist attempt to invade that country, is something that they can understand; not just a unilateral action by the United States but action as a result of united world opinion to oppose a control which they recognize as imperialism.

The people of southeast Asia are completely fed up with war and insurrection. They want peace and the opportunity to improve their status.

I think now is the time to show that, despite our own difficulties in world affairs and in the Korean War in particular, and despite the importance of our interest and plans in Europe, we are big enough and powerful enough, with the assistance of our friends in the United Nations, to move in to assist these governments and people in their sincere and newborn determination to rebuild and improve their economies, decently to administer their lands, and to improve the common lot. I think it is we Americans, not the Russians and their stooges, who have the qualities to step in to capture the imagination and the national spirit of these people.

These people are not in the market to bargain with us for aid, least of all, with political concessions. We cannot buy anticommunism in southeast Asia; and, if we try it, we will probably win suspicion rather than friendship. I believe this is a job for statesmen-like engineers and economic and agricultural experts. I saw it started, set up with its initial effects in China by the ECA.

It is unfortunate that this promising effort was begun too late to overcome the Communist advances already made. We must not let this happen in the remaining countries of southeast Asia.

COURSES OF ACTION FOR UNITED STATES TO FOLLOW

Finally, in answer to many questions, I will presume to outline to this selected group the courses of action which I would follow in this part of the world in order to derive the greatest strategic advantages:

(*a*) Continue—this is a basic thing—and accelerate the rearmament program of the United States and all other free nations. There has been some doubt in the Far East to my personal knowledge as to our strength. Remove the doubt.

(*b*) Take the initiative in southeast Asia and other areas outside of Communist control by the prompt establishment and implementation of economic, humanitarian, and agricultural programs of aid and technical guidance.

Technical guidance is extremely important. You cannot expect too much from people who have no knowledge. The statement is that money without the know-how is no good.

(*c*) Continue to effect heavy losses in Korea of Chinese military manpower and of their essential equipment in the hope that the Peiping government may be forced to change its attitude of demand to one of acceptable negotiation.

Conduct all operations in connection with the war in Korea consistent with the fact that the availability of arms, ammunition, and equipment is more critical to the Chinese effort than is the availability of manpower.

They have always shown shortages of equipment. They lack industrial capacity, but their manpower—on the basis of figures, some people estimate that there are 6,000,000 boys who attain the age of 18 every year, and certainly their source of production is pretty well spread out.

(*d*) Support (*c*) by discontinuing the recognized use of sanctuaries by armed enemies of the United Nations, and by the establishment of effective sanctions and, if necessary, blockades.

In connection with blockades, the fact should not be overlooked that the Communists effectively used the weapon of economic blockade against the Nationalists during the past few years of Chinese conflict. These blockades fatally weakened Nationalist control and administration in important areas.

In China, the availability of materials and manufacturing capacity is so limited that the stoppage of trade and economic intercourse is often considered to be the strongest weapon available for weakening the enemy, gentlemen, in that part of the world. Thank you.

BOMBING OF BASES IN MANCHURIA

Chairman Russell. Admiral, am I correct in assuming from your statement that you favor the proposal of General MacArthur that we bomb the Communist bases in Manchuria?

Admiral BADGER. I think we can lick them in Korea. I think we should not open ourselves to the bombing of bases in China. But I think that, if we do not get a negotiable reaction from the Chinese Communist Government pretty soon, we would have to do what we could to destroy the sources of equipment, which. I think, is the element of strength or weakness on the part of Chinese forces.

In other words, to clarify that, I do not believe, as a person of some experience in the Orient, that we would derive one-sided benefit from the bombing of the bases in China at the present time.

CHAIRMAN RUSSELL. Well, as a military man of great competence and experience, what factors would enter into the timing when we should bomb in Manchuria and in China?

Admiral BADGER. I am too far out of China and too removed from Korea at the present time to answer that, and I believe that you certainly have witnesses here who can give you a better estimate of the value received from one side of that question or the other.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, eliminating the time element then, when you refer to destroying "the sources of equipment", does that mean the warehouses where the equipment is stored or the places where the equipment is manufactured?

Admiral BADGER. I would like to straighten it out. Did I say "destroy the sources of equipment"?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I so understood you, Admiral; and Senator Saltonstall, who keeps very copious notes, also nods his head. I was just wondering whether you mean the warehouses where the equipment was stored or the places where this equipment was manufactured.

Admiral BADGER. I would take the sources of equipment all the way back, well, everything involved in equipment. Sources of equipment may be shipments made into China from other areas. So, as I said before, I think that we can stop that source of supply at the present time with the leeway we have got between the Yalu River and the position of those troops; and I would prefer to limit military action to that area for the time being.

That does not mean, however, that there are not other things. For instance, I spoke of stopping equipment going into China from sources which we can control.

ECONOMIC AND NAVAL BLOCKADES

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, that was to be my next question. I want to say, Admiral, I was not trying to ask you a loaded question. We have had a great deal of testimony here about the sources of the equipment used by the Chinese Communists and the means whereby that flow of equipment could be cut off.

The question immediately arises, of course, of whether it is being furnished by the Russians, and how far we would have to go to bomb it.

I understand, from your last statement now, that you would disrupt the lines of supply to where the equipment would either be destroyed or could not reach the men who were carrying on the fighting on the front.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, do you favor—I am sure you favor the imposition of all possible economic sanctions against Communist China.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; that apply, certainly apply in any respect to the support of the Armed Forces.

Chairman RUSSELL. The ordinary contraband of war is fairly well established, I think, by international law.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you favor the imposition of a naval blockade on Communist China?

Admiral BADGER. A naval blockade has advantages which should be recognized; and that is the blockade does not necessarily mean that you go beyond the stoppage of contraband of war. And it has a further advantage of stopping smuggling or stopping shipments by people who do not want to cooperate with the control of such material.

I think that the naval blockade—when the Chinese closed the port of Shanghai under the term "port closure," they did not close the port against everything; they only closed it against very few items, one of which was liquid fuel; but they had control of what went into Shanghai. There is no question about that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you read the testimony of Admiral Sherman before this committee?

Admiral BADGER. I did, but sometime ago, and I had a good many discussions at various places since that time.

I would like to say that, when I read Admiral Sherman's testimony, my reaction was one of agreement.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think that I can safely say a vast majority of this committee found themselves likewise in agreement. The question has been before this committee as to the means of imposing a naval blockade, as to whether it should be an undertaking of this Government, the United States, or whether it should be an undertaking of the United Nations.

Do you have any opinion on that subject that you could give us?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; I think it requires the full coordination of our allies in the United Nations.

Chairman RUSSELL. You would not then favor a strictly American naval blockade.

Admiral BADGER. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You would, of course, favor our utilizing every resource at our command to induce our allies and our colleagues in the United Nations to impose such a blockade.

Admiral BADGER. As a means of stopping contraband of war, yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have you been on Formosa, Admiral?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. When were you last in Formosa?

Admiral BADGER. About 2 years ago.

Chairman RUSSELL. Are you familiar with the number and quality of the Chinese Nationalist troops there?

Admiral BADGER. Only from reports.

USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS IN KOREA

Chairman RUSSELL. I am coming now to another of the recommendations of General MacArthur that has been the subject of a great deal of testimony before these committees.

Do you favor the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea, or do you favor—well, I will ask you that question first.

Admiral BADGER. In Korea?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Admiral BADGER. May I ask you something? I would feel a little bit embarrassed by such a question as that, because I am unable to evaluate the applicability of such troops in Korea.

I say as a matter of personal opinion, with limitations as to the desirability of having them in Korea, which is a matter of recommendation of the responsible military commander in that area, I do not believe that they have any too many troops on Formosa to spare them right at the present time; that they had better train them and equip them to safeguard the island itself.

Chairman RUSSELL. I want to state again, Admiral, that I was not trying to ask embarrasing questions. These are questions that have arisen. As a matter of fact, they are the very heart of the differences between General MacArthur's views and those entertained by the Joint Chiefs.

I was asking the question because I knew that some people would, and in an effort to push the hearings along.

The other was: Do you think it proper at this time for us to give logistical support to the Chinese Nationalists for forays against or invasion of the Communist Chinese mainland?

Admiral BADGER. I would have to refer that to the recommendations such as they are of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I feel that it is proper for us to give them support in the build-up and equipping of those troops on Formosa as a means of defense. I think that they might be used in a very restricted fashion in raids which might divert some of this equipment I am talking about locally; but, on the other hand, I think that history points to the fact that they don't have numbers to really go there seriously, because you have got to remember that a couple of million well-led, well-equipped Japanese went over there and weren't too successful.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, do you think we should assist those forays by carrying them in American bottoms and perhaps affording them American air support, or should we confine our assistance to the logistics of such forays by furnishing ships and planes to the Chinese Nationalists themselves?

Admiral BADGER. Well, there again I am sorry that I am unable to make a good recommendation or express a good opinion on that——

Chairman RUSSELL. Admiral, some of the members of this committee think that your great experience there in the Far East and your intimate knowledge of the personalities and the peoples involved make you a peculiarly qualified witness on some of those things.

Admiral BADGER. Well, I will go on. I feel that for raids of the size that I would contemplate being feasible, that the Chinese might well handle it themselves.

IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA TO UNITED STATES

Chairman RUSSELL. What is your opinion, Admiral, as to the strategic importance of Formosa to the United States, to the defense of the United States?

Admiral BADGER. It has been said by some that Formosa constitutes a location of considerable strategic importance. I have stated as a matter of record that as a naval base it is not too effective.

I believe that the harbors are too small and the facilities are too restricted. I would like to come back at you on that answer though by saying I consider Formosa to be extremely important as a source of influence to the thinking of the people on the mainland, Chinese people on the mainland of China.

I think the success and the upbuilding of Formosa is one of the outstanding forces of favorable propaganda going to the mainland of China now, and is indicating to them a good measure of what a democratic and popular form of government can do under proper technical guidance and assistance from an unselfish people.

Therefore, I would like to answer your question that I leave the value of Formosa from a military point of view to the up-to-date planners, but I will say that I would certainly support Formosa for every reason, one of which is its very great importance to our moral strength, the moral strength of the United States and of the free world in the Far East.

REASONS FOR WITHDRAWING MARINES FROM CHINA

Chairman Russell. Were you in command of the naval forces in the Far East at the time that the marines were withdrawn from China?

Admiral Badger. Yes.

Chairman Russell. Do you know the reasons which dictated the withdrawal of those forces from the mainland of China?

Admiral Badger. Yes, sir.

Chairman Russell. Do you mind stating them for the committees?

Admiral Badger. There were two reasons. There were two locations from which they were withdrawn. One was Tsingtao, and, as briefly as possible, Tsingtao was being used as a naval base, but in my opinion, personal opinion, as a naval base it was not favorably located because a base that is located ahead of the area of operations is not well located strategically.

I mean, if you have got your operations in the ocean behind the base, then your base is in the front line.

The second reason was that when the Chinese crossed the Yangtze River, Tsingtao became strategically valueless to the Chinese Nationalists. It had some potential value, up to that moment, because of the fact that they could land troops there and proceed, against very weak Communist resistance, on Shantung, if you remember your map, and could have interposed for some time against the line of supply to the Chinese Communists troops that were down farther to the south; in other words, cutting across from Tsingtao into Yunan, there was a strategic value of Tsingtao as a port for the starting of such operations behind the Communist lines and breaking their lines of communications.

When they crossed the Yangtze, the strategic value of Tsingtao became of practically no value whatsoever to the Nationalist side, and they decided to evacuate Tsingtao on that account and because they intended to evacuate Tsingtao, I agreed to the fact that Tsingtao was not a favorably located naval base, and that we could support the fleet effectively in the western Pacific, without Tsingtao, and without the handicap of having to defend a base that was so exposed to various forms of attack.

You must remember that the Soviet fields at Port Arthur and Dairen, with about 600 planes, were only about 35 minutes' flight from Tsingtao.

Senator **Wiley**. What was that last statement?

Chairman **Russell**. He said that the Soviet planes were only 35 minutes' flight from the base at Tsingtao.

Was that correct?

Admiral **Badger**. That is right.

The Shanghai base was a little different. The forces, the Marines, at Shanghai, were merely there for—well, more to effect local security of American citizens and their property, and we have to go back there a little bit to the Communist firing on the *Amethyst;* and when they fired on the *Amethyst*, they made the announcement at that time that all foreign forces of any kind whatsoever were to be considered enemies of the Communists.

We had about eight or nine hundred marines in Shanghai, and the question arose as to whether they would be sufficient in number to effectively protect the widely dispersed properties, and I talked that over with the consul general, John Cabot, and I made arrangements for the security of those people and of that property by other means—by the guaranty of the Nationalist general, Tang En-po, who I had known for a number of years, and who was a thoroughly dependable individual, and we could not publish the fact that we were withdrawing those marines on that basis because if we had done so, we would have been confronted with a propaganda that a Nationalist general had made a dicker with an imperialist admiral.

It turned out that the plan was good, so far as the protection of lives and property were concerned; but it did mean this: It meant that the Chinese Nationalists, in connection with the protection of those lives and property, also agreed to remove that property from the scorched-earth program which they had set up.

They were going to have a perfectly complete scorched-earth program in Shanghai, and were going to destroy all industrial plants and areas, power plants, oil stations, shipyards—everything, whether they were foreign or Chinese.

On our arguing with General Tang En-po, he agreed to do what he wanted to do with the Chinese shipyards and he did destroy the Chinese shipyards before he left. He did destroy other things, but he removed the telephone company, the power plants and all American and all British property from the scorched-earth program.

So, that was something of an exchange, and when we moved the marines out, it was a gamble, and a good many people out there didn't understand it, but it was good, in my opinion. There wasn't a piece of property harassed during the period of occupation, or the period of turn-over; and of course the Communists—it was to their interest not to destroy it; so that the withdrawal of the guard of marines in Shanghai was concurrent with the fact that in order to actually protect them, we would have needed a full force out there to actually take over the protection of Shanghai with American troops.

We didn't have them, and to prevent loss of life, and an incident, we removed them.

Chairman **Russell**. Well, my time has expired.

Senator Connally?

Chairman CONNALLY. Admiral Badger, you were here before in 1949?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Before the joint committee, were you not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Chairman CONNALLY. September 8, 1949.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. In the military assistance bill?

Admiral BADGER. The 8th of September; yes, sir.

PRIORITY BETWEEN JCS RECOMMENDATION AND THEATER COMMANDER RECOMMENDATION

Chairman CONNALLY. When General Wedemeyer was here the other day, he testified, in reply to a question of Senator Sparkman, that a Member of the Senate would do well to accept the recommendations of our Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to important military decisions, rather than a recommendation of a theater commander.

Do you agree with that, or not?

That is if the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended one course and the theater commander recommended another course—which would you say we should attach the most importance to, as a general proposition?

Admiral BADGER. There is no question in my mind but that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the senior of the two, and are fully informed as to world conditions and circumstances which a theater commander may not be familiar with.

Remember, Senator Connally, that I served with the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the war, and saw those directions and decisions going out to the theater commanders.

The theater commanders, during the World War, continually submitted plans of operation and it was a question, not of disapproval of the plan, but the feasibility of the plan, which affected the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time—the ability to support the attack on other forces; and, herefore, I believe that I would go—to answer your question, by saying that if there is any difference of opinion, and assuming that there will be proper exchanges of views, that our form of control throws the decision to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Chairman CONNALLY. Thank you.

ECONOMIC AID TO CHINA AND ITS EFFECT

Now, when you were here in 1949, it seems that your recommendation was that with the appropriation of $75,000,000, the four main areas of anti-Communist resistance in China then, at that time, we could stem the tide of communism in China, provided, and I quote:

> No equipment, material, services, or financial aid shall be furnished under the provisions of this act except in support of specific plans or objectives submitted for approval of the Government of the United States, as a part and justification of the requisition.

Do you adhere to that view?

Admiral BADGER. I think that to supply material and equipment that has no bearing on the plan is wasteful and always wrong.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, the Congress has already, before your appearance, appropriated $125,000,000 for the use of Chiang Kai-shek as he saw fit. We have still got some of that money, haven't spent it all, presuming that he would purchase military supplies in this country with that amount.

Just how was that amount used? Do you think we could have saved China if we had given them more aid?

Admiral BADGER. That is a pretty broad question.

Chairman CONNALLY. It is—very broad.

Admiral BADGER. But I think we lost our great gamble, a great gamble, with an element of possible success in the specific implementation of that act. We had gone through that area of North China and we had had several things that were very favorable occurring and evident in that part of China.

SITUATION IN NORTH CHINA AND GENERAL FU TSO-YI

In the first place, the armies were led at that time by a general named Fu Tso-yi. He was a man who we knew, by close acquaintance and by inspecting his armies, was a very popular and effective leader.

He had under handicaps stopped the Communists for a considerable period of time at the Great Wall, and at the time of our inspection he had 11 armies, of which 4 were pretty well equipped, 3 were indifferently equipped—and by indifferently equipped I mean poorly equipped, because you would take a look at their stacks of arms, and you would find eight rifles in a stack, and there might be three or four different kinds of rifles in the stack.

Senator WILEY. What year was that?

Admiral BADGER. That was in late 1948. I would like—I have to go a little slow on this story, because I think it is an important one, and I have to do a little thinking.

The Ambassador to China, Leighton Stuarte, Roger Lapham, who was at the time head of the ECA, and myself, with a group of Americans, went up to North China and made contact with Li Sun-jen, who was then the governor general of north China, but was not at that time even thought of as the vice president, which he was later elected to.

We talked to Fu Tso-yi, inspected Fu Tso-yi's armies; we visited the villages, we pretty well covered that part of North China; and as a result of that visit we sent a joint recommendation to Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommending that specific support be given to Fu Tso-yi.

It was quantitative, and it involved this:

He had four armies well equipped, three that were not well equipped, and four that were unequipped.

To explain how he worked those things—when he had an army that wasn't equipped—and I have seen this—they would come out from the rear and go out toward the Great Wall, and the army they were relieving, or the forces they would relieve, would retire. And I have seen them line up on the opposite side of the road and then close ranks and exchange the rifles one to the other so that the rifles available were always at the front, and the fellows in the rear were, of course, unarmed.

So this didn't amount to very much, and in the conversation—I can read that to you. Maybe that would be easier.

Senator WILEY. Is this the report you sent to Washington?

Admiral **Badger**. This is a personal letter. I think it is in a personal letter to Secretary Forrestal.

I've got a few I's in here; I mean personal pronouns, which you will have to pardon. This is a personal letter to Mr. Forrestal:

> The following day at General Fu's invitation I inspected the better part of three of his armies, one of which had just returned from service in the field, one being prepared to go into the field, and the third army that had been under training but which was unequipped in arms and ammunition and therefore incapable of action. These armies were very impressive in their appearance, actions, and spirit. Their loyalty to General Fu was unmistakably of the highest degree. General Fu told me during this tour that he had a total of 11 armies, 4 of which were well equipped, 3 of which were fairly to poorly equipped, and 4 of which were unequipped. He stated that he could do little more than to keep the Communists out of the area with his equipped armies and that he was constantly employing them on a defensive basis to meet Communist thrusts from various directions; he stated that if he could obtain equipment for the four additional trained armies he would then be able to set up an offensive to the northeast stabilizing the Chinhuangtao-Hulutal corridor and for the eventual relief of Mukden. He explained that in relieving Mukden he would reopen a channel of supply for about 300,000 of the best troops in China (many of them American-trained and -equipped) which were cut off there and were very lacking in American munitions.

They had some ammunition, but I had contact with that crowd up there and would fly in every now and then, and they averaged three or four cartridges per man. They couldn't go on the offensive and were pretty well locked in.

PROGRAM TO AID GENERAL FU

I asked General Fu Tso-yi if he had made his requirements known to Nanking, and he said, "Yes," that he had. But I said, "Are they specific and listed?" And he wasn't sure but said that he would make up such a list.

When he made it up that list came to me, came to the Army advisory group in Nanking and to the Ambassador. As a result of that a recommendation was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically listing this equipment and recommending this supply of arms, which we estimated at a total value of $16 million, based on the cost of marine equipment—which was all I had with me. And that has been presented I think. It is known as the first priority group—aid to China from the $125 million.

That recommendation went forth about in July of 1948. We felt that we had, I might say, the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of that program which came back almost immediately, and surprisingly so. I mean just 2, 3, or 4 days.

Chairman **Connally**. They approved it?

Admiral **Badger**. Oh, yes. Then nothing happened. Now I want to point out this because this is my story about that. The Generalissimo had achieved the great moral effect in North China by giving all items of United States military aid to the support of North China.

That was the critical spot, and he said everything coming from the United States, military aid for the support of China, would go to North China. That build-up was great for morale there, and in a dispatch sent jointly by the agencies in China, the Ambassadors, the chief of the Army advisory group, myself, and Roger Lapham, we emphasized the fact that the condition up there which we had observed, popularity of government, support of the armies, enthusiastic armies, loyalty to their leader and a fairly capable leader pointed to this as the most promising thing that we had seen in China for a couple of years.

DATE AND CONDITION IN WHICH AID ARRIVED

To make a long story short, nothing happened. Questions as to even the prices, what it was going to cost those people, were not forthcoming, and remembering that that was approved by the Joint Chiefs, had the authority of the act of Congress and had the approval of the President, a period of 5 months went by before we could actually get any action.

Senator Hickenlooper. Action where?

Admiral Badger. Action toward the shipment or knowledge of what was going to come, and you can't build a house, you can't fight a campaign unless you know what is coming and when it is coming, and therefore all the planning, the whole thing was stopped.

In the meantime the Communists started coming down against Fu Tso-yi and were knocking him back about December, November 31.

Chairman Connally. There is no such time.

Admiral Badger. I beg your pardon. I mean November 30. I received word that a ship was entering, was about to go into Tientsin and it had about 10 percent of this shipment that we had recommended on board. I said, "Well, that's pretty bad. It's too bad that it isn't the full business, but maybe it will still have a morale effect," knowing as I did that these generals under Fu-Tsu-yi and his troops were hanging on in the fighting and fighting hard, hanging on in the promise of this American aid.

That ship went in at Tientsin on the night of the 29th of November as I remember, and on the 30th I received this dispatch sent to me because of the fact that I had communications, but also to Nanking, and it was from General Fu Tsa-yi reporting the deficiencies of these machine guns of which there were 480 without space parts, tripod mounts, Thompson machine guns with no magazines or clips, no loading machines for loading of the ammunition belts, light machine guns with only a thousand of these with mounts, only a thousand clips for 2,280 light machine guns, no loading machines, and other discrepancies, with the sentence:

> The above-mentioned weapons are not in good condition, and for the most part cannot be used. I do not know how or why these weapons were forwarded in an incomplete state.

The result was that General Fu Tso-yi, who had his back to the wall at that time at Tientsin and Peiping in effect had his generals say, "Is this what we have been waiting for?" and they collapsed within 2 days.

Chairman Russell. Senator Connally, your time has expired.

Senator Connally. All right. Thank you, Admiral.

Chairman Russell. For the benefit of the record, I think two questions should be asked here. One is, Who is the head of the American Army mission in China at that time?

Admiral Badger. General Barr.

Chairman Russell. Now, another just for the benefit of the record. What was the size of the Chinese Army? Armies differ. You said there were 11 armies. How were those armies constituted?

Admiral Badger. They were small, approximately of between nine and twelve thousand, average of about ten thousand.

Chairman Russell. In each army?

Admiral Badger. Yes, sir.

Chairman Russell. Senator Bridges.

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO AID GENERAL FU

Senator Bridges. Admiral just a question. As a result of this type of supplies which were sent over at that time which you have described here as a result of the official message which you got, that broke down the morale of the Chinese Army—Nationalist Army—that was waiting for these supplies.

When they saw what they were getting and the ineffectiveness of it, that was rather a determining factor in the breakdown of the morale, was it not?

Admiral Badger. It was the straw that broke the camel's back, in my opinion.

Senator Bridges. And you never found out why that type of shipment was sent which was so ineffective?

Admiral Badger. I received several personal letters, but I have not found out why. I tried to find out by—it was water over the dam when I came back here after that. I did make some inquiries, but I never was able to find out the actual reason for it.

Senator Bridges. And the fact that we did give aid and gave aid that was such ineffective aid to a large degree, why it would have been almost as well if no aid was given rather than the type that was given without the essential parts of certain of the equipment given, would it not?

Admiral Badger. I think that I would like to say that this was a specific case I am speaking of and I think you will understand that I want to clarify by saying that this does not apply to all aid, but I think that in general that we did not follow out the basic rules of effective support of military operations in that we did not support plans as to timing or as to quantity or as to objective, and that is the reason why I recommended, as Senator Connally just stated, that no aid be given except in support of a definite plan, which means the objective, the trips to be rendered, equipment and the timing of the operation, which is, of course, included in the plan.

Senator Bridges. A Browning automatic rifle without a magazine would be about as much use in battle as a baseball bat, would it not?

Admiral Badger. Not much good.

Senator Wiley. Not as much.

Senator Bridges. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Hickenlooper. I didn't get the admiral's answer.

Chairman Russell. He said he didn't think it was much good, as I understand it. You can answer it for yourself.

Admiral Badger. It is part of the rifle.

Chairman Russell. Senator Wiley.

Senator Wiley. Admiral, I get from this incident that you have so dramatically told us that there was a matter of 6 months before any shipment came, and then when it came, the shipment was, as you have delineated it, absolutely useless for the purpose that it was supposed to be used for; is that right?

Admiral BADGER. Close to useless.

IMPROVEMENTS POSSIBLE IN AMERICAN AID TO CHINA

Senator WILEY. Now, have you in your experience in the Far East witnessed any other such wonderful spirit of cooperation?

Admiral BADGER. I think we could have improved, as I said before, the planning, the timing, and the necessary elements involved in connection with logistics, as we know it, and as we have experienced it.

I have said that money without the know-how isn't much good. I have said that material without it being in support of a plan is likely to be wasteful and useless and material which is defective and not accompanied by its spare parts and technicians who can make the repair is not going to be made more effective when it arrives at the scene of action.

In those instances, in those respects, a good deal of the material that was sent over there, which I am sorry to say I was shipping, but a good deal of the material thatw as sent over from the islands of the South Pacific of all kinds was very defective and lacking in usefulness, because of the fact that there were no spare parts, there were no technicians to make the repairs in China, and much of it just was removed from the ships and for years and maybe still is to be found out in the fields around various ports, still useless.

I am sure that some of the members here have seen that material in those wide areas.

Senator WILEY. Then in that answer you are referring to the general over-all aid, not simply the one incident.

Admiral BADGER. Well, it involved quite a good deal of it; yes, sir.

REASONS FOR FAILURE TO AID GENERAL FU

Senator WILEY. A good deal of it. Now, Admiral, you say you sought to find out why after you had made these specific recommendations and the Ambassador joined and the Chiefs of Staff had agreed, there was this delay and why there was the failure to make adequate compliance, and you could find no real explanation; is that right?

Admiral BADGER. It seemed to be a number of things rather than any specific thing. Of course, the fundamental behind the thing was that although this particular aid and quantity had been approved by the necessary authority, the law stated that it couldn't be provided unless it was requisitioned through diplomatic channels by the Chinese Government.

I found that the Chinese Government, however, had, under a list known as priority 1, submitted that list.

I found that the availability of material had to be examined. You will remember we were getting short, we were thinking of rearming our own military forces, and the availability of material had to be examined by the Army, which caused some delay.

There were various causes, but it was not the old drive that, in my opinion, indicated a realization in this particular case that it was important.

The objective was well-defined, and that the matter met with the authority and approval of Congress and Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President.

I didn't go into it too much; I was satisfied that it was a combination of effects that caused this thing rather than any specific thing, and I am not able—I cannot answer your question any further than that, because I didn't really try to find out any details.

Senator WILEY. But you do say that the failure to get the matériel that you, the Ambassador, and others had recommended really was the straw that broke the camel's back.

Admiral BADGER. Well, yes, I think that that was what made the situation very hopeless.

Senator WILEY. Made it hopeless.

Now, that is a very serious reflection upon somebody in relation to a policy that we have had through the the years, as I understand it. I want to ask you one other question. It goes more to the proposition of where do we go from here.

POSSIBLE RECOVERY OF CHINA

You have pretty well covered this item, and that is that in your opinion there is in China itself a ferment against the atrocities and the rule of the Communists; am I right about that?

Admiral BADGER. From a series of informants, I think there is; yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. If, as a result of a combination of circumstances, our own ineptitude in handling the Chinese policy and anything else, China becomes a stooge of Russia, does that not mean that 10, 25 years from now, we will lose Japan, we will lose Formosa, and the whole of Asia will be gone, as far as that is concerned?

If, on the other hand, we can keep the Chinese an independent people, or a friend, that will mean that we will have in the world picture created a barrier against the overpowering influence of the Kremlin?

Admiral BADGER. I cannot hope to be such a prophet to go so far in the future, but I will say this: That our sole objective—put it better this way, our primary objective—when we were in China was the realization that the stabilization of China under a friendly democratic government was essential to prevent such a possibility. In other words, we considered China and its friendly government the key to stabilization of western ideas in the Far East.

That is the reason that in this talk I say we have lost China; but that is the reason for stepping up our effort to prevent further losses; and I am a little inclined to accept in my mind—in my own mind I am a little inclined to accept China as being gone, under unfriendly control, and I would not want to rely for the stability of the Far East and the rest of the Far East on the recovery of China. I think we have got to accept the situation as it is now, and I am a little optimistic about the possibilities of the future if we accept it as it is now, and do not repeat the mistakes that we have got to admit we have made; and I say that without any idea of pointing any fingers. I think everybody appreciates that we might have done better.

Senator WILEY. When you say you accept China as it is now, what do you mean? There is this ferment in China itself; there are at least a million and a half guerrillas; and as you said, in North China there were some 70 million Chinese that you felt were not very "hot" toward the Communists, or words to that effect. Is that what you mean when you have got to accept China as it is? Do you think that because of the Communist ineptitude, as Hitler's ineptitude was in the Ukraine, there is a hope of a reconstructed and reinvigorated China going along with the West?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; provided that we take advantage of other opportunities that present themselves in the Far East, outside of China.

Senator WILEY. And if we take advantage within China.

Admiral BADGER. Well, that goes along with it.

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Well, I am glad to get that reaction because I, too, am hopeful about that situation. I am hopeful, and I have more hope recently because of information that has come directly through these hearings and elsewhere.

Admiral BADGER. In order to clarify that I would like to make a brief little statement.

WISDOM OF AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA

During my experience out there I always felt that what we were intending to do was perfectly right down the line. I mean the acts of Congress were adequate in my opinion, and timely. We gave them the contents of the islands of the Pacific not because we didn't have a good heart; we were intending to do all right. But we sent the material over there which was not in support of a plan, and therefore it wasn't usable.

I mean—to reduce it to simple terms—if I were to tear down a house and say to you, "I will give you this to build a house," but the thing didn't fit with your plan, and you didn't have an architect, or didn't have any plumbers, and so on, you would have a dickens of a time using that material—although my heart was all right and I sent that stuff over to you all right. But it didn't fit with the plan.

We went along those lines, doing the best we could, and I feel sure we did the best we could as a Nation and as people. I have never heard a Chinese in all my life criticize us for lack of generosity.

But we expected too much of them. They never had had a central government; they never had had any national public works program; they never had had any national planners. They couldn't requisition stuff; they didn't have the facilities. Therefore, we met and they met, and we didn't get the results that we hoped to get.

In other words, it's implementation—it's planning and implementation that I would like to call your attention to.

ECA EFFORTS IN CHINA

Now, when the ECA came out there to China along about 1948, they had with them a good staff. They ran into the usual political demands of the Chinese politicians to send rice to this province when they had decided they needed it somewhere else. But Roger Lapham would say, "Okay; you don't need rice in that province or any other kind of aid, and if you don't want me to put it where I think you need it, why, then we are not going to issue it at all." In other words, he exercised control; he examined things; he derived the greatest benefit.

They had an efficient staff that went out after getting more out of the land—agricultural business. And they were really going along most profitable lines.

I spoke of the enthusiasm in China. I saw Roger Lapham land in Tsinan, and I honestly think that for 10 miles they were 20 deep on both sides of that road, cheering. But it was a little too late.

Now we sent a lot of stuff over there, but it wasn't planned, it wasn't in support of a plan—it was haphazard. We expected the Chinese to have all these agencies. They didn't have them, they never had had, and therefore they couldn't take this stuff and adapt it.

I said in this thing here [indicating prepared statement] to build up this effect outside of China, let it drift into China as being something they want. But, for goodness sake, let's not waste material and money by putting it into what a military mind says is an infeasible plan.

I think that this is so important to you gentlemen that are thinking seriously of these things. I want to give you a little example.

For instance, General Eisenhower during the war asked, we will say, for 15,000 planes on the fields of England. Well, the planes were easy. But before we could approve the planes we had to examine the feasibility of sending gasoline over through the submarine zone, getting the gasoline from the holds of the tankers into trucks or pipelines, to the field, into the underground gasoline storage, out of the storage into the planes. We had to have 15 technicians on that field for the maintenance of every plane. We had to have bombs; we had to have ammunition. It was the technical know-how and the technical application of these things, not the planes.

It was a plan. He needed 15,000 planes, and we supported him with everything that was needed to operate and maintain those planes.

That's what we call feasibility of planning. If we had found that we couldn't get that gasoline through the submarine zone, and the necessary men and equipment were not available, we would have disapproved the plan as not being feasible.

AID ONLY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF A PLAN

I merely point that out because I think that there is a great deal of hope in the Far East. I think we are the most respected people in the world out there. We have been generous to them for years. We have their respect.

And if I sit up here and plead, I don't say that our policies were wrong, that we were deficient in any way of law or anything else; I merely say that to a considerable degree our implementation wasn't what could possibly lead to success in the military field or in the civilian field.

On the other hand, I can't say enough—I can't say really enough—for the ECA as I saw it after it arrived in China. We just had a few years of those fellows out there. They got pretty close to a dollar's worth of value out of what was received. Without such an organization, I should say that—well, it's only a wild estimate, but I doubt if we got 10 cents worth of value out of a dollar.

I think that my simple example will disclose that not as a criticism. We just didn't appreciate the fact that we sent planes to China without ground crews; they didn't have technicians. We sent trucks out there that needed spare parts; they didn't have any repair crews.

Now I ask as a constructive thing that we most economically, efficiently, and effectively derive the benefit where we can outside of China in the Far East. I believe that the example of Formosa and its successful build-up and general contentment of its population under its present government is drifting over into China as a principal source of favorable salesmanship or propaganda, or whatever you want, toward the western friendship. I think that there is a possibility of doing that elsewhere in the Far East, and I think that we should try it.

Senator WILEY. May I ask one more question?

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there objection to Senator Wiley asking one question?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I have got to be on the floor at 12. I come next, and I would like to ask one question; then I would be glad to give the rest of my time to Mr. Wiley.

Senator WILEY. No. Go ahead.

Chairman RUSSELL. You can't do that.

Senator WILEY. I withdraw my request.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Admiral Badger, I would like to ask one question, because I agreed to be on the floor at 12 o'clock. I read your testimony of September 8, 1949, before the Foreign Relations Committee. I have listened to what you have just said to Senator Wiley and others.

CONDITIONS OF EFFECTIVE AID TO FORMOSA

If we are going to give this planning and this implementation of the aid through the planning, is it your opinion now that that should be done through Chiang Kai-shek, and as you used your expression in September 1949, dumping the material on Formosa, or are you still in favor of, as I read your testimony, separating it among three or four leaders in China proper?

In other words, do you believe that we should try to support a central government of China—are we imperialists if we do that—or is it better to try to spread our aid where it will do the most good among various leaders?

Admiral BADGER. At the present time we have no contact whatsoever with those leaders you speak of inside China.

I think our present means of doing what we are doing in Formosa is perfectly sound. We have the Governor there, K. C. Wu, who is a well-educated man, a graduate of Princeton, who has set up agencies, but he is supporting his agencies by spending sufficient money to employ the advisory capacity of one of our great American engineering firms. I have forgotten the name of it now; I know it perfectly well.

That engineering firm meets demands of that local planning agency in connection with harbor developments, power development, irrigation projects, and so on.

In other words, they are there and if they need that kind of engineers, they get them out from the United States and estimate the situation. Then they can make requisitions to support what is a well-designed engineering plan.

Senator SMITH. Is that the J. C. White Co.?

Admiral BADGER. That is J. C. White.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You believe——

Admiral BADGER. Just a minute, Senator. The same thing applies in connection with military. If we have military advisors out there who are estimating the probable employment of those troops for beach defense or for the defense of an island, or in connection with naval ships—I can speak from experience that the Navy in connection with the Chinese assisted them a great deal in connection with their maintenance of their ships and the requisitioning of supplies and the issue of supplies.

For that reason that particular form of planned and, I might say, advised aid was one of the things which was like the ECA. It was pretty darned effective.

Therefore, to answer your question briefly, I would say in supplying aid to a place like Formosa, before you supply it, we should have a plan. We should determine that it is a feasible plan. That is based on the know-how and if they haven't got the know-how, then we may have to send or allow them to hire engineers that have the know-how.

Then we can go ahead and support such a plan with the knowledge that it is feasible and will bring the profit or the advantages that you hope it will bring.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And that is our best bet now toward helping China, in your opinion?

Admiral BADGER. As far as China is concerned, of course, friendly China is now reduced to Formosa.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you very much. I am sorry I have to leave.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral, you have not been in China since 1949?

Admiral BADGER. That is right, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You have not been in Korea since this fighting started?

Admiral BADGER. Not at all.

Senator GEORGE. You have not been in the area?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir.

SITUATION IN KOREA

Senator GEORGE. You expressed a hope a while ago that we would be able to get through with the fighting there in some way. Is that just a hope, or what do you base it on?

Admiral BADGER. I don't believe that I expressed the hope that we would be able to get through with the fighting. I do express the hope that we may make it so costly to the Chinese by loss of equipment as well as loss of life that they may be willing to negotiate on acceptable terms.

Senator GEORGE. That is what you had in mind anyway?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator GEORGE. That may or may not be a long-drawn-out operation.

Admiral BADGER. I am not close enough to it to make any estimate, of course. I have been pretty close to the Chinese military and armies and have some ability to estimate their battle strength, but the fact that I haven't been in Korea would make it in very bad taste for me to discuss Korea or the conditions that exist there.

Senator GEORGE. Yes. I have no further questions, Admiral. I just wanted to ask you about that situation there presently, and you obviously are right in saying that you could not discuss it in good taste.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

NAVAL COMMANDS IN THE PACIFIC

Senator KNOWLAND. Admiral Badger, you of course left the Far East prior to the time the Seventh Fleet was set up, or did you command the Seventh Fleet?

Admiral BADGER. At the time I left, the need for a commander of the type that I was no longer existed, in our opinion. Let me explain that.

I was known as Commander, Naval Forces, Western Pacific, and as the senior military commander in that area, I was operating directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When we had to leave China and began to reduce the forces at that time, you see, for obvious reasons, because they weren't needed under those circumstances, it was recommended and I recommended also that that command be put under the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and that would give us the flexibility of Pacific Fleet in maintaining forces as they were needed out there rather than trying to define it on a too-long-range basis.

If they wanted to carry a group out there they could send it, don't you see, and so that was the change in the organization that took place, and when I left, the title Commander, Naval Forces, Western Pacific, was abolished, and the title Commander, Seventh Fleet, was established, and the Commander, Seventh Fleet, instead of going directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff was subordinate to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

INSERTIONS IN RECORD

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland, if I start your time after I conclude, would you permit me now to place in the record some letters I have received which contain matters in answer to questions that have been asked here in these hearings?

Senator KNOWLAND. Certainly. I would be delighted to.

Chairman RUSSELL. I desire to offer for the record the statement from the Department of Defense which came to me over the signature of the Secretary in answer to a question asked by Senator Smith on May 14 on page 1830 as to discussions between policy makers in Department of State and Department of Defense with General MacArthur prior to June 1950.

I also offer the answer to a question by Senator Hickenlooper appearing on page 4958 asked on June 4. I will read the question:

> After the technical end of the embargo, isn't it a fact that for almost a year after that for one reason or another export permits were blocked so that no particular quantity of aid either economic or otherwise in fact went to the Nationalists?

This is the answer to that question.

On June 5, Senator Brewster asked Secretary Acheson a question about 20,000 rifles, which were stated to have left a German port for China but were stopped en route.

On June 5, appearing on page 5144, Senator Brewster asked a question of the Secretary as to a statement he made before the Foreign Affairs Committee on March 20, 1947.

Senator Brewster likewise on page 5146, during the examination on June 5, made a statement to the effect that "persons in direct contact with the Nationalist troops in rural areas state that there are insufficient small arms and ammunition to arm all combatant troops in the field."

That statement was attributed to Ambassador Stuart.

Then, I asked a question on June 5 as to the amount of Marine Corps ammunition and other military matériel and supplies that were furnished to the Nationalist Government. It appears on page 5158 of the transcript.

Those, being in response to questions, I thought should go into the record rather than into the appendixes.

(The documents above referred to will be found at the end of today's hearing.)

Chairman RUSSELL. I thank you, Senator Knowland, for your kindness.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest, without charging any of this time to Senator Knowland, that while I raise no objection to having these answers placed in the record, and I think they should be in, I would like to call attention that the answer to my question is nebulous and should be subject to examination of the witness because there are many things in it that need amplification. Certainly, there are certain conclusions and broad statements made in this answer that, so far as I am personally concerned, are not satisfactory.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, I have not undertaken to vouch for any of the evidence that has been delivered here. I have undertaken to see that it all got into the record in one way or another.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not objecting to it being put into the record, but I call attention to the inadequacies where the witness is not here to answer questions.

CENSORSHIP ROUTINE

Admiral BADGER. While I have been sort of on holiday here, a thought occurred to me. Could I say something off the record or something?

Chairman RUSSELL. Just a minute now, Admiral. Does this relate to classified matter?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; it relates to my position as to classified matter.

Chairman **Russell**. Well, we have a procedure established——

Admiral **Badger**. It won't need to be off the record, but I hope that it will be continued classified.

Chairman **Russell**. Well, Admiral Davis is the man whom we have had to fix the classification.

Admiral **Badger**. I am at the present time, as you gentlemen probably know, serving in connection with UN, and I have to conduct myself rather carefully in that text.

This discussion of those arms that I spoke of is classified, and I presume there is machinery here to regard that as such. In other words, I went into some classified details here which I think people outside of here, who read this thing, ought to be informed about, and it has also to do with my present position in dealing in things I have to deal with at the present time.

Chairman **Russell**. Well, you read from classified matter, is that your statement?

Admiral **Badger**. Yes; I so stated.

Chairman **Russell**. I will see that Admiral Davis is advised of that immediately.

Admiral **Badger**. I stated that all that statement was from top-secret classified matter.

Senator **Knowland**. Of course, I think the admiral should know that we have had this censorship arrangement set up as long as the item did not violate security documents which 3 or 4 or 5 years ago might have been classified and for which there is no longer the basic need for classification, that he has in his judgment made it available; and if it involved cryptography, why, the paraphrase has been made available.

Admiral **Badger**. Yes.

Senator **Knowland**. So that, for instance, the Wedemeyer report was top secret until it was released here recently.

Admiral **Badger**. Yes.

Senator **Knowland**. So, I think you should know that we do pass through a process where he has the judgment——

Admiral **Badger**. I just wanted to be sure that was understood. Also, I think that Davis, if he is in control of these things, ought to be reminded of the fact that my present contacts that go on from day to day up there, are very touchy—are very international in aspect, and quite touchy at times.

Chairman **Russell**. Well, this committee, at least the chairman of the committee, and I know some of the members, have learned to have a very great respect for Admiral Davis' judgment——

Admiral **Badger**. Yes, sir.

Chairman **Russell** (continuing). In handling these classified papers. He was assigned here to a very thankless task to handle the record of these hearings, and I think that up to date he has done a very good job.

Admiral **Badger**. Yes, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. You may proceed, sir.

IMPORTANCE OF SUPERVISED AID

Senator **Knowland**. Admiral, first, I am glad to say that I am glad to hear you express yourself as to the importance of having supervised aid. As I understand it, that has been General Wedemeyer's position that no aid should be sent unless supervised; General MacArthur's position was that there should be supervised aid, and certainly the Congress had that in mind even at the time the $125 million arrangement was in existence, that such provisions were put into the House bill, but it was objected to for reasons best known to them by the State Department, and was taken out of the bill in the Senate. So that this question of supervised aid, I think, is a very important one, and personally I have never advocated aiding or aid going to China or any other country, for that matter, unless there was this supervision to be sure that the equipment was properly used, and the people were properly trained in using it in the same manner that we sent General Van Fleet to Greece to properly supervise the equipment and the training of their forces.

Now, while you were in command, Admiral, was any plan prepared under your direction for the purpose of rendering assistance to the Republic of China, even while they were still on the mainland, or subsequently, when they finally got out into the islands of Formosa and such other islands as they then held?

SUPERVISION OF NAVAL AID

Admiral BADGER. Within the scope of the naval responsibility, we were legally authorized to supervise naval aid and assistance and advice. Therefore, there was a knowledge on the part of—on my part, of the use to which a good real of this material and equipment was going to be put, not always the specific use, but the type of use, and therefore we assisted them in the adaptation of the assistance and aid that was available and we advised against the requisitioning or demand for equipment that was not going to be useful, and therefore would be wasted.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, at that time——

Admiral BADGER. We assisted them in other lines.

We conducted a school for technicians, or helped them to conduct one. We had advisors, technicians in the form of radio electricians, radio maintenance men, ordnance maintenance men, and at the Chinese naval training station and naval school, why, we had quite a staff up there that not only taught them how to operate those things, but how to maintain them and how to repair them.

Senator KNOWLAND. I visited that school and have seen some of the equipment there on Formosa.

Admiral BADGER. Well, they also had one up in—I think the best one probably was the one at Tsingtao.

COORDINATION OF AID BY AMERICAN EMBASSY

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, at that time, as I understand it, General MacArthur had no responsibility for the China area; that was more or less under the Navy, was it—on the area of command?

Admiral BADGER. The China area, the official responsibility for the coordination of all American activities in China was the Ambassador to China, and therefore I was very close to him and never made a recommendation of any kind, of any importance, without talking it over with him and getting his concurrence.

Senator KNOWLAND. That was Mr. Stuart, at that time?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

As a matter of fact, I would like to emphasize the fact that we were most meticulous about that. I mean, everything that we put out, that was of any scope at all, or of any importance, all received his concurrence and usually the dispatches or whatever it was, said so.

RECOMMENDATION OF AID TO CHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. In addition to this naval aid that you have mentioned, and the training of technicians, was there a specific plan worked out for further assistance to the Republic of China, while you were in the theater, and was such a plan or recommendation forwarded to the Joint Chiefs, or to whoever in your chain of command you normally forwarded such recommendations to?

Admiral BADGER. You mean, beyond the Navy?

Senator KNOWLAND. Beyond the Navy.

Admiral BADGER. There was never a broad strategic plan I would consider as such.

Senator KNOWLAND. I am not speaking about a strategic plan, I am speaking more about a plan for aid to the Republic of China.

Admiral BADGER. I never knew of any plan like that, sir; beyond the fact that—are you asking me now about what I know about it?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. I say, I know of none, other than the fact that again I refer to ECA who did go out there, and did send their supervisors, their inspectors around, and who did estimate the need for repairs and overhaul of mining machinery and power plants and agricultural techniques, and what-not, and after their estimates, made their wants known and did follow out that plan.

Senator KNOWLAND. While you were out in the Far East, and prior to your coming back to this country, did you recommend a mission to be sent to Formosa, and if so, what became of the mission?

Admiral BADGER. I do not recall making an actual written recommendation to that effect, although I do know that I came back favoring it, and may have expressed a view to the various agencies that I testified before.

Senator KNOWLAND. What became of the recommendation, or what was the response to the recommendation of the mission to Formosa?

Admiral BADGER. I have lost touch with that. I do not know.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I mean at that particular time, I understand, of course, we now have the so-called Chase mission that the Defense Department has sent over there, but I am speaking now at the time that you came back in 1949.

Admiral BADGER. I am very sorry, but I have forgotten. I really just have forgotten that.

Senator KNOWLAND. The reason I asked that specifically, because I want you to know the purpose of my inquiry. I had been informed, and there is testimony before this committee, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended that a military mission be sent, in, for instance, in December or November of 1949, and the State Department at that time objected to such a mission being sent.

Admiral BADGER. Now that you remind me, that is where I expressed that recommendation, in my contact with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after I came back.

Senator **Knowland**. And what was the date of your return again?

Admiral **Badger**. That was about September 1949.

Senator **Knowland**. So that it is possible that your recommendations were one of the several factors and several pieces of information which the Joint Chiefs might have had before them at the time that they made their recommendations, which were not concurred in.

Admiral **Badger**. Quite possibly.

STOPPING SMUGGLING INTO COMMUNIST CHINA

Senator **Knowland**. Admiral, in regard to this question of the blockade and the possibility of the UN action on it, I received yesterday or the day before from Hong Kong several clippings, which indicate that though there have been restrictions placed by the British Government on the shipment of certain materials to Red China, that there is still quite a traffic in smuggling going on. I doubt if you will ever be able to stop smuggling in China, but I noticed, for instance, that one master of a large Japanese junk that was found with a load of gasoline was picked up by the British authorities and fined what is the equivalent of $50 American for having tried to smuggle that to Red China.

Now, since gasoline would be a very important strategic material to go to the Communists and since there is very little civilian automobile traffic in China which is not requisitioned by the Chinese Communist military, do you think—if this is a fair question—do you think that a fine of the equivalent of $50 American for a junk load of gasoline is hardly an effective way to stop such illegal traffic?

I will withdraw the question because of what you told us about your more recent obligations you have assumed, but I want to say on my own responsibility as a Senator, with these clippings that have come to me out of Hong Kong papers, that I don't think they are going to effectively stop smuggling with any minor fine when the item is such that it is essential to the Chinese Communist war machine; and that is one more reason why it seems to me that a UN naval blockade perhaps should be considered by the responsible nations that are trying to build up a collective security system.

TRADE WITH CHINA—CONTRABAND AND OTHER

I think I only will have one final question, Admiral. That is: In this question of the maintenance of the economy of Communist China, which is now by its own action engaged in aggressive war in Korea, does not the fact remain that even items which are outside of normal contraband of war aid the Chinese Communist economy?

What I have in mind is if they, for instance, can send hog bristles out of the country and get dollars for them, they in turn can use those dollars to purchase items elsewhere in the world, which will directly affect and be helpful to their over-all economy, which in turn supports their war economy.

If they can get certain items which we would normally term civilian items to run power plants, for instance, doesn't the power generated in turn become useful to the arsenals and the war manufacturing plants?

Under those circumstances isn't it essential to go beyond perhaps the mere normal contraband of war if you are really going to put effective pressure upon the Chinese Communists to stop their aggression against the United Nations?

Admiral BADGER. That is a question that is so complicated that it is probably outside of the scope of what you might call a responsible answer on my part.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF CHINA

Senator SMITH. Admiral, you stated earlier in your testimony today that Formosa as a naval base would probably not be too effective. Let me just comment on that for a moment.

The testimony we have from the Joint Chiefs and I think the position of the State Department today is that we are not interested in Formosa as a base for ourselves for any purposes, but we don't want it to get into hostile hands where it might be a menace to our island defenses in the Pacific. Is that your position?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir. That is one of the basic reasons why I want to support that friendly government which now exists on that island.

Senator SMITH. Would you agree it is to our interest not to let Formosa get into hostile hands so it can be used against us?

Admiral BADGER. That is right.

ATTEMPT TO AID GENERAL FU

Senator SMITH. Now, I was very much interested in your testimony here with regard to the attempt to aid General Fu Tso-yi in North China. Where was he operating at the time, July 1948, when he needed the equipment for an offensive that apparently our proprogram of $16 million was to help?

Admiral BADGER. He was operating, as he had been operating, in the vicinity of the Great Wall and south of the Hulutal Corridor.

Senator SMITH. Was that in the neighborhood of Manchuria?

Admiral BADGER. It is practically on the border of North China and Manchuria.

Senator SMITH. Then from your testimony, if my notes are correct here, it took about 6 months before anything happened with regard to that recommendation, which you said was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Ambassador there in China. For some reason that we don't know apparently there was delay in getting the material to him. And when he got it about 10 percent of what was recommended came in, and he reported that it was in the condition that the weapons couldn't be used.

Admiral BADGER. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. You also stated—and this is the point of my question—at that time General Barr was the head of our United States Army mission in China. Did he have any responsibility for the movement of this equipment?

Admiral BADGER. No, he had no responsibility for the movement of the equipment until it arrived, and one of the elements of the proposal and which was approved all the way up including the approval of the President was that in order to insure prompt delivery and delivery to the point of application, authority was granted to transport that particular material in United States Government vessels.

ADEQUACY OF AMMUNITION FOR CHINESE NATIONALISTS IN 1948

Senator SMITH. Well, what troubles me is that in the white paper that was issued on China which you are familiar with, General Barr is reported to have said, "Since my arrival no battle has been lost for lack of ammunition or equipment."

I can't quite reconcile that with your story about this particular equipment.

Admiral BADGER. Well, I have given that statement some consideration, and all I can say is that I understand General Barr will be here before this committee and can answer the question himself, but on the other hand there is a great difference between a battle which is undertaken, and inability to undertake battles.

In other words, if you are making strategic plans and looking forward to the possibility of taking the offensive, unless you not only have adequate ammunition but sufficient assurance that you are going to have replenishments for ammunition expended on such an offensive, why you would consider such an offensive operation as not being feasible and would not be undertaken.

When you consider some of the battles in China, for instance the battle of Weihsien, and remembering the consistency of the Communist strategy which was always to surround with a superiority of numbers of 2, 3 and 4 to 1, and you see a defensive force which has been cut off by these surrounding people and they have we will say any number you want, an average of six cartridges per belt, why arithmetically you might say, "Well, six cartridges per belt, if every one hits a Communist, is going to be enough," but it depends on your arithmetic.

I would like to make the point that there is a differeence between the arithmetic of saying that no battle was lost due to lack of ammunition—I know that in the battle of Weihsien the defenders lost about 50 percent of their troops, and when the Communists overwhelmed them by their attack on that town, the defenders were not only throwing rocks, bottles and bricks at them, but they were dropping homemade bombs out of small planes made of bottles with powder in them and ordinary caps. They just ran out of ammunition at Weihsien, and that is all there was to it. It was a tough fight.

So that I would rather have General Barr, who must have some reason for making that statement—maybe he is correct, but maybe he wasn't fully informed of all the things, and maybe he didn't realize that some of the offensive actions which were planned were found not possible because of lack of sufficient material, one of which is the case that I speak of.

I would also go so far as to say that General Barr, in my recollection, was certainly endorsing the recommendations of need and advisability of rendering that support to North China at that time, and I am sorry that I haven't got the files of the exchange of dispatches at that time, but I am quite sure that he would agree with me that he favored those recommendations.

Senator SMITH. Well, as you say, he will be before us so we can get that cleared up. But I want to try to bring out whether there was a discrepancy between that statement of his which seems to be a pretty broad statement that no battle was lost for lack of ammunition, and your story here of a case where apparently there was a fold-down, and it may have meant the collapse of that North China movement. That is what disturbs me.

Maybe he was thinking in terms of some particular battle where there was no lack of ammunition, and you were thinking in terms of a broad strategy for a campaign where there wasn't adequate backing to justify the campaign.

Admiral BADGER. And the difference between a battle which is undertaken defensively and the absence of a battle which might develop as a result of adequacy of equipment, manpower, and all it takes to take the offense.

Senator SMITH. Well, I gather that is the difference between those two statements probably.

POSSIBILITY OF SAVING NORTH CHINA IN 1948

Now you said earlier, Admiral, that we could not save China if we lost North China. I understood you to say something to that effect, that North China was critical in the whole China picture. When you speak of North China, could that have been saved by this operation of General Fu Tso-yi if he had had adequate equipment?

Admiral BADGER. The statement was made in one of the official dispatches that it had better than a 50–50 chance of success.

Senator SMITH. And if that campaign had been successful, North China might have been saved; is that the point?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; but there were other angles involved in that planning. That recommendation went forward, as I said, from the Ambassador and from myself, and I am sure Barr, if he wasn't party to it, he was certainly pretty close to it and knew about it, and Roger Lapham.

Now that involved a plan. The plan involved exchange of Chinese currency, the shift of the Chinese currency. It was very evident at that time that the Chinese currency had to be changed from the won dollar, which had gone defunct, over to the new exchange.

Well, we felt it was bad to make that change of currency with the morale of the Chinese people such as it was, which had been subject to just a succession of military defeats, and therefore we wanted a military victory as an element of building up the Chinese morale at the time that the money was changed over from one type of currency to the other.

You probably remember that when that currency was changed over, it was very successful. It was accepted well, but we knew that unless something happened in the way of military victory, that it couldn't succeed.

The spirit was there, and for quite a time it was extremely successful, but that was tied in also, Roger Lapham was involved in the timing, in the application, in the location of the aid to China. and he sent a dispatch back which in effect said: "Don't sell North China down the river. Give us an opportunity to get in there."

And also other locations of the agricultural aid program which was being timed and successful. The point I make is that in that plan it was far more than military. It involved the timing and the application and the conditions of morale and so on which affected the change of currency, the application of the economic aid, and it was stated that this was not only a very important place but that if they failed in North China there would be no stopping them to the Yangtze River, and a few of us, myself included, said there wouldn't be any stopping at the Yangtze River. They would go all the way to Canton.

Don't misunderstand me; I didn't say that I—I don't mean to say that we were able to say that this aid would have meant the difference between success and failure; but it was stated by those authoritative people, and not by me as an individual, but by a group of us, that after being in the country watching the spirit of the Government and the spirit of the people, and the support and loyalty of the people toward the Government, the leadership of the Army and the loyalty of the Army toward its leadership, and the support of the people to the effort of the Army, that it was a pretty darned favorable background for success, and that, as I said before, they gave promise of what we considered to be better than 50–50.

Senator SMITH. And then that incident was the straw that might have broken the camel's back, and gave rise to some of the defections from some of the Nationalist forces that occurred immediately thereafter.

Admiral BADGER. Fu Tso-yi never got those armies—all of his armies—into action except on a relief basis.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF INITIATIVE IN FAR EAST

Senator CAIN. Admiral Badger, in your very informative opening statement you said this in several sentences on page 7175:

> This discussion may be a little lengthened by my attempt to point out the value of taking the initiative and which Russia in this case has maintained and cleverly exploited for a considerable period of time. To the students of the Far East it has been evident that the strategic value placed upon North China, including Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang has been very pronounced for many years—150 years.

Admiral, I would ask you, sir, would you broaden our understanding a little concerning the methods used by Russia since 1945 to exploit their advantages in the Far East?

Admiral BADGER. Going back a little ways, you remember they established a mission in China——

Senator CAIN. I do, sir.

Admiral BADGER (continuing). And they worked for quite a while, and it turned out to be unsuccessful with Chiang Kai-shek.

We remember that they fought a war with the Japs, and we certainly know that one of the very important elements of that war is the port of Port Arthur.

If you go back further into the history of Siberia and its development for a great many years, you will find missions of all sorts that were sent down to bring Manchuria into the development program of Siberia by the Russians when they went out there, and the story and the history is just full of that. You can get it more if you study the development of Siberia, strangely enough, than any other place, and the specific reason behind it has been that surveys of the situation indicate a better balance of ores and chemicals and so on in Manchuria and eastern Mongolia, and to some degree in North Korea, which bring a very fine balance of industrial potential—I mean, you have got your coal, you have got your ores and things that make things right there, and there is nothing compared to it in Siberia.

Senator CAIN. Admiral Badger, is all of that to say that in recent years the Soviet has been working daily and cementing its friendships with the Communists in all of and around the Far East, while we, on occasions, have been, perhaps, indifferent and sometimes neglectful of supporting the free forces of the Republican forces in China and in other areas of the Far East?

Admiral BADGER. Well, I think the answer to that question is that the Russians have been conscious of this, and evidently conscious of it for a good many years. I think that Manchuria didn't come into the hands of Russia just perchance. I tried to bring out what we were thinking about during the war as to what are they going to select. Well, I was a little surprised when they went out there because we thought the other two things, particularly the Persian corridor, was going to be A-1, and so that when you try to analyze it, why, the only answer is that they have been interested for a long time, and this is what—it was an objective.

Senator CAIN. Admiral Badger, to what extent, sir, in your opinion, was Russia's desire to exploit the Far East advanced by Russia's entry into the war against Japan?

Admiral BADGER. I am sorry, you will have to repeat that, sir.

Senator CAIN. To what extent, sir, do you think Russia's desire to exploit the Far East was advanced by Russia's entering the war against Japan?

May I put the question another way: Would the progress be as advanced, in your opinion, if Russia had not entered the war against Japan?

Admiral BADGER. I don't think so for several reasons. They would not have been a party to the occupation of Japan for one reason.

The surrender of Manchuria to the Chinese would have been, I think, a little more direct under those circumstances by other nations.

Senator CAIN. Admiral Badger, beginning on page 7175——

Chairman RUSSELL. Are you through answering?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

PAST AND PRESENT STRENGTH OF SOVIET IN FAR EAST

Senator CAIN (continuing). Of your opening statement, you state this, and I quote just briefly from your observations:

> At Cairo in November 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff were considering the advisability of Russian entrance as a declared belligerent in the war against Japan. Because of the meeting with Mr. Stalin in Tehran, which was to follow the Cairo conference by only a few days, an immediate decision was necessary in order that they might advise Mr. Stalin accordingly.

Then you went on to relate to us that the Allid logistic agencies recognized weaknesses with reference to the Soviet in the Far East. You told us that such weaknesses were a fact and that Russia's participation in the war against Japan for these logistic reasons was not desirable.

May I ask whether the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a later date changed their view and recommended that Russia be brought into the war against Japan?

Admiral BADGER. I left the Joint Chiefs of Staff shortly after Cairo and went out to the fleet in the Pacific. Therefore, as I think I mentioned, I wasn't present in a position to know what went on after the meeting at Cairo.

Senator CAIN. Admiral Badger, if it was a fact—and we take that for granted, that Russia in 1943 was so weak logistically that even to support their defensive forces, including those on the border of Manchuria, would have been dependent on overseas support from American Pacific coast ports, what in your opinion is the strength of the Russians logistically in the Far East today, against an evidence of great weakness the day before yesterday in 1943?

Admiral BADGER. I think their strength logistically in the Far East at the present time is potential.

Senator CAIN. But not actual.

Admiral BADGER. No.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON SOVIET ENTRY INTO WAR IN 1943 AND 1945

Senator CAIN. We have been told, I think, Admiral Badger, that Russia was encouraged to enter the war for one reason and one reason alone, and that to support an assault by ground forces on the main Japanese islands.

How could that have been effectively carried out back in 1945 or 1943 or 1944 if the Russian logistic system was as weak as you and the Combined Chiefs of Staff had told us it was?

Admiral BADGER. Speaking now logistically——

Senator CAIN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. Remember at Cairo the Russians were so back on their heels and their industry had been so destroyed that we agreed to ship 5½ million tons of American aid around the Cape of Good Hope and up the Caspian Sea for delivery to the Russian forces.

There were other reasons for that, but nevertheless we did that. You can see that with that going on, it was impossible to hope that the Russians could ship any real amount of material across the Trans-Siberian Railway for the simple reason that they were bringing it in as fast as they could and couldn't ship it out in another direction to be diverted into the Far East.

Now remember also that Russia did not enter the war with Japan for a period of 6 months, and, as I understand it, that was specified—that there would be a 6-month interval between VE-day and VJ-day, which gave them a 6-month period of time of uninterrupted opportunity to build up in the Far East through the transport of available material left over from the war and all the other things, into the Far East.

I have no idea how much they shipped, if they shipped any; but, nevertheless, there is a great difference between having 6 months to ship and set up and not withdrawing from other operations.

And the fact as it might have developed—you understand I am just giving you an opinion on this thing.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral BADGER. That I would look with logistic favor on the possibility—well, if I give them a holiday for 6 months and let them use the railroad, maybe they can get some stuff over that would be useful. But, on the other hand, it would certainly strain that railroad in my opinion.

Senator CAIN. It was your professional opinion in 1943 that the Russians could not logistically support their entry into the Japanese war?

Admiral BADGER. That was it.

WINNING CONFLICT IN KOREA TO WREST INITIATIVE FROM RUSSIA

Senator CAIN. Admiral Badger, in your opinion, sir, can we hope to take the initiative from the Soviet in the Far East unless we achieve a decisive victory in Korea?

Admiral BADGER. I think success is very important from every angle, and I guess that is about as far as I can go on the answer to that question because I—well, that is what I want to say.

Senator CAIN. Admiral Badger, I want to press just for a minute, and if you feel my question is indiscreet, why, of course, you are at liberty not to answer it, sir. But I am mindful of two big things you have told us this morning.

The first is that Russia in your opinion has had the initiative in the Far East for quite some time; that Russia has exploited its advantages with rare skill.

Secondly, you have testified that there is some doubt to your own satisfaction in the Far East as to America's strength and, I presume, the strength of our allied nations, too.

It is against that background of those two premises that I ask in all seriousness how we are going to have any remote chance of taking the initiative from the Soviet in all of the Far East unless we can convince the Far East of the inherent and actual strength of the free nations through a decisive victory in Korea.

Admiral BADGER. I think that I gave emphasis to the desirability and, if not, the need to build up a realization of United States strength, when I recommended, or rather stated, that I would continue to accelerate the rearmament program of the United States and all free nations. I think that is very important.

I would like to clarify one thing, though, and that is that I don't think we are weak. I just made the statement that I think a lot of people out there think we are weak and have swallowed this propaganda along those lines, and therefore failure to succeed in Korea would be an endorsement of the propaganda of the other side rather than our knowledge of our over-all strength.

Senator CAIN. Well, I share your view, Admiral Badger, or at least I believe that America has never in all of its long history been so strong as it is today short of total war. But I was interested in your observation about the reactions of people in the Far East.

Admiral BADGER. I am glad to get this opportunity to say that I don't think we are weak.

Senator CAIN. I enjoy having you say it, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Green?

Chairman **Connally**. Wait a minute.

Are we going to quit——

Senator **Green**. I thought you said "Wait a minute."

Chairman **Connally**. I was talking to the chairman.

Senator **Green**. We have got joint bosses.

Senator **Connally**. I thought we were going to recess at 1.

Chairman **Russell**. Admiral, it has been our custom, if we reached any Senator before 1, we go ahead with his period of examination and recess after he concludes.

That seems to be a vote.

No, it is calling on absentees.

BYPASSING THE UNITED NATIONS IN KOREAN ACTION

Senator **Green**. The military action which is being taken in Korea is being taken not by the United States of America, but by the United Nations.

All the military troops there are acting under the direction of the United Nations. They are carrying out, implementing the policy that an unjustifiable aggression is an international crime.

There are some 18 nations that have furnished military assistance there?

Admiral **Badger**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Green**. And other nations have furnished other aid such as hospitals, ambulances, and so forth, in different ways.

Now, we are acting unitedly with them in this operation. It is a great step forward, in my opinion, in the advance of the human race, when all these nations can act together in defense of a principle—the principle that unjustifiable aggression must be punished.

Now, even if it were advisable otherwise, in our opinion, to withdraw from Korea, do we have any moral right, or legal right, if there is such a thing applying to the United Nations, to do it without the consent of the other members of the United Nations who are fighting with us, there?

Admiral **Badger**. Oh, I don't see how we can take a unilateral decision along those lines, unless—I should say, definitely, that anybody would agree that it must be agreed to by the allied powers.

Senator **Green**. Yes, sir.

Well, then, if we did it, we would be abandoning our allies to their fate. If we withdrew our troops and they didn't consent—we would be abandoning the South Koreans to their fate, and abandoning the United Nations to its fate, would we not?

Admiral **Badger**. Yes, sir; but I hadn't gathered that there was any idea along those lines.

Senator **Green**. Well, the view has been expressed here that we ought to try to get the consent of our allies to any such move, but if we didn't, we should go it alone.

I understand from your answer, that you think that could not be right, or should not be done.

Admiral **Badger**. I think that this is a United Nations problem; but I also feel that Oscar Badger is in a pretty low echelon of government to decide, or express a view on such a thing; because I realize too well that there are many factors that may enter into a problem as serious as that, which are not available to me; and although my first reaction, Senator, would be—as long as I am an ally of a group, or somebody else, why, I would expect to act as a teammate, and if they didn't agree, why then, we would have to do what we see happen so often, that when we don't agree with two sides of a problem, if we still want to go ahead, we have to meet an acceptable intermediate course of action.

Senator GREEN. Exactly.

Admiral BADGER. And, we had to do that frequently, during World War II, as you remember.

Senator GREEN. Yes, sir.

Well, I agree with you entirely, but I wanted to get that expression of your view. I am glad we do agree.

EFFECT OF UNILATERAL BOMBARDMENT OF CHINESE CITIES

The same thing would be true, would it not, if instead of abandoning Korea, withdrawing from Korea, without the consent of our allies, we started a bombardment of the coastal cities of China, without their consent? The idea of that would be relieving the pressure on Korea.

Admiral BADGER. I understand that the responsible military agencies of our country have decided on resisting the idea of broadening the war, so to speak.

Senator GREEN. That is right.

Admiral BADGER. And I have no feeling or no desire to differ with them in that decision or that opinion, and certainly I have no evidence that would indicate that I would even go and advise them in my particular capacity and tell them that I think they are wrong.

I say that because since I have been back from China I have not—I have advised a good many agencies of the Government of what I think should be done to correct certain things.

In many cases, numerous cases, at least, that advice has been accepted; but the point is, Senator, that I feel that if I wanted to go and advise any responsible agency here in Washington, or present my views, that they would give me a hearing, and I just don't feel that I have anything to offer along those lines.

Senator GREEN. Yes, sir; but my question is directed not so much to you individually, as you, an adviser, as to what American policy should be. If the effort was made to get our allies in Korea to agree to a bombardment of the coast of China, and they declined to agree with us, then there is that additional reason why you should not do it—not only the reasons that might apply to us alone but the additional reason of our doing it without the consent of our allies, is that not true?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, I think so; yes, sir; I think so.

Senator GREEN. The bombardment of the coastal cities of China would be an act of war, would it not?

Admiral BADGER. I can't deny that. On the other hand, I feel that there are a good many acts of war being performed at the present time.

Senator GREEN. Yes. Well, if it were an act of war, as I think all of the testimony shows, then under the treaty with China, which Russia has, Russia would be bound to come to the defense of China, would it not?

Admiral Badger. I should be, but I am not familiar with that treaty. I understand that what you say is true.

Senator Green. Mutual defense.

Admiral Badger. Yes. I beg your pardon?

Senator Green. It is a treaty of mutual defense?

Admiral Badger. I understand that is so; yes, sir.

SINO-SOVIET TREATY OF 1950 AND PROSPECTS OF WAR

Senator Green. Then if our allies refused to go along with us and we did it notwithstanding, as it has been suggested, then we would have of ourselves brought on a war with China and Russia, and it would be incumbent on us to fight it alone, would it not?

Admiral Badger. Well, that is quite a build-up, and I don't want to duck out on anything that I can be helpful on, but I do not feel qualified to answer that question.

I wouldn't know whether it would involve Russia in war or not; I wouldn't even presume to predict. Although I can see the great logic of the question as presented, I feel that I am utterly unqualified to really give a weighted expression of opinion on that.

Senator Green. Well, without regard to the construction of the treaty, if Russia should come to the aid of China and we would have to fight them both, what would be the prospect of success, our fighting the war there, against those two nations?

Admiral Badger. It would depend—I could write a book on that, but I can't answer the question as briefly as I would be required to do. Of course, we would have to go into the question of objectives—what are you trying to do?

Senator Green. Well, we were to bring the attack on China, they would be in a position of resisting the attack.

Senator Knowland. They made an attack on us.

Senator Green. I think I have the questioning of the witness, have I not?

Senator Knowland. I was just saying that we were not attacking China. China was attacking us.

[Deleted.]

Senator Green. Well, of course it is a calculated risk in other words. It seems to me from your answers and my own deductions that the result would have been that we would have lost contact with all our allies. They would remain neutral, refusing to come in with us, assuming we had asked them. We would have taken on this war with China and Russia, and that would be certainly assured make a tremendous drain on our military strength. That would appear certain, would it not?

Admiral Badger. Can't I answer that briefly by saying that no military man with any experience wants to do anything or wants to leave anything undone that is honorable to avoid another world conflagration, and I again repeat that I haven't got the close contact with all of the elements of the——

Senator Green. This is all supposition, Admiral. I am just basing my questions on the testimony which we have had here before from other witnesses.

Admiral Badger. If the chairman will permit me——

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes; I will permit you to make a statement. Senator Green's time has expired.

Admiral BADGER. I would like to again state that recognizing the difficulty of this problem and the decisions that have to be made, I have no reason whatsoever to go before the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommend any different course of actions from what I know they are now recommending.

Senator GREEN. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you complete your statement, Admiral?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, we may have some difficulties this afternoon because there is a unanimous-consent agreement to vote every 30 minutes. I doubt very much though that all of those votes will be record votes, and inasmuch as we have consent to meet this afternoon, why we will endeavor to have a meeting again at 2:30 this afternoon to see if we can conclude the admiral's testimony.

(Whereupon at 1:14 p. m. the hearing was recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p. m. this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Knowland, Cain, Sparkman, and Flanders.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committees will come to order.

Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

EFFECT ON ASIA OF UNITED NATIONS DEFEAT IN KOREA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Admiral, what will be our position in China and the Orient, based upon your experience and knowledge in the past, if we come out of this Korean venture with what amounts in their eyes to a defeat of America and the United Nations?

By that, I do not necessarily mean a defeat in battle such as the surrender of armies, but a defeat in our position there. We hear about "face" meaning so much in the Orient and having so much to do with the standing and acceptance of people and nations.

Admiral BADGER. Excuse me. That is quite a question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not trying to prescribe what would be the conditions of victory or the conditions of defeat. I am trying to put it on the basis of the Oriental acceptance of the fact——

Admiral BADGER. What I am apologizing for is that I would like to hesitate a minute. I want to give it a little thought.

I have stated that one of the basic things that I think we should do and which I think we are doing is to strengthen our military position, and I previously testified that, whether we believe it or not, the Soviet propaganda—which is incidentally a great source of well-planned aggression—put in the minds of those people that we have weakened ourselves and also that we were considerably weaker than the Russians.

It isn't a question of fact. It is a question of what had been promulgated, and I saw that with my own eyes and heard it with my own ears and read it in the local newspapers.

Now we are building up that strength. We are beginning to express our own confidence in ourselves more than we were a year or two ago. We should take measures to insure out there that all of the facts, particularly the facts about our increasing strength and military ability, get to those people.

We have achieved a great end in my humble opinion by taking a definite stand against aggression, and I think that the vast majority of people in the Far East appreciate that no end. I think that that adds to the respect that they had for us throughout the years, which I also commented on.

Now, if we have what amounts to a defeat, in that we do not attain our objective of insuring a unified free and democratic Korea, I think it is going to set us back. But I think that everything points to the fact that if we stick to our principles, and stick to our determination to oppose aggression, that a minor set-back from time to time is not going to affect the picture very much. But a major set-back would in my opinion weaken us very considerably, and require—well, it would weaken us just, say, very considerably.

Senator Hickenlooper. Now, Admiral, I would just like to explore for a minute some contingencies and get your opinion on the effect of the happening of these contingencies in the Orient.

I may say that I think our position in the Orient is a most vital thing for the future of our position in the world; that is to say most important. It may not be utterly vital and it may be.

ADMISSION OF RED CHINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Let's suppose that in any settlement of the Korean situation a part of the terms of settlement would be the admission of the Red Chinese government to membership in the United Nations. Would you consider that to be a victory for the Red Chinese government?

Admiral Badger. I have already expressed my views along those lines, Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator Hickenlooper. I am sorry, Admiral. I must have been out of the room at the time.

Admiral Badger. And expressed them in a speech which I read that I had given to the National War College on the 14th of March. I mention the date because that was 2 weeks or so before this thing happened.

I gave reasons why I am opposed to the recognition of the Chinese Communists, and gave in there—if I can repeat, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. You may. I recall the statement that you advised very strongly against it.

Senator Hickenlooper. I am sorry to rehash this matter if you have already answered it.

Admiral Badger. As long as you may have some follow-up questions, may I take the liberty to repeat this?

Senator Hickenlooper. You may answer it in any way you care to.

Admiral Badger (reading):

> I am opposed to recognition of the present Communist government of China. Briefly, I believe that the unanimous stamp of approval by western nations of

a government so unpopular, so tyrannical, and so at odds with all acceptable principles of civilization would result in loss of western prestige and would result in the encouragement of similar movements by minorities in other world areas and the further spread of Communist tyranny and slavery among people who basically seek peace, independence, and the opportunity to establish for themselves a better way of life.

I give that reply in that form, having in mind certain specific conditions in certain specific countries which I have observed.

THE ISSUE IN KOREA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Admiral, is it fair to generalize in this way: The issues in Korea today are broader than the simple issue of mere resistance of aggression by one group, such as the Red Chinese against the South Koreans, and they are broader because the gauntlet is down to a certain substantial degree between the Communist advance in the world and the free nations' determination to resist?

In other words, it is a broader issue, really, fundamentally, than merely a war in a small peninsula of a big continent?

Admiral BADGER. I don't believe that I have ever talked to anybody in the Orient or anywhere else that does not realize that the issues are world-wide in their—what is the word—significance.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then, Admiral, let us say that the Chinese Communists prevailed in this matter, without defining the details of what it means to prevail. Suppose they came out of this struggle with a settlement advantageous to themselves. In view of the fact that it is, I think, universally accepted that the Russians are backing them with equipment, and probably advice, would you say that that would be a substantial measure of victory for the advancement of world communism?

Now, I am trying to get comparisons here; I do not want to say that it is or will be a complete victory all over the world, but that it would advance apace the ambitions of world communism.

Admiral BADGER. I cannot make that assumption because I don't look forward to the need for making such an assumption, and I say that very sincerely. I think that is a problem and an answer that has to be given thought at the present time, but I think that we have not come to that bridge yet.

OBJECTIVES IN KOREA AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then, what are we doing in Korea? What is our purpose; what is the moral and the other justifications for the casualties in Korea and for the sacrifice which the United States, in the main, is putting into that effort if it is not the question of the broadest moral and political principles to follow?

Admiral BADGER. Maybe I misunderstood your premise of the last question, but what we are doing in Korea at the present time is, in my opinion, to give evidence of our strong opposition, and willingness to oppose aggression, and also to prevent—we are fighting in Korea and considering it worth while to fight in Korea for that reason, and also to prevent the need for any presumption of failure.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, Admiral, I have asked this question of every witness, I believe, that has been on this stand, and I have as yet failed to get an understandable answer. I am not being too caustic with the witnesses; I do not mean that, but I have asked this question, based upon the fact that we all seem to accept our objectives as the defeat of aggression in Korea and the unification or the pacification of Korea; those are our objectives of broad nature. What are our policies to implement our actions in order to attain those objectives? Where are we going? What will we consider to be a satisfactory solution of this difficulty in Korea, and I have failed to get any witness to give me a reply that is in any detail at all.

Admiral BADGER. I think that the reason you are unable to get a satisfactory answer is because of the fact that there may be no satisfactory answer at the present time. That doesn't mean that there isn't being developed a satisfactory answer.

I spent all yesterday afternoon talking with people who are working on such matters. There were a good many expressions of opinion and suggestions for action which were under discussion, some of them very appealing, some of them very practical, some of them not so practical, and some of them not so appealing.

But to put a question to a witness in answer to something that is so fluid and so dependent on bringing people who now have divided opinions into the backing of a single course of action is, in my opinion, Senator Hickenlooper, a little more than should be expected at the present time.

In other words, there are a good many nations involved in some of these matters; but I assure you that, from my own associations, our people are, in my opinion, wrestling with this problem, unable to say exactly what the answer is or what the solution is, but that doesn't mean that they are not going to arrive at a solution, because I think they are getting closer to it.

And, therefore, I don't apologize for not being able to answer that question, because there isn't any answer to that question at the present time that would be sufficiently acceptable to all concerned to make it effective.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time is up.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Admiral, I have just one or two questions. I think that was a very fine and realistic answer you just made to Senator Hickenlooper's question, because he is correct in stating that nobody has been able to answer his question categorically and in specific detail during these hearings.

We may not ever arrive at an answer that will be thoroughly satisfactory to all the people; but, as I understand it, our objective would be to arrive at an answer that would give us the most that we could hope to obtain under conditions as they exist in the world today.

OUR MORAL AND MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE FAR EAST

Now, you stated that, if we fail to achieve our desire of a free and united and democratic Korea, it will undoubtedly set us back.

I would like to ask you as to whether or not you think the failure to achieve that objective in whole, totally, would set us back as much as we would have lost if we had never undertaken to resist aggression in Korea.

Admiral BADGER. I personally think, if we had not undertaken to resist aggression in Korea, that we would have lost all feeling of dependability on us by the people that I ran into in the Far East.

I might say that we do a good deal of talking about military strength, but I think that you have gathered from me that I place moral strength in the form of what we are doing out there and the way we do it out there almost as important in the Far East as military strength.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is necessary to have considerable military strength though—is it not—before we can seek to apply the moral suasion?

Admiral BADGER. Yes and no. Moral strength was lost to some degree by failure to live up effectively and efficiently and in a manner that they expected us to in conection with some of our relief activities. I mean to say the inefficiency and mistakes and so on gave the other side an opportunity to reduce our moral strength.

Also, I can't help but mention the terrific effect of propaganda. As a matter of fact, it was only a week ago that I made a speech entirely devoted to propaganda in the Far East.

And in my opinion that is the most insidious, effective, well-planned, difficult to oppose, means of aggression that the Communists have used out there, and moral strength is very greatly affected by that.

Now then, I think that they are looking at us and whatever we do we have got to remember the importance of moral strength and not give the other fellow an opportunity to promote lack of any sincerity of purpose on our part in his propaganda.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not want to get into any philosophical discussion. I realize the tremendous importance of moral support, but in today's calloused world I thought it had to be accompanied by some form of military strength.

In other words, Mr. Gandhi—he had a wonderful set of principles, civil disobedience campaign against enlightened people like the British, but I would not want to be one of the leaders in a movement of that nature against a Communst regime.

I do not think that they would last very long and they would not have much to support them in their searching for moral support unless they had some arms around that they could likewise employ.

Admiral BADGER. Well, I agree and I am willing to drop the whole darn thing if you are.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, I will go along with you.

RELATIONSHIP OF GENERAL FU TO THE GENERALISSIMO

Now there is so much that is not understood about China on the part of those who have been in it for 10 or 12 days there. This man Fu Tso-yi, was he a general that was appointed by Generalissimo Kai-shek or was he a war lord that was brought into the Chiang establishment when the general was seeking to reconcile the conflicting elements?

Admiral BADGER. I am not sure about his background except that he is a Mongol.

Chairman RUSSELL. He is a Mongel?

Admiral BADGER. And I think he is a Mohammedan, but I can say this much in answer to your question: That he was trusted by Chiang Kai-shek although Fu Tso-yi had a good many complaints against, about the support of the Central Government at one time. At the time that I referred to this morning, the relationship, the teamwork, the mutual confidence, and so on, was excellent and was so stated officially in an official dispatch which I remember particularly pointing out, I remember the words were, more or less, "and separations of purpose that we noted heretofore now have been brought together."

That was one of the things that we pointed to as one of the strong reasons for going to work right at that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, his troops, were they regular Nationalist troops or were they part of a private army?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, no; they were the Nationalist Army, and of course most of those troops were men of North China, and that is important because those troops were local boys, so to speak, in North China, as differentiated from the troops in Mukden that were transported from the south and were even so foreign to the local populace that they didn't speak the same language, although they were Chinese.

Chairman RUSSELL. I assume that these North Chinese then would have had a somewhat better chance of existing in the face of opposition due to the feeling of the local population and their own inherent instinct to fight for their firesides at home.

Admiral BADGER. We thought the situation there was as strong all around as any situation that we had seen in China for 3 or 4 years.

Chairman RUSSELL. You stated this morning that they were devoted to the civil government there. It seems to me we have had some evidence during this hearing that there was some feeling on the part of the North Chinese or perhaps the Manchurians because governors were brought in from other sections of China. I seem to have a recollection of some such testimony as that.

Admiral BADGER. I have mentioned Li Sun-yen who later became Vice President of China was the governor with his headquarters in Peiping.

His relationships with Fu Tso-yi were as they should be and the best I can say, without going into a lot of words, is that the people of North China trusted Li Sun-yen very, very much.

As a matter of fact, his strength up there gave considerable hope that he might even be a very influential and beneficial Vice President.

CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH MARINES WERE WITHDRAWN

Chairman RUSSELL. I asked you this morning, just as my time expired, about the removal of the marines from China. I had understood that the marines at one time were spread out considerably over

North China; they were guarding coal mines and railroad lines and other means of communication. Were they engaged in any activities of that nature during your command in that area?

Admiral BADGER. They were taken out of North China about a year before I went out there. They brought them back to Tsingtao. And while I was in Tsingtao, after I had been there about—it doesn't make much difference—but, say, about a year or 8 months, I guess, the battle of Weihsien took place, which was an extremely vicious battle, in Weihsien, which is in Shantung.

The Communists won that battle, and about 200,000 of them moved down toward Tsingtao, and they were threatening. But they came within 6 to 30 miles and stayed there for several months. I had orders to defend Tsingtao, and the marines had that job at that time.

Chairman RUSSELL. I assume the total number had been considerably reduced from the 50,000 that we had there in North China at one time.

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes. At the time I speak of, I had about 7,000.

Chairman RUSSELL. Seven thousand?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

MARINE EQUIPMENT TURNED OVER TO NATIONALISTS

Chairman RUSSELL. Were you there at the time the surplus ammunition of the marines was turned over to the Nationalists?

Admiral BADGER. We turned over a little. I remember one item was about a million rounds of ammunition. One reason we turned that over was because the tracers in the ammunition wouldn't work, and we were replacing the ammunition and turned it over to the Nationalists.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, there was some testimony here that considerable amount of ammunition was turned over by the marines to the Nationalist troops.

Admiral BADGER. There was some turned over up in North China when they left North China. I am not familiar with that, as to the character of it. But I did see the figures, and it was an impressive bunch of figures on a piece of paper, but not impressive figures when you start talking about rounds per man for a group of men. In other words, a million rounds sounds like a lot of ammunition, but when you start spreading it around among 20,000 men it doesn't amount to so much.

Chairman RUSSELL. At the time you were there did the Nationalists still control the Mukden area?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; they were in Mukden until after the surrender of Peking. And they had to—Chiang Kai-shek ordered them to make the break, and they made a good effort, but they just didn't have it. They were lacking in what it takes—equipment and so on—for sustained action.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you think their will to fight was pretty strong at that time?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; their will to fight to get out of that box they were in, if for no other reason than that, was strong.

Remember that army in Mukden were the Burmese armies. They were the Chinese Army that trained and fought in Burma.

Chairman RUSSELL. Some of the Rangoon troops?

Admiral BADGER. They were American-equipped and even had American clothes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, that seems to be a vote. What is the desire of the committee?

Senator KNOWLAND. Shall we vote?

Senator CAIN. Shall we be permitted to vote and return?

Chairman RUSSELL. Admiral, if you will excuse us, we will go vote and return.

(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The committees will resume its proceedings. Chairman Connally?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. Admiral, I have just one or two more questions I want to ask you.

Were you aware, through your period of duty out there, of any differences between General MacArthur and the Chiefs of Staff, in the United States, or any evidence of any friction between the office in Tokyo and the office in Washington?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; I was not.

I used to fly over and see General MacArthur, and maintain contact, every 4 or 5 weeks, and I never sensed any difference at all; no, sir.

DIVISION OF AUTHORITY IN FAR EAST

Senator SMITH. Well, could you develop for us the division of authority in the Far East, there?

As I undestood it from General MacArthur, he had the jurisdiction, you might say, over the islands, that is, Japan, Okinawa, and that area; but the Navy had jurisdiction over the mainland of China; and I understood the State Department had jurisdiction over Korea, in general, over all matters of policy.

Is that a correct statement, or not?

Admiral BADGER. General MacArthur had jurisdiction over Korea until the Army withdrew from Korea.

Senator SMITH. Oh, yes; until the Army withdrew.

Admiral BADGER. And that is a correct statement, as you stated; but include the mainland of Asia under the jurisdiction of the respective Ambassadors, who were coordinators of all United States agencies in the area.

I was, in my capacity out there, the senior military officer, in case of any emergency—I mean local emergency; and offshore, of course, for quite a distance.

I want to explain, however, that in case of a war, then I reported to General MacArthur.

Senator SMITH. That is what I understood from him—that in case of war breaking out he was the over-all commander in the whole western Pacific area; is that correct?

Admiral Badger. That is correct.

Senator Smith. Were you in the western Pacific during the war?

Admiral Badger. No, sir; I left before—oh, before Korea was even thought of.

Senator Smith. I meant in World War II.

Admiral Badger. Oh, yes; yes.

Senator Smith. You were there?

Admiral Badger. I went out there right after the Cairo Conference; well, I went out there in January of 1944 and stayed out there until the end.

EFFECT OF YALTA ON CHINA

Senator Smith. Well, you were out there then and in contact with China when the Yalta Conference was held?

Admiral Badger. Yes; but we weren't in contact with Yalta and we did not hear anything about it in the fleet at that time.

Senator Smith. I did not assume that you did, of course, but I am wondering what the effect was in China when the report of the secret agreement at Yalta with regard to Russia coming into the war and turning over to Russia the areas that she got under the Yalta agreement came out?

Admiral Badger. I cannot tell you that, Senator Smith, for two reasons: One was I, of course, was offshore and not in China, and the second reason is that no responsible Chinese official has ever discussed that with me.

GENERAL MAC ARTHUR'S ADMINISTRATION OF JAPAN

Senator Smith. Were you familiar with the work that General MacArthur did in Japan under the title of SCAP, the supreme commander of the Allied Powers?

Admiral Badger. Only to observe it with a good deal of admiration.

Senator Smith. Did you feel as I felt from my trip there that the work that he did over the period of time since VJ-day had a large influence in moving the Japanese sentiment from one of fear of the conqueror to one of friendship and a desire really to be lined up with the western powers?

Admiral Badger. Yes, sir; I always felt that.

Senator Smith. You feel that that was genuine with the Japanese and not just a sense of inferiority and deference to the conqueror?

Admiral Badger. I think it was much more genuine than anybody had reason to expect.

Senator Smith. Well, I am glad to have you give us that testimony because I had the impression that what happened in Japan was close to what I would call a miracle in the sense of the people that I talked with. Of course, they might have felt that they had to talk in that way to please me. But the Japanese people that I met had apparently an attitude of enthusiasm and respect for what America had done since VJ-day. I do not know whether you have had enough contact to get that impression or not. Have you any comment on that?

Admiral Badger. No; except that I would agree in general.

Senator Smith. Yes.

USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS ON CHINESE MAINLAND

Now, Admiral, one question more. We have had some testimony to the effect that probably south of the Yangtze, especially in southern China, there is a large measure of unrest; there is a possibility of outbreaks of resistance to the Communist regime there, and the possibility perhaps in the not too far distant future of a split of China between the area north of the Yangtze and the area south.

I am only mentioning that because that was one of the arguments for taking the wraps off the Nationalists in Formosa, not with the idea that they would make any large-scale invasion of China but that they might be enough of an annoyance to keep things stirred up, to keep the guerrillas operative and keep enough tension there to force the withdrawal of some of the Chinese Communist divisions from Korea.

My impression of General MacArthur's recommendations about taking the wraps off Formosa was along that line. I did not feel he was advocating a full-scale invasion of China, but he did feel if we took the wraps off and scared them and there were a few raids from Formosa to the mainland and a few contacts with the guerrillas there, that they might be a source of diversion of the Communist divisions that were so much trouble in Korea. Would you comment on that thought?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; I have given that considerable thought and feel that there are potentialities in regard to Chiang Kai-shek. I think that he can make people coordinate with him—under the limitations of my comment this morning about how any failure or any interruption would just result in widespread loss of life, and so on.

It has got to be awfully well considered by every individual Chinaman under the rigid and cruel control that they are under. But at one time you remember that Chiang Kai-shek flew some of his airplanes over the mainland with a number of rice bags—2 pounds of rice, just a couple of pounds to the bag, but each one had a little statement of the success of the rice crop under the technical assistance of our people, and it was a form of propaganda that reached effectively over there in that country that was short of food.

So that there are elements of that sort. I do believe there are guerrillas who would accept certain local leadership. I think it would have to be darn well planned and darn well timed in order to be successful. It can't be done haphazardly.

I have thought of it along the line of diversion of effort and I have thought of it along the line of diversion of equipment. As a matter of fact, when they started talking about invading Formosa, I didn't worry about that too much. I thought that that would divert an awful lot of equipment and gasoline and stuff that they wouldn't be able to use up in Korea, and that it would not necessarily be successful.

So that the best I can say is that I have thought of it. I realize the possibilities of it. And I believe that I can say that those angles of the situation out there are being given due consideration from the point of view of feasibility and practicability and need. That is as far as I can go, because I haven't engaged in any serious evaluation of those possibilities now since I have been in this job, although I have pointed out the possibilities as you have stated them on two or three occasions.

I am sorry I can't give you a better answer, but that is the best I can do.

IMPROVEMENTS ON FORMOSA

Senator SMITH. Are you personally acquainted with K. C. Wu?

Admiral BADGER. Very well; know him intimately.

Senator SMITH. You know him well?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. I am interested in him because I am a Princeton man and he got his Ph. D. at Princeton. That is a matter of local pride.

Chairman RUSSELL. The admiral mentioned that this morning.

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. You want it in the record again?

Senator SMITH. I wonder whether the reports you get jibe with mine. Since K. C. Wu as civilian governor has been there, he has overcome a good deal of the prejudice among the Taiwanese people, who were quite resentful of the military governorship that first was put in. They have increased their rice crop so that today they are actually exporting rice, taking care of their own needs there on the island. They don't need to import any food. The Taiwan people have been brought into the provincial government so that, as I said earlier, Formosa might be taken as a model for the mainland of China or the provinces as an indication of what might be done with such programs as ECA and rural rehabilitation and other reforms that have gone on there since K. C. Wu has been the Governor.

Is that a fair statement of what has been happening so far as you know?

Admiral BADGER. I made that statement, in effect, this morning.

Senator SMITH. I thought you did. I was just trying to sum it up so as to get the record clear on it. I have been very much encouraged.

I hear from Formosa, I should say, not less than once a month from somebody I know that is there, and there seems to be a serious and genuine improvement. It isn't just a fake report but it is a true report of improvements in the spirit.

Admiral BADGER. I don't know whether you realize it or not, but K. C. Wu when he went there relieved a very unpopular government and governor.

Senator SMITH. Well, I realize that because I was there just before he became Governor.

Admiral BADGER. And he got support and took the job under the assurance that he would be supported in the establishment of a popular government. He had been there only a month, I think—6 weeks—when he had completed his election.

Three of his five cabinet ministers were native Formosans. Those three were the agriculture and forestry minister, the internal affairs minister, and the public works minister—3 of the 5—and he in his meeting equivalent to our Senate, I guess, as much as anything else, 17 of his 23 members of that body were native Formosans, and now I understand that his mayor of such cities as Taipei and many other towns are local boys, native Formosans, and I understand also, from I think very reliable information that I get from there, that that is as popular a government as exists anywhere, and is the area of 7 million people where there is less evidence of any Communist influence than any comparable place anywhere—out there, certainly.

Senator SMITH. You are speaking now of the entire Far East?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. That area?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

IMPORTANCE OF MORAL FACTORS IN THE FAR EAST

Senator SMITH. I was very much interested in one comment you made because it rang a bell with me. You said that you were just as much interested or even more interested in the things we can do in the Far East outside of military operations, such as getting at the spirit of the people, responding to their yearning for freedom, and desiring to express their own individuality.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. I thought you emphasized that. I would like to have you just elaborate a little bit on it.

Admiral BADGER. Well, I said before and I am repeating myself right now, that I considered Formosa extremely important from the point of view of being a source, and I think the leading source, of favorable propaganda in the Far East in building up—I am sorry, sir—our moral strength and our ability to effect improvements.

Chairman RUSSELL. Don't say sorry to me, Admiral.

Senator SMITH. I am glad to notice you looked at the chairman when you said that.

Chairman RUSSELL. I want the record to be clear that I did not mean to speak disparagingly of moral force. I realize it is the most important of all of the weapons that can be used in this ideological conflict, but I still say if you have not got some arms handy, it is not a very favorable climate for your moral support to function.

Senator SMITH. Let's compromise by agreeing to both of them. I will go along with that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

PREVIOUS GOVERNOR OF FORMOSA

Senator KNOWLAND. Admiral Badger, I just have a couple of very short questions here. One I would like to clear up for the record—in your statement relative to Gov. K. C. Wu—and I have the same very high regard both you and Senator Smith have expressed for him, because I have seen his work out there on the island. It is true, though, is it not, Admiral, that the first governor that the Chinese National Government sent in was an unfortunate choice and there was considerable discontent on the island? He was later replaced, first by one man whose name I don't remember, then by Gov. Chen Cheng who was no relation to the first Chen who since has been executed, I believe. But the governor who immediately preceded K. C. Wu is now the premier of the Republic of China, and my information there was that he initiated the land reforms and some of these reforms which K. C. Wu has carried out. I think your reference was to the original military governor that they sent out there, and I wanted the record to be clear.

Admiral BADGER. I am glad you did that because I was referring to him in what I termed when I was out there, "that carpetbagger government" that went over there in the initial stages of that thing.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is right.

Admiral BADGER. Which caused, as you remember, the reaction——

Senator KNOWLAND. That is right.

Admiral BADGER. As a matter of fact, quite a lot of killing.

Senator KNOWLAND. I merely wanted the record clear because somebody reading the cold record might think it referred to his immediate predecessor.

Admiral BADGER. Thank you.

Senator KNOWLAND. Who, as I have been told by our officials out there, Gov. Chen Cheng, now Premier, was a man of great integrity and ability and put in and initiated a great many of these reforms.

Senator SMITH. Will the Senator yield?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. I want the record to show when I referred to the predecessor of K. C. Wu, I was referring to the first Governor that made so much trouble. Gov. Chen Cheng, as Senator Knowland said, was a wonderfully good administrator from all I heard, and I had the highest regard for him after my trip there.

Admiral BADGER. I think the first Governor Chen was the man who initiated the marked reduction in taxes.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is correct.

Admiral BADGER. And K. C. Wu just followed along and made further reductions.

STABILITY IN FORMOSA AND PERMISSION FOR VISITS THERE

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to ask this question, Admiral: At any time during the period when you were out in the Far East, were you discouraged from either visiting or maintaining a naval mission on Formosa?

Frankly, the reason I ask the question—to my own personal knowledge, I have two colleagues in the Senate that I know were discouraged from visiting the island of Formosa, perhaps because of the mistaken belief in the State Department that the island was in a condition of unrest.

As a matter of fact, when I first visited there in 1949 I was greatly surprised, after leaving the island and finding it one of the most stable places in the entire Far East, to read in the Hong Kong newspapers that there had been rioting on the streets on the days that I had been there—I stayed there almost a week—and that the island was about on the verge of completely collapsing economically, politically, and otherwise. And I spoke to some of the correspondents that I saw and rather taxed them with writing an article which to my own knowledge I knew not to be true, and asked whether any of them had been to Formosa. They said, "No"; that they had picked up those stories in Hong Kong.

So I did want to ask whether—perhaps for the same reasons, because they may have felt that the conditions were more unstable than actually they were—whether there had been any discouragement to either a personal visit by the representatives of the Military Establishment to Formosa or the sending of a mission there.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir. I was instructed at one time not to visit Formosa or to send ships in to Formosa without the specific authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, who, of course, was a representative of any authority in Washington that had that authority; and the order, of course, would be transmitted through the Chief of Naval Operations, and then from him.

I had been on Formosa before that. I had always cut my visits short and very much to the point, and tried to avoid the discussion of matters of policy and so on; and subsequent to this directive I was able to make the contact necessary on matters of mutual interest and in the interest of our policy, of our Government, by having meetings in Amoy and other places outside of Formosa.

EFFECTIVENESS OF CHINESE NATIONALIST BLOCKADE OF MAINLAND

Senator KNOWLAND. In the earlier days, and before June 27, when we followed this so-called neutralization policy in regard to Formosa, is it not correct that the Navy of the Chinese Republic, small though it be, was doing what some at least considered to be a fairly good job of running their own blockade of certain of the key ports of Communist China?

Admiral BADGER. I thought they were doing a very excellent job. I would like to explain, however, that they not only avoided the word "blockade," but actually did not conduct a blockade.

For instance, I remind you that there was a certain amount of shipping going into North China, and the Nationalist Navy knew how much it was. It amounted to only about 30,000 tons a month of different categories of cargo, so they didn't bother about it; but then, when it built up, they sent a couple of ships up there and interrupted that, and when they stopped that, they hauled off again.

And, their closure of the port of Shanghai, which they used as a term, wasn't for the purpose of a complete closure; they merely used it for certain items, but there wasn't any attempt to keep junks from going in and out with reasonable frequency, and I merely want to inform you that there was a difference between an all-out blockade and a closure of certain things that they considered contraband, or necessary to stop, to weaken the enemy.

EFFECT OF LACK OF SPARE PARTS ON NATIONALIST NAVY

Senator KNOWLAND. Is it or is it not a fact, Admiral, so far as you know, that with the limited naval forces which the Republic of China had, that one of the handicaps they were and possibly still are faced with was the lack of replacement parts and certain types of ammunition for those smaller vessels that they have, such as destroyers and destroyer escorts?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; they did have trouble getting those, and if you gentlemen on the Foreign Relations Committee remember when I came back, I asked you to approve Chiang Kai-shek's request for a $5 million pool of money to obtain American spare parts for American machinery, and that was incident to that difficulty.

Senator KNOWLAND. Do you know whether they finally accelerated and whether they got that equipment?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know it as a fact, because I haven't heard anything about it for a year.

I imagine that it is satisfactory.

Senator KNOWLAND. Was there ever any indication from the responsible officials of the Republic of China, either their defense department or from Admiral Kwei, that if they had additional parts to supply the shortages that they would be able to do a little more effective work on at least stopping this strategic contraband from getting into Chinese Communist areas?

Admiral BADGER. They, of course, agreed that they could be more effective along those lines, but, on the other hand, when the time came they were pretty effective, as it was.

ROLE OF THE NAVY IN JAPANESE SURRENDER

Senator KNOWLAND. One last question, Admiral: You testified earlier, as I recall your testimony, that at Cairo in 1943, the viewpoint of the Joint Chiefs was that the problem of the Soviet Union getting into the war in the Far East would have been considerably handicapped by their lack of logistical support out there, and it would not be worth the effort to supply them to bring them into the war in 1943.

Then, as I understand it, you left the Joint Chiefs and had an assignment in the Pacific so you did not keep currently abreast with developments here in Washington, but you were in the Far Pacific.

Might I ask whether during the period of 1945, leading up to VJ-day, it was the common viewpoint of those in the Navy at that time that the Japanese could be brought to surrender without the Soviet Union coming into the war?

I want to just give this background to the question. I happened to have attended as I do from time to time, lectures down here at the Navy Historical Society in which they indicated, and had some films, on the job of our submarine force in the Pacific, and I was really greatly surprised because I had been in the European theater of operations in the Army, and I had not kept abreast of the tremendous tonnages that we had sunk, and how the Japanese were being strangled economically by the Navy out there, and I was wondering—of course my information is second-hand, but I was wondering—whether the general impression of the Navy in the Pacific at that time was that the Japanese were being badly hit with the blockade and destruction of her shipping, and whether it was felt that the entrance of the Soviet Union was essential to our defeating Japan?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; definitely. As an indication I might give you an incident. Do you remember an expedition where we went into the bombardment of a Japanese city, and particularly in the ordnance and steel plant in Muroran; we went in between two narrow straits and up a bay; we were a good 6 hours or 5 hours, at least 30 knots, getting to our point of opening fire, and came on out. Well, we were pretty well—there we were with Japan on three sides of us.

Senator KNOWLAND. I did not get that last.

Admiral BADGER. There we were with Japan on three sides of us.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. And during that entire thing, inside both shores, not as wide as Cheseapeake Bay, no wider, we went in there and did our business, poured, gosh knows, how many projectiles on the target, and came out, and not a single Jap airplane or anything else came at us, and the natural answer was, well, they must be pretty far gone if they are going to let us come in and do something like this.

Senator KNOWLAND. When was this, do you recall, roughly?

Admiral BADGER. That was, oh, I guess that was—my guess was it was a good 2 months before the surrender.

NEED FOR SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN JAPANESE WAR

Senator KNOWLAND. The thing I wanted to clear up, though, as you started to answer my question, you said, "Yes," and I did not know whether that "Yes" definitely applied to the fact that it was essential for the Russians to come in or whether it applied to my question as to whether Japan was being strangled pretty well without——

Admiral BADGER. We were not thinking in terms of the Russians coming in. We were thinking in terms of the collapse of Japan and the need for the implementation of our then very extensive plans and operations for the setting up of such a landing in case it was necessary; and both Admiral Halsey, who talked that matter over with me at that time, and I thought, and both agreed—I mean, he expressed the view to me, and I agreed with him, that Muroran—that that Muroran thing was all the evidence that we needed that they were right flat on their backs.

Senator KNOWLAND. Just one last question, if I can have unanimous consent to ask it.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right.

Senator KNOWLAND. If the Soviet Union had not come in, one theory was that the Manchurian army, the Kwantung army I think the Japanese called it, might have come back from Manuchuria to the Japanese Islands, but that would have been a right smart undertaking with the Japanese shipping in the condition that it was in, and with our general command of the air and the sea, would it not, to have made a major amphibious movement from the mainland of China over to Japan?

Admiral BADGER. Well, I should say that any amphibious movement of that extent would have been a major undertaking.

Senator KNOWLAND. Thank you; that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. Admiral Badger, I do not care to take you over anything that you have covered this morning, so if I ask you any question——

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

EXPECTATIONS OF SOVIET DEMANDS AT YALTA

Senator SPARKMAN (continuing). That you have answered, if you will simply tell me, why I do not want you to answer it because it will be in the record before us.

But I do want to ask you to review something that you said this morning. You were talking about Yalta, and you said that prior to the announcement of the Yalta Conference and what it gave to Russia a great many people were trying to predict a price that the Soviet Union would demand at the end of the war for her participation.

> In general, those predictions were limited to three. All pointed toward the acquisition of warm water ports as outlets for Soviet world trade. I think the general concensus of opinion pointed toward the possibility that Stalin might demand all three, but if not, they would be made in the following order of importance:
>
> First, Soviet control of a belt extending to the Persian Gulf.
>
> Second, Soviet control and access to the Dardanelles with definite rights to adjacent territory.
>
> And, third, Soviet commercial and military rights in the ports of Port Arthur and Dairen, with commanding control of those ports and the land approaches to them, including the Manchurian Railway.

Then, you went on to say this:

> To many it was a considerable surprise when Soviet demands pointed merely to the third or the Manchurian factor. On the other hand, I think that among Western Powers this demand was received with considerable relief as being the lesser of three evils.

Now, when you say a great many people, do you mean military people? I would just like for you to tell us what you mean by that.

Admiral BADGER. In the associations that I had during the war, I think you can understand that there were a great many conversations as to what was going to happen, and so in this statement which you have just read, I have given a true reaction that I had to those conversations.

Some of them were people of prominence who were interested in just discussing the war and its implications, possibilities. Some of them were members of foreign delegations with whom I had association at Cairo and Quebec, and some of them were just plain sailormen like myself sitting around and talking, and I say without hesitation that most everybody that I talked to under those circumstances looked to the belt through the Persian Gulf as being sure-shot for the simple reason it was so close to the oil and also gave an outlet where we would have found it possible to give them such an important inlet during the war.

And I call your attention to the fact that I am trying to make a statement here leading up to the fact that they did go into Manchuria and maybe they went into Manchuria because they had a reason which was stronger than the reasons which we in our estimate and conversations had given to these other areas.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I recall that part of your statement further on. You list the three possible prices that Russia might apply, all of them geared to the historic requirement of Russia for a warm water port, aren't they, each one of them?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. All down through the years we know that Russia has been seeking a warm water outlet, hasn't she?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now in your opinion as a military man, a military expert and as a student, one who understands the Far East, is the listing that you give correct so far as degree of importance is concerned?

Admiral BADGER. You mean the priority?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, one, two, three. You list them that way.

Admiral BADGER. There again I would like to come back to the fact that we must presume a considered plan on the part of the Soviets. I think that anything that we demanded or would demand would be the result of plan and study, and therefore I think that from their point of view, which is the important point of view, that this estimate that we in our conversations and discussions and considerations gave to the matter before the war ended were wrong because if they selected the third, then it is only normal to believe that related to their plan, whatever it might be, and you and I are not familiar with that, that that is the most important.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, Admiral. I asked my question wrong because I asked it in the present tense. I should have asked it back at that time in 1945, 1944 when you were having these discussions. This did represent in your thinking as a military expert the order of priority?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And at the time that Yalta was held, that would have been your idea?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

DESIRABILITY OF SOVIET ENTRY INTO JAPANESE WAR

Senator SPARKMAN. Now you explained to us this morning that in 1943 at Cairo and Tehran I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that it was not desirable to bring Russia into the war against Japan. You participated in those conferences?

Admiral BADGER. To some degree.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. You were not at Yalta?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not in February 1945 it was desirable to induce Russia to come into the war?

Admiral BADGER. I would have to say that if there were advances made to induce them to come into the war, there were circumstances which made that justifiable.

I am again confronted with one of these darn things which couldn't possibly be published with good sense, and therefore I submit a request that it be withheld from publication if it can.

But I feel I must tell you that the turn of events—when we still had the war with Japan on our hands, the turn of events was not clear as to what Russia was going to do.

Therefore, it was considered quite an assurance by those of us who were familiar with many of the facts of the world at that time, the conditions in the world, again is was considered quite an assurance when they came back from Tehran and said that Stalin had agreed to go into the war with Japan 6 months after VE–day.

That defined clearly what Russia was going to do after VE–day. It stabilized certain planning and many things that were confronting us at that time, too numerous to recite here, and in fact much too numerous for me to even remember.

Senator SPARKMAN. You said they came back from Tehran. You meant Yalta, did you not?

Admiral BADGER. Tehran.

Senator SPARKMAN. Tehran?

Admiral BADGER. It was at Tehran he said he would go into the war with Japan 6 months after VE-day.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was reassuring——

Admiral BADGER. Very reassuring.

Senator SPARKMAN. To the forces in the field?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Russia did manage to get quite a sizable force over into Manchuria, did they not?

Admiral BADGER. I am sorry, I can't tell you.

Senator SPARKMAN. We have been told what the force was; I don't remember just now what it was, but it was, as I recall, quite a sizable force.

ADEQUACY OF UNITED STATES AID AND FAULTS IN ITS DISTRIBUTION

Admiral Badger, I think you made pretty much this statement this morning, but I was interested in reviewing the testimony that you gave before this joint committee in 1949, and I want to read very briefly here something.

I think it is in line with what you said this morning.

> I have been sitting out there and I think our policies have been as good as possible.

This was September 8, 1949.

> I think our acts of Congress have been adequate and timely, and I think that we had good decisions of our Joint Chiefs of Staff. But, on the other hand, our supplies that have gone there have been more than they could handle with the organization they had. We have wasted a great many of our supplies. It hasn't been feasible to put them to good use.

And then Senator Connally, the chairman, asked you this question: "You say we wasted them; we turned them over to the authorities and they wasted them?

> Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; but you don't hand things over to incompetents in your business. Banks don't lend money to organizations that can't handle it.

I think that is very much in line with your testimony here earlier in the day, is it not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you still adhere to that full statement?

Admiral BADGER. I said this morning that I thought that we expected too much and did not adhere to any plan, and referred to the military mind where all plans during the war, of course, were submitted by the responsible commanders, and examined, not to change by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but examined for feasibility and timing.

I other words: Could we supply the goods that were needed? Could we supply the techncal personnel it required? Could everything we sent over there be operated effectively? And that was the real decision of the approval of a plan.

Well, I felt there was a certain lack of that, and therefore that much of this stuff went over there not in support of a plan. I gave a simple example this morning of how you couldn't build a house or do anything else unless you had plans.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. And cut the timbers to meet the need.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. I was very much impressed with your testimony back in September 1949. You were stressing then the need for this. As I recall, you said that you really had four plans, I think, plus the Generalissimo on Formosa.

Apparently—I don't know—I got from a reading of the testimony that you sensed a certain degree of futility because of the lack of a complete, adequate over-all plan.

Admiral BADGER. That is right.

KREMLIN DOMINATION OF CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Senator SPARKMAN. May I ask you this question: Do you believe that the leaders of China are dominated by the Kremlin?

Admiral BADGER. I cannot answer that at the moment any more than to the degree that I think they are strongly influenced, almost to degree of control, if not to degree of control.

But I can also say that there was plenty of evidence in my minor dealings with the Communists while I was in China, in connection with certain minor matters, that no answer could come from any subordinate, it had to go all the way up into the joint offices up there in Manchuria.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time is up.

Senator SPARKMAN. I would like to make it clear, I am not sure I did in the question, I was talking about the Red Chinese Government. You understood me to mean that.

Admiral BADGER. Yes. I don't know that. I just merely say that I believe that it followed a pattern which I observed started when I was out there.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes; thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

REASONS FOR ASIATIC DOUBTS OF UNITED STATES STRENGTH

Senator CAIN. Admiral, earlier today you said that to your personal knowledge there had been some doubt in the Far East concerning America's strength.

I would appreciate it, sir, if you would tell us approximately the period of time covered by those doubts and what were the prime reasons which gave rise to the doubts in the minds of the Far East.

Admiral BADGER. The prime reason was the boastfulness and the effectiveness of the Soviet propaganda.

That propaganda drifted down into China, and from China, into other parts of the Far East. It was augmented by a quotation of some of the statements of our own people in regard to our disarmament, and so on, which they had picked up and spread around, and I think that that was the prime reason.

Senator CAIN. Admiral Badger, may I ask you this, in this connection: We spend considerable sums of money, though perhaps not well enough or large enough, on our Voice of America.

What is there about the Russian propaganda which, in your opinion, has made it more effective in terms of selling ideas to the people of the Far East, than our own psychological warfare or propaganda methods?

Admiral BADGER. Well, for one thing, it is an entirely different pattern. There is always a background of fear and threat in it—"Come with us and join us, or else——"

And, although that may not always be expressed, it is always implied.

One of the first things that you always noticed before a Communist advance, in those countries, is that your employees start to leave you, for no reason whatsoever. They may be house employees. They may be industrial employees; and the reason for it is that they foresee a Communist occupation and advance, and they do not want to be identified as employees of the imperialists when they enter that particular area where they live.

That is done, and I have seen it done, by no real threat of advance at the time, but just infiltration of propaganda that comes in there says they are going to do it.

It is a question that you and I could discuss for an hour or two; but there is, in the Communist propaganda, I believe I am correct in saying that it is patterned to support a plan. It is very aggressive. It is well thought out, and there has been evidence of a certain type of propaganda offensive which has been too true not to give it weight among those people.

Senator CAIN. Well, Admiral Badger, I think you have just said something very significant.

If we are to remain in the Far East, it stands to reason that we are going to have to find a way in which to compete on an equal basis with the propaganda of the Soviet.

INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR INFORMATION SERVICE

Out of your large experience, would you have any recommendations to leave with us now, in brief form, or later on, in written form, as to what we need to do in terms of propaganda to be more effective in the Far East, Admiral, than has been the case in the resent years?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir. If you will allow me, I have some material partially prepared on that subject, because I have been giving it great thought——

Senator CAIN. If the chairman were to permit it——

Admiral **Badger**. And if you will permit me, I will be very glad to go back and, within a reasonable time, or sufficient time, to prepare, or to streamline it a little bit, and I will be glad to send it as part of the record, or part of my testimony, if you like.

Chairman **Russell**. We should be very glad indeed to have it, Admiral. I think the matter that Senator Cain is discussing is one that has been of great concern to every Member of the Congress who is interested at all in this international picture. We apparently are defeated on every front in the propaganda war.

Admiral **Badger**. I have seen this thing. May I have time to give you a couple of examples?

Senator **Cain**. Well, let me say, sir, all I am sitting here for and all the other members of the committee are sitting here for is to benefit from the advice of witnesses, and if you will just proceed at your own pace, I will appreciate it.

Admiral **Badger**. I will give you two brief examples of how this thing works. A newspaper reporter who is identified as a man who is at least a follower released a dispatch which said that we were going to reduce the number of marines in Tsingtao, sometime in 1948, by a thousand, and it came out in the papers and went all over the world, and I saw that thing when I landed.

I was coming in from somewhere and they handed me this news report and I didn't even leave the airfield. I got in a plane and flew from Tsingtao to Shanghai and called an international press conference, and there were 31 different nationalities present as I remember it, and I said, "This is not true and it has gone all over the world, and I request that you give the denial as broad a coverage."

Well, before I got to Shanghai, which was some 8 hours after the release, the Chinese currency had depreciated nearly 40 percent in value, and when the denial came out the next morning, why, the Chinese currency recovered and went back to a little bit better price than it had ever been before.

Now that is the international effect of the untruths, when people are edgy. A thousand marines, think of it.

WEAKNESS OF OUR PROPAGANDA EFFORT

Another case—we have to watch awfully carefully, and I don't know how the dickens we can do this one, but we are always a little inclined to criticize failure, you know, and sometimes we don't go into the reason for failure. I say that the Chinese Government was confronted with too high expectations.

I won't go into that at any length, but we tried to assume that they were a democracy with all kinds of agencies and planning agencies and they could take stuff and expend it effectively, and so on; that there wasn't any politics in it and all the rest of it. Well, I think that they failed, but I think a heck of a lot of those people tried out there, but every now and then for some reason or other we would see a fellow come out there, maybe in business, and come back and say, "Well, this fellow is no good; he is a crook," and so on.

It would be repeated, and some of our very prominent people would say that. Well, it wasn't always a proper statement. Sometimes they criticized the strongest friends we had and the strongest men of China, but that damn propaganda would pick that up and say, "This is what your American people are saying about this fellow, and that is what we have been telling you."

And I know that we ruined two or three very prominent people out there and their status by that vicious circle of picking up these things and having somebody here fall for it or some prominent commentator. It would go out there and come right back and be published in there as a statement of a prominent American.

He might be a prominent commentator, a prominent official. Now how we are going to lick that one I don't know, but it is a fact that that is a part of the effective planning of that propaganda and they never miss an opportunity.

Senator CAIN. Admiral Badger, I know that my understanding is being broadened by what you have just been saying and at your convenience if you will send along the memorandum, I shall be most grateful.

If, sir, you could put some emphasis on a phrase you used a few minutes ago—you said, if I understood you correctly, that Russian propaganda or Communist propaganda is largely effective in the Far East because it is working against a plan and what I want to try to understand is this:

Is one of our weaknesses propagandawise in the Far East that we are not working, as the Soviets or Communists are, against an agreed-upon and understandable plan of operation? We seem to be spending money, Admiral Badger, without getting a hundred cents return on every dollar, it seems to me.

Amiral BADGER. I wouldn't want to make a comment on that situation out there now, because I haven't observed it.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral BADGER. But when I was out there, I realized that that was true, and sometimes our propaganda was not in accordance with a plan.

EFFECT OF A DECISIVE VICTORY IN KOREA ON THE FAR EAST

Senator CAIN. Admiral Badger, if I have the time remaining to stay right with this subject, I wish to ask one other question. In your opinion, against what you have just been talking about, are the peoples of the Far East likely to judge American strength and the strength of the United Nations by what has taken place or may take place in Korea?

Adimarl BADGER. I think it has an influence, a very strong influence under certain circumstances, but we mustn't let that blind us to the fact that there are a good many other factors involved, and that those people are interested in their own welfare and security, mainly, and independence and so on, and regardless of what happens in the rest of the world, it seems to me a good idea not to overlook anything that is going to reassure them as nations or as, almost, individuals.

Senator CAIN. Of course, I may be completely wrong, but it seems so obvious to me that a decisive victory, a decisive decision in Korea will do more than anything and everything else—and much more rapidly—to convince our friends in the Far East that the United States and the United Nations are possessed of a strength sufficient to restore and maintain a free way of life, so to speak, in the Far East;

and I want other people to punch holes in that theory, if that is possible.

Admiral BADGER. I want to say this: You talk about decisive victory. I want the thing to reach an end and our objective attained as it was stated at the time we undertook the operation.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders.

POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING A MODEL AREA FOR RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH CHINA

Senator FLANDERS. Admiral, through perhaps a mistaken sense of duty I was somewhere else this morning, and I read during the lunch hour on the ticker the news report of what you have been saying, some of which you have in effect repeated this afternoon.

I wonder if I would be wrong in saying that it is your conviction that military victory is necessary to peace, but that peace also requires effective economic, political, and social measures to consolidate the gains in a form which is to the advantage of the people themselves.

Admiral BADGER. As I understand your question, my answer is in the affirmative; yes, sir.

Senator FLANDERS. Now, I am tremendously interested, as we all are, in what to do next in China, or in that area, all the way from Korea down through Indochina and the peninsula, where conditions seem to be so balanced and liable to go one way or the other.

You just mentioned a few minutes ago the dropping of rice in what, I presume, were famine areas as an example of one of the ways of affecting the minds of people.

I had an idea back in June 1947, and I wonder whether it is still desirable and feasible to work it out.

I wrote a letter to General Marshall, of which I shall read only these three paragraphs:

> Would it be possible to clear a restricted area of Communist military strength and mark off that area for assistance and reconstruction? It might be from the Yangtze River south, or perhaps the area 50 to 100 miles north of the Yangtze might be included. If transportation, supporting coal mines and cotton textiles, for instance, could be reconstituted in that area, it would form a basis for reviving normal living for many millions of harassed people.
>
> The difficulties are obvious. It would require close supervision on our part to make sure the assistance is not poured down the military rathole. It would be difficult to get such supervision to be politically acceptable to the Chinese Government, and it would be difficult to recruit and organize the necessary supervision.
>
> Recognizing these difficulties and others which our experience would suggest, it might still be considered as one of the faint hopes in the Chinese situation.

I brought up this letter, Admiral Badger, because on the news ticker I saw, as I understood it, an expression of opinion on your part that North China and Manchuria were probably more or less permanently attached to the Soviet area of power, but that that power was not definitely consolidated, perhaps, in the south of China, which you will see follows the idea that I was expressing 4 years ago.

Now the thing which it seems to me we have got to plan and work on is a possibility of an entering wedge of some sort in this southern area, in which we combine military, economic, political, and social reorganization and other things. If that entering wedge can be devised and applied, is there not a chance that that area may be recovered for civilization?

It is quite an undertaking; is it not?

Your balloons with rice—not balloons, but airplanes with rice—are just an example of a faint entering wedge of penetration. Taking the wraps off Chiang Kai-shek's army is a possible instrument to use for that purpose.

Is there any hope in that? That is my question.

Admiral BADGER. t is only a matter of opinion, sir, but my opinion is at the present time that it is not feasible within the limits of what is known as Communist-controlled China at the present time.

I think they would reject it as anything acceptable to them, and I do not believe that such a distribution could be controlled as you would like to have it controlled, or for the purposes or for the people that you would like to have it go to. Nor do I think that the military strength of Chiang Kai-shek is sufficient to establish such an area and maintain it and expand it.

On the other hand, this morning I had given consideration to the fact that we didn't have close contact to the people in China and offered what I considered to be the next most favorable solution, which was to do what you say where we can, which is beyond the limits of the bamboo curtain in Southeast Asia.

I also, because you were away this morning, will end this answer by stating that I emphasized the need for top-flight efficiency in the implementation of any undertaking we have out there.

We must have the highest type of engineering and planning and agricultural experts and so on.

EXPERIENCE OF ECA IN CHINA

Senator FLANDERS. So far as your experience has gone, are there any areas in which you have felt that the ECA has done fairly well? Are there other areas in which you have felt that the ECA has fallen down in these things?

Admiral BADGER. In my experience so far as China is concerned, that is the only direct contact I have had with the ECA. I just cannot say enough for them. The only trouble was they got out there too late.

Senator FLANDERS. Yes. Well, I am glad to have that opinion from you, sir, because that organization is still intact.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Senator FLANDERS. And still available.

Those are the only questions I had, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

POSSIBLE REASONS FOR OUR APPARENT PROPAGANDA FAILURE IN FAR EAST

Chairman RUSSELL. The questioning again comes to me. I had not intended to ask any other questions. I do hope that you will comply with Senator Cain's request and give us your views on this psychological warfare that we call propaganda.

Admiral **Badger**. I tried to do the best I could.

Chairman **Russell**. That has disturbed me no end—the fact that we apparently suffer defeat after defeat in that field.

I have had a theory of my own in connection with it, and I thought that our difficulties, particularly in China and throughout Asia, went much deeper than the two illustrations that you gave the committee.

It seems to me that we are greatly handicapped in this field in dealing with the people where there is no substantial middle class—where there is not a large number of people of the middle class.

Admiral **Badger**. Yes, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. And I notice that most of our defeats occur where there are a few rich people, and a great many poor people, and the Soviet or Communist propaganda offers them a direct and immediate action—now.

We come in with our brand of democracy that we know is the best on earth, with all of its faults—the greatest Government that men have ever enjoyed living under or living with, and operating, because we all have a part in it, but when we talk about the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, equal rights, which means equality of opportunity in the last analysis, that is something that they do not understand or else seems to be far away.

The Communists come in and say, "Come, join with us now"——

Admiral **Badger**. And give them more rice.

Chairman **Russell** (continuing). "And we will satisfy the yearnings that you have had through countless generations to own a little piece of land or to have a little better house or a little more rice; and, if you will just come and join with us, we will go over here to this one, out of perhaps, a 100,000, who has something, and we will take it away from him, and we will distribute it to where you will get a share of it."

Tragically enough, they do not see that in the illusion of getting something for nothing immediately, or redressing very real wrongs and injustices that have been suffered by that man and by many generations of his forebears, that they have fallen into a trap and are selling whatever little liberty they might enjoy.

We have been, I think, tremendously handicapped in the whole psychological warfare or propaganda struggle because of this offer of immediate action to forcibly redress wrongs, whereas we offer them a plan of gradual redress through legal means of these same wrongs.

I decided that that was the reason we lose constantly in this psychological warfare in all of the great areas of Asia, and why we were handicapped in winning such a contest in any land where there had been so much oppression and exploitation over many generations, so that such wealth as there was there had gravitated into very few hands.

POSSIBILITY OF AN ENTERING WEDGE IN CHINA

Senator **Flanders**. Mr. Chairman, if I might have permission of the members to follow up just with one more question. I imagine unanimous consent——

Chairman **Russell**. Without objection, Senator Flanders may propound his question.

Senator **Flanders**. We are just hearing a little bit of Senate procedure here in these few words.

If I understood you correctly, you did say that some such entering wedge of military and economic assistance might be tried wherever—south of the iron curtain—the curtain was thin enough; that is, you would not cast aside all possibility in the southern area of China of getting through with some of these things; would you?

Admiral BADGER. I cannot think of any area where it is thin.

Senator FLANDERS. I beg pardon?

Admiral BADGER. I cannot think of any area where it is thin.

Senator FLANDERS. You cannot think of anyplace where it is thin?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir.

Senator FLANDERS. You think it pretty well protected clear down the coast to Indochina?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator FLANDERS. All right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, I shall not follow the ordinary procedure of calling upon each of the Senators who hold membership on these committees, in turn. I will ascertain from those present if they have any further questions.

Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. I have no further questions, but I would like to thank Admiral Badger for his patience and fine contribution to the record here. He has made a very important contribution.

Admiral BADGER. Thank you, Senator Smith.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

DISCONTINUANCE ON CHINESE SANCTUARIES

Senator CAIN. Admiral Badger, this morning in your excellent statement you offered recommendations which represented a course of actions which, in your opinion, could be followed with good results in the Far East. With your permission, I should like to ask you several questions against these recommendations.

You impressed upon the committee the need for continuing to impose heavy losses in Korea on Red China's military manpower and the need for destroying Red China's essential equipment in the Korean theater of operations.

You urged us to conduct all of our operations in Korea with the fact in mind that the availability of arms, ammunition, and equipment is much more critical to the Chinese effort than is the availability of manpower.

You told us that the Red Chinese have always shown shortages of equipment.

Admiral Badger, from my limited knowledge, I could not agree with any contentions more. You went on to urge the discontinuance of the use of sanctuaries by the armed enemies of the United Nations.

I want to ask you, against everything you have said today, how we can reconcile your recommendations to us with the continuance of Rashin in northeast Korea as a supply and equipment depot for the Chinese armies? I cannot understand that, sir.

Admiral BADGER. The continuation of what, sir?

Senator CAIN. Of the town of Rashin in northeast Korea, which General MacArthur testified was a major Red Chinese supply depot in Korea. That is a sanctuary, Admiral Badger, not beyond or north of the Yalu River but in the heart of the enemy's country in Korea.

Admiral BADGER. I am not familiar with the details or with the circumstances or even with the existence of that base which you describe as an extensive source of supply; but, if that is allowed to continue as a base of supply, then I must be perfectly frank in saying that that is contrary to my recommendation.

Senator CAIN. That is what I want to get at, sir. You did mean in a considered sense what you told us this morning that we ought to take from our enemies those areas which they are now using as sanctuaries and from which they can supply their armies in the field which have but one purpose, and that is the destruction of the allied forces in Korea.

Admiral BADGER. My idea of a sanctuary is a point of refuge in another neutral territory, somebody else's territory. A sanctuary in my understanding of the word, as I intend to imply the word "sanctuary," is that if a man, in simplest explanation of this, comes on your side of the street and does something, threatens you or kills your son or something and then goes on the other side of the street and he is not subject to punishment; and, therefore, I feel that sanctuaries apply very effectively to security of, for instance, an aircraft.

If an aircraft comes over and gives you a good going over and then he gets up and when he passes a certain line, why, he is no longer subject to attack, I have understood that that is not admitted at the present time and that they can be followed and are followed.

I look on sancuary as a man who comes in that door and does something, then goes out the door and you can't do anything to him.

POSSIBLE BOMBING OF MANCHURIAN SANCTUARY

Senator CAIN. I think, sir, you have given us a very accurate definition of the Red Chinese enemy air bases and supply depots which exist today north of the Yalu River. I take it then from what you have said— and it is awfully important that we do no one, particularly a witness, an injustice—that you are recommending that all such supply and air bases in Manchuria should be destroyed by our Allied forces if they have the firepower to do it?

Admiral BADGER. I certainly recommend against the recognition of sanctuaries, and I consider that if an airplane takes off of a field and returns to that field, that is free of attack for any reason, that he is going back to a sanctuary.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir; and as such he should be followed and destroyed if that is possible in order that he does noe reenter the war to our Allied detriment. That is correct, sir; is it not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, but that is a different thing from going over there. That is an objective. That is following the fellow who has committed a crime, an international crime or whatever you want to call it, but that is a different thing from setting up an expedition to go over and—well, you have got to have in my opinion direct cause for the direct effect that I recommend.

Senator CAIN. Is not the direct cause present in the air bases situated in Manchuria from which enemy aircraft attack our installations and aircraft south of the Yalu River, and in the supply depots in Manchuria from which Red Chinese armies are maintained south of the river in the field against our Allied and American forces, sir?

Admiral BADGER. That is a point which I feel should be the definite recommendation of the responsible military officials in the field, and again I don't want to quibble about this thing at all and I am not quibbling when I say that there are factors involved that don't make it quite as simple to say that definitely, but we have certain things in international law which we have recognized, continuation of the chase and all that sort of business, and it has been recognized in sound international law for a good many years, but that doesn't mean necessarily that because—suppose that a bomb was acquired in France, for instance, and found its way to Korea. I don't think that you would be justified in going over there and destroying that point of source of the bomb.

Senator CAIN. Admiral Badger, I think, sir, that I can understand all of the things you have just spoken of, but I have asked several questions just against what you offered to us in your prepared statement this morning, and I wanted to be awfully certain that I understood what you meant when you recommended that we ought to discontinue the recognized use of sanctuaries by armed enemies of the United Nations, as that statement relates to Korea.

Admiral BADGER. The sanctuary relates to the man who has committed the act, and not to the man who is supporting the act, in my definition of it.

SANCTUARIES AND HOT PURSUIT

Senator CAIN. Well, sir, we have two problems, and I may find it difficult to understand; so, if you will just be a little tolerant with me for a minute:

We are in complete agreement that any Red Chinese aviator or any aviator who gets in an enemy aircraft and flies it across the Yalu River and attacks our forces ought to be chased until he is destroyed.

We are in agreement on that; are we not, sir?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. So far, so good.

Now, I understand you to say that the same premise did not run to the person who was back of some supply line; and I want to be certain that I am in understanding on this principle—you have told us that our primary objective, militarily, is to destroy the equipment of the Red Chinese, because that is the quickest way to put him out of business.

We all know that the Red Chinese have a sanctuary in Manchuria, because through their supply depots in Manchuria they equip and maintain their Red Chinese armies south of the Yalu River, in Korea.

May I ask you why that sanctuary should not be totally destroyed, for reasons of pure military necessity?

Admiral BADGER. Because that brings in a little wider definition of the word "sanctuary" than my definition of the word "sanctuary" is.

I can't do better than try to explain my view in that I said that I think we can beat these people in Korea. I think that we can. I have said that I would go along with the considered recommendation of responsible people who have taken matters of wide scope under consideration and that I offered no opposition to the fact that if they don't want to go in there and bomb Chinese bases, why, I have no conclusive reason why I want them to, because I think you can get away with this thing without it.

But, on the other hand, when a fellow comes out of the skies and makes an attack on you, then I think—and then seeks refuge where you can't attack that fellow—I think that it becomes a sanctuary; and I want to see that recognized by the United Nations and its recognition abolished.

I don't know that I can make any simple case of it, but we talked about this fellow who crossed the street and he performs an act.

All right. Suppose he runs into a house on the other side of the street. I would go in there and get him, but I don't think I would necessarily punish the fellow that opened the door for him to come in the house.

Senator CAIN. Admiral Badger, you know I am awfully serious in trying to understand this. I think you have written your own definition of "sanctuary" as far as today is concerned and as far as Korea is concerned.

Permit me to state your definition of a sanctuary covers "hot pursuit" or what is commonly known as "hot pursuit," the recommendation of the JCS back in January that any enemy aircraft coming south of the Yalu should be chased north of the Yalu and destroyed if possible.

Admiral BADGER. That is right.

[Deleted.]

Senator CAIN. We have a limited war. You might just as well have a limited sanctuary, even though I individually would vote "No."

Admiral BADGER. I feel this: that there is one thing about it. It is the airplane that is going to produce the attack, and if you can by the system of "hot pursuit" refuse to recognize the security of that fellow, because he happens to cross a certain border, and authorize going and getting him, why I think that you have performed something along the lines that I want to perform.

I don't think that the base can come over, the base can't fly over and form the attack. I want to get the fellow that comes over there and not give him a sanctuary.

Senator CAIN. You and I differ only on one respect: I want to get all of them by whatever means.

Admiral BADGER. Well, don't misunderstand me.

Senator CAIN. I don't, sir.

Admiral BADGER. Maybe I do, too, but, on the other hand, we must realize that there are basic considerations which——

Senator CAIN. I do understand, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman, do you have any further questions?

Senator SPARKMAN. Just a few.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Cain said bases in Korea, and am sure he meant Manchuria.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes; I thought that, and I am sure the Admiral would not want the record to show he did not believe in bombing the enemy bases in Korea.

Senator CAIN. I apologize for having used the word incorrectly, but the whole substance of our conversation was concerning the bases of supply and air depots in Manchuria and not Korea.

ADVOCACY OF HOT PURSUIT THROUGH UNITED NATIONS AGREEMENT

Senator SPARKMAN. Following up this matter of hot pursuit—it is true, as Senator Cain said, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did recommend it and the State Department recommended it, and when it was submitted to some of our allies in the United Nations they declined it.

[Deleted.]

Admiral BADGER. I didn't know that there had been such approval of the principle of hot pursuit by all of what I consider all responsible agencies of our Government. If that is so, why, I certainly would continue every possible effort to put that into effect, because I agree with it, I believe in it, and I think it is a great moral factor, and I think that everything points to it.

In other words, I am just merely, and without knowledge at the time, I heartily agree with the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in that thing and, of course, the State Department also if they approved of it, because I think that that business of sanctuary is something that just should not be tolerated under any circumstances.

Senator SPARKMAN. As I recall the testimony, what I said is true—that several of the governments of our allies in the arena were consulted and they frowned upon the idea.

Now, let's assume that some of our allies who have a major interest along with us in the Korean compaign did decline and object to it. Then do you think we should do it on our own, or should we direct our effort toward getting those allies to agree with us?

Admiral BADGER. I am going to have to say that I do not feel qualified to answer that question. If the Joint Chiefs of Staffs have made the recommendation, I believe that they are in a position to pursue that line of action, and I would like to see them do it. But as to whether I would do it without the other fellow or not, and that sort of business, I don't know enough about the factors behind that really to give you a sensible answer to it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, perhaps I will follow up with this question: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, following the objection on the part of several of our allies, withdrew such recommendation and they do not recommend it now. Would you follow the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral BADGER. I would have to follow it unless somebody gave—unless—I don't know what caused that revision of their decision. It must have been pretty convincing.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, the testimony before us is that they did object strenuously to it.

Admiral BADGER. I am going to have to go back to my recommendation—that I believe that the United Nations should abolish the recognition of sanctuary.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is the point I am trying to get. In other words, you recommend it to the United Nations rather than our own individual action?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; because I think that in matters involving a policy of that sort that you got to have certain unanimity among those allied forces.

FACTORS CONSIDERED IN BOMBING OF RASHIN

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. Now, Admiral, I want to take you back to this question about Rashin. Of course, you said that you were not familiar with the facts concerning it.

As I recall, Admiral Sherman testified that Rashin was about 17 miles from the Soviet border, and that there were Russian ships in the harbor, and they did actually bomb it once. As I recall he said they had a rather unfortunate bombing mission. I don't remember the exact terms used but something to that effect.

Now, certainly before you would recommend that it be bombed, you would take into consideration all of those factors, if it was your responsibility, would you not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, indeed.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you think Admiral Sherman is quite competent with reference to those matters?

Admiral BADGER. Definitely.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you would be willing to follow his recommendation?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Admiral, it has been a long day. I want to say I have been very much interested in your testimony regarding the possibilities in China. I think you have given us some hope at least so far as Southern China is concerned.

POTENTIAL REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS IN CHINA

But one thing that is a matter of great concern to all of us is this: Are there potential leaders in China who can take advantage of this ferment and lead the people in the event that ferment does work?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. I wish I had some written statements to that effect; I could say it so briefly and directly.

There are potential leaders, and some of them are very fine individuals. Without mentioning names, for obvious reasons, I can recall one who, I believe, if he went back into his particular province and said, "Boys, here it is. This is the time"—I think he would have a very great following. I think he would probably in that province have—3 months ago I estimated that he would have a following of about 400,000 guerrillas.

I think, however, that the timing of that thing is not yet come. I think it has got to be awfully sure of certain support. It's got to be time so that one fellow doesn't expose himself when another fellow is inactive.

But knowing China, and if you go back in your history of China you find that they have been conducting revolutions for a great many years, and they time these things after their own pattern. But the important thing to me is to do the things that we should do that will make it desirable for them to react against the present government and to establish their own local leaders.

I wouldn't promote any particular national leader in China, because China isn't accustomed to a national leader. It has always been under a provincial form of government. They know it.

It is traditional with them, and they will follow and respect, and I might say obey, the orders of a local leader, whereas they have shown no enthusiasm for a national leader. That doesn't mean that the local leader will not work with the national leader, because sometimes he will, but that doesn't mean that he is going to take orders, restricting orders, making him a subordinate of a national leader.

He will probably resist that; so that it is a question of a bunch of people that are completely disorganized now, unready to move; but let's keep on what we are doing.

I think we are doing all right, but I would like to make it known in China that there are better things for them if they take the action that they might feel against ridding themselves of an unpopular, oppressive form of government.

I think, as I suggested this morning, that one way of doing that is to continue our favorable support, which I think is appreciated on the mainland of China, of the uplift of the way of life on Formosa. I think we should be sure that we have a plan and implement it efficiently, effectively, in neighboring countries.

I think it will drift in there and I think, I really think that the Chinese may react in their own peculiar way, which has been going on. The last one of any moment was the revolution of Sun Yat-sen.

Senator SPARKMAN. Admiral, do you think that an early peace treaty with Japan would be helpful?

Admiral BADGER. I beg your pardon?

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you think that an early peace treaty with Japan would be helpful?

Admiral BADGER. I haven't given that any thought.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN FAR EAST

Senator SPARKMAN. I have been interested in your references to the importance of "psychological warfare," if we can use that term. I believe you are going to submit a statement later.

Admiral BADGER. I will do the best I can.

Senator SPARKMAN. Enlarging on that. But isn't this true: that one of the greatest problems confronting us so far as Russian propaganda is concerned, is the feeling or the idea that they are able to get across that we are imperialistic?

Admiral BADGER. I think they are able to get it across that we are associated with—I don't call it imperialistic. I call it, and I think properly—I almost want a nod from Senator Smith on this expression—I think it is not imperialism that they are worried about out there as much as it is colonialism. I think they want their independence.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I agree with you.

Admiral BADGER. I don't think at the present time that the Russians can point to the United States and say that we are colonial-minded.

Senator SPARKMAN. I agree fully with what you have said, but I was not talking so much about what the people out there were thinking but I was talking about this charge which Russia is eternally directing against us, and I have heard it many times over, in their speeches and in their news releases, about the imperialism of the United States, and I certainly agree with you with reference to the statement that you make about colonialism.

Admiral BADGER. Well, I was in the propaganda, for a while known as an imperialistic admiral, for instance, but that never bothered me because I was an American and I knew they weren't getting that across.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral BADGER. And I don't think they will get it across with reference to the United States of America. I think that our background and our actions out there in the past in the Far East put us down as neither being colonial-minded nor, in our actions toward those people, imperialistic.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I am glad to hear you say that, sir.

Admiral BADGER. Do you agree with that?

Senator SMITH. I agree with that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Are there any further questions, gentlemen?

Senator CAIN. I would like a few, if I may, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right.

COURSES TO CARRY OUT UNITED NATIONS OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

Senator CAIN. Admiral Badger, I have understood you to testify that the United Nations ought to pursue a course of action which would carry out our stated objective when we entered Korea last June.

That is correct, is it not, sir?

Admiral BADGER. I understood it was the United Nations course of action.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Would you tell us what your understanding of that stated objective was?

Admiral BADGER. Well, the most important stated objective was opposition to aggression, and, in the particular case of Korea, to arrive at a state of affairs where there was a unified, democratic, and independent Korean Government.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Some witnesses who have appeared before this committee, and some members of this committee, feel that the only possible way in which to carry out that objective, as you have just stated it to be, is through the adoption of one or all of the following courses of action.

Now, I should like to state them, Admiral Badger, and then ask you, in the briefest way possible, your reaction to each one of them, so that as a member of this committee, I will know exactly, sir, what your position with reference to Korea is:

A. Imposing economic sanctions by every member of the United Nations against our common enemy, Red China.

B. Imposing a United Nations blockade against our common enemy, Red China.

C. A proportionate contribution in matériel and manpower by every free member of the United Nations.

D. ——

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you want to read them all before he answers, Senator?

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir; just for continuity.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't know whether he can keep them all in mind.

Senator CAIN. D. Destroying the sanctuaries which are now available to our common enemy, Red China, which includes Rashin, within Korea, air bases and supply depots in Manchuria, and supply sources in China itself, if the destruction of the previously mentioned sanctuaries are not adequate to the undertaking; and

E. Using Chinese Nationalists on Formosa, in their own war, to make that job as easy as possible.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Admiral Badger, it has been my understanding, from everything you have said today, that you are in support of all the members of the United Nations imposing strict economic sanctions against Red China, with reference to war matériels.

Admiral Badger. Yes, sir; but I also stated that I am in favor of that.

Senator Cain. Yes, sir.

Admiral Badger. But, on the other hand, put it this way: I can see the validity of the difference between an all-out—what is the word you used?

Senator Cain. Economic sanctions there.

Admiral Badger. All-out sanctions, and giving way to some of our weaker and less stable friends in order to satisfy what they consider and may be their essential needs.

Senator Cain. Well, it would be fair then to say that you think the sooner all of the United Nations can agree to impose economic sanctions against Red China the better off everybody is going to be?

Admiral Badger. Yes, sir.

[Deleted.]

Senator Cain. Yes, sir.

GREATER UNITED NATIONS CONTRIBUTIONS

Admiral Badger, though we have not talked about it, I know that you must be aware that after a year of war, our fifty-odd nations have contributed approximately 30,000 ground troops in Korea.

Is it your view that the time has come when all of those free members of the United Nations ought to try to make a more proportionate contribution to the war in Korea?

Admiral Badger. I think, in general, that idea—mindful of the capacity and capability of the members of the UN, I think that, in general, that idea is one of the basic——

Senator Cain. Needs of the day, perhaps?

Admiral Badger. Well, no; I think it is the general basic spirit of the Organization of the UN to join in an equitable contribution, no matter what the effort might be.

Senator Cain. Well, without prejudice to anybody, implied or direct, is it not your view that thus far all of the free members of the United Nations have made a proportionate contribution to the war out of their capacity to sacrifice and contribute to Korea?

Admiral Badger. I have not examined that specifically but everything that I have—every bit of information that has come to me says that such a contribution is not equitable.

BOMBING OF RACIN

Senator Cain. Admiral Badger, with reference to this general question of sanctuaries, and beginning with the one that is closest to us, as we sit in this room, I understood you to testify that you were not aware that Racin was being used as a major supply depot by our enemy, Red China, and the North Koreans, is that correct, sir?

Admiral BADGER. That is correct.

Senator CAIN. You are just not familiar with that?

Admiral BADGER. That is correct.

Senator CAIN. May I ask you, have you, in pursuit of your naval duties, ever personally visited Racin?

Admiral BADGER. No.

[Deleted.]

Admiral BADGER. You say northeast Korea. You mean northeast Korea? Do you mean northeast Korea?

Senator CAIN. That is what I have been advised, and that is what the map shows its location to be, sir.

Now, people have pronounced that word, Admiral, in various ways.

The Secretary of State called it Racin, and he may be more correct. Do you know it against that pronunciation?

Admiral BADGER. Well, if it is in Korea, if it is within the area of North Korea, and a part of North Korea, then the least I can say is I don't understand.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Cain, he may know it by another name, Najin.

Senator CAIN. Yes. Well, the admiral's last reply is if Racin, called by any other name, is situated in northeast Korea and is being used by our enemy to destroy us, he, Admiral Badger, cannot understand why that is permitted.

Admiral BADGER. That is right. I am not cognizant of any particular reason for its elimination from being subject the same as other localities in Korea.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

HOT PURSUIT

Admiral Badger, you have said with reference to the subject of hot pursuit that that is a course you think the United States ought to pursue to destroy enemy aircraft which crossed the Yalu River going south to destroy our forces.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. Thank you.

[Deleted.]

USE OF NATIONALIST FORCES ON FORMOSA

My last question: I have understood you to indicate that you were not very familiar with the status or the capability of the Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa, and for that reason you think a decision as to whether they should be employed, either in Korea or on the mainland of China—and with reference to the latter generally for guerrilla purposes—ought to be left to a decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Have I understood you correctly in that sense, sir?

Admiral BADGER. That is correct, plus the third alternative as to their value for retention as defensive forces on the island.

Senator CAIN. Admiral, I have labored long this afternoon, but I set out to do my best to understand exactly what you think about this question, and to my satisfaction, I have gotten the answers. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. The examination of Admiral Badger now comes to a close.

Admiral, on behalf of the committees, I wish to thank you for your helpfulness to these committees. I enjoyed your opening statement. It was clear, concise, and pertinent to the issues that are under investigation. I think it was one of the most helpful statements that has been made here. The balance of your evidence is very valuable to the committees and grows out of a rich experience of many years in the service of your country. We thank you for your appearance here and for your assistance to the committees.

If there is no further business at this time, we stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(The information referred to at pp. 2755, 2756 of this hearing follows:)

CONSULTATIONS WITH GENERAL MACARTHUR ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

During the testimony of General Marshall on May 14 he was asked by Senator Smith whether any of the policy makers in the Department of State or the Department of Defense discussed far-eastern problems with General MacArthur prior to June 1950 (p. 1830). In the course of General Marshall's answer to Senator Smith, he said that further information could be obtained from the Department of State.

The information requested follows:

The formal channel for communication between General MacArthur and this Government was the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of the Army.

As far as the Department of State is concerned, in addition to these formal channels, a high-ranking Department political officer was attached to General MacArthur's staff from the beginning of the occupation of Japan. This position was first filled by Ambassador George Atcheson, Jr., who was tragically killed in a crash of a military transport plane in 1947 while returning to Washington for consultations. Since his death this position has been filled by Ambassador William J. Sebald. Both of these men maintained very useful and close relations with General MacArthur.

In addition, almost all of the senior officers in the Department of State concerned with the Far East visited General MacArthur in Tokyo at various times and informally discussed with him virtually the whole range of far-eastern problems.

Walton Butterworth, formerly Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, visited and conferred with General MacArthur in 1947 before coming to Washington from China to assume his post, and again in February of 1950. In the spring of 1948 Mr. George Kennan, who was the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff, was sent to Japan by Secretary of State Marshall, for the specific purpose of fully conferring with General MacArthur concerning Japan and other far-eastern problems. Mr. Kennan spent 3 weeks in Japan for this purpose. Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup visited Japan to confer with General MacArthur in January 1950. Ambassador Dulles visited General MacArthur twice—first in June 1950 and again in January of this year, to discuss the problems connected with the making of a peace treaty with Japan. Almost all of our ambassadors in the Far East have also conferred with General MacArthur.

The American Ambassador to Korea, John J. Muccio, has maintained very close touch with General MacArthur before, as well as after, the attack on South Korea. He has visited Tokyo to see General MacArthur on numerous occasions, and he conferred with General MacArthur on the latter's visits to Korea.

Most of the other top civilian officials of the Government concerned with problems of the Pacific area visited and conferred with General MacArthur.

Thus, between General MacArthur and Washington there was not only the regular exchange by telegram and letter of views on matters of all degrees of importance, but there was the give-and-take of face-to-face discussions on all vital policy questions.

Detailed lists of officials who consulted with General MacArthur, showing the dates of each visit to Tokyo are attached.

ATTACHMENT A

SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WHO VISITED TOKYO, MARCH 1946 TO MARCH 1951

March 11–13, 1946: Gen. George C. Marshall, mission to China.
April 16–17, 1946: Gen. George C. Marshall, mission to China.
May 8, 1946: Paul MsNutt, Ambassador to Philippines.
February 25–26, 1947: Paul McNutt, Ambassador to Philippines.
June 3–4, 1946: Joseph Ballantine, Assistant to Secretary.
May 13–June 13, 1947: James Penfield, Deputy Director, Far Eastern Affairs, State Department.
May 18–23, 1947: Walton Butterworth, Minister-counselor.
January 1, 1948: J. M. Allison, Chief, Northeast Asian Affairs.
March 1–23, 1948: George Kennan, Chief, Policy Planning Staff.
August 14, 1948: John J. Muccio, Ambassador to Korea.
March 27–29, 1949: John J. Muccio, Ambassador to Korea.
October 12–18, 1950, John J. Muccio, Ambassador to Korea.
February 16, 1949: Max W. Bishop, Chief, Northeast Asian Affairs.
June 8–19, 1949: Myron C. Cowen, Ambassador to Philippines.
February 6–22, 1951: Myron C. Cowen, Ambassador to Philippines.
December 27, 1949: George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State.
January 5–11, 1950: Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large.
February 3–6, 1950; Walton W. Butterworth. Assistant Secretary of State.
June 17–27, 1950: Ambassador John F. Dulles.
January 26–February 11, 1951: Ambassador John F. Dulles.
June 17–27, 1950, John Allison, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.
January 26–February 11, 1951: John Allison, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

NOTE.—Foregoing not necessarily complete.

ATTACHMENT B

HIGH OFFICIALS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT (EXCEPT DEPARTMENT OF STATE) WHO VISITED TOKYO, MARCH 1946–MARCH 1951

March 10–14, 1946: K. C. Royall, Under Secretary of War.
February 1–7, 1949: K. C. Royall, Secretary of the Army.
May 5–7, 1946: Herbert Hoover, United States Food Mission.
May 10–11, 1946: E. W. Pauley, Reparations Commission.
June 19–July 15, 1946: E. W. Pauley, Reparations Commission.
July 8, 1946: W. S. Symington, Assistant Secretary of War for Air.
July 8, 1946: Robert Hannegan, Postmaster General.
September 3–4, 1946: Howard E. Petersen, Assistant Secretary of War.
January 28–February 19, 1947: Clifford Strike, Reparations Party.
February 24–26, 1947: A. J. Krug, Secretary of Interior.
September 18–27, 1947: William Draper, Under Secretary of the Army.
March 20–April 2, 1948: William Draper, Under Secretary of the Army.
December 8–26, 1949: William Draper, Former Under Secretary of the Army.
March 1–4, 1948: Paul Aiken, Second Assistant Postmaster General.
March 20–April 2, 1948: Paul Hoffman, Administrator, ECA.
December 17, 1948: Paul Hoffman, Administrator, ECA.
June 7, 1948: Roger Lapham, China Aid Mission.
May 25–28, 1949: Roger Lapham, China Aid Mission.
November 17–20, 1948: Arthur S. Barrows, Under Secretary of the Air Force.
February 1–7, 1949: John W. Gibson, Assistant Secretary of Labor.
February 1–May 2, 1949: Joseph M. Dodge, Dodge Mission.
October 30–December 4, 1949: Joseph M. Dodge, Dodge Mission.
October 7–December 4, 1950: Joseph M. Dodge, Dodge Mission.
April 2–7, 1949: Robert A. Griffin, Chief of ECA in China Economic Survey Mission.
March 1–5, 1950: Robert A. Griffin, Chief of ECA in China Economic Survey Mission.
August 29–September 14, 1949: Tracy S. Voorhees, Under Secretary of the Army.
December 5–9, 1949: Tracy S. Voorhees, Under Secretary of the Army.

November 17–20, 1949: John J. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury.
November 17–20, 1949: John W. Bray, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.
January 16–20, 1950: Robert West, Deputy to Under Secretary of the Army.
February 28–March 24, 1950: Robert West, Deputy to Under Secretary of the Army.
April 15–28, 1950: Thomas G. Blaisdell, Assistant Secretary of Commerce.
June 17–23, 1950: Louis A. Johnson, Secretary of Defense.
June 17–27, 1950: Earl Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army.
January 26–February 11, 1951: Earl Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army.
August 6–8, 1950: William Harriman, Personal Representative of the President.
November 22–28, 1950: F. P. Matthews, Secretary of the Navy.

NOTE.—Foregoing not necessarily complete.

ASSISTANCE TO CHINA DURING AND AFTER THE EMBARGO (JULY 29, 1946 TO MAY 26, 1947) ON MILITARY SUPPLIES

Senator Hickenlooper asked (p. 4958, June 4):

"After the technical end of the embargo, isn't it a fact that for almost a year after that, for one reason or another, export permits were blocked so that no particular quantity of aid, either economic or otherwise, in fact, went to the Nationalists?"

The information requested follows:

Aid, other than combat matériel, was provided throughout the period of the embargo.

Export licenses were promptly granted on request of the Chinesse Government during the period cited by Senator Hickenlooper. The embargo applied only to combat-type items of military equipment. It did not apply to economic assistance or civilian equipment, such as trucks and road-building equipment of obvious military value. On October 22, 1946, the embargo was modified to permit the Chinese Government to purchase civilian end-use items under 8⅓ group program. The Chinese Government concluded no contracts covering these items until over a year later, on November 6, 1947.

On August 30, 1946, 1 month after the embargo on combat matériel, the United States signed an agreement with the Republic of China for the sale of civilian-type war surplus property with an estimated procurement value of $900,000,000. This property consisted in large measures of vehicles of all types, construction equipment and air force supplies and equipment . The remainder comprised a wide variety of communications equipment, tools, shop equipment, industrial machinery, electrical equipment, medical equipment and supplies and chemicals.

The UNRRA program for China, which began in November, 1945, continued throughout 1946 and 1947. The United States contributed 72 percent of the cost of this program or $474,000,000. UNRRA's China program consisted chiefly of food and clothing and of a wide variety of capital goods and materials important to the rehabilitation of China's agriculture and industries. In addition, UNRRA provided large numbers of technical and supervisory personnel who assisted the Chinese in the distribution of consumption commodities and the installation of capital goods.

The embargo of combat matériel was lifted on May 26, 1946. That same day the Chinese Government was informed that the Department of State would approve the sale to China of 130,000,000 rounds of surplus rifle ammunition; and would approve export licenses for transport planes and for spare parts for all equipment, including combat items, previously transferred under the 8⅓ group program. On June 25, 1947, the Chinese Government signed the contract for the ammunition and it was shipped from the west coast on July 14 and August 11, 1947. The Chinese Government was also informed that it would be granted export licenses on material purchased in the normal commercial arms markets in the United States, but it concluded no major contracts for the purchase of ammunition until December 1947.

Before the actual lifting of the embargo in April and May, 1947, the United States Marines began to turn over (abandoned) large quantities of small arms and artillery ammunition rather than evacuate it when they were withdrawn from North China.

The Secretary of State testified further on sales and deliveries of military supplies in his testimony on pages 5073–5976 of the June 5 session.

ALLEGED BLOCKING OF SHIPMENT OF GERMAN ARMS TO CHINA

On June 5 Senator Brewster asked Secretary Acheson: "Are you familiar with the fact that a consignment of 20,000 rifles had actually left a German port for China, but was stopped en route by an order signed by Laughlin Currie on White House stationery forbidding any such aid to China? * * * I would be interested to have you see what the records would indicate regarding that. * * * It was following VE-day and the shipment was urgently recommended by General Wedemeyer and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Senator Brewster gave Freda Utley's book China Story as his source.

The Department of State has checked with appropriate offices in the Department of Defense and is informed on the basis of a preliminary search that the records checked in the Department of Defense show no recommendation by General Wedemeyer, or approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for any shipment of the kind indicated, nor any record of any such proposed shipment. The Department of State is requesting that the Department of Defense make a thorough investigation to ascertain what basis, if any, might exist for Miss Utley's report. The Department has also checked at the White House and is informed there is no record of any Laughlin Currie letter of memorandum on such a subject.

The Department of the Army advises that in a letter dated July 7, 1945, to the London Joint Munitions Board, the combined Joint Chiefs of Staff did approve as a matter of policy the shipment of arms taken from the Germans to allies fighting in the Far East. The Department of the Army advises that there is no record of any shipment to Nationalist China in implementation of such policy. It appears possible to the Department of State that such a policy was rejected by agreement between the United States and the Chinese Nationalists since it was believed desirable at that time that the Nationalists standardize their arms for .30-caliber ammunition. With the German arsenals no longer producing ammunition for German arms, it was generally agreed that German arms would be of little use to the Nationalists since no further ammunition for such arms would be forthcoming.

STATEMENT OF UNDER SECRETARY ACHESON BEFORE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MARCH 20, 1947, ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SITUATION IN CHINA AND IN GREECE

Tuesday morning, June 5, Senator Brewster (p. 5144) asked whether Secretary Acheson recalled making the following statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 20, 1947:

"That is what we are doing in China. The Chinese Government is not in the position at the present time that the Greek Government is in. It is not approaching collapse. It is not threatened by defeat by the Communists. The war with the Communists is going on much as it has for the last 20 years."

This single paragraph was a part of Secretary Acheson's reply to a question by Representative Judd. Representative Judd's question and Secretary Acheson's full reply follows:

"Mr. JUDD. Mr. Secretary, a great many Americans obviously are confused by what seems to be a contradiction in our foreign policy with respect to the governments which become Communist-dominated.

"If it is a wise policy for us to urge, for example, the Government of China to unite with organized Communist minorities there, why is it a wise policy to assist the Greek Government to fight against the same sort of armed Communist minorities in Greece?

"Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think the problem is not exactly as you have stated it, Mr. Judd.

"In China, as you know far better than I because you are an expert on the matter, the area controlled by the Communists is an area which the Communists have controlled for many years, perhaps up to 20 years. It is a large contiguous geographical area. In that area they have a government, for years, which has defied the authority of the Central Government and maintained its own authority.

"It has an army which for years has repulsed all attempts to invade it.

"Last spring a conference was held after a truce between representatives of the Communist-controlled area and the Government. Out of that conference came a Chinese proposal which was to create a new form of government, the result of which would be to dissolve the Communist government, to dissolve the Communist army and to allow that area of China which is now controlled by Communists to be represented in a central parliament.

"Those representatives would not control the Government, they would not even be in the Government unless they had enough votes, which it seems likely they would not have, to be in the Government.

"That was China's proposal. It was put forward by the Chinese groups in an attempt to solve peaceably a situation which they had not been able to solve in a military manner.

"General Marshall supported the efforts of all Chinese groups to bring about such a solution. The solution seems not to have been possible. For reasons which General Marshall described in his statement last January, the truce has broken down and fighting has broken out.

"The United States has been giving great help to China since the end of the Japanese war.

"We have extended lend-lease aid since the surrender of Japan. That is, since September 2, 1945. We have extended lend-lease aid to the Chinese Government since that date in order to help to reoccupy areas which were under the Japanese control, in the amount of about $700,000,000.

"We have turned over to the Chinese Government surplus property which cost the United States over $836,000,000. We have turned over to the Chinese Government lend-lease property not theretofore delivered and services which cost the United States about $50,000,000, and we have extended loans—and this is not clear in my memory as being too accurate—in the amount of $83,000,000.

"Therefore those people who lightly describe our attitude toward China as a hands-off policy do not accurately describe it. We have given great and vast aid to China in this effort to reoccupy its areas and to reestablish the authority of the Government in the country.

"General Marshall, in his statement of January 6, was urging upon the Chinese Government that it should take necessary steps to make itself more representative and more efficient. That was not directed toward including Communists in the Government, but making the Government more effective in carrying out the purposes of the Government.

"That is what we are doing in China. The Chinese Government is not in the position at the present time that the Greek Government is in. It is not approaching collapse. It is not threatened by defeat by the Communists. The war with the Communists is going on much as it has for the last 20 years.

"In Greece we are faced with the crisis we have described.

"We will continue to be as friendly and as helpful to the Chinese Government as we can possibly be."

Secretary Acheson commented further on the above remarks, putting them in proper context in his testimony on pages 5787–5790 of June 8, 1951.

STATEMENT OF DR. STUART, JULY 1, 1947

Senator Brewster Tuesday morning, June 5 (p. 5146), asked whether Ambassador Stuart on July 1, 1947, made the following statement:

"Persons in direct contact with the Nationalist troops in rural areas state there are insufficient small arms and ammunition to arm all combatant troops in the field."

This statement is taken from a comprehensive letter from Ambassador Stuart addressed to Secretary Marshall from Nanking, July 1, 1947. The complete text, which follows, appears beginning on page 732 of the white paper:

"Communist military successes, the shrinkage of railway mileage in Nationalist hands, the depreciation and depletion of Nationalist equipment and supplies, the increasing friction between southern military forces and civil administrators on one hand and northern troops and the local civil population on the other, reports of a projected withdrawal of Nationalist forces to intramural China and the abandonment of Manchuria to the Communists, rumors of the early return of Marshal Chang Hsuehliang to Manchuria, and the expanding economic stagnation suggest the following observations:

"The recent Communist drive has met with little Nationalist resistance. Northeast Combat Command sources and military observers admit that many Nationalist withdrawals were premature and without military necessity. The words 'strategic retreat' have lost all significance. As a result the Communists possess almost complete initiative and are able to maneuver practically at will. If Ssupingkai with its garrison of 17,000 falls, the Communists, should be able to proceed successfully against bypassed Changchun and Kirin and thereupon gain unimpaired control over 90 percent of Manuchuria. The fall of Yingkow would leave only ports on the west coast of the Liaotung Gulf in Nationalist hands. The only railway of any appreciable mileage in Nationalist hands is the Peiping-Liaotung main line. The Communist drive eastward through Jehol is threatening even these meager holdings and should this drive be successful and contact be established between these forces and those now in the vicinity of Yingkow, Manchuria will be effectively cut off from land and water communication with China, and Mukden itself will be virtually in a state of seige. Nationalist military intelligence has been outstandingly deficient. The Northeast Combat Command is seemingly in almost complete ignorance of Communist plans and is therefore being constantly outwitted. Northeast Combat Command headquarters officers admit they had no intelligence of the recent Communist drive on Changchun and then southward, even though it is now known that such plans therefor had been formulated 3 months prior to the opening of the drive.

"Rivalry (if not enmity) between General Hsiung Shih-hui, the Generalissimo's representative, and General Tu Li-ming, commanding the Northeast Combat Command, is openly discussed and the absence of closely integrated military and economic planning in Manchuria is attributed to it.

"By holding the initiative, the Communists are able to keep the Nationalists scurrying over the countryside, thereby causing depreciation of Nationalist motorized mobile equipment and depletion of sorely needed supplies. Communist transport on the other hand consists almost wholly of draft animals. Persons in direct contact with the Nationalist troops in rural areas state there are insufficient small arms and ammunition to arm all combatant troops now in the field. These reports are so consistent, some, though not necessarily full, credence must be given them. The Communists also are underarmed, but by guerrilla tactics and surprise night attacks they are able to cause greater loss of weapons and expenditure of ammunition by the Nationalists than by themselves.

"Nationalist southern military forces and civil administrators conduct themselves in Manchuria as conquerors, not as fellow countrymen, and have imposed a 'carpet bag' regime of unbridled exploitation upon areas under their control. If military and civil authorities of local origin were in control, they too would probably exploit the populace, but experience has shown that Chinese authorities of local origin, in general, never quite strangle a goose laying golden eggs, and furthermore, it is a human trait to be less resentful toward exploitation by one's own than toward that by outsiders. The result of this is that the countryside is so antagonistic toward outsiders as to effect the morale of non-Manchurian troops and at the same time arouse vindictiveness in southern military officers and civil administrators.

"Nationalist withdrawals toward Mukden have progressively cut off Nationalist-held areas from the great food-producing regions in Manchuria, thereby causing a potential national food shortage which was already apparent in extensive grain hoarding and speculation. Puerile efforts have been made toward price control and to combat hoarding, but in general, the results of these efforts have been largely to enforce the requisitioning of grain at bayonet point for controlled prices and to enable the resale of requisitioned grain at black-market prices for the benefit of the pockets of rapacious military and civil officials. The common man is being crushed between the rising cost of living and the depreciating currency. (The cost-of-living index of May, 160 percent compared to 100 percent in April.) Local currency is pegged to Chinese national currency and has not only fallen with CNC, but also because of the wholesale exodus of families of Nationalist officials and the resulting flight from local currency incidental to frenzied buying of CNC and gold bars. The black-market value of the United States dollar at Mukden is now TP dollars 3,300 against TP dollars 1,000 March 1.

"Little goods move between Mukden and its hinterland. Business is rapidly approaching a standstill, exports from Manchuria have practically disappeared and imports have reduced to a trickle of the normal. Almost all capital has been expended in long-range investment since the Nationalists took over Manchuria and no such capital, government or private, is being invested today. All commodity markets are purely speculative.

"The evidence is growing daily that the people of Manchuria not only are prepared for but are keenly desirous of a change in the government. But what change? Most are undecided even though voluble in discontent of the present way of living and the trend of events. It is safe to state that the overwhelming majority in the nation are as dissatisfied with, dislike and would welcome freedom from the present Nationalist regime. A like majority fear and would therefore not welcome the Communist regime. Many talk "revolution" even aloud in public places, but few are able to define their conception of revolution other than as change from the present way of living and even fewer envisage revolution involving armed resistance. There seems no likelihood that an armed uprising would be more than abortive, at least until the national morale and military might has suffered devastating deterioration. One platform on which Manchu seem almost unanimous is 'out with Heilien (outsider) Chinese and Manchuria for the Manchus.' The return of Ma Chan-shan lent heart to those who look to restoration of Manchu rule under a 'native son,' but his relegation to figurehead status in a position of importence has dampened their hopes. Eyes are today turned toward the possibility of the return of the young marshal to power in Manchuria. His vices, weaknesses and playboy tendencies are known but he is nevertheless associated in the minds of the people with prosperity and progress which Manchuria enjoyed under Chang Tso-lin regime. He or some other pre-Manchu leader could serve as a central figure for rallying the Manchu people. Such a change would in all likelihood herald the return of warlordism to Manchuria, but even so Manchuria would remain Chinese with nominal allegiance at least to China and not a 'Manchu peoples republic' as it may become if the Communists succeed in sweeping the Nationalists back into intramural China.

"There is every reason to believe that punitive military action against the Communists, unless suceeded by overwhelming military occupation will not save Manchuria to China. It is high time for Nanking to be realistic and to replace its present impotent disliked regime in Manchuria with one which will be supported by the local population and would thereby serve to weaken the Communist movement. It may be, and some think that it is, too late to accomplish this purpose. Without some such effective measure there are many indications that it will be only a matter of some months, perhaps 6 to 9, before Manchuria will be lost."

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MILITARY AID TO CHINA SINCE 1941

On June 5, Secretary Acheson was asked by Senator Russell: "Mr. Secretary, there has been some question here as to this Marine Corps ammunition. Is it possible to get a statement as to the amount of small arms and artillery ammunition that was left there? * * * If they are available, we would like also to get the number of rifles and machine guns and artillery pieces—howitzers, fighting planes, and other military equipment—that was furnished to the Nationalist Government of China by this Government after December 7, 1941. * * *" (Transcript, p. 5158.)

There is attached for use of Senator Russell and the members of the committee a summary statement of the available materials covering Senator Russell's request. In order to give a more complete picture, the attached memorandum sets forth briefly all the military aid which this Government has provided to China since 1941—totaling some one billion, eight hundred million dollars. The table on page 1 of the attached memorandum sets forth the various transactions and amounts. To the table there is attached an appendix explaining briefly each of the items in the table. Wherever detailed breakdown is available the detailed breakdown for particular items in the appendix is set forth in attached annexes as indicated.

Listings of shipments under lend-lease and the $125 million grants (China Aid Act of 1948) include the most detailed information available to the Department at this time, based on data furnished by the agencies responsible for implementation.

The breakdown of the ammunition left by the Marines, specifically requested by Senator Russell, is contained in Annex 3.[1]

A number of additional factors are relevant to the question of the military aid extended by the United States to the Republic of China from 1941 to date. In addition to $1,800 million worth of military assistance, the United States also extended to China during this period economic aid amounting to almost $1,700 million. This assistance helped to maintain the Chinese economy and greatly assisted the Chinese Government to carry on its war effort. The economic aid also released Chinese resources for use for military purposes.

The United States began to give military aid to China even before we became a belligerent in World War II. China was declared eligible for military aid on May 6, 1941, and for a year this aid was aimed at improving transport over the Burma Road—the one land route into China. After the establishment of a

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[1] Already furnished to committees. Testimony of June 9, 1951.

United States military headquarters in Chungking emphasis was placed on the supply of military items.

During World War II, General Stilwell served as commanding general of the United States forces in the China-Burma-India theater and Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo. General Wedemeyer, who succeeded General Stilwell as commanding general of United States forces in China, also served as chief of staff to the Generalissimo. Both of these officers and their staffs provided the Chinese during the war with advice and assistance in the conduct of military operations and the utilization of all resources available. In an effort to modernize Chinese forces, General Stilwell began the transfer to China of military equipment for ground and air forces. These programs were continued by General Wedemeyer with the aim eventually of equipping 39 Chinese divisions. This program was approximately 50 percent completed as of VJ-day. As a result of transfers of aircraft and equipment, the Chinese Air Force played an effective role, working in close collaboration with the United States Army Air Force. By VJ-day a considerable number of planes, together with large quantities of air force material had been transferred to the Chinese. The lend-lease which was continued after VJ-day was intended in part to further the development of a modern army and air force for China. In fact, through post-VJ-day lend-lease, this Government provided equipment by tonnage sufficient to complete the 39 division program, and continued the transfer of planes until a total of 936 aircraft had been transferred for an 8 1/3 group air force program.

Since VJ-day, as indicated, we gave the Chinese about one billion dollars' worth of military assistance. In assessing military aid extended to the Chinese Government by the United States Government since VJ-day, however, no dollar value can be placed on three of the most vital forms of aid—that rendered by headquarters, United States Forces China theater, in planning the redeployment of the Chinese Army and the repatriation of the Japanese; the aid rendered by the United States Marines in north China in occupying key areas and maintaining control for the Government of essential lines of communication; and the aid provided by the United States advisory groups.

TRANSPORTATION OF CHINESE TROOPS

In order to assist the Chinese Government in reoccupying Japanese-held areas and reopening lines of communication, United States forces immediately after VJ-day transported three Chinese Nationalist Armies by air to key sectors of east and north China, including Shanghai, Nanking, and Peiping. During the ensuing months United States forces provided water transportation for an additional large number of troops. In all, between 400,000 and 500,000 Chinese soldiers had been moved to new positions. The plans for these operations and the planes and vessels to carry out the moves were provided through headquarters, United States Forces China theater. Without the use of these planes and vessels, and the coordinating activities of headquarters, United States Forces China theater. Without the use of these planes and vessels, and the coordinating activities of headquarters, United States Forces China theater, the Chinese Government could not have made the rapid transfer of this large number of troops.

Only certain operational costs of the United States planes and vessels in this transportation were carried on lend-lease accounts. Some question was raised at the hearings of this committee as to the validity of the item of $335 million for services and expenses which included these tranportation costs. It is entirely accurate to say that the transportation costs included in this sum represented a major military contribution, which added immeasurably to the Chinese military effort. It enabled the Nationalists to occupy key cities without a struggle and prevented these cities from falling into the hands of the Communists.

UNITED STATES MARINES

In order further to assist the Chinese Government in maintaining control of certain key areas of North China and in repatriating the Japanese—and at the request of the Chinese National Government—50,000 United States marines were landed in North China. They occupied Peiping, Tientsin, and the coal mines to the north, together with the essential railroads in the area. With the assistance of headquarters, United States Forces China theater, and the United States marines, the forces of the Generalissimo were able to effect the surrender of the great majority of the 1,235,000 Japanese troops stationed in China proper, together with their equipment and stocks of military matériel. It is relevant to emphasize that in assisting the Chinese to effect the surrender of these Japanese troops we enabled them to take over the arms, equipment and ammunition of the Japanese troops as well. The Marines, as indicated, in the appendix, also left the Chinese some of their ammunition.

UNITED STATES ADVISORY GROUPS

The United States advisory groups, comprising a total of from 1,200 to 1,300 officers and men, assisted the Chinese Government in reorganizing and consolidating the various branches of the Chinese armed services, including the supreme staff, the ground, naval, and air arms, and the services of supply. The American advisory groups also provided the Chinese with advice and assistance in assimilating and using the large quantities of military matériel turned over under lend-lease, and in training Chinese Government troops. From the close of 1947 until the withdrawal of the advisory groups approximately a year later, the Director of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group advised the generalissimo and senior Chinese military officers with respect to operations on an informal and confidential basis.

THE QUESTION OF AMMUNITION

During the hearings before this committee, questions were raised as to the adequacy of the ammunition which the Chinese Nationalists had for the fighting against the Chinese Communists since VJ-day. The following points are relevant to this question:

1. The military assistance which the United States gave to the Chinese included, of course, large amounts of ammunition. While the Department of State does not have available a detailed itemization of wartime lend-lease materials, the item of ordnance and ordnance stores ($153,333,189.94) included large amounts of ammunition. The post VJ-day lend-lease, as indicated in annex 1, includes more than $94 million worth of ammunition.

In addition, 6,500 tons of ammunition, including more than 4½ million rounds of small arms ammunition, were left by the marines and Navy, at no cost to the Chinese Government, during their evacuation from North China; surplus property sold to the Chinese included in addition to other equipment and assorted ammunition of all sizes, 188,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition; the ammunition purchased from the $125,000,000 grant under the China Aid Act of 1948 included 230,000,000 rounds of 30 caliber, 26,500,000 rounds of 45 caliber, 66,000 rounds of rocket ammunition, and 280,000 grenades.

2. The Chinese Government also bought ammunition in the commercial market. Thus, in December 1947, for example, the Chinese Government signed a commercial contract for 6½ million rounds of 50 caliber ammunition. The Chinese Nationalists also, we are informed, made substantial purchases in the commercial markets of other countries.

3. Arsenals: Until the National Government's military collapse, which may be said to have begun in November 1948, the major arsenals in China and Manchuria were held by the Nationalists—15 major arsenals and 5 subarsenals producing considerable quantities of small arms and small-arms ammunition.

4. From the more than a million Japanese which the Chinese Nationalists disarmed with our help, the Chinese took their ammunition as well as their arms and ammunition. The Chinese Nationalists also disarmed some 750,000 Japanese puppet troops (Chinese) and took their equipment and ammunition.

5. It is estimated that as of VJ-day the Nationalists had a 5 to 1 superiority over the Communists in rifles and that they maintained military superiority in rifles and ammunition until after their defeats of middle and late 1948.

There has been some attempt in this committee to prove that the Chinese Nationalists did not have adequate ammunition; that the United States was at fault in not providing the necessary ammunition; and that this lack of ammunition was responsible for the Chinese Nationalist defeats on the mainland. The attention of the committee is directed to the authoritative judgment on this question—that of General Barr. General Barr was Chief of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group; he was there in China from January 1948 to early 1949, the period when the Chinese suffered major crucial defeats which spelled the eventual doom of the Nationalist forces on the mainland, and he would appear clearly to be the man best qualified to express an opinion on the losses of the Chinese Nationalists. His reports, quoted in the record of these hearings, give his views as to the reasons for the losses of the Chinese Nationalists; it is relevant to emphasize his statement of November 16, 1948, that "no battle has been lost since my arrival due to lack of ammunition or equipment." In the final report of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group, there is the judgment that "in general, troops in combat have had adequate supplies of weapons and ammunition, and their reversals are attributable to other causes than lack of equipment." (See China white paper, pp. 358–359).

U. S. Government military aid to China since 1941 (exclusive of current MDAP program)

[In millions]

	Grants	Credits
May 1941 to VJ-day: 1. Lend-lease [1]	$825.7	$20.0
Post VJ-day:		
2. Lend-lease [1]	513.7	181.0
3. Transfer of military matériel under Sino-American Cooperative Organization Agreement	17.7	
4. Sale of excess stocks of U. S. Army in West China		20.0
5. Ammunition made available by U. S. Marines in North China (over 6,500 tons) [2]	(2)	(2)
6. Transfer of U. S. Navy vessels under Public Law 512, 79th Cong	[3] 141.3	
7. $125 million grant under China Aid Act of 1948	125.0	
Total post VJ-day	797.7	201.0
Grand total	1,623.4	221.0

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[1] As indicated in the text following, lend-lease materials shipped were primarily military, although a small portion of the total consisted of civilian-type items.

[2] No estimate of value available.

Surplus property transactions involving military matériel

8. Sales by Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner and War Assets Administration June 1947–October 1949:

Procurement value	$102,000,000
United States realization	6,700,000

DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL CATEGORIES OF UNITED STATES AID

(Paragraph numbers correspond with numbers of items listed in preceding table)

1. *Pre-VJ-day lend-lease.*—China was declared eligible for lend-lease aid on May 6, 1941. During that first year until the blocking of the Burma Road in April 1942, lend-lease aid was aimed especially at improving transport over the Burma Road, which, due to the Japanese blockade, was the only land route into China. Although amounts carried by this route were greatly increased, they were still small. Delivery by air-cargo plane from Assam in India over the 18,000-foot hump of the Himalayas, begun in April 1942, was the only means of lend-lease supply until the completion in January 1945 of the Ledo Road from India across Burma. Lend-lease materials supplied prior to VJ-day were primarily military in character, but included considerable quantities of industrial and transportation equipment essential to the Chinese war effort. All but approximately $20 million of the $845.7 million in lend-lease aid extended prior to VJ-day is considered to have been on a grant basis. Terms of settlement of the $20 million balance are subject to negotiation.

The following table presents a breakdown by major categories of pre-VJ-day lend-lease aid:

Ordnance and ordnance stores	$153,333,189.94
Aircraft and aeronautical material	187,339,849.94
Tanks and other vehicles	94,177,927.72
Vessels and other watercraft	35,561,264.12
Miscellaneous military equipment	47,085,115.94
Facilities and equipment	9,928,803.33
Agriculture, industrial, and other commodities	46,505,983.26
Testing and reconditioning of defense articles	204,393.63
Services and expenses	271,611,693.00
Total	845,748,220.88

These figures are compiled from reports received by the Treasury Department from United States Government agencies as of June 30, 1948.

2. *Post-VJ-day lend-lease.*—Lend-lease aid was furnished China after VJ-day to assist the Chinese Government in the reoccupation of liberated areas and in the disarmament and repatriation of Japanese troops. Under the direction of General Wedemeyer, Chinese armies were moved by air and water to their new reoccupation assignments. The cost for this was included in the lend-lease services and expenses account. Though authority for continuation of the wartime program to equip 39 Chinese divisions ceased as of VJ-day, transfers of Army ground material and equipment were continued under new authorizations until matériel sufficient by tonnage to complete the program, approximately 50-percent complete as of VJ-day, had been transferred. Lend-lease transfers of aircraft and air equipment after VJ-day were effected in order to assist the Chinese in the creation of a modern air force, these transfers including the bulk of the 936 planes provided under lend-lease for the 8⅓ group air force program. Though lend-lease terminated for most countries on June 30, 1946, a military-aid agreement of June 28, 1946, provided for the continuation of military lend-lease to China on a reimbursable basis. This agreement authorized expenditures up to $25 million for the reoccupation of China between June 30, 1946, and December 31, 1947. Expenditures under these programs are included in the total figure of lend-lease aid.

As of June 30, 1948[1] a total grand total of $781 million in post-VJ-day lend-lease transfers had been reported to the Treasury Department by United States Government agencies. Of this amount, $50.3 million represented deliveries on 3 (c) credit terms under the lend-lease "pipeline" agreement, and $36 million covered United States Navy vessels originally lend-leased to China but subsequently transferred under the terms of PL 512 (see item 6 below). Of the balance of $694.7 million, $181 million is considered subject to payment.

Listed below are the major categories of post-VJ-day lend-lease supplies:

Ordnance and ordnance stores	$117, 869, 076. 94
Aircraft and aeronautical material	43, 683, 604. 63
Tanks and other vehicles	96, 009, 610. 08
Vessels and other watercraft	49, 940, 642. 57
Miscellaneous military equipment	99, 762, 611. 71
Facilities and equipment	36, 198. 74
Agricultural, industrial, and other commodities	37, 918, 928. 21
Testing and reconditioning of defense articles	2, 338. 88
Services and expenses	335, 817, 910. 56
Total	781, 040, 922. 32

3. *Military Aid Under SACO.*—Supplies valued at $17,666,929.70, consisting primarily of ordnance, were furnished China between September 2, 1945, and March 2, 1946, by the United States Navy under the Sino-American Cooperative Organization agreement. The supplies were made available in exchange for certain services provided by the Chinese Government. Annex 2.

4. *Sale of excess stocks of United States Army in west China.*—The sale of a broad assortment of military supplies in west China was made on the departure of United States forces from that area. This property was transferred for a sales price of $25 million (United States) plus $5.16 billion (Chinese). Down payments of $5.16 billion (Chinese) and $5 million (United States) were made in the form of offsets against the United States indebtedness to China. The $5 million (United States) down payment was incorporated in the realized return to the United States under the surplus property sales agreement of August 30, 1946. It was agreed that $20 million (United States) would be paid over a period of time by China. The terms of repayment are subject to negotiation. No breakdown is available to the Department of State.

5. *Ammunition made available by the United States Marines-Navy in north China: April to September 1947.*—When the United States Marines were evacuated from north China, the military establishments and the State Department agreed to authorize them to abandon a number of dumps of ammunition. The Chinese Nationalists were to be informed so that they could take possession, without cost to them. This decision was implemented by the marines between

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[1] While no detailed breakdown as of the final date has been prepared, an inventory as of June 30, 1947—when the program was already almost completed—has been prepared and is attached as annex 1.

April and September 1947. The Chinese Nationalists were informed in every case and took control of the ammunition. In all 6,500 tons of ammunition were made available, including a wide variety of small-arms ammunition and artillery ammunition, grenades, mines, bombs, and miscellaneous explosives. Certain quantities of naval ammunition were also transferred at this time, under lend-lease. No estimate of the total value of this material is available. A breakdown of the ammunition made available is contained in annex 3.

6. *Transfer of United States Navy vessels under Public Law 512.*—Public Law 512 authorized the President to transfer naval vessels to the Chinese Government on such terms as he might prescribe. On December 8, 1947, an agreement was signed between the United States Government and the Republic of China in implementation of this act. A total of 131 vessels with a procurement cost of $141.3 million were transferred to the Chinese Navy under Public Law 512 on a grant basis. This figure includes approximately $36 million representing vessels originally lend-leased to China but subsequently transferred under Public Law 512. Annex 4.

7. *$125 million grant under the China Aid Act of 1948.*—Section 404 (b) of the China Aid Act of 1948 (title IV of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948) authorized to be appropriated to the President a sum not to exceed $125,000,000 for additional aid to China through grants, on such terms as the President might determine. The legislative history of the act made it clear that the Congress intended that these funds should be made available to the Chinese Government for such purposes as it might specify. The grants have been used by China to purchase items of a military nature. As of April 1, 1949, the Department of the Treasury had disbursed the total of $125 million appropriated. Disbursements were made to the Chinese Government direct or to United States Government agencies requested by the Chinese Government to engage in procurement activities, as follows:

Recipient	Materials procured	Amount
U. S. Government agencies:		
Department of the Army	Arms, ammunition, medical supplies, motor vehicles, spare parts, etc.	$64,595,178.25
Department of the Navy	Navy vessels, reconditioning of naval vessels, ammunition.	6,892,020.00
Department of the Air Force	Miscellaneous Air Force equipment and aviation gasoline.	7,750,000.00
Bureau of Federal Supply	Petroleum products, ordnance raw materials	13,765,522.12
Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner.	Surplus aircraft, aircraft spares, ammunition, etc.	[1] 2,690,910.88
Republic of China	Miscellaneous supplies and equipment, from commercial sources.	29,306,368.75
Total		125,000,000.00

[1] In addition, OFLC has received by direct payment from the Chinese Government $1,045,693.80 of the $29,306,368.75 paid to the Chinese Government by the Treasury Department.

A report from the Chinese Embassy on the types of material for which this sum was disbursed is contained in annex 5.

The Department of Defense is continuing to ship material requisitioned under the $125 million grants. Approximately $3.9 million of the $125 million appropriated remained unshipped as of April 30, 1951. The existence of this balance is due to price adjustments favorable to the Chinese and to the fact that new requisitions have in certain instances been substituted for matériel originally requisitioned.

Equipment shipped under this program included the following:

	Number delivered
United States rifles, caliber .30	132,851
Browning automatic rifles, caliber .30	8,793
Heavy machine guns, caliber .30	1,707
Submachine guns, caliber .45	12,975
Rocket launcher	1,196
Grenade launcher	5,758
.30-caliber ammunition	231,221,082
.45-caliber ammunition	26,577,498
Rocket ammunition	66,380
Grenades	280,560

8. *Sales of surplus military equipment.*—The United States continued to make military equipment available to the Chinese Government following the termination of lend-lease, through the transfer of surplus United States equipment at a small fraction of its original procurement cost. As of October 31, 1949, China had received military surplus totaling $102 million in value at procurement cost, or $6.7 million at sales price. The following is a listing in summary form, of military surplus shipments:

	Procurement cost	Sales price
(1) 130 million rounds of 7.92 ammunition (sold by OFLC under contract dated June 25, 1947)	$6,564,992.58	$656,499.27
(2) 150 C-46 airplanes (sold by War Assets Administration under contract dated Dec. 22, 1947)	34,800,000.00	750,000.00
(3) OFLC transfers, Jan. 1, 1948, Oct. 31, 1949:[1]		
Ammunition, caliber .30 to 155 howitzer	21,781,533.48	571,055.88
Air Force matériel and equipment, including 178 aircraft and 683 engines	36,637,064.31	4,454,105.00
Ordnance, signal and other military equipment (over 9,000 tons)	2,263,897.17	282,987.17
Total	102,047,487.54	[2] 6,714,647.38

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[1] A breakdown of such of this equipment as was transferred prior to Mar. 31, 1949 is contained in annex 6.

[2] A portion of the total military surplus shipments was financed by the Chinese Government from the $125 million grants authorized under the China Aid Act of 1948.

MDAP PROGRAM

The United States is now furnishing additional grant military aid to the Chinese Government, to meet deficiencies in supplies and equipment required for the defense of Formosa, from funds appropriated for the general area of China under Public Law 329, Eighty-first Congress, as amended. Current programs are based on the recommendations of a United States survey mission, dispatched to Formosa during August 1950, and covered by an agreement between the United States and Chinese Governments contained in an exchange of notes dated January 30 and February 9, 1951. Pursuant to this agreement a military aid advisory group has been sent to Formosa, arriving on May 1, 1951. Total figures for the current aid programs for the Chinese armed services are classified and hence have not been included in the attached tabulation of military aid to China since VJ-day.

As General Bradley has indicated to the joint committee investigating the military situation in the Far East, a total military-aid program of approximately 300 million has been recommended for Formosa, to be provided in due course.

ANNEX I

Lend-lease—VJ-day to June 30, 1947

Purpose classification	*Value*
Ordnance and ordnance stores:	
Ammunition	$94,297,895.91
Ordnance material	23,533,946.43
Subtotal	117,831,842.34
Aircraft and aeronautical material:	
Aircraft	10,833,591.56
Aircraft engines, etc	15,037,540.68
Accessories and other parts	6,676.52
General aeronautical supplies and facilities	6,745,608.30
Establishment and operation of depots for servicing aircraft	2,498.78
Modernization and reconditioning of completed aircraft	16.06
Cancellation and repossession liability	165.59
Training of personnel	10,308,233.28
Subtotal	42,934,330.77

Lend-lease—VJ-day to June 30, 1947—Continued

Purpose classification	*Value*
Tanks and other vehicles:	
Ordnance vehicles	$200, 408. 30
Other than ordnance vehicles	67, 530, 227. 77
Trucks	27, 895, 974. 38
Miscellaneous auto supplies, spare parts, etc	334, 289. 12
Training of personnel	25, 229. 81
Subtotal	95, 986, 129. 38
Vessels and equipment for vessels:	
Equipage, services, supplies, and materials	383, 385. 11
Freight forwarding	16, 000. 00
Rental and charter of vessels	9, 648, 333. 33
Ocean transportation of personnel	732, 800. 00
Pilotage	848, 13
Subtotal	10, 781, 366. 57
Miscellaneous military equipment, supplies, and materials:	
Quartermaster equipment	50, 673, 078. 87
Clothing	154, 847. 77
Equipage	5, 312. 78
Kitchen, mess and field baking equipment	3, 242. 23
Fuel	572, 728. 04
Provisions	360, 652. 70
Miscellaneous quartermaster supplies	160, 534. 99
Medical equipment	6, 285, 432. 87
Signal equipment	21, 026, 869. 59
Chemical warfare equipment	10, 656, 523. 99
Engineer equipment	9, 292, 133. 30
Training personnel	587, 705. 39
General expense	141, 686. 78
Subtotal	99, 920, 749. 30
Facilities and equipment:	
Acquisition of land and appurtenances	15, 855. 04
Machine tools for direct transfer	20, 343. 70
Subtotal	36, 198. 74
Agricultural, industrial, and other commodities and articles:	
Agricultural products and foodstuffs	250, 183. 41
Machine tools	453, 211. 87
Agricultural implements	2, 268. 00
Electrical equipment	3, 510, 757. 26
Other machinery	1, 362, 695. 80
Iron and steel	172, 298. 58
Copper and brass	965, 924. 44
Aluminum	13, 909. 26
Zinc	7, 202. 27
Other metals and alloys	1, 769. 16
Nonmetallic minerals	19, 908. 62
Chemicals (other than nitrates and phosphates)	36, 059. 20
Petroleum and coal products	100, 342. 65
Gasoline	17, 083, 493. 44
Petroleum products other than gasoline	5, 588, 498. 70
Rubber and rubber products	1, 166, 822. 43
Textiles and clothing	5, 906, 910. 15
Civilian medical supplies	21, 947. 02
All other comodities and articles not otherwise classified	71, 197. 31
Subtotal	36, 735, 399. 57

Lend-lease—VJ-day to June 30, 1947—Continued

Purpose classification	*Value*
Servicing of defense articles:	
Vessels	$455.95
Other defense articles	1,882.93
Subtotal	2,338.88
Miscellaneous and contingent expenses:	
Miscellaneous services and expenses	322,133,387.36
Subsistence	87,329.12
Ocean transportation of personnel	8,204,466.00
Air transportation of personnel	4,343,129.50
Air cargo transportation	780,040.48
Cancellation and repossession liability	1,922,628.52
Other miscellaneous and contingent expenses	138,939.51
Hospitalization	72,167.15
Training of personnel	55,207.53
Subtotal	337,737,295.17
Total of lend lease	[1] 741,965,650.72

[1] This figure excludes approximately $36 million of U. S. Navy vessels land-leased to China, which constituted a portion of the Navy vessels subsequently transferred to China under Public Law 512.

ANNEX II

Sino-American Cooperative Organization Agreement

	Amount
Ordnance supplies and equipment	$14,284,067.80
Radio equipment and supplies	1,320,664.26
Fiscal codes, aerology	957,782.27
Equipage, shore bases	585,045.18
Payment of lump sum of expenses of training 40 Chinese students as obligated by art. 17, SACO Agreement	200,000.00
Medical equipment	159,493.57
Public-works construction and maintenance	79,304.37
Furniture and fixtures	63,448.82
Communications	14,746.58
Clothing	2,309.60
Aviation supplies and materials	67.25
Total estimated value of issues, VJ-day to Mar. 2, 1946	17,666,929.70

ANNEX III

Ammunition made available by the United States Marines-Navy in North China, April–September 1947.

The data contained in this annex have already been submitted to the Committees by the Secretary of State on June 9, 1951. (See pp. 5886–5891 of the testimony.)

ANNEX IV

U. S. naval vessels transferred to China under Public Law 512, 79th Cong.

Type	*Number of vessels*
PR 4	1
DE 6	1
DE 47	1
PCE 867	1
PCE 869	1
AM 257	1
AM 258	1
AM 259	1
LST 537	1
LSM 155	1
LSM 157	1
LSM 285	1
LSM 457	1
LSM 431	1
AM 260	1
AM 266	1
AM 273	1
AM 276	1
AM 246	1
AM 274	1
AM 286	1
PC 1247	1
PC 1549	1
PGM 12	1

U. S. naval vessels transferred to China under Public Law 512, 79th Cong.—Con.

Type—Continued	*Number of vessels*
PGM 20	1
PGM 26	1
PGM 13	1
PGM 14	1
PGM 15	1
SC 648	1
SC 698	1
LSM 433	1
LSM 442	1
LSM 456	1
LCI (L) 233	1
LCI (L) 631	1
LCI (L) 417	1
LCI (L) 418	1
LCI (L) 630	1
LCI (L) 632	1
LST 557	1
LST 755	1
LST 1030	1
LST 993	1
LST 716	1
LST 717	1
LST 1017	1
LST 1050	1
LST 1075	1
LCI (L) 514	1
LCI (L) 517	1
AG 124	1
LCT 512	1
LCT 515	1
LCT 849	1
LCT 892	1
LCT 1143	1
LCT 1145	1
LCT 1171	1
LCI 1213	1
AOG 42	1
AFDL 34	1
LCM	25
LCVP	25
AM 287	1
AM 216	1
YMS 339	1
PC 490	1
PC 492	1
PC 593	1
PC 595	1
SC 704	1
SC 708	1
SC 722	1
SC 723	1
SC 735	1
AOG 22	1
AFDL (c) 36	1
ARL 41	1
DE 102	1
DE 103	1
DE 104	1
DE 112	1

NOTE.—Total procurement cost of above 131 vessels: $141,315,000. These vessels were transferred to China free of charge.

ANNEX V

Report received from the Chinese Embassy on the use of funds obtained under $125 million grants

SUMMARY OF THE USE OF FUNDS RECEIVED—(A) CHINESE AIR FORCE

	Amount
1. Aircraft	$2, 867, 700. 00
2. Aircraft parts	8, 088, 203. 38
3. Aircraft engines	2, 690, 895. 78
4. Aircraft accessories and parts	520, 796. 71
5. Casing, tube, rubber materials	310, 267. 87
6. Fuel and lubricant	7, 528, 903. 83
7. Electrical supplies and accessories	8, 247. 16
8. Gunnery equipment	21, 947. 50
9. Flying shoes	112, 500. 00
10. Radio equipment	28, 901. 00
11. Tools and equipment	223, 882. 72
12. Field and hangar equipment	459, 473. 64
13. Armament and ammunition	90, 282. 25
14. Raw materials and hardware	4, 034. 60
15. Photographic supplies	6, 831. 28
16. Chemicals, gas, and oil	4, 604. 38
17. Rubber and hose	273, 570. 24
18. Medicine	42, 566. 96
19. Critical items	129, 868. 08
20. Shipping charges	534, 253. 07
21. Insurance and handling	58, 986. 50
22. Services	3, 984, 283. 05
Subtotal	28, 000, 000. 00

Report received from the Chinese Embassy on the use of funds obtained under $125 million grants—Continued

(B) CHINESE ARMY

	Amount
1. Ordnance, weapons and ammunition	$42,604,465.47
2. Ordnance, materials for arsenals	12,512,779.61
3. Transportation trucks	359,987.64
4. Transportation, vehicle spare parts	9,706,094.39
5. Transportation, tools and equipment	375,646.33
6. Transportation, materials	124,020.57
7. Signal, field communication equipment	4,133,465.87
8. Signal, equipment and supplies	332,763.76
9. Signal, miscellaneous	1,038.00
10. Engineer, supplies and equipment	397,114.51
11. Armored force, equipment and supplies	1,000,033.43
12. Intelligence, equipment	90,000.00
13. Intelligence, miscellaneous	702.09
14. Medical supplies	7,000,000.00
15. Petroleum products	8,375,000.00
16. Shipping charges	483,274.85
17. Insurance premiums	3,373.88
18. Miscellaneous charges	239.60
Subtotal	87,500,000.00

(C) CHINESE NAVY

1. Vessels, guns and ammunition, equipment and supplies	6,557,020.00
supplies	6,557,020.00
2. Petroleum products	2,942,980.00
Subtotal	9,500,000.00
Total	125,000,000.00

ANNEX VI

Breakdown of indicated portion of surplus equipment transferred to China

[This chart covers only the period Jan. 1, 1948–Mar. 31, 1949]

Item	Quantity shipped	Procurement cost	Sales price
Air Force:			
Aircraft P47–D	42	$3, 999, 534. 00	$147, 000. 00
Do	701	5, 771, 220. 00	350, 000. 00
Aircraft C46–F	132	3, 292, 991. 00	292, 500. 00
Aircraft P51–D	53	2, 781, 917. 00	397, 500. 00
Aircraft engines	683	8, 729, 563. 50	1, 210, 077. 00
Aircraft spares	Mixed bulk		
Parts and tools	Shipments	11, 729, 011. 45	2, 023, 745. 32
20-millimeter guns	200	332, 827. 36	33, 282. 74
Total		36, 637, 064. 31	4, 454, 105. 06
Other equipment:			
Chemical	M/T 273.92	29, 992. 28	3, 749. 04
Engineer	M/T 439.91	77, 037. 09	9, 629. 64
Medical	M/T 77.05	42, 500. 28	5, 312. 54
Ordnance	M/T 7,072.63	1, 590, 699. 39	198, 837. 43
Quartermaster	M/T 1,011.14	309, 224. 55	38, 653. 07
Signal	M/T 182.42	214, 443. 58	26, 805. 45
Total	M/T 9,057.07	2, 263, 897. 17	282, 987. 17
Ammunition:			
Caliber .30	37,972,793 rounds	1, 865, 421. 86	24, 621. 46
Caliber .50	18,571,550 rounds	2, 540, 350. 79	41, 913. 07
Caliber .45	1,836.600 rounds	71, 878. 38	4, 259. 50
20-millimeter	138,696 rounds	42, 977. 50	4, 708. 26
37-millimeter	346,874 rounds	848, 639. 56	42, 989. 04
60-millimeter	152,411 rounds	452, 600. 67	4, 526. 62
81-millimeter	83,475 rounds	432, 546. 24	4, 325. 44
4.2-millimeter	36,918 rounds	415, 327. 50	41, 717. 34
75-millimeter	151,933 rounds	1, 499, 335. 68	61, 070. 58
105-millimeter	354,780 rounds	5, 484, 691. 89	155, 800. 95
155-millimeter	287,732 rounds	1, 293, 128. 48	64, 805. 22
155-millimeter (propelling charge)	8,889 rounds	63, 310. 65	3, 150. 69
Grenades	216,668	317, 665. 76	32, 062. 24
Mines	52,133	208, 532. 00	20, 853. 20
Bombs, grenades and L/T mines (mixed)	5,666	2, 691, 336. 23	26, 913. 36
Bombs (photoflash)	200	6, 200. 00	620. 00
Ammunition (mixed bulk)	4,125	2, 989, 866. 52	29, 898. 67
Metallic links	Mixed bulk	15, 169. 01	620. 00
Boosters, flares, fuses, etc	L/T 696	330, 495. 03	3, 304. 95
Clusters	M/T 506	137, 952. 35	1, 379. 80
Total		21, 707, 536. 10	569, 071. 80
Grand total		60, 608, 497. 58	5, 306, 164. 03

[1] Delivered to Taiwan in September and December of 1948 in combat operational condition.
[2] Delivered to airfields in China in mid-1948 in operational condition.

(Whereupon, at 5:27 p.m., the committees recessed to reconvene at 10 a.m. Wednesday, June 20, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:04 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, George, Smith, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Sparkman, Brewster, Bridges, Saltonstall, Johnson, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, Flanders, and Long.

Also present: William H. Darden, chief clerk, Committee on Armed Services; Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committees will come to order.

REPLY FROM MAC ARTHUR TO COMMITTEE INVITATION

Before we enter into the testimony of the witness this morning I should like to read into the record a letter I have received from Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

I offer first for the record a copy of the letter that I addressed to General MacArthur.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

June 16, 1951.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,
New York, N. Y.

Dear General MacArthur: The Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations are endeavoring to terminate as soon as possible the series of hearings which began with your appearance before the committees on May 3.

As you were the first witness before the committees, the testimony presented by you during the first 3 days of the hearings was available to succeeding witnesses. You had no knowledge of the testimony of the succeeding witnesses at the time of your appearance before the committees. I am sure that the committees will feel that you should be afforded an opportunity to again appear before the committees to present any rebuttal testimony that you may think desirable.

If you wish to appear before the committees again, I shall appreciate your advising me of your decision as promptly as possible.

With assurances of esteem, I am,

Sincerely,

Richard B. Russell.

Chairman RUSSELL. General MacArthur's reply to my letter reads as follows:

NEW YORK, N. Y., *June 19, 1951.*

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL: I appreciate very much the opportunity offered by your letter of the 16th instant to appear again before the Senate committee, but in view of the voluminous record which has already been taken wherein is included my own personal views in most complete detail, I do not believe it in the public interest for me to do so.

I think it should be understood, however, that certain of the testimony which was given by some of the subsequent witnesses did not coincide with my own recollection and record of the events, and with many of their opinions and judgments I am in direct disagreement. I especially take sharp exception to interpretations of events of campaign given with little local knowledge thereof by those thousands of miles away from the scene of action. In some cases such witnesses had never even visited the area and none had direct knowledge of the events discussed. I suggest that the bimonthly official reports to the United Nations be incorporated into the committees' proceedings as they represent factually the views of the Commanders on the spot at the time of the actual occurrence of events, entirely uninfluenced by any extraneous issues or pressures.

Much opinion testimony was given of a nature which was never either by word or deed communicated to me and of which I had no slightest inkling. There has been, too, a lack of accuracy in the paraphrased documentation presented and some lifting from context—which could not fail to have been misleading.

Insofar as the investigation dealt with my relief from the Far East Command, I feel that the full facts have not been elucidated due to the orders of the President silencing the pertinent witnesses as to his own part in the action.

With renewed expressions of personal esteem.

Most sincerely,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

FORRESTAL DIARY

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have a procedural matter that will not take more than a minute that is a little different situation than we had heretofore; so I wanted to bring it up now.

In the documents which we have requested heretofore they have been documents in possession of the Defense Establishment or the State Department. I addressed the following letter to the chairman today, reading as follows:

DEAR SENATOR: During the testimony before our committee the name of the late James Forrestal, former Secretary of National Defense, has been mentioned by several witnesses. Mr. Forrestal occupied his position during a period of time when important events were taking place on the mainland of Asia.

While his tragic death prevents him from being called as a witness, he has left a diary, which might throw considerable light upon certain of the policy decisions which were made in the Far East by the State Department and Defense Establishment.

For this reason I would like to ask that immediate steps be taken to request the executors of the Forrestal estate that the diary insofar as it relates to decisions in the Far East be made available to the committee.

I have been informed on what I believe to be reliable authority that part of the diary has been turned over to the heirs of Mr. Forrestal and that part is still being held at the White House. My further information is that the diary has been cleared from a security point of view.

It seems to me that it will be difficult to fully understand some of the steps taken by this Government without the appropriate information, which might well be available through the observations of the late Secretary Forrestal and the record which he kept.

With personal regards, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND.

RECORD OF THE WITNESS

Chairman **Russell**. The matter will be handled in accordance with the procedure outlined by the committee in the agenda of April 30.

Gentlemen, we have with us today as our witness Gen. Patrick J. Hurley. General Hurley is known to all of the members of this committee, and I shall not undertake to outline in detail the many positions of responsibility and trust that he has held during a long public career.

General Hurley is a distinguished soldier. He has received some of his country's highest decorations for gallantry in action on the field of battle.

He served as Secretary of War prior to the time that we created the Department of Defense. He has played a key role in the events which are under study in this committee. He served as Ambassador to China from November 30, 1944, to November 27, 1945. Those, of course, are some of the most significant months involved in our study of our far eastern policies.

General Hurley, the committee has directed me to administer the oath to all witnesses. Will you please rise and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give to these committees upon the matters under inquiry shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General **Hurley**. I do.

Chairman **Russell**. Be seated, General.

General, do you have a prepared statement that you desire to make to the committee before the questioning starts?

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. PATRICK J. HURLEY, MAJOR GENERAL, HONORARY RESERVE, UNITED STATES ARMY

General **Hurley**. Yes; I do have a statement I would like to present.

Chairman **Russell**. You may proceed, sir.

General **Hurley**. In the beginning I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that in the opening statement I will not use any decoded or secret documents. I will, of course, on examination use those documents, but in the opening statement I will not present secret documents.

Mr. Chairman and Senators of the committee, I am grateful to you for the invitation you have given me to appear before you.

MISTAKES OF AMERICAN POLICY

My primary purpose is to show what were the underlying principles of American foreign policy at the beginning of World War II and then to show where, when, and how our State Department surrendered them and embarked our Nation on an entirely different policy. This surrender of the principles and objectives for which we said we were fighting and the support of principles completely opposite to them is responsible for the confusion and for the costly failures in American relations.

We should quit supporting ideologies abroad which if successful will destroy the American system of liberty. We should quit the policy of appeasement and present again a positive foreign policy based upon the principles of individual liberty, self-government, regulated free enterprise, and justice.

Investigations pertaining to facts and principles of our foreign policy are, I believe, essential in order to give the citizens an understanding of the principles involved.

I am more than willing to testify on all subjects within my knowledge regarding America's change from the basic objectives and principles which constituted the policy at the beginning of World War II to a policy that supported principles and ideologies which are in conflict with the objectives for which we said we were fighting.

FOREIGN POLICY CONDUCT

I have been told that I would be called to testify because of the injustices done me by Secretary Acheson in his testimony.

The Secretary, in his testimony of June 5, 1951, in response to questions, said I had approved the policy announced by the Presidents and Secretaries of State and had only recently indicated I had not approved the policy. Let us look at the record. Mr. Acheson will find in his own white paper, at page 581, in my resignation as Ambassador to China, where I said:

> In the higher echelons—

that is, the President and Secretary—

> of our policy-making officials American objectives were nearly always clearly defined.

Now, up to that point, the Secretary was telling the facts, but listen to the facts:

> The astonishing feature of our foreign policy is the wide discrepancy between our announced policies and the conduct of our foreign relations.

Then I devoted several pages to show where and how I dissented from the foreign policy that was being made effective by some, not all, of the career men in the State Department. I said the policy made effective was in conflict with the policy announced to the American people by the top officials of this Government.

I have no intention of engaging in a personal controversy with the Secretary of State. What he has said about me is of very little importance, except where it affects the welfare of 150 million Americans and defeats the ideals and principals that have made America the greatest unit on the face of the earth.

I will have more to say about that subsequently.

Personalities are insignificant compared to the great issues by which our Nation is confronted.

SECRET DIPLOMACY

There is but one element in these proceedings to which I object, and that is secrecy. I am convinced that secret diplomacy should have no place in a government by the people. In a government by the people, the people cannot make correct conclusions if they are not given all the facts. It is immoral, as well as hurtful to the welfare of the Nation, to permit officials to make secret commitments and follow secret policies binding all of the people without the knowledge or consent of the people.

Military plans, strategy, and tactics belong in a different category from political policies and political commitments which bring military force into operation.

Military plans should be kept secret, but policies that cause the commitment of a nation to war should not be kept from the people affected by the commitment.

The tragic thing about secrecy surrounding international commitments and policies is the fact that everything necessary for the information of the enemy leaks, and the result is that the people of America who are being committed without their knowledge are the only people kept in ignorance of what the commitments are.

Our diplomats surrendered the territorial integrity and the political independence of China in a secret agreement at Yalta.

We surrendered in that secret agreement the objectives for which we had told the American people we were fighting. Since Yalta, our Government has failed to evolve a positive foreign policy worthy of the men who have died to uphold the principles of individual liberty, self-government, and justice.

FOREIGN POLICY AFTER YALTA

A weak and confused foreign policy after Yalta, and in general after World War II, is the primary cause for every international problem confronting our Nation and for every casualty we have suffered in Korea.

Beginning at Yalta in February 1945 our foreign policy changed from the support of the principles of the Atlantic Charter to a policy based on concessions to communism and imperialism, and fear of Russia, rather than on confidence in America. Confidence in America is a better basis for a foreign policy than fear of communism.

The last paragraph of my resignation as Ambassador to China, which is dated November 26, 1945, states:

> Our strength should be used to uphold the decisions of the United Nations rather than to support conflicting ideologies or war-making blocs.

EFFECTIVENESS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

This would indicate my confidence in the principle of collective security. I well remember the difficult task President Wilson had in attempting to convince the American people that the principles of collective security are the bases of world peace.

Wilson himself, in the beginning, had misgivings about whether or not collective security would work. He finally decided that it would. I was among those who agreed with that conclusion on collective security reached by President Woodrow Wilson.

I admit that the token support given for collective security in Korea by nations to whom we have given billions, and for whom our soldiers have fought so valiantly, would make many people conclude that the principle of collective security had failed.

The Korean experience made it apparent that the United States would have to pay in blood and treasure nearly all of the cost of the United Nations and associated nations in that war.

The American people learned with dismay that some of our associates in the United Nations to whose welfare America has contributed with so many billions, sent only token forces to Korea, and at the same time profited by trade with the enemy.

In the face of all these discouraging facts, I am still of the opinion that we should continue to support the principle of collective security.

Now I come, gentlemen, to the issue of the ages. The purpose of collective security is to protect nations and individuals against oppression. The basic conflict in the world today is the same old issue of the ages, the battle for the rights of the individual and the right of self-government against oppression.

CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND "ISMS"

Today we may define the issue as the conflict between the rights and dignity of the individual against collectivism, imperialism, and totalitarianism, communism.

The battle for individual rights was old before Christ the Saviour was born. Christ taught the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. He promulgated the Golden Rule, and emphasized the importance of the dignity and the glory of the soul of the individual. The Christian religion has become a bulwark of individual rights.

I am attempting now to establish a background for the international policy followed by the United States up to the secret agreement at Yalta.

The struggle for individual rights and self-government in the United States was outlined by Patrick Henry in his address, "Give me liberty, or give me death"; by Thomas Jefferson in his Declaration of Independence, which pledged Americans to support "governments deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

We find them again in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution of the United States, in Washington's Farewell Address, in Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, in his Second Inaugural; in his Emancipation Proclamation; in Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points; and finally in Franklin Roosevelt's and Winston Churchill's Atlantic Charter.

THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

The Atlantic Charter was written, I believe, in the British Foreign Office in an attempt to define the war objectives in a manner that would command the support of the American people and the respect of oppressed people everywhere.

After being introduced in the Atlantic Conference which was held by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt on August 14, 1941, the Atlantic Charter was changed but little in its form. It is a one-page document and is worthy of the finest tradition of the liberty-loving people.

While I will not attempt to discuss all of the items of the Atlantic Charter, I would like to submit here a copy issued by the State Department for this record at this point. It is but one page.

Chairman RUSSELL. The matter will be printed in the record.

(The document above referred to is as follows:)

Declaration of Principles, Known as the Atlantic Charter, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, August 14, 1941

Joint declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security;

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

PEARL HARBOR AND THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

General **Hurley**. The Atlantic Charter was promulgated before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; before America officially entered into World War II.

It is true that our forces entered into some war actions prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. That accounts for the charge so widely made that, at the time the Atlantic Charter was written, we were already secretly backing into the war. The arguments on that question have been worn threadbare on both sides.

I frankly admit that I personally was convinced that notwithstanding the Neutrality Act, notwithstanding the superficial barriers against war, America would eventually be compelled to take sides in that conflict, and I was in favor from the beginning of taking sides beside the nations that eventually became our allies in the war.

Before Pearl Harbor it was quite generally believed that the American people would not give wholehearted support to America's entrance into the war unless and until they had some positive assurance that the principles they would be attempting to uphold were in harmony with the principles of individual liberty and self-government.

The Atlantic Charter met that demand. The Atlantic Charter was immediately approved by 45 nations. The Atlantic Charter is clearly on the side of individual liberty and self-government and is in keeping with the philosophy of the American system of liberty. Let us glance at just a few provisions of that Charter. We, the signatory nations, "Seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other."

YALTA AND THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

That provision was intended to hold Russia and communism within the national boundaries of Russia. All the territory, all the nations, given to or taken by Russia was in violation of that principle. Russia's commitment to seek no aggrandizement was relinquished and set aside in a secret agreement by our own diplomats at Yalta.

The repeal of the foregoing provisions was necessary, to use the expression of our own diplomats, to let Russia off the hook and to permit her to return to the Communist policy of conquest.

The third provision of the Atlantic Charter provides:

> We respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.

That provision had to be repealed in order to give the colonial imperialists the right to resubjugate their colonial and mandated people.

American helped the imperialists at the time that the United States was actually liberating our own Philippine Islands.

The promulgation of the provisions of the Atlantic Charter as the objectives for which the United Nations were fighting, which then constituted the Big Four—Russia, China, the Soviet, and the United States—gave hope to all the oppressed people of the world.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, General Hurley said Russia, China, the Soviet, and the United States. You meant Britain there?

General HURLEY. Yes. Well, I have got it here. I misread it. I have got Russia, Britain, China, and the United States. I beg your pardon, and I thank you for the correction.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Hurley, now that you are interrupted, could you go back and reread that statement just before on Yalta on the page, the repeal. I think it was your first point or your second point?

General HURLEY. What was it about, Senator?

Senator SALTONSTALL. As I heard it, there were certain points of the Atlantic Charter repealed at Yalta. I did not get it accurately.

Senator BREWSTER. Territorial aggrandizement.

General HURLEY. Oh, yes.

> The Atlantic Charter is clearly on the side of individual liberty and self-government and is in keeping with the philosophy of American liberty.
>
> Let us have a glance—

Do you want me to read what we repealed?

Senator SALTONSTALL. You said that certain parts of it were repealed by the conference at Yalta.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. Very well, I will come to that.

> The signatory nations—

that is signatory to the Atlantic Charter—

> seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other.

Then I go on to say that that provision was repealed and set aside in a secret agreement at Yalta.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes.

MEANING OF THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

General HURLEY. The Atlantic Charter was intended to secure for our cause the support of people everywhere who were denied self-government and individual liberty and whose individual rights were being transgressed and whose resources were being exploited by other nations.

I know personally that in the 20 nations where I served in various capacities, most of the time as the personal representative of President Roosevelt, that the ideals of liberty and self-government gave strength to our cause long before the power of America and American men and munitions became effective on the battlefields.

It was after the Atlantic Charter had been approved by 45 nations and after America had been irrevocably committed to the war by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that the Communists and the imperialists undertook a propaganda campaign to show that the human principles of the Atlantic Charter, the principles of human liberty and self-government, were detrimental to our great associates in the war.

It was pointed out that the first provision of the Atlantic Charter—

> The nations seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other—

would prevent the conquest of other territory and other nations by Russia.

The provision—

> they respect the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live—

caused the imperialists to conduct a vigorous campaign for the repeal of the Atlantic Charter.

America has no imperialist designs for America, but it has been supporting the imperialists. The imperialists, Communists, and totalitarians put out propaganda that the Atlantic Charter did not have any binding effect as an international agreement. One of the high contracting parties said it was only a press release.

THE IRAN DECLARATION

It was in this posture of affairs in late November 1943 that I attended the Teheran Conferences as one of the advisers of President Roosevelt. I brought to the attention of the President the dangers that lay in permitting our associates to disregard or to discard the fundamental principles of liberty and self-government, for which he himself said we were fighting.

I told him that in my opinion it would have a damaging effect on the attitude of the American people toward the war if we surrendered the principles and the objectives stated in the Atlantic Charter.

The President was fully convinced and at Teheran he directed me to prepare what is known as the Iran Declaration. A previous Iran Declaration had been submitted by Secretary Hull at Moscow but it was not adopted.

The Iran Declaration which I prepared, with the assistance of others, for President Roosevelt, contains many provisions of the earlier proposed declaration, which was not adopted at Moscow.

There was a new provision, which I insisted be adopted by the contracting parties at Iran. It is one sentence, and here it is:

> They—

that is, the people who were meeting at Iran—

> count upon the participation of Iran together with all peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security, and prosperity after the war in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter to which all four nations have subscribed.

The Iran Declaration was signed at Teheran on December 1, 1943. The declaration reaffirmed the principles of the Atlantic Charter as the principles and objectives for which the United Nations were fighting. At that time again the United Nations consisted of Russia, China, Great Britain, and the United States. That was before the San Francisco Conference.

This declaration is signed by Winston S. Churchill for the United Kingdom, Joseph V. Stalin for the Soviet Republics, and Franklin D. Roosevelt for the United States.

What I want to suggest to you gentlemen is that at that time, over the signatures of the high contracting parties, we have the Iran Declaration. A lot has been said about this, and I will proceed further to show that it was submerged and I will hand to the chairman here a photostatic copy bearing the signatures of Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt.

Senator WILEY. You want it in the record, do you not?

General HURLEY. That is also a short, one-page document, with signatures and all. It has comments on it. It was published by Iran subsequently.

There are a few changes in there that were made, I believe, by Winston Churchill when it was submitted, and they were well taken. I think he wrote in that it had been pending for some time.

Chairman RUSSELL. The matter will be printed in the record.

General HURLEY. Thank you, sir.

(The document referred to follows:)

DECEMBER 1, 1943.

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS REGARDING IRAN

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U. S. S. R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the postwar period, the Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

> The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security, and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.
>
> WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.
> JOSEPH V. STALIN.
> FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

General HURLEY. Notwithstanding this reaffirmation, our State Department continued to oppose the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and appease the Communists and the imperialists.

It was said at the time, of course, that there were secret, private commitments made at Tehran.

Well, I didn't answer those statements at the time because, frankly, I didn't know. You never know what the head of a government has said to another head of a government, if you are not present; and I declined to speak on that subject. So, it may or may not be true that there were secret commitments made at Iran.

SECRET YALTA PROTOCOL

President Roosevelt, after his return from Yalta, the Yalta conference, in his report to Congress on March 1, 1945, said, and I am quoting the President:

> Among the civilian leaders at Tehran, however, there were only exchanges of views and principles. No political agreements were made, and none attempted.

I took that statement at face value, at the time the President made it, and so far as I personally know, it is true.

Let us omit all that happened between Tehran and Yalta and come back to them later, so that we can pass immediately now to the Yalta secret agreement.

The Yalta secret agreement that affects China is as follows—

Again, Mr. Chairman, the Yalta secret agreement is dated February 11, 1945, and is signed by Joseph V. Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill. It is a one-page document and I would like to submit it at this time for the record.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that is already in the record in connection with General Marshall's testimony—that particular agreement.

I introduced it in connection with the quotation from Mr. Stettinius back, before that.

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe you inserted it in full, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Inserted it in full, in the testimony.

Chairman RUSSELL. We will find that page of the record where this matter has been inserted, and that will appear in the statement of the witness.

(The document referred to as the Yalta agreement appears on page 1817 of the record of the joint committee, under date of May 14, 1951.)

General HURLEY. Thank you, sir.

I have no intention of encumbering the record with something that has already been introduced.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Were you at Yalta?

General HURLEY. No, I was not.

This document was kept secret from me, as Ambassador to China, from the President of China, from the Chinese people, and from the people of the United States.

It is well known that the Russian and Chinese Communists and the Japanese knew of this agreement. I learned of its existence through the Chinese armed Communists.

Later I queried the State Department about the agreement and was advised that the State Department knew nothing about the agreement.

Secretary Acheson tells you now the agreement had to be kept secret for military reasons. Please remember that the war with Japan ended August 14, 1945. The secret agreement made at Yalta was one of the documents that I asked the State Department to furnish to me when I appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 5, 1945. The Department refused to let me have it.

That was many months after the close of the war. I requested a number of other documents; requested that they be decoded and paraphrased and presented to me for use before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. None of them were furnished me.

I have the documents asked for here, and I have a list of them that I presented to Senator Connally at that time, and the committee can now have them if they wish.

Senator WILEY. If you asked for the Yalta agreement, when was your first information which came to you that there was an agreement—such an agreement?

General HURLEY. I am about to cover that now.

Senator KNOWLAND. I wonder if we might have for the record the list of the documents which you requested of the State Department at the time you appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee, to be printed in the appendix of our record?

General HURLEY. Yes, I am going to give those when I reach it in my statement. I will cover it all, and then, of course, I will submit myself to examination, and I intend to give the committee everything I have that they ask for.

Now, someone has asked me why didn't I insist on having these documents at that time. Well, of course, I see my friend Senator Green who is present here—they wanted me to become a witch-hunter and tell them who were the people who were wrong in Washington. I had been about 13,000 miles flying distance, the way I had to come home, from Washington so I didn't know a lot of things on that; but the hearing was diverted from the true facts to something to stop the American people from getting the facts at that time.

INFORMATION ON SECRET YALTA PROTOCOL

This document was kept secret. Please remember that when I asked for it it was not forthcoming. Now, there were many reasons stated to me at that time why I shouldn't ask for the publication at that time. Secretary Byrnes and Senator Vandenberg and others were about to go to Moscow for a conference, and my late friend, Arthur Vandenberg said, "Pat, you are really cutting the ground from under Byrnes and the rest of us in this conference. Why don't you wait until it is over and you will be given an opportunity to say everything you wish to say."

Well, I did wait, and this is the first time, 5 years later, gentlemen, that I have had an opportunity to appear before you to say anything.

I told Senator Vandenberg at the time that I had no desire of doing anything that would injure my country and her relations with other nations; and when Secretary Byrnes came and read a statement to the effect that the men whom I had sent home from China, whom I charged with sabotaging the American policy in China, were nice boys who had reported to their superiors, and that we should approve reports made within the Department by men in the field to their superiors—well, I never opposed anything like that, and that was not my charge.

My charge was that these men were favorable to communism and against the policy of the United States in China, and that is very different from being insubordinate to me or reporting to my superiors over my head. I didn't make any such charge. But I was not permitted to answer Secretary Byrnes.

As a matter of fact, they closed the hearing and I was never permitted to present this case before.

Senator WILEY. Did you report that in writing?

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you prefer to continue without any questions at this time?

General HURLEY. Yes, I would like to finish. This is short now, and I would like to finish the statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well. You have that privilege. Witnesses are accorded that privilege of proceeding without questioning.

General HURLEY. Yes. But, at the same time, I don't want to be so understood as indicating that I won't answer a Senator's question at any time that he asks me.

Now, remember that by this time, after I had raised the question, everyone, I believe, including Senator Green and Senator Connally knew, that there was a secret agreement made at Yalta.

It was 4 or 5 months after the war; but Secretary Byrnes went to Moscow. Did he report anything to the people in this secret agreement? Now, let us look at the record again.

At the close of the Moscow conference, and we look now to page 125 of the white paper, Secretary Byrnes reported to the American people that three foreign Secretaries—Russian, British and United States—exchanged views with regard to the situation in China. He said:

> They were in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil strife. They reaffirmed their adherence to the policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of China.

YALTA PROTOCOL AND ITS EFFECT ON CHINA

No statement had yet been forthcoming from the Secretary of State to show that our diplomats in the Yalta secret agreement had reversed the American policy in China, and the statement made by Secretary Byrnes did not describe the policy that was then in force.

American diplomats surrendered the territorial integrity and the political independence of China, surrendered the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and wrote the blueprint for the Communist conquest of China in secret agreement at Yalta.

I cannot help but notice Secretary Byrnes' release to the American people regarding his Moscow conference, in which he said:

> The Foreign Secretaries of Britain, Russia and the United States respect, reaffirm their adherence to the policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of China.

What did Secretary Byrnes mean by noninterference in the internal affairs of China?

It would be amusing to have Secretary Acheson and ex-Secretary Byrnes reconcile that statement with the directive issued by the President to Gen. George C. Marshall directing him to force a coalition with the Communists upon the National Government of the Republic of China.

REASONS FOR YALTA CONCESSIONS

Let us examine the State Department statement regarding the reasons for the Yalta secret agreement.

On July 20, 1949, in a letter transmitting the so-called white paper on American relations with China, on page 8, Secretary Acheson states:

> From the wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union and from the costly campaign against the Japanese came the Yalta Agreement. The American Government and the American people have waited with intense anxiety the assault on the main island of Japan, which it was feared—feared—would cost up to a million American casualties before Japan was conquered. The atomic bomb was not then a reality, and it seemed impossible that the war in the Far East could be concluded, or ended, without this assault.

The Secretary's statement concerning the stage of development of the atomic bomb as of February 11, 1945, I think is erroneous, but that is immaterial in what I am going to say.

Senator SPARKMAN. General, will you read a little louder? We can't quite hear you down here.

General HURLEY. Yes; I will, Senator. I thought I was shounting a little loudly now.

Senator SPARKMAN. You varied a good bit and we couldn't hear the last.

Senator BREWSTER. Will you read that last?

General HURLEY. Yes. The Secretary's statement concerning the state of development of the atomic bomb as of February 11, 1945, is, I think, erroneous; but I wish to make no point of that because it is immaterial in this statement.

WERE THE YALTA CONCESSIONS JUSTIFIED?

In addition to that, it was not contemplated at that time that the bomb would ever be used by the United States in the war against Japan.

We should for a moment say that before the secret agreement at Yalta was signed General MacArthur had already fought his way back to the Philippine Islands; Admiral Halsey had defeated the Japanese Navy in the South China Sea.

In January, before the secret agreement was adopted, in the following February, Admiral Halsey had sunk as many as 40 Japanese fighting craft in one day. The Japanese air force had been defeated and almost completely destroyed. A great part of the Japanese Army was isolated in the islands and on the mainland. Japan had neither the ships nor the air force to return the Japanese Army to the Japanese Islands.

The victorious American Navy under Admiral Nimitz was in a position to prevent the return of the Japanese Army to the Japanese Islands. The victorious American air force under General Kenney was in a position to complete the work of destruction that it had already commenced on the Japanese fortifications.

Yet, Secretary Acheson tells you that the American people and the American Government feared the final assault on Japan would cost more than a million American casualties.

You will note this statement by Secretary Acheson did not name any military officers or any officials of the Government who feared the final assault to conquer Japan would cost a million casualties.

If we believe this statement made by Secretary Acheson, we must also believe that the final conquest of a broken and beaten Japan would cost more in American casualties than all the battles of the Pacific, all the battles of the islands, all the battles of Burma and China, all the battles of the Atlantic, all the battles of Africa, all the battles of the Mediterranean, all the battles of Italy, all the battles of England, all the battles of France, all the battles of Holland, all the battles of Belgium, and all the battles of Germany. America had less than 1,000,000 casualties in all of those battles.

You may consult any reliable almanac and you will find that American casualties in World War II, inclusive, were less than a million casualties. Yet Secretary Acheson has been telling the people for several years that it was feared that the final assault on a broken and beaten Japan would cost more casualties than were expended in all the war put together.

The fear expressed by Secretary Acheson in my opinion did not exist, but the Secretary expressed both moral and physical fear.

EFFECT OF YALTA

We turn now from the physical to the moral. America was in a position at Yalta to speak the only language the Communists understand, the language of power. The President of the United States at Yalta was in command of the greatest land, Navy, and Air Force ever assembled on earth.

One quiet sentence to Marshal Stalin in that language could have indicated that America would require him to keep his solemn agreements. That one sentence would have prevented the conquest of all the Balkan States, the conquest of Poland, and the conquest of China. The sentence was not forthcoming.

On the contrary, your diplomats and mine surrendered in secret every principle for which we said we were fighting. They talk about Stalin breaking his agreements, gentlemen. He never had to break one. We cowardly surrendered to him everything that he had signed and we did it in secret. President Roosevelt was already a sick man at Yalta.

The State Department released Russia from its solemn commitments and therefore brought about the conquest of other people and other nations. The surrender of principles and objectives by the State Department at Yalta created the confusion, the crisis which confronts our Nation today.

Now let us look at another phase of the Secretary's argument. The same date, July 20, 1949, Secretary Acheson said:

> At Yalta, Marshal Stalin not only agreed to attack Japan within 2 or 3 months after VE-day but limited his "price"—

and I am using exact language, the price—

> with reference to Manchuria substantially to the position which Russia had occupied there prior to 1904. We, for our part, in order to obtain this commitment and thus to bring the war to a close with a consequent saving of American, Chinese, and other allied lives, were prepared to and did pay the requisite price. Two facts must not, however, be lost sight of in this connection. First, the Soviet Union, when she finally did enter the war against Japan, could in any case have seized all the territories in question and considerably more regardless of what our attitude might have been.

Let us examine that statement a moment. Russia had already solemnly agreed and finally over the signature of Marshal Stalin himself to—

> seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other—

and it had also agreed—

> to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.

What I am saying to you gentlemen is that at the time of Yalta the United States had unquestionable power to make Russia respect her solemn agreements, but instead we surrendered them in secret. Russia did not have to break her agreements or commitments. All of them were surrendered to her by American diplomats at Yalta and subsequently.

The postwar success of Russia is not due to Russia's strength but to the weakness of American foreign policy. Mr. Acheson has been telling you that all of the principles and objectives stated in the Atlantic Charter and the territorial integrity and political independence of our ally, China, were given away in secret because our State Department was convinced that Russia would not keep her commitments and was in the position to seize all of the properties that we gave her in secret.

Rather than face this threat by Russia, American diplomats weakly surrendered the objectives, to which Russia and 45 other nations had agreed. The American State Department, instead of demanding that Russia respect its commitment, secretly released them from those commitments. This weakness brought about the ruthless conquest of other people both in the east and in the west. Through the weakness of the Yalta secret agreement with Russia, we have lost 450,000,000 Chinese friends in Asia.

EXCLUSION OF CHINA AT YALTA

Now let us turn for a moment to one more feature of the Yalta secret agreement. The National Government of the Republic of China was our ally. The secret agreement gave away another's property.

None of the property that we used to appease Russia belonged to the United States. As Mr. Acheson has ably said, we paid with the property of another to save American casualties and in the fear that if we didn't pay Russia, Russia would have taken it all anyway.

Here we find a very weak defense of America's secret betrayal of China and the giving away of someone else's property to protect ourselves.

I believe that the verdict of history on the Yalta agreement will mark it as both immoral and cowardly.

Secretary Acheson, in his recent testimony, attempts to set up a defense against the charge that we betrayed our ally by saying that China really liked the fact that we betrayed it in secret at Yalta—Chinese property that we gave Russia in secret—Chinese property—and kept that agreement secret from the Chinese—that the State Department had betrayed China and that the Chinese people liked the betrayal.

That defense by Secretary Acheson is absurd. I was there at the time and I know that it is not true.

Senator BREWSTER. A little louder.

OUR STRENGTH AT YALTA

General HURLEY. Pardon me. Secretary Acheson could now turn to the quotation, which he has not used, from my resignation to the President of the United States, November 26, 1945. This has not been quoted by any of the gentlemen who have been saying how poorly I served in various capacities.

I said this:

> The weakness of American foreign policy has backed us into two world wars. There is a third world war in the making. In diplomacy today we are permitting ourselves to be sucked into a power bloc on the side of colonial imperialism against Communist imperialism. I am opposed to both.

Now, they say, of course, we need all the allies we can get, but let me reemphasize, gentlemen, at Yalta we didn't need any allies to make the solemn commitments made by the United States effective.

Our Commander in Chief had the power. Now, we are talking about establishing strong points. We had the strong point and we surrendered in secret at Yalta. That was 5 years ago when I made that statement. In my opinion, that was early enough for these errors to have been corrected, but I am not going to complain about that.

At this point let me pay attention to Secretary Acheson's statement under question by Senator Fulbright, all of which tends to show that the purpose of the Secretary was—and he used quotations to prove it—that I approved the foreign policy of President Roosevelt and President Truman and of the Secretary of State.

That, of course, is true; but Secretary Acheson didn't continue to quote. I am not going to pass judgment on misleading statements.

DISAGREEMENT ON FOREIGN POLICY

I am not going to pass judgment on misleading statements by quoting a part, and not quoting the rest. That is for you to do; but here is what I said, here is the next sentence after what he quoted:

> In the higher echelon of our policy-making officials, American objectives were nearly always clearly defined. The astonishing feature of our foreign policy is the wide discrepancy between our announced policies and the conduct of our international relations.

Secretary Acheson certainly knew, from my letter of resignation, why I had resigned; but he said he did not find out until my recent speeches that I appeared to be opposing the foreign policy as announced after Yalta.

Secretary Acheson well knew that I did approve the policy announced in the Atlantic Charter and Iran declarations, and in the addresses of President Roosevelt and of President Truman; but I contended that the policy that was being made effective by our State Department was in conflict with the policy announced by the top authorities of our Government.

Now, you want some evidence of that—of that statement, rather than just a passing statement from me.

I hold before you, gentlemen, a document issued by the State Department, printed by the Government Printing Office, entitled "Making the Peace Treaties, 1941 to 1947."

I had better give the number of that, too. It is Department of State Publication 2774, European Series, 24.

That tells the American people officially the facts pertaining to treaty making and the basis of our appearance at making peace.

There is not, in that publication, one line to show that the Iran declaration and the principles and objectives for which we were fighting were approved over the signature of Joseph V. Stalin for Russia, Winston S. Churchill for Great Britain, and Franklin D. Roosevelt for the United States.

That is too much to publish in this record, but I ask you gentlemen to examine one of the finest jobs of deception of the American people that the State Department has yet put out.

There it is, published and circulated all over the world as the basis of peace. As a matter of fact, it submerged, obliterated, defeated the real principles, the principles in conformity and in keeping with the philosophy of the American system of liberty.

Now let us hasten to a close.

You can now understand, if you will permit me to reiterate what I said, why I said the astonishing feature of our American foreign policy is the wide discrepancy between our announced policies and the conduct of our foreign relations by the State Department.

You may ask me now, "What is wrong with the present foreign policy?"

The answer is that since Yalta it does not support the principles of individual liberty, self-government, self-determination, and justice, for which we said we were fighting.

The policy has been changed to support imperialism and to appease communism.

Now, Secretary Acheson has said—and I don't want to engage in a personal controversy, because they don't settle anything—but he has said, in answer to a question by Senator Fulbright and, I think, Senator McMahon—no; I think it was Senator Sparkman—that he recently found out that I complained that the State Department was not supporting the policy approved by the President.

As evidence of that fact, in just laying a foundation for the rest of the inquiry, I present a true copy of a letter which I sent to President Roosevelt under date of September 17, 1944. This letter may also indicate to you that I was at that time, and contrary to the statements made by Mr. Acheson, quite critical of both Secretary Acheson and the policy; and I did present it all at that time to President Roosevelt.

Now, I don't want to keep the committee too long. I notice that you are looking at your watches, but I think that this is essential to conclude this opening statement, because of the fact, in answer to the question, I think that Secretary Acheson definitely left the conclusion that this quarrel between whether or not the State Department was making effective the real American foreign policy or not is recent.

LETTER TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, 1944, ON IRAN

This is dated in 1944, long before the Yalta Agreement; long before any of us were speaking our minds, except to our superiors; and I think it may be said that I never did speak my mind to anyone except with the approval of, and under the direction of my then chief, President Roosevelt.

Now, I will read this.

Senator SALTONSTALL. The date please?

General HURLEY. The date is September 17. I don't know whether it would be necessary to read this entire thing.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that Mr. Hurley read the letter because otherwise we won't get a chance to examine the transcript until tomorrow and we may want to examine it before.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. If he wishes he may read it all.

General HURLEY. Fine, fine; I shall read all of it.

Hon. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On my way from Moscow to Chungking we stopped at Teheran. While there I interview your Ambassador, the Honorable Leland Morris, certain members of his staff, and in the absence of Major General Conley, I interviewed Brigadier General Sweet, acting area commander.

I was astonished to learn at first hand in a very brief period of the very startling deterioration that has taken place in America's position in Iran.

While I am no longer your personal representative in Iran—

at this time I was Ambassador to China—

I deem it my duty, sir, to give you a quick review of the rise and fall of America's influence in Iran so that you may have before you the pertinent facts that will enable you to take whatever action you may deem appropriate.

My first detailed report to you on Iran is dated May 13, 1943. After stating all of the facts I made the following recommendations:

"I believe you must assume at least that degree of leadership that will justify the confidence of the officials and the people of Iran in America's capacity to uphold the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and to assure the continued existence of Iran as a free nation. Under your leadership there must be found also a solution of the Russian-Britain conflict.

"I recommend initially that Iran be assured that America insists upon the principles of the Atlantic Charter and that those principles do apply to Iran.

"2. That Iran be permitted to join the United Nations in a declaration of war against the Axis."

I will interpolate there to say that the President immediately directed to proceed to obtain such a declaration, and I did obtain it from the Shah. The King of Iran declared war on the Axis and joined the United Nations, although all the propaganda up to that time was to the effect that he was pro-Axis.

"3. That the American and British Legations be raised immediately to the status of Embassy.

"4. And that American and British Ambassadors compatible to each other and able to understand and promote British-American-Russian cooperation may be appointed to Iran."

Every one of those recommendations was finally fulfilled by President Roosevelt.

At the time I made these recommendations Iran was being treated as pro-Axis or occupied enemy territory. The Government of Iran had been rendered impotent by the occupying forces.

The Shah was very distressed by this situation. He said that he and his people were not in fact pro-Axis; they were pro-United Nations. He admitted that there were some of the people of Iran, like some of the people of most other nations, who were pro-Axis.

I then suggested to the Shah that his government could remove all doubt on that question as to whether Iran was pro-United Nations or pro-Axis by declaring war on the Axis. I told him that if he would declare war on the Axis the welfare of his own people and the status of his nation would be improved. Iran did shortly thereafter declare war on the Axis.

Later during the Tehran Conference I presented for your consideration a declaration pertaining to Iran, which you approved and which you had adopted by the conference.

Now this is President Roosevelt doing this.

In the Iran Declaration the three powers—America, Britain, and Russia—pledged themselves to maintain the independence, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of Iran. The three powers recognized the assistance Iran had given in the prosecution of the war and pledged themselves to give such economic assistance as might be possible during the progress of the war and to give full consideration to Iran's economic situation in the postwar period, and to reaffirm the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

At this writing all the recommendations I made to you in my letter of May 13th have been made effective by you.

A copy of the Iran Declaration is attached.

On December 21, 1943

Now remember that the Iran Declaration is December 1, 1943—

in compliance with the suggestion made by you—

that is, by President Roosevelt

—I rendered for you a full report with recommendations for an American policy in Iran. A portion of that policy is as follows:

It is the purpose of the United States to sustain Iran as a free, independent nation and to afford the Iranian people an opportunity to enjoy the rights of man and to participate in the fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

The policy of the United States toward Iran, therefore, is to assist in the creation in Iran of a government based upon the consent of the governed, and a system of free enterprise which will enable that nation to develop its own resources for the primary benefit of its own people.

Iranian resources are adequate to sustain a program to help Iran help herself. By this program of self-government and well-directed self-help, Iran can achieve for herself the fulfillment of the principles of justice and freedom of conscience and freedom of the press and equality of opportunity.

To accomplish the above the United States will furnish at the invitation of the Iranian Government experts in any or all the fields of government. All the experts and advisers to Iran by the United States will be paid by the Iranian Government and implemented in their operations by authority of Iranian law, and will not be a financial responsibility of the American taxpayer.

The United States will not ask or receive any special privilege in return for these services. The American advisers will be fully indoctrinated in the policies of our own Government toward Iran and shall make regular progress reports to our State Department.

This indictrination and requirement of reporting will provide a vital element of coordination which is essential to the direction of our policy and the protection of American interest.

Modern history of this country shows—

Now, I think I have quoted a lot of this in my letter to the President, but if you put the rest of the quotation in, because I am now dealing in the modern history of Iran, which I think would be of little interest to you this morning.

But what I would like to say is there in what I have read is what is now the point 4 program, except that I insisted because of the bountiful resources of Iran and the other Middle East nations that they should pay the cost of development of their own resources, and it should not become a burden on the American taxpayer.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the historical part of Mr. Hurley's letter be put in the record at this point.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; I will submit the whole thing. That means you can copy the whole thing.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean to be printed in the record at this juncture or to follow the morning's proceedings?

Senator SALTONSTALL. No; at this juncture to save the time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The document above referred to is as follows:)

It is the purpose of the United States to sustain Iran as a free, independent nation, and to afford the Iranian people an opportunity to enjoy the rights of man as set forth in the Constitution of the United States and to participate in the fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

The policy of the United States toward Iran, therefore, is to assist in the creation in Iran of a government based upon the consent of the governed, and of a system of free enterprise which will enable that nation to develop its resources primarily for the benefit of its own people. Iranian resources are adequate to sustain a program to help Iran to help herself. By this program of self-government and well-directed self-help, Iran can achieve for herself the fulfillment of the principles of justice, freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom from want, equality of opportunity, and, to a degree, freedom from fear.

To accomplish the above, the United States will furnish, upon invitation of the Iranian Government, expert advisers in any or all of the fields of government. All experts and advisers furnished to Iran by the United States will be paid by the Iranian Government and implemented in their operations by authority of Iranian law, and will not be a financial responsibility of the American taxpayer. The United States will not ask or receive any special privileges in return for these services.

American advisers will be fully indoctrinated in the policy of our own Government toward Iran and shall make regular progress reports to our State Department. This indoctrination and requirement of reporting will provide a vital element of coordination which is essential to direction of our policy and protection of our interests.

Modern history of this country shows it to have been dominated by a powerful and greedy minority. The people have also been subjected to foreign exploitation and monopoly. In extending American assistance to the building of an improved society in Iran, there must be imposed a sufficient degree of supervision and control over free enterprise and personal aggression to protect the unorganized and inarticulate majority from foreign and domestic monopoly and oppression.

Inauguration in Iran of the American pattern of self-government and free enterprise will be an assurance that proceeds from development of Iranian resources will be directed substantially to the building of schools, hospitals, sanitary systems, and improvement of all facilities contributing to the health, happiness, and general welfare of the Iranian people.

This plan of nation building may be improved through our experience in Iran and may become the criterion for the relations of the United States toward all the nations which are now suffering from the evils of greedy minorities, monopolies, aggression, and imperialism.

The American people, single-mindedly devoted to independence and liberty, are fighting today not to save the imperialisms of other nations nor to create an imperialism of our own but rather to bestow upon the world the benevolent principles of the Atlantic Charter and the four freedoms.

The whole plan is predicated on your desire to raise the standard of living in other nations as a means of sustaining our own standard of living. The standard of living in other nations cannot be substantially or permanently raised by lend-lease or doles. The American taxpayers would not be able to pay for a continuance of relief for the world on a lend-lease basis. Therefore, as I understood you, our purpose was, as stated above, to establish free governments and free enterprise and to lend expert advise and leadership in developing the resources and the commerce and building up generally the industry of each of the less-favored nations so that the citizens, through their own efforts, could raise their own standard of living. The American agents or experts were to be paid by the nations in which they served and would not be a burden on the American taxpayer. All of this is in conflict with the opinions of those who believe that the American taxpayer can become the Santa Claus to the whole world, and is also in conflict with the opinions of all who favor imperialism, monopoly, and exploitation.

On March 25, 1944, I received a letter from you which is, in full, as follows:

MARCH 25, 1944.

DEAR PAT: Your letter of December 21, 1943, concerning Iran contains suggestions of very great interest. I am thrilled with the idea of using our efforts in Iran as an example of what can be done by an unselfish American policy. If we can get the right kind of American experts who will remain loyal to their ideals, I feel certain that our policy of aiding Iran will succeed.

You are right that the distribution of lend-lease supplies throughout the Middle East should be taken over by our own people, and I have let the Secretary of State know my views in this matter.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Now I think, gentlemen, that I am reasonably assured that the policy which I had outlined had the approval of the highest official of the United States and that it had been communicated to the State Department. I continue:

This letter is excellent. It indicates that you approved and desired to make effective the plan for Iran.

I was permitted also to read in the State Department your memoranda of January 12, 1944, addressed to the Secretary of State, with which you transmitted my report. You expressed to the Secretary your desire to use Iran as an example of what we could do with an enlightened, unselfish American policy. You told the Secretary, as I recall it, that you would like to have a try at making this policy effective in Iran, as Iran appeared to present the most difficult situation in the Middle East at that time. You wished to make Iran the testing ground for an American policy based on the principles stated in the Atlantic Charter. You very pointedly stated that the essence of your plan was in the fact that it offered assistance to the so-called less-favored nations in their economic difficulties without creating a burden on the American taxpayer.

On March 2, 1944, I received a very favorable and understanding letter from the Acting Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, copy attached, in which he enumerates the recommendations made by me, in reference to Iran, which had been made effective.

That was the original.

I am justified now in assuming—

remember, my friends, this letter was written in 1944—

I am justified in assuming that the program for Iran had your approval and the approval of the Secretary of State.

The Shah of Iran and all the officials with whom I conversed after the Tehran Conference gave you full credit for having procured the Iran declaration. In Iran, as in all the Middle East nations, the people were especially pleased and encouraged by the reaffirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter by Britain, Russia, and the United States. They had felt that the principles of the Atlantic Charter had already been repudiated by Mr. Churchill, and they often quoted excerpts from statements made by him on that subject. Because of your policy. America at that time stood higher in the estimation of the officials and people of Iran than any other nation. The Iranians awaited action by the American experts.

At this point, I might state that I have been told that the deterioration of America's position in Iran is due, in large measure, to the fact that you did not call on the Shah after he visited you while you were in Iran. This, in my opinion, is not true. The deterioration in America's position in Iran is due to more deep-seated causes.

Let me examine for you what I believe to be the more deep-seated reasons for the deterioration of America's prestige in all of the Middle East. I was shown a memorandum in the State Department which was written by Mr. Rostow and was initiated by Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson—

in his own handwriting—

and others. This memorandum condemned the Iranian plan and referred to it as "messianic global baloney".

My report which you sent to the State Department was circulated in other departments of the Government. It carried with it the "messianic global baloney" memorandum and was also verbally attacked by men in the State Department to such an extent that the report was discredited. It finally reached the press through a keyhole columnist in a discreditable form. So, the basic work of destroying your Iranian plan was accomplished—

in your own State Department—

in Washington.

Now, did Mr. Acheson mean what he said when he said he didn't know that I disagreed with what they were doing in the State Department until some recent speeches? Let us continue.

Now, Mr. Chairman, there is a lot here, I think, that I would just be wasting your time to read, but, if you will let me, I will submit the whole thing. There isn't anything in here that hasn't been told the President of the United States.

Chairman RUSSELL. Does that include all of that you eliminated from the reading?

General HURLEY. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. The reporters are somewhat confused to know just where to pick up where you left off under Senator Saltonstall's unanimous-consent motion.

General HURLEY. The first place was after my quotation from my letter to the President of—I quoted back to the President my letter of May 13, 1943, and it is all in here, and by taking the copy you can quote it.

Chairman RUSSELL. They are very clever, and I am sure they can get it.

Senator GEORGE. I didn't understand Mr. Hurley wished any part of it omitted. Just omit the reading.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was talking about the portions of it that he did omit that must be fitted into the context of what he did read, and that was the thing I was getting at to assist the reporters. They indicated to me that they were having some difficulty in keeping up with the transcript.

General HURLEY. I would like for the entire letter, Mr. Chairman——

Chairman RUSSELL. That has already been done by unanimous consent.

Senator GEORGE. The whole letter will go in.

General HURLEY. In that I talked about lend-lease and talked about the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, which we were supporting in its attempt to establish a monopoly in the nations to which we were furnishing lend-lease.

It is all in there, but I think the purpose of the letter which I have read is to meet Mr. Acheson's statement that he didn't know that I disagreed with the foreign policy made effective by the State Department, which policy was in conflict with the policy approved by the President and I have picked that letter out to show that I was saying that as far back as 1944, and that Mr. Acheson himself had handled it, and I thought knew well what my attitude was on the subject.

(The balance of the letter referred to above reads as follows:)

Those who opposed the Iranian plan in Washington have also expressed the same opinion about the Atlantic Charter that they have expressed about the Iranian plan. They are especially opposed to articles 3 and 4 of the Atlantic Charter which are, in full, as follows:

"3. They respect the rights of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

"4. They will endeavor wih due respect for their existing obligation to further the enjoyment of all states, greaf and small, victor and vanquished, of access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity."

These are men in the State Department who are upholding imperialism, monopoly and exploitation as opposed to the principles stated in the Atlantic Charter. That is one of the deep-seated reasons for the failure of the Iranian plan.

We come now to consider the experts. You very wisely pointed out, in your letter to me of March 25, 1944, that: "If we can get the right kind of American experts who will remain loyal to their ideals I feel certain our policy of aiding Iran will succeed."

Here you put your finger on the second deep-seated cause for the failure of the Iranian plan.

After the Tehran Conference, the Iranians awaited action by the American experts. Some of the so-called experts had already been appointed. The American experts in Iran were, at best, faced by a very difficult situation. Britain and Russia had occupied the country and had hired or commandeered nearly all the transportation facilities. They had already consumed a considerable portion of Iranian food. Our General Connolly was operating the Iranian Railroad for the purpose of transporting supplies to Russia. American so-called experts were put in charge of food rationing and finance; military reorganization; national and municipal police reorganization and other internal affairs for the reorganization and development of Iran. The conduct of the occupying nations had deprived Iran of transportation and food to a great extent. The occupying nations had required Iran to issue large amounts of currency which, together with the shortage of transportation and supplies, brought about inflation. The occupying nations publicly condemned the Iranian Government, which they had made impotent, for not taking stronger action. The occupying nations finally condemned the American experts or agents for not bringing order out of the chaos which the occupying nations had created. They have now succeeded in getting the Iranian Government to join them in condemnation of the American agents.

In short, Mr. President, America has been made the goat. I am advised that the Shah said recently, during the course of a conference with the British Chargé d'Affaires, that he would be happy if all the so-called American experts would go home. We should frankly face the fact that to a great extent, this position if taken by the Shah is justified.

Minister Dreyfus was withdrawn by you so that you could appoint a man capable of coordinating and leading the American agencies in Iran. There was great delay in appointing an Ambassador and a commercial attaché. The man who has recently been appointed Ambassador is unquestionably a splendid gentleman. He was in Iceland before being made Ambassador to Iran. He is not familiar with the situation in Iran. His previous experience would not justify anyone in believing that he is capable of handling the most difficult situation in the Middle East. He does not seem to understand your policy nor does he show any evidence of being able to make it effective.

Dr. Millspaugh, the finance expert, is able and honest but has not been getting along very well. He has not had the support of the other American agencies in Iran. The Iranians, the British and the Russians and our own State Department believe that Dr. Millspaugh has failed. I am not willing to go that far in his case. I think his trouble is that he has not had the proper direction or support.

General Connolly, the American military commander, has certainly been efficient. He has achieved outstanding results in getting supplies to Russia. That was his mission.

Most of the other so-called American experts in Iran are wash-outs. Some of them have taken no action whatever. There is neither unification nor harmony among them. There has been no enlightened effort to coordinate American experts in Iran. The experts, sent to Iran, have not been indoctrinated in the fundamental principles of the policy which you have adopted.

Instead of creating a set-up in Iran which would serve as a criterion for America's policy not only in Iran but in all the so-called less-favored nations, the American effort in Iran has become a symbol of American inaction, incompetence, and failure.

This is certainly not your fault nor is it the fault of the Secretary of State. Both of you have, in my opinion, been faithful to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and have reiterated many times the rights of small nations to free government, free enterprise and the development of their own resources for the purpose of raising their own standard of living.

DETERIORATION OF AMERICA'S POSITION IN IRAN

The deterioration of America's position in Iran and in the entire Middle East, and the debacle of the principles of the Atlantic Charter was initiated in Washington. The element in the State Department that made plans for the defeat of your Iranian policy justifies the sale of lend-lease goods by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation. This corporation is a Government-owned institution created for the purpose of establishing a trade monopoly in Iran. This corporation is the deep-seated basic reason for the failure of your plan for Iran. Those in the State Department who are opposed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter are cooperating in furnishing lend-lease goods to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and its subsidiaries for the purpose of sustaining imperialism, monopoly, and exploitation. These same people wish to prevent the building of free governments and free enterprise and the development of the resources of Iran and other Middle East nations for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the people within the Middle East nations. They are succeeding in subjecting all the peoples of the Middle East and Africa to the principles of imperialism, monopoly, and exploitation. The result of all this is that the United States, having occupied the highest position in the estimation of the Iranian officials and people now occupy the lowest position of any of the powers represented there.

While I have written to you and spoken to you personally about the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation I am not certain that I have been able to impress upon your mind a true picture of what that corporation is doing. Let me give you here a brief outline of one of the chief reasons for the failure of your Iranian plan.

The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, with the use of American lend-lease goods, is establishing a trade monopoly in Iran. While in Iran I expressed my opposition to the use of American lend-lease goods for this purpose and wrote you suggesting that lend-lease supplies in the categories that were being sold should be stopped or at least the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation should be required to reimburse America for the lend-lease goods which it is selling for purposes that have no connection with the war but have the sole purpose of establishing a monopoly.

Your Minister, Dean James Landis, has told me that, in recognition of my demands, the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation has deposited $15 million in some sort of a suspense account in London which is to be applied on the payment of lend-lease goods which it has sold. In recognition of the principle which I advocated the lend-lease goods are to be paid for as soon as an accounting has been made. While this does acknowledge the principle, the action would not be satisfactory to me if I were representing the United States.

In the first place, the amount is not a drop in the bucket compared with the value of lend-lease goods which have been sold by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and its subsidiaries. In the second place, even the $15 million will not, in my opinion, be applied. There seems to be a determined effort not to pay the United States for any lend-lease goods whether they are used for war purposes or sold by a corporation for the purpose of establishing a monopoly.

Article 1 of the Atlantic Charter is as follows:

"1. Their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other."

Because of the demands made on your time, I do not believe that you have ever fully realized that the money of the American taxpayer is being used in the name of democracy and in the name of the Atlantic Charter to establish an international trade monopoly that has for its purpose the exploitation of the people of the weaker nations throughout the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere. So that you may have a sketch of the gigantic operations of this monopoly, which we are supporting through lend-lease, I submit here a rough outline of the set-up of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and its subsidiaries.

A. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation is a Government corporation having headquarters in London. Its subsidiary corporations operate in each of the following nations under the name indicated:

(1) UKCC (Egypt), Ltd.
(2) UKCC Libia).
(3) East Africa.
(4) UKCC (Sudan), Ltd.
(5) UKCC (Ethiopia), Ltd.
(6) UKCC (Eritrea), Ltd.
(7) UKCC (Palestine), Ltd.
(8) UKCC (Palestine and Lebanon), Ltd.
(9) UKCC (Iraq), Ltd.
(10) UKCC (Persia), Ltd.
(11) UKCC (East Africa), Ltd.
(12) UKCC (Algiers), Ltd.
(13) UKCC (Turkey), Ltd.
(In addition there are branch offices at Cyprus, Aden, and Jibuti.)

B. Global subsidiary:

(14) United States.
(15) India.
(16) Argentine.
(17) Portugal.

American money and lend-lease supplies are used by this corporation and by its subsidiaries for the purpose of controlling natural resources and trade and exploiting the people in all of the nations indicated. Incidentally, it is being used also for the purpose of defeating America's economic interests in all of these nations. I do not say that it is intended to defeat America's interests alone. It is designed to prevent free enterprise, free commerce, free access to raw material by all nations except Britain. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation is the antithesis of the Atlantic Charter.

A frank statement of this situation in my letter to you of December 21, 1943, which became public through the State Department, led to the accusation that I am anti-British. I am not anti-British. I am opposed to monopoly. I am opposed to exploitation of weaker people. It is not necessary for me to say this to you as you are fully aware of these facts, but I am stating them here so that if this letter gets into the same channels that my letter of December 21, 1943, got into it will not be as easy for those in our Government, who oppose the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to put their own estimate of my character and the principles I support. For that reason I am writing down here that I do believe in democracy. I do believe that governments should derive their powers from the consent of the governed. I do believe in and support the principles of the Atlantic Charter. I do believe in free enterprise. I do believe that the people of the world should have equal rights of access to the raw materials of the world. I do believe that the people of small nations should be assisted in the development of their own resources for the benefit of themselves. I do believe that the resources and trade of nations should be developed primarily for the purpose of raising the standard of living within each nation. I am in favor of the principles for which you and Mr. Churchill have stated we are fighting. I am opposed to the British policy of imperialism and monopoly and exploitation in the Middle East and in Africa. I am convinced that this British policy is in conflict with the principles for which you and Mr. Churchill have stated we are fighting. I do believe that the destiny of the English-speaking people is a single destiny. I do believe that the United States and Britain should get together on principles. From the facts stated here it is evident that the British do not unhold the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

The failure of your program in Iran is due (1) to incompetence and lack of leadership of some of our own agents in Iran; (2) to opposition to the plan in our own State Department; (3) to the determined opposition of British imperialists; and (4) to the strong, intelligent, and determined opposition of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation.

My purpose in addressing this letter to you is to call your attention to the deterioration of America's position in Iran and to emphasize the effect of that deterioration on the prestige of America. I have no recommendation to offer other than those stated in my former letter. I do suggest the advisability of taking appropriate action to correct the situation in Iran, to restate or reaffirm your policy and to retrieve America's prestige.

Respectfully submitted.

PATRICK J. HURLEY,
Major General, Army of the United States.

EXPERIENCES IN RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

General HURLEY. Now, Mr. Chairman, I have concluded my opening statement. I don't know whether the committee wants to proceed further on the general policy or leave the nations of the Middle East and Russia.

I wish to say this to the committee. The President sent me to Russia as his personal representative in November 1942. I conferred at that time with Marshal Stalin, and he did tell me that he would at the appropriate time join the United States in the war against Japan.

But in reporting that to the Presindent I told him that subsequent conversations and statements made by Foreign Minister Molotov seemed to inject such fear into it that we would tell Japan and that such an announcement would bring Japan down on his rear at a time that might be disastrous, when he was being pushed pretty heavily in front.

I said to the President, "While he did make a definite commitment, I suggest that you have it put in writing and properly authenticated before you accept this."

Then Marshal Stalin permitted me to accompany the Red Army in the battle for the encirclement of Stalingrad. I then asked him to let me see what he had between the oil and his enemy. I went down across the Caspian Sea and into Baku, the refineries and the producing fields.

I then went through the Georgian Military Pass and was with the Russian Army as it attacked the flank of the Axis Powers as they moved out of the Crimea to attack the Russian oil town of Grozny. I was with the Russian Army when they attacked on the flank at a place called Alageer. So I saw the first victory over the Axis by the Russians in the battle of Stalingrad; and I saw the second victory of the Russians over the Axis in the battle of the Caucasus.

I have never published or referred to these, but I do have some very complimentary cables from the President in regard to the reporting at that time, something that was essential to unificaton of the strategy between our ally, Russia, and the other members of the United Nations.

Now, I am running over that quickly so that you may understand and you may examine me on all of that.

Then in the Middle East I had to do and did report in regard to Egypt and then I went over to General Eisenhower's headquarters when they were having some criticism over there and reported to the President from Algiers in Africa.

Then I went to Palestine and to Saudi-Arabia and to Iraq and back to Iran and Lebanon and Syria, and then finally into India and Afghanistan.

EXPERIENCE IN CHINA

In that same year, 1943, the President directed me to go to China.

But now another thing that Secretary Acheson said—and I don't believe the Secretary really meant this. He said, "Hurley's first connection with China was about August 1944."

Well, now, if that were somebody sniping at me in a column or something, I wouldn't pay any attention to it. I was in China on September 18, 1931, the day of the Mukden incident.

In Secretary Stimson's book he tells that I reported to the Cabinet that our notes and letters, our kindly suggestions to Japan were having no effect, that Japan engaged on a program of imperial expansion and could be stopped by nothing short of war.

Secretary Grew in his book Ten Years in Japan said that in Japan I summarized my feeling about the then situation in China in this sentence, and this is Secretary Grew's sentence in his book: "Like it or fight it."

Well, you know we decided not to fight, but Secretary Stimson was kind enough to say some 12 years after that I was right. We finally had to fight Japan, that our kind words were not stopping the Japanese imperialist expansion.

INDEPENDENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Now, about that time I received, and you can have it for the record, a telegram from the commanding general of the Philippine Islands, named Douglas MacArthur, in which he tells about the policy that I enunciated for the Government and for the relations of the United States in the Philippine Islands at that time. The fight was on for independence.

And I said that—

> The United States is committed to the eventual independence of the Philippines and the Filipinos are now asking us to fix a day certain on which we will grant their independence.
>
> The plan I have to offer is more expensive to the United States than giving independence at this time, but I don't believe we can measure the capacity of the people for independence by the calendar, that we should not give independence to the Philippines until they have developed economically to the place where they are able to support self-government.
>
> Therefore, our commitment on independence should be made on the progress made by the Filipinos rather than on the calendar.

Well, that policy was accepted, and the reason it was accepted was because we were sure that if we would step out and leave the Filipinos alone, unprepared economically as they were to support self-government, Japan or some other imperialist power would have stepped in.

So that all of this is merely a brief answer to the fact that my first experience out there was when I went in raw in 1944.

In addition to that, I had gone there in 1943 on a mission for President Roosevelt to talk to General Stilwell and Generalissimo Chiang

Kai-shek about the forthcoming Egyptian, that is Cairo, conference.

So that the statement in which Secretary Acheson, I believe, was belittling my experience—

Now, you understand, I am not saying anything about my capacity. All he said about my ability may be correct, but he is mistaken about the experience I have had in the Orient. It has lasted over years.

Now, I don't know whether you want to ask me any more questions about Russia and the Middle East, or whether you would like to proceed immediately to China.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, General Hurley, we have no set pattern of examination here. We do not have a counsel, and you are likely to be interrogated about almost any matters under the sun, by some one of the members of the committee.

If you are ready for the examination to proceed, I have a few questions I would like to propound.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; I will be happy to.

IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Chairman RUSSELL. I understood, in the early part of your testimony, that you expressed a very profound belief in the necessity for having some system of collective security——

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Among the nations of the earth, in order to maintain world peace and to preserve the individual liberties of the people who inhabit the earth.

Am I correct in that?

General HURLEY. That is correct, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you think that it is possible to utilize the United Nations structure as the instrumentality for collective security?

General HURLEY. I do.

ACTION IN KOREA

Chairman RUSSELL. Had you been consulted, had your advice been sought as to whether or not this Nation should undertake, under the request of the United Nations, to stem aggression in Korea, what would have been your advice?

General HURLEY. My advice——

Let me preface that by saying that I do approve President Truman's action in his effort to stop aggression in Korea. I think it constituted the reversal of a 5-year appeasement policy of communism in Asia, and therefore I thought it was right; but when you say what would have been my opinion—well, my horseback opinion, down in Oklahoma and New Mexico, I would have just approved it; but in my opinion, having been Secretary of War, and spent some little time in the Army, I would have asked the original primary American policy—what were we going to do, and what were we going to do it with?

And, I would have been deterred somewhat by the fact that we found ourselves unprepared, and that we were so weak when we went in.

But, to answer your question positively, I do approve, and think that President Truman's action in determining to, under the banner of the United Nations, to stop aggression in Korea, was courageous and sound.

PRESENT SITUATION IN IRAN

Chairman RUSSELL. I was very much interested in your reading from some statement that you made, I believe, to the Shah, or the King of Iran, as you referred to him, that it was the policy of the United States to sustain Iran as a free and independent nation, and related to the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter.

Iran is a troublous spot in today's troubled world.

In event of an aggression from Soviet communism in Iran, what would be your suggestion as to how we could sustain American policy in Iran?

General HURLEY. Well, it is quite complicated now, but it isn't any more complicated than was the Korean situation.

I am answering you frankly, and assuming that the censor will take out of my testimony anything that might be detrimental to the country in this hour.

Chairman RUSSELL. He has those instructions to that effect.

General HURLEY. But, to answer you frankly, Senator, being personally familiar with the ground in both places, and the people in both places, and the resources in both places, there isn't anything of great military importance in Korea.

It has neither the population nor the minerals nor the goods to support military action.

Everything you do for Iran must be a dead lift on the American taxpayers.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean the Koreans.

General HURLEY. Koreans, that is right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

[Deleted.]

OIL SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Chairman RUSSELL. Out of your experience in Iran, your knowledge of conditions and the people there, would it be your judgment that the present movement to nationalize the oil, and the pressure which is being brought to bear day by day and hour by hour on the Government to proceed immediately with the nationalization is in anywise Communist-inspired or does it grow out of a feeling that the contract that they have was a form of colonialism that they wish to rid themselves of?

General HURLEY. The latter is true. As I have said, I spent a considerable time—I have been in Iran four or five times for President Roosevelt every time he was having trouble there, and your trouble in Iran is imperialism, not communism.

The Russians have been very careful about it, because they believe that by reason of the greed, to put it mildly, of the Western World, Iran will fall into the Communist hands.

Now, let me go a little further. I have examined for President Roosevelt, and I have my report here if you wish it, the so-called Red Line Agreement. That is an agreement which drew a line around all of the Middle East nations, and up to the Russian, Turkish, and Afghanistan borders, and the Red Line Agreement was a cartel between the British, the French, and one Greek, and the Standard Oil Cos. of New York and New Jersey, in which they agreed that anything that they acquired inside of the red line would be available to all of these with whom we agreed they could take their portion of any of the land or refineries at the cost to the one who acquired it. That eliminated competition between the red companies operating there.

Now, if you go south of that and go into Saudi Arabia—and I also investigated that and spent a lot of time with the king, Ibn Saud, and reported for President Roosevelt on that because I had some familiarity with oil—but south of that, while the Standard of New Jersey and of New York, do own a part of the cartel inside of the Red Line Agreement, south of that Kuwait is Gulf, the Gulf Oil Co. of Pittsburgh—I think I criticized them for having taken a charter out in Canada or in England, and made themselves British in place of American, but they were using American money and evading American taxes, and paying the taxes some place else; I didn't like the fact that they incorporated in a foreign nation, and I reported that.

Chairman RUSSELL. They found a place for lower taxes than we had here?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

The nex thing was that you found the Texas Oil Co. and the Standard of California, that has now become Aramco; they have a great oil empire.

I believe I told President Roosevelt, not in a report, although I may have—I made several reports to him on that situation, but he asked me how much oil the Americans have in these different areas, and I said, "I would say that if we took Texas and California and New Mexico and Oklahoma and put them together, the American holdings in the Near East nations is greater than all of them together," and, therefore, I was rather convinced that we should do that which is necessary to continue to control the oil resources of the Middle East rather than to see how much profits—and understand, I am in favor of reasonable and real profits, but when they became exorbitant and great profits are being taken out of resources that belong to people who are starving there is a limit.

Therefore, I suggested that America, in place of waiting for the day of expropriation to come, like it had come in Mexico—and, by the way, I was interested in that case, too—America should take time by the forelock and readjust her holdings, her commitments and her profits on a reasonable basis, a basis that would leave some of these vast resources for the benefit of the people who owned them for the purpose of letting them use their own resources to raise their own standard of living in place of applying to the American taxpayer to raise everybody's standard of living.

After that, the Standard of California and the Texas Co. approached that situation in a most realistic fashion. They were conscious of the great empire in oil which they controlled. They finally made a contract that they would pay all of the expenses of development, and that's very high because everything for development has to be transported from the United States and some of it taken over land and desert.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have lost me. Are you talking about Saudi Arabia now, or Iran?

General HURLEY. Iran, it is the same problem. What I am trying to do is I am laying a predicate for the situation in Iran.

Our companies made an agreement with Saudi Arabia and, roughly speaking, in place of giving them a twelfth, twentieth, a twenty-fourth royalty, "We will pay all the expenses of development. Then we will take the entire cost of development production and transportation to market out of our profits, and we will split the profits 50–50 with you."

And, "Fine; that's good."

Well, that gives our companies a very fine profit and the situation is happy.

Now, on the other hand—and I hope on account of my name you won't think this is an anti-British statement—but I considered the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.'s conduct as stubborn, unenlightened, and greedy. They would not move one single inch. They were paying enormous dividends. Even during the war they paid as high as 20 percent of their invested capital, and they haven't done anything to ameliorate that situation where people see great wealth being produced from their own country, and they are not getting it.

Now I agree that our sense of obligation of contract is such that we would say, "Well, we made the agreement and we will stand by it," but it's a different situation there.

I do believe that the Iranian situation could have been composed if the British, and the Americans who are interested with the British, had approached the problem—now you see why I was talking about Saudi Arabia—had approached the problem in Iran as the Americans approached it and solved it in Saudi Arabia.

Now, does that answer your question?

STEPS TO PREVENT LOSS OF IRAN

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, in a way it does. My knowledge is very limited of what is transpiring over there. I do read the reports that are being made, and I must confess that I felt a certain pride that the American companies in Saudi Arabia had made such intelligent approach to the question. They get out pamphlets showing the schools and the health facilities that they have developed and the manner by which they have improved the living standards of the people.

My original question, of course, went more explicitly to the steps that we should take to prevent either of those areas from falling into hostile hands. That was the question I had in mind.

General HURLEY. Now I will answer that directly.

I know how hostile the King, the Government, and the people are to imperialism. I know the way they feel not alone about the British but any colonial imperialist who is attempting to exploit them and their country for the benefit of someone afar.

I think we declared and convinced the King and the people that America had no imperialistic designs, that America would not ask or accept any privileges in any nation that was not accorded to all other nations.

I did believe that in place of having people who are antagonistic to the Government and the King of Iran, because they are imperialists, we should send or have sent people who are in sympathy with the ideals of the people to try to work out a basis of agreement that would be rather equitable to all concerned, and I am convinced that had we done that—and in that letter I showed that the imperialists had a complete monopoly in Iran at that time but we didn't keep that up and our experts were not what President Roosevelt hoped they would be.

They were not loyal to the purpose for which they were sent there to serve and I think that we have rather lost out notwithstanding the fact that Ambassador Grady in my opinion has done a very good job considering what he was up against.

But I am telling you, Senator, that the whole approach to the Iranian oil problem has been wrong. It has been one of force, and "We will send the paratroopers in there and we will stop you," in place of saying, "Now let's sit down and find out what's right about this. See if we can come any distance toward what you want."

Well, now they are coming a distance, but it is like so many cases. It's late. The people are aroused. The campaign is on. The demand for everything, the demand for expropriation, they want to take it out and be rid of what they call imperialism.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, my time has expired. On another round I will get back to my question as to the steps we should take in the future policy in that area to prevent it from falling into unfriendly hands.

General HURLEY. I will tell you that right now. Immediately I would send to Iran people who have sympathy for the aspirations of Iran, and I would get back into the good graces of the Iranian King and the people. It can be done and we should move peacefully and not in antagonism to either Iran or Britain.

RECESS

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, you are familiar with the announcement made on the floor yesterday to the effect that so long as appropriation bills were under consideration, no consent would be granted this committee to meet while the Senate is in session. That is a matter that we should consider in deciding on the steps that we shall take.

I do not know whether it is the pleasure of the committee to proceed for this morning until they have another quorum call or whether to keep faith with the Senate we should recess at this time.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we continue until 1 o'clock unless there is another quorum call. Then we will adjourn.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there any objection?

Senator BREWSTER. Does that mean we will not meet this afternoon?

Chairman RUSSELL. That is correct. Now I do not know what is the pleasure of the witness or the committee, but I thought that if the appropriation bills were to be drawn out for a long time, it might be well to consider the advisability of having an evening session tomorrow evening.

Senator BREWSTER. What about this evening?

Chairman RUSSELL. You always run into the proposition a number of members of the committee say "I have a dinner engagement," or "I have this or that or the other engagement." I should be very happy to meet this evening.

Senator McMAHON. I would have to take exception to that, Mr. Chairman, for the reason which you just gave. I think we ought to have at least 1 day's notice of a night session.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I wish to respectfully request then that the members of the committee give thought to a night session tomorrow evening and be prepared for it, provided, General Hurley, will it discommode you greatly to be with us?

General HURLEY. No, Mr. Chairman. I am at your service at any time.

Chairman RUSSELL. We appreciate that attitude.

Senator BREWSTER. I hope that in that connection some of the members may through some convenience of other members who can't be here tomorrow night—I am in a position I can't be here tomorrow night—I hope I might have at least one round before I leave.

Senator SPARKMAN. The same thing applies to me. I cannot be here tomorrow night.

Senator SMITH. I am in the same position, Mr. Chairman. There is a dinner with the President of Ecuador that is supposed to be official.

Senator GEORGE. It is possible that this appropriation bill might get out of the way today and you might be able to sit all day tomorrow.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, in the event that the appropriation bill is disposed of today on the floor, we will meet all day tomorrow. If it is not disposed of, I think that some of us who can be here should undertake to have an evening session because it will undoubtedly be impossible to conclude with the witness at an evening session. We can't meet more than 2 hours.

Senator MCMAHON. Mr. Chairman, in view of Senator Brewster's and Senator Sparkman's statement that they could not be here tomorrow, I certainly would not ask that we adjourn tomorrow night, but I do not think we will be through with the witness tonight, and I will get my chance tomorrow and that will suit me.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, in view of the circumstances as they appear to the chairman at the present time, I think it is well for us to recess now until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, and I hope we shall be able to have a full day's hearing tomorrow.

The committees stand in recess therefore until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon at 12:20 p. m. the hearing was adjourned to reconvene on Thursday, June 21, 1951, at 10:01 a. m.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:01 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Wiley, Smith, Green, McMahon, Brewster, Bridges, Johnson, Knowland, Cain, and Stennis.

Also present: William H. Darden, chief clerk, Verne D. Mudge and H. Galusha, staff members, Committee on Armed Services; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committees will come to order. Chairman Connally.

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Wiley.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. PATRICK J. HURLEY, MAJOR GENERAL, HONORARY RESERVE, UNITED STATES ARMY—Resumed

Senator Wiley. General, I listened to your odyssey yesterday, and I think it is the modern odyssey. Certainly no Scandinavian ever had a greater saga than you did, traveling around the world. In the last 20 years you have contacted the far places, had such a rich experience as seldom comes to any human being, I am sure.

I was very much impressed with everything you said. Now, see if I can get the gist of what I think is one of the main significant points that you made.

You brought to our attention the terms of the Atlantic Charter and its subsequent affirmation in Teheran; and then you drew the conclusion that at Yalta we had gone back on those great principles that we laid down in the Atlantic Charter.

Am I stating the situation correctly?

General Hurley. Yes, sir.

EVENTS AT YALTA

Senator Wiley. I think you drew the conclusion that the far eastern mess, if you can call it that, or the mistakes that we made in our far eastern policy, were the direct result of our changing from the great fundamental, ethical principles as enunciated in the Atlantic Charter and reaffirmed at Tehran to Yalta. Am I correct in that conclusion?

General HURLEY. That is a correct conclusion.

Senator WILEY. Now, as I understand it, you were not present at Yalta.

General HURLEY. I was not.

Senator WILEY. It is very important, sir, that in this investigation we get the judgment of men of your years and your background—on what you understand occurred at Yalta—and your understanding or any information as to who were the prime actors in that drama which so changed the world and which so affects our present economic and political life today. I would like to get your reaction to that.

General HURLEY. In the first place, I notice that some of the commentators or newsmen yesterday reported that I said the Yalta surrender was due to the cowardice of President Roosevelt.

I remember distinctly that I said that President Roosevelt was already a very sick man at Yalta, and I did not attribute to him what transpired at Yalta.

Now on the second part of your question which has been so ably stated, for me to engage like some others do in a recitation of rumors and hearsay evidence would not only be unbecoming me, but it would be unbecoming the cause in which I am appearing, and for that reason if you will permit me, Senator, I will testify to that which I know.

I was not at Yalta. There are a number of witnesses who were at Yalta, and I couldn't testify for the minute details of what happened there.

Senator WILEY. Well, Hiss was at Yalta, wasn't he?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; Hiss was at Yalta.

Senator WILEY. Do you suggest that we subpena Hiss?

General HURLEY. Well, I am afraid that there is a certain provision that enables a man to be relieved from testifying against himself, and I think, I don't believe you could get Mr. Hiss to tell you the facts about Yalta.

I notice, however, that Secretary Byrnes, now governor, stated this morning that while he was at Yalta, he had no knowledge of the secret agreement or any secret commitments until months after Yalta. I think possibly that proves a complete alibi.

Then you would have left Secretary Stettinius who unfortunately is deceased, a very fine man, but you would have Ambassador Averell Harriman who was there, you have quite a number of men who were present at Yalta, but I think, Senator, to ask me to testify to the minute details that happened at Yalta would be putting me in a position where I would get off on hearsay.

MOTIVATIONS AT YALTA

It would be like charging a man with being a Communist on hearsay, and it would put me in a position that, notwithstanding the controversies I have been in, I have not occupied up to this time.

Senator WILEY. Well, sir, I respect that answer, and I think it exemplifies a judicial temperament that is very much needed in these days.

My thought was not that you should attempt to designate blame. Let me put the question this way: We have heard the testimony of the

Secretary and others—testimony which was certainly in part rebutted yesterday by some of your testimony—that at Yalta it appeared to be the judgment of those present that to do the thing that was in the best interest of America.

Now many of us always have better hindsight than foresight—whether we were naive, whether we were just children without the world horizons before us, or whether we were inoculated by fear due to the Communist method of impacting human minds—what was it, that, let's put it kindly, made us so inept, so incompetent to foresee around the corner of tomorrow with the results we have got what we got now.

Now your judgment on that, without indulging in any personalities would be valuable because you were then a world figure, are now a world figure, and with your background you know something about the things that might teach us not to be so inept or so naive in the world of today and tomorrow.

General Hurley. I am glad to answer where you asked me what would be my judgment on what occurred at Yalta.

I believe I testified yesterday that in my opinion the surrender of principles at Yalta because of fear that Russia had the power to take the property anyway is immoral, the surrender of our ally, the betrayal of our ally, China, at Yalta, because, as Secretary Acheson said, we feared that the final assault on the islands of Japan would cost a million casualties. Now we said that when I believe that Japan was already beaten and broken. We said that when your Commander in Chief was at the head of the greatest land, Navy, and Air Force in the world.

And I said yesterday that I believed that the surrender of principles, the letting of Stalin free from the solemn commitment that he had made, the surrender of all those commitments at Yalta, I think that in my judgment the verdict of history will be that it was both immoral and cowardly.

That was my judgment on what occured at Yalta.

LOYALTY AND SECURITY

Senator Wiley. Well, I think that is a partial answer. But unless we can get those who were present to tell us the clash of minds, we are still in the dark as to whether or not Hiss and his kindred, as the tools of the Communists, were the ones who were shaping this thing, or whether it was based upon the facts that you say did not exist but which they thought did exist.

General Hurley. I do; and I will be glad to discuss that.

I think that the fact that men like Hiss have been shielded—we have had a lot of secret hearings by committees; we have had a lot of a star chamber executive committees set up; commissions; proceedings in all of them have been kept secret from the public.

For instance, the hearings on the atomic energy organization: I read the report of the committee that heard that case, and it was a clean bill of health, a certificate of purity and patriotism for everyone in the organization; yet, less than 6 months, just a little while after, Dr. Klaus Fuchs confessed in London, and the result is that they were not pure, they were not patriotic in that organization, and two of them are under sentence of death at the moment.

Now, we could go into other hearings, and all of these things, in my opinion, gave rise to the enactment of the McCarran Act. It was passed by an overwhelming majority of the Members of this Congress.

Why? Why was the McCarran Act passed over the veto of the President?

Because I believe, in answer to your question, the people and the Congress were convinced that in these secret hearings officials of this Government were not giving the proper protection to American standards and ideals and principles.

I think that is the reason for the McCarran Act.

Senator WILEY. Again we come back to the fundamental issue.

With President Roosevelt ill, who dominated that picture at Yalta, so that the facts, apparently as you say they were, were disregarded, and other facts were assumed as the basis for action?

Who was it that dominated that picture?

General HURLEY. That I couldn't tell you, except by mere hearsay. I wasn't there.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley, your time has expired.

Senator Bridges?

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, I will pass. I heard with a great deal of interest General Hurley's answers yesterday, and I have no questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, might I interrupt for just a moment?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Senator SMITH. I see I apparently will be the next person called on, and I want to call attention to the fact that at 11:30 this morning certain Medal of Honor awards are going to be made at the Pentagon for members of the Armed Forces from New Jersey killed in Korea—they will be given that honor, and I will have to go in a few minutes, and if it is agreeable, when it comes to my turn, I would like to exchange my place with Senator Brewster, who has to leave at 1 o'clock.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection so far as I am concerned if we can get unanimous agreement of the committee to temporarily pass, as has been done, and let the Senator ask his questions so that he can get over to the Medal of Honor presentation. That would be entirely agreeable.

Chairman RUSSELL. If I understood the Senator, he wished to exchange with Senator Brewster.

Senator KNOWLAND. I thought that was only because he could not get his questions in.

Senator SMITH. No, Senator Brewster has to leave, and I was going to accommodate him.

Chairman RUSSELL. May I ask the Senator from New Jersey if he will express to the parents of Private First Class Story of Georgia my profound regrets that I could not be there this morning on this occasion.

Senator SMITH. I will be very happy to do that.

Chairman RUSSELL. He killed over a hundred of our enemy in Korea and, though wounded, refused to leave his machine gun but stayed there to cover the retreat of his battalion.

Senator SMITH. What is the name?

Chairman RUSSELL. Story.

Senator SMITH. Of Georgia.

Chairman RUSSELL. And his parents will be there; and I will particularly appreciate it if you will tell them that I was engaged here and could not be present.

Senator SMITH. I will be very happy to do that.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask permission to do the same thing, because I have a boy from Maine who was killed, and he is also receiving this decoration, and express my regrets at not being there. I think there are some 30 who are going to get it.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I have never asked any reshuffling, and the consequence is that if I happen to be out of the room at the time my name is called, and if I come back later then I have to wait the whole round again, and get passed for some other reason.

Chairman RUSSELL. No, sir. You will not be passed for any reason whatever if you are here and you are in turn. If you are out of the room you will be passed.

Senator GREEN. No, sir; I have never asked to take somebody else's place. I have always taken my turn. But if everybody is going to be shoved ahead of me on and on and on I should have to leave.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not think, Senator, this unanimous consent would really delay——

Senator GREEN. I do not know that there would be any loss to General Hurley or——

Chairman RUSSELL. Because Senator Smith was offered an opportunity to examine now.

Well, is there objection? The Chair hears none.

Senator CAIN. Would you state the request?

Chairman RUSSELL. That Senator Smith and Senator Brewster be permitted to exchange their places when the time comes for them to be heard.

Senator CAIN. No objection.

Chairman RUSSELL. There is none. The Senator from California is heard.

REASON FOR STILWELL RECALL

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Hurley, from time to time the question has been raised in this committee, and evidence cited as to the reasons for not supporting the Republic of China because of certain adverse reports sent back to Washington by General Stilwell. Were you acquainted with General Stilwell when you went out in the Far East?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; we were well acquainted.

Senator KNOWLAND. I have read the general's book, letters that were published, and while he had had a long and distinguished career in the American Army and I think a very outstanding soldier in many respects, I rather gained an impression from reading his letters that he had what some people term a rather sharp tongue which I think is indicated in some of his criticisms of the President of the Republic of China and certain others. Are you familiar with that phase of the situation?

General HURLEY. I am completely familiar with General Stilwell's record both in Burma and in China, and I have the facts in regard to his relief from command in China and, different from the questions asked me by Senator Wiley on which I declined to answer because I have only hearsay evidence, I have first-hand information in the Stilwell episode and will be delighted to present it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I think, Mr. Hurley, you would be performing a service to these committees and to the country if you could give the information leading to the relief of General Stilwell and the events leading up to it, because much of the damaging information regarding the Republic of China apparently at least in part stemmed from that source, and it may be that even Secretary Marshall, who I understand had had a close association in years past with General Stilwell, may have been influenced to a considerable extent in his own thinking by the reports that he had received from the China theater at that time.

If you could recite in your own way the events leading up to the Stilwell removal, why I would appreciate it very much.

HURLEY DIRECTIVE TO ADJUST DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STILWELL AND CHIANG

General HURLEY. In the first place, my first directive from President Roosevelt had to do with settling the controversy between General Stilwell and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President sent me to China first in 1943 on that controversy. He sent me back in 1944 as his personal representative, and if you will turn now to page 67 of the white papers put out by the State Department, you will find this letter, dated August 10, from President Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek. He said:

> I have this proposal to make; that Gen. Patrick Hurley be designated by me as my representative to you. He should be of great service in adjusting the relations between you and General Stilwell.

Now, of course, that is the State Department version of the situation and I don't think they put in the rest of President Roosevelt's telegram because it would be too difficult for them to overcome in their deliberate attempt to disparage me, so with your permission I will read the rest of that message.

Senator KNOWLAND. I think that would be essential if we are to understand the full background.

General HURLEY (reading):

> I have this proposal now to make: That Gen. Patrick Hurley, former Secretary of War, former Minister to New Zealand, and recent special representative of mine in the Middle East, be designated by me as my personal representative with you.
>
> General Hurley has had broad diplomatic and political and business experience. He is well known and a respected figure in public life in this country. He served

> actively in the First World War and knows our Army. He should be of great service in adjusting relations between you and General Stilwell. He met you in Chungking many years ago and appears highly qualified for this important post.

Now my only purpose in putting that in now is to show that the white paper publishes only such parts of my record as can be construed to be disparaging. It doesn't even quote President Roosevelt correctly.

HURLEY EXPERIENCE IN CHINA

Now, the next thing on China, to show why President Roosevelt thought that I was familiar with it, if you will turn to page 243 of Secretary Stimson's book, you will find that when we were debating the apparent policy for the conquest of China by Japan, that was in 1930 and 1931, Stimson describes a Cabinet meeting when I was young like you are, Senator, and Stimson says in his book:

> Hurley opened the discussion, making the argument that notes and diplomatic representations were not going to do much unless backed by force, since in his view the Japanese in Shanghai and in Manchuria were executing steps in a far-flung plan of imperial expansion, which could be blocked only by force.

Now, many pages later, in fact, 10 years later, Stimson said he was right; and then you will find in Grew's book where he epitomized my attitude by this quotation:

> I might express his attitude on the situation in China by the words "Like it or fight it."

Well, now, what I am saying that for is to get the proper predicate to my service in China and not be controlled by Secretary Acheson's statement that I was new in China and arrived there some time late in the fall of 1944 and didn't quite understand what it was.

HURLEY MEETINGS WITH CHIANG ON STILWELL

Now, if we can leave that, Senator, I would like to proceed to a discussion of the Stilwell episode. I agree fully with you that it is a matter that the people are not familiar with, and I think that possibly more falsehoods have been published in connection with that episode than any other one.

After I arrived in China in 1944, the President had fully briefed me. Then I went to the War Department and was briefed by the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, and then to the Air Force and was briefed by the Chief of the Air Force, Gen. Hap Arnold.

My desire at that time was to get the status of Stilwell in our own military service. I am happy to report that it was good. Stilwell had a fine reputation, he was a fine officer, he was a man worthy of respect.

I started to get the situation straightened out for General Stilwell, and I was in daily conference with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. I had prevailed upon Chiang Kai-shek to appoint Stilwell—already told the President in response to a telegram that he would appoint Stilwell, but he had stopped and I convinced him that it was to his own best interests, in the interest of cooperation, in the interest of whipping Japan, that he continue Stilwell and find a basis of mutual cooperation.

It was in that status that I was with the Generalissimo and present in the room with his interpreter, Jui Shi Ming, his Secretary for Foreign Affairs, T. V. Soong, his Secretary of War, whose name was Cheng, and most of his military staff and his Cabinet, and we had agreed on his appointment of Stilwell.

But the question arose as to what Stilwell's jurisdiction would be, and I pointed out that President Roosevelt in his first letter on the subject to the Generalissimo said:

> I have this to propose: That I make General Stilwell a four-star general; that you recall him from Burma and place him in command of the forces, both American and Chinese, in China under you.

And I said, "Why, that is all settled. He is your subordinate. He is under you. The President has told you that." And I said, "None of us have asked for anything other."

So that then Joe Stilwell wanted what you call the "chop," that is the authority in China, the mark, the significance.

Well, I talked to him about it, and the Generalissimo didn't think that was essential, but he agreed to give it to him. Then we agreed on what Stilwell's jurisdiction would be, and my contention was that Stilwell shouldn't be given responsibility without adequate authority—that if he were appointed in command of the forces, he should have the right to promote and demote and to punish and award.

After a lot of discussion, that was agreed to, although it was taking certain prerogatives out of the Generalissimo. But he agreed to it.

Finally General Stilwell had told me that he wanted a commission like we get in the United States Army, and in China they didn't give that.

So we had everything settled for Stilwell to take over, and I was sitting at a tea table with a tablet, kind of like a school tablet, and a lead pencil trying to figure out in my memory the last commission in the Army that I had ever read. It was, I think, the one when I became second lieutenant. But I did recall, "To whom these presents may come, greeting. That reposing special trust and confidence in the patriotism and ability of Joseph Stilwell, I do hereby appoint him."

This is what we were doing, I was making, and he had agreed to it. And a knock came on the door, and the orderly came in and said: "General Stilwell is outside and wishes to see General Hurley."

The Generalissimo said, "Won't you ask General Stilwell to come in? We have agreed upon everything, and it is a nice time to come in."

The orderly came back and said, "General Stilwell insists that he must see General Hurley privately before he goes in the meeting."

I went out, and it was a nice sunshiny September day, and Stilwell and I sat on the porch, and he took out and showed to me a cable from the President of the United States. It wasn't addressed through me, as had been agreed to, but it did direct General Stilwell to present it in person.

I read it carefully, sitting there by the general. I turned to him and I said, "Joe, you have won this ball game. The Gimo has agreed to everything that the President tells him that he must agree to or else."

Stilwell said, "I don't care whether he has agreed to it or not; I am directed by the President to hand it to him."

And I said: "Now, Joe, we have had a hard time getting to this place and we are writing your commission now, and I think you better tell the Gimo what's in this in place of this pretty stiff telegram. He may think it's an ultimatum and that he is being compelled publicly to do what he has already agreed to do. He has agreed to every item of this."

He said, "I am directed by the President to present it to him, and I am going to do it."

Now, it was a longer conversation than that. I labored with my friend, but he went in and presented it.

Now, I think that possibly you would want the cable from the President in the record, if I can find it among my papers here—memoir.

TELEGRAM FROM ROOSEVELT VIA STILWELL TO CHIANG

I am finding everything except the right thing, gentlemen. Bear with me a moment.

It is top secret. This is a top secret, and it is dated February 18, 1944, and it is from President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek:

> After reading the last reports on the situation in China (top secret from the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek) my Chief of Staff and I are convinced that you are faced with the disaster that I have feared. The men of your Yoke forces crossing the Salween have fought with great courage and rendered invaluable assistance to the campaign in north Burma, but we feel that unless they are reinforced and supported with your every capacity, you cannot repeat not expect to reap the fruits of the sacrifices that they have made, which will be valueless unless they go to assist in the opening of the Burma Road.
>
> Furthermore, any pause in your attack across the Salween or suggested withdrawal is exactly what the Japs have been striving to cause you to do by his operations in eastern China. He knows that if you continue to attack, cooperating with Mountbatten in the coming offensive, the land line to China will be opened in early 1945 and continued resistance in China and maintenance of your control will be assured.
>
> On the other hand, if you do not repeat not provide manpower for your divisions to north Burma, and if you fail to reinforce the Salween forces and withdraw the army you will lose all chance of opening land communications with China and immediately jeopardize the air route over the Hump.
>
> For this you must be prepared to accept the consequences and to assume the personal responsibility. I have urged time and again in recent months that you take drastic action to resist the disaster which has been moving closer and closer to China and to you.
>
> Now, when you have not—repeat not—yet placed General Stilwell in command of all the forces in China we are faced with the loss of a critical area in East China with possible catastrophic consequences. The Japanese capture of Kuling will place Kunming air terminal under the menace of constant attack reducing Hump tonnage and possibly severing the air route. Even though we are rolling the enemy back in defeat all over the world this will not—repeat not—help the situation in China for a considerable time.
>
> The advance of our Pacific forces across the Pacific is swift but this advance will be too late for China unless you act now and vigorously. Only drastic and immediate action on your part alone can be in time to preserve the fruits of our long years of struggle and the efforts we have been making to support you; otherwise, military and political considerations alike are going to be swallowed up in military disaster.
>
> The Prime Minister and I just decided at Quebec to press vigorously the operations to open the land line to China on the assumption that you continue unremitting attacks on the Salween side. I am certain that the only things you can do now in an attempt to prevent the Japs from achieving their objective in China is to reinforce your Salween armies immediately, press their offensive while at the same time placing General Stilwell in unrestricted command of all of your forces.
>
> The action I am asking you to take will fortify us in our decision and in our continued efforts that the United States proposes to take to maintain and to

increase aid to you. This we are doing when we are fighting two great campaigns in Europe and across the Pacific.

I trust—

Let's see, I have missed something—

I trust that your foresight, your vision, which has guided and inspired your people in this war will realize the necessity for immediate action.

In this message I have expressed my thoughts with complete frankness because it appears plainly evident to all of us here that all of your efforts and our efforts to save China will be lost by any further delay on your part.

WISDOM OF ROOSEVELT'S TELEGRAM

Now, of course, that was immediately called an ultimatum. President Roosevelt told me it wasn't an ultimatum, and was not intended to be. You can see there was still an opportunity to discuss it.

But when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had agreed to every element of this, and before I get far along I will show it to you in Joe Stilwell's own handwriting—I said, "You shouldn't now because of this firm language pile it on him at the time when he has felt compelled to make every concession that we have asked. He has made them; he is ready to go; he is ready to bring troops down from the north to reinforce you on the Salween front; he is going to appoint you commander in chief." He said, "Well, I am directed by the President to deliver this." That raised another question of who had the authority to speak for the President, but I didn't stand on that.

We walked in, a few pleasantries were exchanged, and a cup of tea was served to General Stilwell, and finally he stood up and walked over and handed this letter from Roosevelt to General Hu Chi-ming, the interpreter. Well, I felt as though the situation was rather precarious, and I stood up and I said to the interpreter, I said, "Pardon me, isn't there a Chinese translation attached to the communiqué?" He said, "Yes." I said, "Would you let me have that, please," and he said, "Yes," and I said, "I think we would all save time by permitting the Gimo to read this Chinese translation himself."

So, the Generalissimo did read it, and for all the heroics that you have read about in the papers, and especially in the Daily Worker and the left-wing papers, when the Generalissimo concluded, of course, I noticed that he looked like he had been hit in the solar plexis. He had agreed to everything, and here was what he believed was an ultimatum telling him to agree to what he had already agreed to.

The Generalissimo showed no emotion, and didn't, as I recall, utter one word, although his secretary did say, "The Generalissimo wishes to be alone," but then the Generalissimo reached over to his teacup and put the cover on the teacup upside down.

Well, General Stilwell, who was an old China hand, speaks Chinese, had served long in China, he said in a polite manner, "That gesture still means, I presume, that the party is over," and someone in the audience said, "Yes," and we walked out. Now, all this thing about hysterics, there wasn't a suggestion of it.

That evening I received from the Generalissimo a call, and I went back over and he wanted me to tell President Roosevelt what had occurred, and I said, "Oh, no, you must tell him what occurred and you must speak, and I wouldn't attempt to write to President Roosevelt what your opinion was about what transpired."

Then the Generalissimo, oh, hours later, handed me an aide memoire. The aide memoire told that he had decided to appoint General Stilwell and was on the verge of doing so when General Stilwell came in the room in a peremptory manner, demanded that the Generalissimo should do what the Generalissimo had already agreed to do.

Now I have two aide memoires here. The first aide memoire was dated at Chungking on October the 9th, and everything has been said about——

Senator WILEY. 1944?

General HURLEY. 1944; yes. Everything has been said about what the controversy was, but here it is, and remember again, Mr. Chairman, this aide memoire was transmitted by me encoded, and I warn you not to let it get to the public without being decoded and paraphrased as I think possibly we have a new code here, but I have been very meticulous in not using anything that might break our code, and besides, within the law you are not unauthorized persons to whom I am delivering it.

This is an aide memoire to General Hurley. He handed me an aide memoire 24 hours before this, and I took it back with criticism that it was unbecoming a government to speak to a government who was a friend in any such language as that contained in the proposed aide memoire, and that it would have to be rewritten before I would agree to deliver it to my President.

If you look at Joe Stilwell's papers, you will find that they believed that my criticism of the aide memoire compelled them to rewrite and finally hammer out what appears to be a quite moderate respectable State paper.

AIDE MEMOIRE OF CHIANG ON DIFFERENCES WITH STILWELL

Well, of course that is not what I was trying to do. I was trying to keep scurrilous matter out of the record pertaining to Stilwell. I thought it did contain unbecoming matter, so here it is:

> In my telegram replying to the President which I have just handed to you—

he did hand me a telegram and I will give it to you if you wish. He said he wasn't going to appoint Stilwell—

> you will note that in order to avoid what may be considered controversial matter, I have purposely limited it to a simple statement of lack of confidence in General Stilwell and a request for his recall.
>
> So long as I am head of the State and Supreme Commander in China, it seems to me that there can be no question as to my right to request the recall of an officer in whom I can no longer repose confidence. There are, however, certain essential points which I wish to make informally with a view of obtaining full and clear personal understanding between the President and myself. I am anxious to secure such an understanding since the President's courageous, far-sighted leadership in the war against Axis aggression has won my unbounded admiration, and since he has my lasting gartitude for his generous assistance to China in her long struggle to win independence and a rightful place in the family of nations, the President has been a constant inspiration to me and to my people so that any misunderstanding between us distresses me most deeply.
>
> Both the President and the War Department are dependent upon General Stilwell for information concerning the military situation in China. Thus the President may not be aware that I not only have no confidence in General Stilwell, but also lack confidence in his military judgment. I believe the record sustains my opinion and I shall summarize it briefly.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman. Pardon me, General. Was this all called for by one question?

Chairman Russell. Yes.

Senator Knowland. Yes. I asked for the background of the Stilwell removal, and he is answering the question, quite properly.

Senator McMahon. I guess our hope to finish this week is——

General Hurley. If the Senator objects——

Senator McMahon. I don't object.

Chairman Russell. The witness is within his rights.

Senator McMahon. I was just asking for information.

General Hurley (reading):

> General Stilwell and I never agreed about the Burma campaign. I have most naturally been anxious for a campaign in Burma which would reopen connections with China and communications. But at the same time I view the enemy's superior communications in that area and the difficult terrain—I have always insisted the only strategically sound campaign in Burma was the one which included an amphibious operation in South Burma to insure rapid collapse of the enemy's resistance within Burma.
>
> The first, I have repeated, and warned Stilwell that a limited offensive in north Burma would be more costly than could be justified by the results even if he attained his objectives and would prove exceedingly dangerous. I have also given my opinion to the President when I met him at Cairo.
>
> At the Cairo Conference commitments were finally made by the representatives of the United States and Great Britain which appeared to insure the kind of Burma campaign which I could approve. Unhappily, those commitments were abandoned shortly after I left Cairo.
>
> General Stilwell came to me and announced that he proposed to proceed with a limited offensive in north Burma. Again I warned him of the dangerous consequences, stating specifically that I feared the project would be difficult and costly and would engage all of China's limited resources at a time when this would be dangerous to the welfare of the state.
>
> He treated my warning lightly and insisted that if I maintained my attitude, China would be suspected of wishing to withdraw any real contribution to the Allied cause. At length I consented to his employment of the Ramgar troops, which is entirely American trained and equipped, and the clear understanding that these forces were all that would be forthcoming for that campaign.
>
> It was not long before my warning was substantiated. The moment obstacles were encountered in Burma General Stilwell began to use every sort of pressure to induce me to commit additional forces. I shall not enter into detail. It is enough to say that by the beginning of May the Burma campaign had drained off most of the properly trained and equipped reserves in China.
>
> At the same time it had greatly reduced the incoming supply of tonnage, so that during the critical ensuing months it was impossible to strengthen the military position in any area within China. It was not until June that the Hump tonnage, exclusive of the B–29 project, again reached the January level.
>
> I had feared the Japanese took advantage of the opportunities thus offered to launch an offensive within China, attacking first Honan and then Yunnan. Owing to the Burma campaign no adequately trained and equipped forces were available in those two areas. Owing to the effect of the Burma campaign the Hump tonnage supplies were not forthcoming for the Chinese armies stationed in Honan and Yunnan. The forces brought to bear on the Japanese in their offensive in east China were six times as great as those confronting Stilwell in north Burma, and the consequences of defeat were certain to outweigh in China any results of victory in the north Burma campaign.
>
> Yet General Stilwell exhibited complete indifference to the outcome in east China; so much so that in the critical days of east China operations he persistently refused to release lend-lease munitions already available in Yunnan to use in the east China fighting.
>
> Prior to June 1944, with the exception of Yunnan expeditionary forces, the entire Chinese Army did not receive one single rifle or piece of artillery from American lend-lease. And until the first week in June when General Stilwell last visited Chungking to discuss the east China situation with me, when the enemy's offensive was already well under way to its objective, General Stilwell finally consented to have a small quantity of equipment to the Chinese Army in east China forwarded, and to facilitate more effectively air support.

In all excepting Yunnan expeditionary forces, the Chinese armies have received 60 mountain guns, 320 antitank guns, and 506 bazookas. In that short time we have taken Myitkyena, but we have lost all of east China, and in this General Stilwell cannot be absolved from great responsibility. Even now he appears to be unaware of the implications of this fact and the grave damage to the prestige and morale of the Chinese armies.

It is possible that this fact, fundamentally important as it is, has not been pointed out to the President. Whatever my opinion of General Stilwell as a man may be, I might bring myself to appoint him to the command in China, if I thought well of him as a military leader. However, with all the facts now before me, I have come to the conclusion that he is not competent to envision or deal with the problem of such range and complexity as now confronts us.

From what I have said above, it is also specifically evident the various areas of war in China cannot be divided into independent sectors. Already what has happened in Yunnan and Burma has instantly and vitally affected all of China.

To limit General Stilwell's authority to Yunnan and Burma does not seem to constitute a solution for the problem.

In his last telegram the President asserted that the China situation has deteriorated so far that he is now inclined to feel that the United States Govment should not assume responsibility involved in the appointment of an American commander.

I do not altogether understand this statement for two reasons:

First. No matter what has happened, no matter what command arrangements are adopted, I cannot personally escape the ultimate responsibility for the future in the Chinese theater. Even the responsibility of General Stilwell's errors must be borne by me, since I allowed myself to be overpersuaded against my own judgment to countenance them.

Second. I cannot feel that the deterioration is so serious as the President suggests. After long years of experience and first-hand knowledge of the Japanese methods and strength, despite the defeats in east China, I cannot foresee any disaster fundamentally incapacitating China.

The statement was also distressing to me in another sense. While I do not anticipate disaster, the situation in China is indeed critical. Aid is most needed in this hour of crisis, yet the statement I have referred to appears to imply that aid will be withheld precisely because this crisis of the hour is upon us.

I am disturbed by the fact that the President has expressed regret at my reversal of agreement with respect to the appointment of General Stilwell in command of the Chinese forces. My telegram to the President, of August the 24th, showed great readiness to meet his wishes, as far as humanly possible.

Developments which I have described in my aide memoire of September 25, I trust, made it clear that it has become impossible for me to now appoint General Stilwell. I am wholly confident that if the President replaces General Stilwell with a qualified American officer, we can work out together to reverse the present trend and to achieve a vital contribution to victory in China.

CONTROVERSY BETWEEN CHIANG AND STILWELL

Now, that is one of the aide memoires, and I know the committee is restive. I am not going to read the other. There were two aide memoires; and after General Stilwell had delivered what he thought was an ultimatum, and what to Chiang Kai-shek was an ultimatum, and what I didn't believe was an ultimatum from President Roosevelt—in other words, I believed that President Roosevelt's position was clear, and regardless of what was said to the contrary, I served President Roosevelt with a whole heart and I don't know of any instance when he refused to uphold what I had done.

After this aide memoire had been sent, and General Stilwell—this is his book, Stilwell Papers, and I might say in passing that I think it has done the greatest damage to a fine character that could be done—I warn you gentlemen to write your own biographies, because this book misrepresents General Stilwell; but I do know that it has one thing in it that he permitted me to read, after he had upset the Generalissimo's policies, and here it is, on page 334 of the Stilwell Papers.

This is written by a young man named Theodore H. White. He was allowed access to the Stilwell papers; and that night, when I saw Stilwell, I know this is correct because he read it to me with great glee, it was supposed to be humorous:

I've waited long for vengeance—
  At last I've had my chance.
I've looked the Peanut in the eye
  And kicked him in the pants.
The old harpoon was ready
  With aim and timing true,
I sank it to the handle
  And stung him through and through.
The little bastard shivered,
  And lost his power of speech.
His face turned green and quivered
  As he struggled not to screech.
For all my weary battles,
  For all my hours of woe,
At last I've had my innings
  And laid the Peanut low.
I know I've still to suffer,
  And run a weary race,
But Oh; the blessed pleasure!
  I've wrecked the Peanut's face.

Now, gentlemen, that was after the President's letter had been delivered, after I had sent the President the aide memoire that the Generalissimo gave to me showing his side, and Stilwell knew that he had licked them according to the poem that I have just read, but when I started to get messages back from Stilwell, and then this book, I think, says I stabbed them in the back, but I still have my replies to the messages I received with interlineations in the handwriting of Joe Stilwell.

We were close together. I was on his side and I remonstrated with him about what he was doing, and on his reports saying that Chiang Kai-shek wouldn't cooperate when he was trying to cooperate, but finally on the 23d of September 1944 came this memorandum. This is in the handwriting of Gen. Joseph Warren Stilwell. By this time Harry Hopkins is supposed to have told H. H. Kung in Washington that the President would appoint a successor for Stilwell.

That wasn't to me, but the Gimo had gone to the Executive Yuan. He had told publicly of Stilwell's insubordination and insolence and had told them that he had removed them and that he wouldn't agree to the appointment of Stilwell, so after Stilwell's poem, the fact was now public, and I was still talking to the Gimo and asking him to ameliorate his position and continue to cooperate, and there is a telegram from me at the time when I told the President that while this situation is serious, we shouldn't lose all hope. "We mustn't acknowledge a failure. I still believe that your wishes can be achieved."

By that time General Stilwell was getting the same kind of messages from Washington that I was getting, and here it is in his handwriting.

STILWELL SUGGESTION TO HEAL BREACH

Now remember that all the controversy is because Chiang Kai-shek wouldn't cooperate with Stilwell. Well, now here is what Stilwell said in his own handwriting. This is Stilwell's memo to Hurley, September the 23d, 1944:

> Something must be done to break up this stalemate, and it is up to us to do it. C. K. S. is sulking, and the War Department expects us—

that is Stilwell and myself—

> to handle him.
>
> It is obvious that C. K. S. is listening to our recommendations.

Well, now that is not exactly what I read awhile ago.

> He changed his plan at Kweilin, he put Pai Chung Hsi back in, he executed the Ninety-third Army commander, and he is moving six divisions down from the northwest. Apparently, he is ready to pass the command, and even use the Reds, if they will acknowledge the authority of C. G.

Well, now the fact that C. K. S. wouldn't cooperate, why he even executed an army commander, a Chinese commander because Stilwell recommended that he do it. I think he was right in doing it because I believe the man was a traitor. Now continuing:

> What he is gagging at is lend-lease, and it is a serious matter of face with him that Stalin and the British can handle the stuff and he can't; the pros and cons are well known; the problem remains unsolved.
>
> I propose that we go to the Gimo and take up the following items for his consideration.
>
> 1. That I be sent to Yenan to make the following propositions to the Reds:
>
> (*a*) The Reds to acknowledge the supreme authority of the Gimo, and to accept command through me.
>
> (*b*) The Red forces to be employed north of the Yellow River, out of contact with C. G. troops.
>
> (*c*) Equipment and ammunition to be furnished for five divisions with supporting artillery.
>
> (*d*) Reds to keep these divisions at full strength at all times.
>
> (*e*) Both KMT—that is the Kuomintang—and Reds to drop discussion of political matters till Japs are beaten.
>
> 2. That lend-lease materials (military) be turned over to the Gimo on delivery in China for distribution, with the understanding that
>
> (*a*) The X and Y forces have first priority.
>
> (*b*) The remainder of the first 30 divisions, the Reds, and the Kweiyang group (to be formed) have equal priority.
>
> (*c*) That no other units be equipped until after these units are fully outfitted. This includes maintenance.
>
> 3. That the command question be settled by the publication of orders, as suggested by General Hurley.

I immediately took this and went to the Gimo with it, but it was after he had publicly announced the controversy, after he had sent his aide memoire and his message, which I have not read, directly to the President, and after he was committed—and you will find written on the bottom of that in my handwriting, "Too late." In other words, the die was cast, the Rubicon had been crossed, the decision had been made, and Stilwell, in place of saying that Chiang Kai-shek was noncooperative, in his own handwriting has shown vast cooperation.

He has shown that he took six divisions away from the Communist front and took them south to give them to Stilwell in his Burma campaign; and the other matter was that at Cairo, Lord Mountbatten was to mount an amphibious attack on Burma from the sea, and that was to meet Stilwell's attack from China, but because changes had been made, not at Cairo, but at Tehran, whereby we agreed to mount the cross-channel attack from England to Normandy, we couldn't spare for Mountbatten the equipment he needed.

Consequently, the campaign was changed for Burma; but Stilwell wanted to carry on just the same, and Chiang Kai-shek said without the other half of the campaign it would be disastrous.

But then Stilwell told me that he intended to go back to Burma. You remember he had been defeated in Burma. He had an insurmountable desire to retrieve the disaster he suffered in Burma. I told him that his defeat, while it was a defeat, he had done everything that a military officer could humanly do to bring victory, and that I thought his idea of having to win all the time was a little too "touchyous," a little too sensitive.

I said, "You know, we are all expendable; a soldier can get killed in action only once. You just got wounded in Burma, and don't distort your whole view by wanting to retrieve something that, in my opinion, you don't need to retrieve; even in defeat you have shown like a splendid officer, a leader of men, and please don't belittle yourself by trying to thwart this whole situation into fighting half of this battle now when Mountbatten can't meet you from the sea."

Well then, I thought that this letter, which I have shown you written in Joe's handwriting, would retrieve the situation; but I had to tell the Gimo that I could not go along with a part of Joe's recommendation, and that is that we turn the administration of American lend-lease over to the Chinese Government. I said that I didn't believe the Chinese Government was equipped to handle the distribution of lend-lease effectively, and I wasn't in favor of it.

I am putting that in the record for myself while all the things are being said about the way lend-lease was handled.

During my time in China, gentlemen, lend-lease was handled only and distributed only by American officers, and while I understand that UNRRA and lend-lease were handled different subsequently, it wasn't while I was representing President Roosevelt in China.

Now, I think I have answered your question, Senator, unless you wish to inquire further.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sorry; he cannot. [Laughter.]

(Documents subsequently referred to follow:)

MESSAGE FROM CHIANG TO ROOSEVELT

SEPTEMBER 25, 1944.

Following message is to be delivered to and is for the eyes of the President alone. Decoding officer insure that delivery is made directly to the President. Message begins.

Here follows an aide memoire from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, addressed to me, dated September 25, which I received at 9:30 p. m., September 25, 1944:

AIDE MEMOIRE (HURLEY TOP SECRET TO THE PRESIDENT SIGNED STILWELL, CFB 23,212)

"or Maj. Gen. Patrick J. HURLEY:

"1. After due consideration of all the weighty issues involved in our discussions, I have reached a final decision, which I request you to communicate to the President forthwith.

"(*a*) I agree to the choice of an American general officer a commander in chief of the Chinese-American forces fighting against Japan in China; will place under his command all Chinese Field Armies and Air Forces; and will concurrently appoint him chief of staff of the China theater. I have further advised you that I would welcome Americans taking over the reorganization and operation of the Chinese Service of Supply. I am also willing to make such important changes in the Chinese Army staff and personnel as will be necessary to make effective harmonious operations by the American field commander.

"(*b*) I cannot, however, confer this heavy responsibility upon General Stilwell, and will have to ask for his resignation as chief of staff of the China theater and his relief from duty in this area.

"2. When at the request of the President you came here to help bring about collaboration between General Stilwell and myself, I regarded your visit as the last chance—the only remaining hope of genuine and intimate collaboration. I was thus prompted, against my instincts and my long-standing judgment, to consider favorably the appointment of General Stilwell as field commander, and I told you my intention to appoint him and give him my confidence. In doing so I was attempting to comply with the wishes of the President even against my better judgment as far as General Stilwell was concerned. Consonant with the wishes of the President, I initiated urgent discussion of the details of the appointment, so that the new command could be established at once. The frank and full conversations between you and myself, carried on in an atmosphere of mutually generous understanding, were such as to make all difficult problems appear soluble, and there was every indication of the success of your mission, and we were indeed on the eve of a complete agreement. You have insisted all along that General Stilwell would cooperate, but all this ended when it was made manifest to me that General Stilwell had no intention of cooperation with me, but believed that he was in fact being appointed to command me. If you will place yourself in my position, I believe you will understand how in future I can never direct General Stilwell to conform to my direction. If, ignoring reason and experience, I were to appoint General Stilwell, as field commander, I would knowingly court inevitable disaster.

"3. In view of the many fine and soldierly qualities which General Stilwell has shown in the past, it is with deep regret that I come to this decision. But my recent experiences with him merely reinforce the experiences of the past 2½ years, which have firmly convinced me that General Stilwell is unfitted for the vast, complex, and delicate duties which the new command will entail. Almost from the moment of his arrival in China, he showed his disregard for that mutual confidence and respect which are essential to the successful collaboration of allied forces. I have repeatedly caused word of this fault in General Stilwell to be conveyed to the President. Last October I intended to ask for his recall, but when General Stilwell himself solemnly promised that in future he would unreservedly obey my orders and would give me no further cause for disappointment I withdrew my request. Unhappily, General Stilwell's solemn promise has never been implemented. Far from leading to an intensified effort against the common enemy, the appointment of General Stilwell as field commander would immediately cause grave dissensions in the new command and do irreparable injury to the vital Chinse-American military cooperation.

"4. Please assure the President as well that any qualified American officer, imbued with that spirit of genuine interallied collaboration which Americans have exhibited on so many battlefields, who may be named to replace General Stilwell and to assume the important additional duties I have outlined will be warmly welcomed by me. It will be my object to enter into his plans, support his operations, and strengthen his authority by every means within my power."

Here follows a covering letter which I received from Dr. T. V. Soong, Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"DEAR GENERAL HURLEY: At the direction of the Generalissimo, I am sending you an aide memoire covering your latest conversations with him. The Generalissimo wishes to make it clear that the issue is one of personality, and not of principle. In principle regarding the unification of command, he is in complete agreement with the President. As he phrased it, 'On policy America and China are in complete agreement, but is equally essential to find the right man to implement the policy.'

"He also wishes me to express his highest regards and abiding confidence in the leadership of the President."

These two documents are self-explanatory.

The aide memoire and the letter state clearly the decision of the Generalissimo. I regret my inability to bring about harmony between General Stilwell and the Generalissimo. There can no longer be any doubt of the fact that the Generalissimo and General Stilwell are incompatible. In my opinion, the Generalissimo's decision not—repeat not—to appoint General Stilwell is final. Up to the last day of the conferences both the Generalissimo and General Stilwell made important concessions in the interests of harmony.

Since my arrival I have been in almost daily conferences with the Generalissimo. I have endeavored to impress upon him the seriousness of the situation that would be created by his failure to appoint General Stilwell. As you will see from the aide memoire, I had convinced him on that subject. The decision not to appoint General Stilwell was not made by the Generalissimo until after General Stilwell, a subordinate, handed the Generalissimo your message of September 19. The Generalissimo states that his decision does not affect any of the other officers of General Stilwell's command. It affects only General Stilwell. The Generalissimo stated that, if you desired, he would submit to you the names of three American generals, any one of whom he will appoint as field commander of all ground and air forces in China.

Chairman RUSSELL. Under a unanimous-consent agreement heretofore made in the committee, while Senator George and Senator Smith have been reached, Senator Brewster will be recognized.

Senator BREWSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ROOSEVELT AT YALTA

In the quotation to which you referred, you took some exception to, I think, a press quotation of you, and I located your exact words on 7465 in which you, in the record, appear to have said:

> I believe that the verdict of history on the Yalta agreement will mark it as both immoral and cowardly.

That is the end of the quotation.

I understand you meant by that that the result was cowardly but that as far as President Roosevelt was concerned he was then a weakened and sick man as a result of his long and arduous service, and that the results stemmed from his advisers.

General HURLEY. That is what I really said. I think the record shows that at that point I said at Yalta President Roosevelt was already a very sick man. I feel certain not only from the record at Yalta but in subsequent conversations with him that he was not to blame for the Yalta surrender.

Senator BREWSTER. General Marshall, I think, has testified that he did not advise him regarding that; is that right?

General HURLEY. Well, that is what I saw in the paper. I don't know that to be a fact.

Senator BREWSTER. Admiral Leahy has stated in his book that he considered the agreement with Russia at that time, sacrificing China, unnecessary. He does not say whether he advised against it or whether it was simply his opinion. He doesn't say whether his opinion was asked.

General HURLEY. Well, Admiral Leahy should testify for himself, but his book does say, and I do know, that Admiral Leahy was opposed to the sacrifice of China's interests at Yalta.

STATE DEPARTMENT ADVISERS IN CHINA

Senator BREWSTER. Have you thus far named the advisers of Stilwell on the diplomatic front who were there with him at that time?

General HURLEY. I don't believe I have named them in this record, although, as Senator Green will possibly remember, I did name them in a record.

Senator BREWSTER. Will you give three or four of the names of his principal diplomatic advisers?

General HURLEY. I will ask Senator Green to assist me if I don't get the names right this time John P. Davies, State Department career man; John S. Service, a State Department career man; John Emerson, a State Department career man, and Raymond Luddon, a State Department man. I think that is right.

Senator BREWSTER. General Wedemeyer has testified that he learned that the reports were going direct to the State Department without passing through your office, that he promptly rearranged the situation so that condition would not prevail. Is that correct?

General HURLEY. Yes; that is correct. General Wedemeyer, like myself and General Stilwell, was on very close personal terms, and while I have related to you the Stilwell episode to get the record straight I want the fact to remain in the record that my message when I asked finally for his relief, I spoke in the highest terms of his character and his ability and I asked General Marshall to assign him to, I hoped, a greater command.

So, so far as the military was concerned, we were getting along all together very well. I don't recall—oh, you know, when you are closely associated in a theater of war and you get a wrong set of facts, you do have not quarrels, but arguments, about what is the true situation. And, of course, I have had them with a lot of my closest and most-beloved associates.

RELATIONS BETWEEN CHENNAULT AND STILWELL

Senator BREWSTER. Did it come to your attention that similar very strained relations prevailed with General Chennault and General Stilwell?

General HURLEY. I recited that in my telegram to the President—that General Stilwell had gotten to the place where he had strained relations with his own command and with our ally, the British.

Stilwell at that time had gotten to a place where he had about three inside fights in progress, and the poem I have read to you from Stilwell was written when he thought he had won one of the inside battles. But he had at least three of them in progress at the same time.

Senator BREWSTER. It might be of interest that it came to the attention of the chairman of this committee, Senator Russell, and myself when we were at Kunming—that General Stilwell refused to attend a luncheon given for the visiting Senators there in 1943 by General Chennault. He stayed at the airport while we had luncheon and left a vacant chair at his place. That was the first time this situation came home forcibly to us, and also the propaganda that was emanating from China at that time regarding diversion of supplies by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from the fighting of the Chinese to the possible use against the Communists, when, as we understood it, he was getting practically no supplies at that time—which indicated that the stories we read in the American papers on our return were very grossly exaggerated, if not utterly incorrect.

Did that propaganda situation of the press come to your attention?

General HURLEY. Yes.

SECOND AIDE MEMOIRE TO PRESIDENT

You know, I have been thinking I have only put one of these aide memoires in the record and it might not give a correct picture.

Senator BREWSTER. I will ask unanimous consent that the other aide memoire be put in the record.

Chairman **Russell**. The other aide memoire, without objection, will follow the witness' statement in response to Senator Knowland's question.

Senator **Brewster**. So I won't be charged——

Chairman **Russell**. How long is it?

General **Hurley**. I won't read it unless you wish me to.

Chairman **Russell**. I was not suggesting about reading it. I was wondering about the length of time it would take to get the record out.

Senator **Brewster**. About 4 pages, I think.

General **Hurley**. Let me see. The second aide memoire is not very long. There are a lot of telegrams here from Roosevelt, the Stilwell ultimatum. Let me see what they are so I can get the right one. "Eyes alone" for General Marshall.

Senator **Brewster**. Does the chairman consider that this is in response to my question?

General **Hurley**. Yes, this is in response to your question because it offers—here is the first aide memoire, and here is the second aide memoire, and the idea is to put in the whole record so I won't be charged with having held out.

HURLEY REQUEST FOR STILWELL RELIEF

And now to put in something that I may be condemned for myself—"Eyes alone for the President from Hurley."

This is request for Stilwell's relief. That was my official duty.

I might, in answer to your question about what was being said, say the propaganda was that I had stabbed Stilwell in the back.

I went to sleep when I found that the ball game was over—I mean I went to bed and I didn't go to sleep. And at 2 o'clock I called my sergeant and I dictated this to the President. When he got it off the typewriter and everything, it was about 5 o'clock in the morning, and I hadn't been in bed all night; so I went over to General Stilwell's headquarters, and I found him making some coffee for himself. His headquarters hadn't stirred, but he was making coffee for himself, and he invited me to take coffee with him.

In place of reading this, I pitched it over to him where he was sitting. And he was a good soldier. He said, "Pat, that must have been a very difficult message for you to write."

I said, "Joe, that is the most disagreeable service that I have ever rendered for my country. There never was a duty that I performed with greater reluctance than this one, and I feel that the situation demands it."

Then he picked up his pencil and he said, "You are wrong about this." He said, "I want you to be right about this." He corrected. I will leave it to you gentlemen to decide whether I was stabbing Joe in the back. We were warm personal friends.

I have for him even today the most complete respect. I lament the fact that he did do the things like his poem and others that made his position untenable.

With that, if the Chair will permit me to introduce my cable to the President, dated at Chungking, October 13, 1944, without reading it. It may be read if anyone wishes it read, but it is merely the basis on which I believed that we could no longer continue our efforts in China under General Stilwell.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper. I am not asking it to be read, but I wonder if—I don't know what the censor will do to some of these.

General HURLEY. I think he will take it out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I don't know whether it should be taken out or not; I am not passing on that. But will there be a record available for members where we can read these things if the censor would take them out?

Chairman RUSSELL. Unless the censor strikes it——

Senator BREWSTER. It raises the question of time here——

Chairman RUSSELL. Unless some Senator objects to inserting it in the record, it will be available to members of the committee in the classified record that the committee has available. We have a record of everything that has transpired here.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That answers my question.

Chairman RUSSELL. About 98 percent of it has gone out to the public, but the other 2 percent is available to any member of the committee who desires to read it, and he can secure it at any time from the staff of this committee. If there is no objection to printing this matter in the record it will be available to any member of the committee who desires to read it.

Is there objection? The Chair hears none. The aide memoire and the telegram will be printed in the record.

General HURLEY. I read one of these.

Chairman RUSSELL. It will not be reprinted but the ones you did not read will be printed.

(The cable referred to is as follows, and the aide memoire appears previously in the Record of this morning at p. 7562A.)

HURLEY TELEGRAM TO ROOSEVELT

CHUNGKING, *October 13, 1944.*

FOR THE EYES OF THE PRESIDENT ALONE

(The following message is from Hurley for the eyes of the President only.)

I have endeavored to cooperate with General Stilwell. I permitted him to strike out of my telegram to you of September 21 conclusions I had reached which General Stilwell thought would be equivalent to recommending that he be relieved. At that time I still believed that harmony between General Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek was possible. I am now convinced, as I have heretofore said to you, that the two men are fundamentally incompatible and they are mutually suspicious of each other. The Generalissimo reacts favorably to logical persuasion and leadership. You can do business with the Generalissimo. He reacts violently against any form of coercion, "squeeze play" or ultimatum. Stilwell is incapable of understanding or cooperating with Chiang Kai-shek politically. Stilwell has stated that Chiang Kai-shek never acts until action is forced upon him. On this thesis, Stilwell's every act is a move toward the complete subjugation of Chiang Kai-shek. There is no issue between you and Chiang Kai-shek except Stilwell. My sympathies are with Stilwell. After I had changed my message to you of September 21 to support Stilwell's ideas, he agreed with me that the Generalissimo does cooperate. I quote Stilwell "I am convinced that Chiang Kai-shek is listening to our recommendations. He changed his plan at Kweilin, he put Pai Chin Hsi back in, he executed the Ninety-third Army commander, and he is moving six divisions down from the northwest. Apparently he is ready to pass the command and even use the Reds if they acknowledge the authority of the Generalissimo." This quotation from Stilwell proves that the Generalissimo is not as noncooperative as Stilwell's wire of the 10th to General Marshall would indicate. I have the so-called Communist question under discussion at the present time and I am satisfied that we will arrive at a solution of that problem. The Generalissimo has also definitely stated he will, with American assistance, reorganize his entire military establishment and his civil government in a manner to promote cooperation in our joint war effort.

The Generalissimo did tell me that he was prepared to give General Stilwell the command in deference to your wishes. At the same time he stated that he had no confidence in Stilwell but now that you had a representative with him and he could be in closer contact with you and for the purpose of creating harmany he would give Stilwell his complete confidence and try to make a fresh beginning. After this statement was made, Stilwell repeatedly showed that he had no intention of cooperating with the Generalissimo; his one intention was to subjugate him. Stilwell's fundamental mistake is in the idea that he can subjugate a man who has led a nation in revolution and who has led an ill-fed, poorly equipped, practically unorganized army against an overwhelming foe for 7 years. My opinion is that if you sustain Stilwell in this controversy you will lose Chiang Kai-shek and possibly you will lose China with him. Therefore, if you are not going to appoint some other American officer we should withdraw from China. I do not agree with what you have said in your telegram to Chiang Kai-shek to the effect that America declines to take the responsibility of the situation in China for fear of a collapse. It is because there is danger of a collapse that America should assume the responsibility. The impasse between General Stilwell and the Generalissimo is big with potentialities involving a prolongation of the war and increased cost to America in material and blood. If we permit China to collapse; if we fail to keep the Chinese Army in the war all the angels in heaven swearing that we were right in sustaining Stilwell will not change the verdict of history. America will have failed in China. I am convinced that we can keep China in the war; that we can reorganize the Chinese Army; and that we can work through the Generalissimo. We cannot do this with Stilwell. I see nothing to be achieved by prolonging the debate as to whether Chiang Kai-shek or Stilwell is responsible for the present situation. Such a debate is another Sampson-Schley controversy that will not settle anything. I am opposed to the plan suggested in General Stilwell's telegram to General Marshall of October 10 advocating the setting up of a military committee in Chungking. The committee he suggests would be purely advisory. It would be adding bureaucracy to an already unsound situation. The plan would complicate rather than simplify the present difficulties. If we are going to remain in China we should accept the Generalissimo's offer to appoint an American general in command of all the ground and air forces of China under the Generalissimo. We should require that the American general be given adequate authority. He should not be hampered by any fifth wheel supervisory or advisory committee as suggested by Stilwell.

The Generalissimo's prestige has suffered because of his reverses in East China. Relying on a cable from Dr. Kung in Washington he believed his action had your approval when he made public his refusal to appoint Stilwell. If you force him to publicly back down his usefullness will be diminished if not destroyed.

All the propaganda going on about China selling lend-lease supplies is absurd. All lend-lease supplies going to China have been handled by our own establishment and given directly to the troops by our own officers. China has had very little lend lease either to use or to sell. There have been abuses of lend-lease supplies in other parts of the world. There, no doubt, will be in China if the situation is not carefully guarded. Up to this time the selling of lend-lease supplies by Chinese is a myth. The idea that China is a republic is also a myth. It is trying to be a republic. It is endeavoring to proceed along democratic lines. It is in effect a dictatorship at present.

I recommend that you appoint an American general who will be acceptable to the Generalissimo. The general selected should be young. He should be a man of experience, ability, breadth of vision, and mental resiliency that will enable him to be tolerant of other people's view but strong enough and persuasive enough to lead. For example, a man like General Handy, General Marshall's Chief of Operations, would, I think, be able to harmonize, reorganize, and retrieve America's position in China. I do not know whether Handy would be available or not. I am using him as the type. There are others. We should accept the responsibility which the Generalissimo wishes to give America for the command of all the ground and air forces in China; for the reorganization of his service of supply; for the training of his army and every other respon-

> sibility that he will give American officers with adequate authority. We should prevent the collapse of China. The situation in China is chaotic but it is not hopeless. General Stilwell is not only in controversy with the Generalissimo, he is having difficulties with certain elements of his own command and he is having other difficulties of an international nature. Stilwell is a fine man. He has my respect and admiration but we should keep China in the war and we can't do that with Stilwell. He is not the man for the job. General Marshall will, no doubt, give him a command that will add to the splendid reputation he has already earned. Notwithstanding all this I respectfully recommend that you relieve General Stilwell and appoint another American general to command all the land and air forces in China under the Generalissimo.

Senator KNOWLAND. A procedural matter?

Senator BREWSTER. Is this on my time? I would like to protect myself as far as I can.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have not got much to protect, Senator. We will allow you about 3 minutes.

Senator KNOWLAND. A procedural matter. On this I notice that the first cable has not been taken out by the censor even though General Hurley had mentioned at that time it was classified as top secret. So I am just assuming that Admiral Davis has information to the effect that since 1944 the codes have been so changed that there is nothing of security value that, at least, in that instance prevented the material from being made available in the public record, because I have the first of the public transcript before me. Now whether all the decisions will be that way, I have no way of knowing.

Chairman RUSSELL. That will be up to his judgment under the duties with which he is charged.

Senator Brewster, we will allow you 3 minutes.

Senator BREWSTER. Three minutes?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. Thank you, sir. I appreciate your generosity and your courtesy.

POLICY IN IRAN

I want to turn to another phase now, to what Chairman Russell examined at some length on—Iran—which I think is a very integral part of this whole global situation, and I will not read the portions of what I think should be considered justly famous letters of 1943 and 1944 on the situation in Iran.

But, calling attention to the excerpts appearing on pages 7477 to 7480, and to the letter of President Roosevelt, March 25, 1944, I will read portions of his language.

> I am thrilled with the idea of using our efforts in Iran as an example of what can be done by an unselfish American policy. If we can get the right kind of American experts who remain loyal to their ideals, I feel certain that our policy of aid in Iran will succeed.

Can you reconcile your letter and advices for free enterprise and for the soverignty of Iran with the communication of our State Department this past month that we will not allow any American oil experts to assist Iran in the operation of their oil fields?

General HURLEY. Of course, it can't be reconciled because, as I attempted to show yesterday, we had decided to support imperialism in the Middle East sphere of influence, and imperialism cannot be reconciled with the free operation of the property within the imperial sphere by the owners of the property.

Senator **Brewster**. That is made entirely clear in the early part of your letter which I will not read, but to which I referred.

[Deleted.]

Senator **Brewster**. One other question:

CHINESE CASUALTIES IN CIVIL WAR

I asked others who have appeared here about the official announcements of casualties in the early stages of the war in China.

The official announcements of General Mao Tse-tung is that he had 1,494,000 casualties during the 3 years from 1946 to 1949; and a summary of the Chinese Nationalists announcements, since Japan invaded Manchuria in September of 1931, with the general war beginning at the Marco Polo Bridge in July 1937 and lasting until August 1945, when they announced officially, the official figures, that they had 22 important battles with the Japanese; 1,117 major engagements; 38,931 minor and guerrilla engagements, in the course of which the Chinese Nationalists suffered 3,211,419 casualties, of which 1,319,958 were killed, 1,761,335 were wounded, and 130,126 were missing.

I will simply ask you whether you have any reason to doubt the reports of casualties on either side, as announced by General Mao Tse-tung of 1,494,000; or of the Nationalist Chinese official announcements? Is there any doubt that those are substantially correct, representing the sacrifies in that great conflict?

General **Hurley**. Well, Senator, I would have to say, in reply to that, that I have learned to distrust Chinese statistics, during all the controversies.

For instance, I was adivsed by cable that 15,000 men had been killed, and sixty-odd thousand wounded in a battle, and I felt that I had to go to the scene, or as close to it as could be possible, and to have the situation investigated.

There were just exactly two people killed.

Now, I am saying that to you, to tell you that we would all be misled, and no doubt have been before, and before I get through here, a lot of people will say that I was, by relying upon statistics and figures that are solemnly presented to you.

Senator **Brewster**. Does that apply to other——

General **Hurley**. I do think that the casualties suffered by the Communists in their war against the government, after VJ–day, were high. They did suffer casualties while Chiang Kai-shek's army had American equipment and American advice.

Senator **Brewster**. While the Nationalists were fighting——

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Brewster, your time has expired.

The time of the witness does not expire here, General, as you found out.

Senator **Wiley**. Witnesses don't seem to expire.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Cain?

Senator **Cain**. General Hurley, I believe it to be so that every thinking American, every student of contemporary history, will be continuingly grateful for the information which you are making available to this committee.

It seems to me that as a direct result of your visit with us, that contemporary history books covering the period from about 1940 to date will be in need of substantial revision.

EFFECTS OF YALTA AGREEMENTS

I want, sir, to lay a foundation in about a minute's time against which I ask a question in an effort to secure some additional information out of your considered and singular experience. The foundation begins on page 7436 of the record of yesterday, on which you said:

> Beginning at Yalta in February 1945, our foreign policy changed from the support of the principles of the Atlantic Charter to a policy based on concessions to communism and imperialism, and fear of Russia, rather than on confidence in America. Confidence in America is a better basis for a foreign policy than fear of communism.

Parenthetically I can only say amen.

> We surrendered—

You said yesterday—

> in that secret agreement the objectives for which we had told the American people we were fighting. Since Yalta, our Government has failed to evolve a positive foreign policy worthy of the men who had died to uphold the principles of individual liberty, self-government, and justice.

General Hurley, on page 7453 you said this:

> This document—

referring to the Yalta agreement—

> was kept secret from me, as Ambassasor to China, from the President of China, from the Chinese people, and from the people of the United States.
>
> It is well known that the Russian and Chinese Communists and the Japanese knew of this agreement. I learned of its existence through the Chinese armed Communists.
>
> Later I queried the State Department about the agreement and was advised that the State Department knew nothing about the agreement.

One further reference which I find, sir, on page 7462 in which you said this:

> * * * your diplomats and mine surrendered in secret every principle for which we said we were fighting. They talk about Stalin breaking his agreements, gentlemen. He never had to break one. We cowardly surrendered to him everything that he had signed and we did it in secret. President Roosevelt was already a sick man at Yalta.

General Hurley, I am not unmindful of the close and intimate relationship which existed between yourself and President Roosevelt over a long period of time. It therefore seems logical to me that when you were advised of the Yalta agreement, that you must have done everything within your power to convince those in the highest authority of this country that a grievous if not a fatal mistake had been made.

ROOSEVELT RECONSIDERATION OF YALTA

Will you please, sir, relate to us what conversations if any you had with the late President Roosevelt about the Yalta agreements and what steps if any were authorized by him in an undertaking to undo what you thought was a fatal or grievous wrong. That, sir, is my question, and I give to you the remainder of my time to answer it as you will.

General HURLEY. Well, Senator Cain, of course, I appreciate the opportunity, but I think it would be unbecoming for me not only because President Roosevelt is dead, but because I did have his confidence, to attempt at this time to quote him.

I will tell you a few of the results of my conversation with him, and I don't want to be in contempt of the committee, but I hope you will spare me any quotation of Franklin Roosevelt.

Senator CAIN. General Hurley, will you permit me this observation. It is not my desire to embarrass either yourself or the late President Roosevelt. All I seek is the substance of conversations and steps resulting from those conversations if there were any, sir.

General HURLEY. When I returned from China after I found out there was a secret agreement, I heard all kinds of rumors about what it was and how it was——

Senator WILEY. About what date?

General HURLEY. I left there late in February within weeks after the Yalta agreement. The Yalta agreement was—I might have left there in March, early March, because I had already heard and my telegrams will show that I had heard that there was a secret agreement.

Senator WILEY. 1945?

General HURLEY. That is in 1945. I asked permission to come to Washington to discuss the present situation. I was very careful not to be misled about what I had heard. I arrived in Washington, and after the State Department had told me that they didn't know of any secret agreement when I asked for it, I went to the White House and—now to preface my answer to the Senator, Franklin Roosevelt and I had been friends for many years.

I married a daughter of an officer in the Navy. We were married at the time when Frank was Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Our personal relations had always been close.

Politically we had been opposed. I am a Republican, and, as he often told me, a partisan Republican. I am really a Southern Federalist, and they take their politics seriously, because they don't expect any political preferment.

But the fact is that we remained close. I had an affectionate regard for him. He was brilliant; he had a sense of humor that was equal to the late Will Rogers'.

MEETING WITH ROOSEVELT IN MARCH 1945

So when I came back, I felt that he had done something that was unusual and damaging to the cause which I knew from experience he was attempting to achieve, to succeed in doing in the war. So I went to the White House and was finally shown in, and I went over, figuratively speaking, with my ears back and my teeth skinned, to have a fight about what had been done.

When the President reached up that fine, firm, strong hand of his to shake hands with me, what I found in my hand was a very loose bag of bones.

Then I looked at him closely, and the skin seemed to be pasted down on his cheekbones; and, you know, all the fight that I had in me went out. I backed up and sat down in the chair beside him, and I said, "How are you getting along? How is your health? You are looking fine."

From there I went into a discussion of Yalta, but very cautiously, not like I would with any of you gentlemen who are here. I wasn't aggressive.

The President told me I was mistaken, that he hadn't surrendered anything. And I said, "You remember I told you while we were sitting in the car together, everybody was trying to make you go aboard the plane, but you wanted to tell me something at Teheran, and I told you, Mr. President, that you were going too far trying to get the consolidation of forces and that they would possibly claim all of those as concessions by you." The President's hand at that time was resting over the arm of the car between us where we were sitting, and I recall that he said to me, "I know what is the matter with you, Pat. You think I am going to get where I can't get what we are fighting for. You think that this thing is building up against us."

And with that fine, firm hand of his, he turned it over like that. He said, "I can change that situation that easily."

And the thing that struck me the morning I sat down with him in the White House after I had returned from China was that "I still think he could change it that easily, but how long is he going to be able to turn his hand?" And that is when I was struck with the certain alarm, because I felt that we had surrendered. Even in his last speech he spoke of upholding the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

So I quietly told him, but not too much, but I told him enough that he thought about it, and he sent for me the next morning again.

He still contended that he hadn't done what I said he had done, surrendering the territorial integrity and the political independence of China. He attacked that in his usual good vigorous language.

Finally I asked him if he would let me see what the papers were, and he said no, that those were supposed to be secret from everyone, but finally he permitted me to read—I believe it was Admiral Wilson Jones—no, Wilson Brown, that he called in. And he wouldn't give me copy, but I did read, and I went out in Pa Watson's office and took a pencil while my memory would serve and I wrote the highlights of the Yalta agreement in pencil.

Well, it seems I was so familiar with the situation then that I got it almost correctly. The President still wasn't going to give it to me, and still was of the opinion, as he said, of "Your seeing ghosts again."

Well, I continued to talk, and finally I got a copy of the agreement.

Senator WILEY. What date?

RECONSIDERATION OF YALTA AGREEMENT AND ATTEMPT TO CHANGE IT

General HURLEY. That would be in March, along possibly the middle of March. I went back to see President Roosevelt and by this time he told me that there are some of the features of that "that justify your fear. I would like for you to go to London and see Churchill to ameliorate that agreement. It has got some things in it"—he said, "I would like for you to go to Moscow and see Stalin." Well, now I am not quoting the President, but the record shows that I did go to London; I did report to him my conversations with Churchill. I did leave London to fly to Moscow, and when I landed in Tehran I received the word that Roosevelt had died.

I immediately wired President Truman, as is usual, telling him that I wasn't now fulfilling my office as Ambassador to China; I had traveled to these other capitals by personal direction of the President of the United States, and I wished him to tell me before I proceeded further whether I should carry on or return to my office.

I immediately received a cable from the President telling me to carry on under the instructions of President Roosevelt.

Now, in this book it tells about my conversation with Stalin, because there were a number of other people present——

Senator WILEY. The white book, you mean?

General HURLEY. This is the white book, United States relations with China, and for your information at this point, I would like to read—how far can I go, "Chinese Communists," I will have to find it—but we will get it here some place.

I am sorry, Senator, I am taking time to do this. "The Adjournment of the Conference"—it is before that; "Conference at Chungking," "The Conference at Moscow," "The Three Point Plan," "General Hurley's Instructions in Regard to Moscow"—here it is:

> I am convinced——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What page?

General HURLEY. That is page 82.

> I am convinced that our Government was right in its decision to support the National Government of China and the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator WILEY. What is the date of that, for the record?

General HURLEY. That is not dated in here but it is, I think, February 1945.

Just one moment; I have got to find this final conference with Stalin on this, "China and the Soviet Union," "What Hurley said about that"; yes, here you are, and it is on page 97 of the white paper.

Senator WILEY. The date?

HURLEY REPORT ON MOSCOW MEETING, 1945

General HURLEY. April 19, 1945 (reading):

> On April 19, 1945, Ambassador Harriman discussed General Hurley's report with Mr. E. F. Stanton of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State.

This is not a quotation from Harriman; it states what he said in the third person.

> The memorandum of conversation indicated that Mr. Harriman felt that General Hurley's report, while factually accurate, gave a "too optimistic impression of Marshal Stalin's reactions." Mr. Harriman was certain that Marshal Stalin would not cooperate indefinitely with Chiang Kai-shek and that if and when Russia entered the conflict in the Far East he would make full use of and would support the Chinese Communists even to the extent of setting up a puppet government in Manchuria—

now, you can go on with a lot there, but I will get more of what he said.

> Russia would not—

no—

> his idea that Russia would not pursue whatever course of action seemed to them best to serve their interests—

again too optimistic.

> Harriman feared that Ambassador Hurley might give Chiang Kai-shek an "overoptimistic account of his conversations with Stalin" and he thought it might be advisable to suggest to General Hurley that he should be careful

"not to arouse unfounded expectations." On April 23 Secretary Stettinius instructed Ambassador Hurley as follows:

well, that takes me down and tells me that we will continue to support Chiang Kai-shek, but to emphasize to Marshal Stalin the way that is—

> However, at the same time I feel, as I have no doubt you do also, the necessity of facing the probability that Marshal Stalin's offer is given in direct relation to circumstances that are existing now and that may not long continue.

Now, what I am trying to say to you gentlemen is that no one questions—even when Edgar Snow wrote in the Saturday Evening Post that I waltzed into Stalin's office and that I knew him very well, and that in a breezy southwest manner I said, "Joe, what will you settle for in China?" Well, gentlemen, that is absurd. I had in my pocket by that time the Yalta secret agreement. I knew what Stalin had settled for in China. That is all absurd, and there are books and reams of it written, but this that Harriman is telling is true; but he said that the report I made to the President was factually correct, but that I was overly enthusiastic.

Well, gentlemen, when there was the Yalta secret agreement, and Roosevelt said, "Go ahead ameliorate it or set it aside, and return to the fundamental principles that you have been fighting for, because they are mine; return to the Atlantic Charter—I never intended to set it aside," now, when you are up against a signed secret agreement of two nations, great nations, if you are going to carry anything you had better be a little enthusiastic, and you had better fight pretty enthusiastically for what you are trying to do.

RESULTS OF HURLEY ATTEMPT TO AMELIORATE YALTA PROTOCOL

When I left Stalin, still mindful of what Roosevelt wanted me to do, I went to Chungking. There, of course, I met the press, as usual; and they said, "You saw President Roosevelt before his death?" "Yes." "You went to see Prime Minister Churchill in England?" "Yes." "We have seen that you visited Stalin in Moscow." "Yes." "Well, could you tell us, did these meetings have any effect on the American policy?" Well, I said, "Yes; in a way. America, Great Britain, and Russia have agreed that they will respect the territorial integrity and the political independence of China, and they will support the efforts of the Chinese people to establish self-government for themselves."

Now, that is very short. It got in the London papers—first, when I said this, as Senator Green knows when I was before his committee before—they said, "Well, that is a nice story, but there isn't any record of it. It was all verbal."

Well, it would have been if the newspapers hadn't published that statement made by me; and the next day on the floor of Parliament in London, the opposition asked the Government—and I have here Ambassador Winant's report on it, but I won't put that in the record, but I will state what it was about—the opposition asked the Government—

> if the statement issued by the American Ambassador in Chungking yesterday properly represents the present British policy in China.

And the answer by the Government said:

> I presume you mean by that General Hurley's statement of yesterday?
> Yes; that is the statement.

> Does that represent our policy?

The answer was—

> That represents substantially the present policy.

Now, that was the reason I was enthusiastic; I thought that I had things moving, and I still believe that with Franklin Roosevelt's understanding the situation as he did, I might yet have blocked the results of the secret agreement at Yalta, and I admit that I was over-enthusiastic. I admit that I stated my case in the most enthusiastic language at my command.

I was trying to do this, but the next thing I had was a cable from the State Department in which they say that they are irrevocably committed to the agreement signed at Yalta; in other words, I was making a little dent on Britain and Russia, but I could not move the American State Department; and that, my friends, I think, brings you to what I consider the saddest defeat that I suffered, and I believe that I was still carrying into effect or attempting to, the wishes of Franklin Roosevelt. That is what I meant when I said to you yesterday that when the Yalta secret betrayal of China was written, that Franklin Roosevelt was a sick man, and I have not believed that it was his work.

His conversations and instructions and directives to me, both before and after Yalta, indicate to me that that does not represent the objectives for which Franklin Roosevelt was fighting.

Now, does that answer your question?

Senator CAIN. My time has long since expired. I shall return to this subject. You have taught me much. I wish to know more, sir. I thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, we are supposed to have a joint session in the House to welcome the president of a distinguished neighboring American Republic at 12:30, I believe. In view of that fact, I think it might be well for us to recess now until 2:30 this afternoon

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m. the committee recessed until 2:30 the same afternoon.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Green, McMahon, Sparkman, Wiley, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Lodge, Johnson (Texas), Bridges, Knowland, Cain, and Flanders.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committees will come to order.

Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Hurley, there was much discussion at the time of your resignation as Ambassador to China. Your criticism at that time was that you believed there existed unethical conduct on the part of certain attachés or members of the Foreign Service in China. I wonder if you could enlighten us in your own way as to that episode and as to what was going on, especially with reference to any soft policy toward the Chinese Communists that existed in the field, that is, in the State Department field, in China at that time.

I do not want to ask you just specific questions, but if you care to give us a narrative of that situation.

General HURLEY. Yes; I will be delighted to answer that, Senator.

A little over 5 years ago I appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee, and I brought with me 12 documents, which I asked be decoded and paraphrased. I presented the list to Senator Connally, who was chairman, but they were not decoded and were not furnished to me, and I was told they were secret and that I could not use them.

Now, before I begin on that phase, there is another prior to that and after the release of Stilwell, and after the death of President Roosevelt, that I think should chronologically come in there. But I am willing to go whichever way the Senator wishes me to.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I wish you would proceed in your own way to recite that.

General HURLEY. Thank you, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And give the chronological steps as you see them. And I think we should have those documents if you have them.

General HURLEY. This would make it chronological if I put this in before what you have asked me for.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. All right.

ROOSEVELT MESSAGE TO HURLEY ON INDOCHINA, 1944

I have here a message from President Roosevelt. Unfortunately, the date is not on it, but the number is 263767, in which the President said:

> Inform Wedemeyer that United States policy with regard to French Indochina cannot be formulated until after consultation with the allies at a forthcoming combined staff conference.
>
> Please keep me informed on activities of the British, French, and Dutch missions, southeastern Asia.

Well, of course that is about like sending a telegram to Washington and saying "Keep me informed on what is transpiring in Tucson, Ariz."

HURLEY REPLY TO ROOSEVELT MESSAGE

It took a little time for me to get it, but I replied to President Roosevelt under date of November 26, 1944:

> Replying to your No. 20, November 16, the British, French, Dutch in Far East are bound together by a vital common interest, namely, repossession of their colonial empires and reestablishment therein of imperial governments.
>
> This common interest is vital to them because without their empires Britain, France, and the Netherlands would be impoverished at home. This interest is binding because it is based on the desire of the British to extend to the Far East the same character of imperial hegemony as the three great imperialist nations have arranged for the control of Western Europe.
>
> The three great empires must operate together as long as there is such strong opposition to imperialism. You may therefore expect Britain, France, and the Netherlands to disregard the Atlantic Charter and all of the promises made to other nations by which they obtained support in the earlier stages of the war. The most certain guaranty that the three imperial nations can have of attaining their imperialistic aims is through unified policy and action.
>
> In the foregoing you have an outline of the reasons why the council of the three empires recently formed at Kandy has been built up without the consent or the approval of the United States.

Now to get back to President Roosevelt as to what his attitude was, he said in a speech on March 1 to Congress:

> It cannot be a structure complete. It cannot be some people think a structure of complete perfection is at first, but it can be a peace and it will be a peace based on the sound principles of the Atlantic Charter, on the concept of the dignity of the human being, and on the guaranties of tolerance and freedom of religious worship.

Now, that to my mind, which came after Yalta, seemed to indicate that the President was still supporting the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The President, as I told you in the morning session, died after I had left London and before I arrived in Moscow. I have related my conference with Marshal Stalin.

HURLEY MESSAGE TO STATE DEPARTMENT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1945

But on May 28, 1945—this is after the death of President Roosevelt—I sent this query:

> After conferences with both British and Russian Ambassadors here, I am assured that for the time being they are directed to support the understanding we had with Churchill and Stalin which is (1) the unification of all the armed forces in China under the National Government, and (2) to endorse the aspirations of the Chinese people and to support their efforts to achieve a free united democratic government for China.
>
> We have two major pressing controversies affecting the present situation and the future of democracy and imperialism in Asia. They are both still unsettled. Those controversies involve Hong Kong and Indochina. Events that have taken place recently indicate that you will soon be called upon to make important decisions pertaining to those two areas.
>
> I have, therefore, thought it proper in compliance with the request made by President Roosevelt to supply you with such factual background as I possess which may be helpful to you in making your decisions.

[Deleted.]

> By message dated November 17, 1944, President Roosevelt directed me to inform General Wedemeyer that no policy would be promulgated on Indochina until after the forthcoming combined staff conference.
>
> The President also directed me to keep him informed as to the activities of the French, Dutch, British missions in southeast Asia.
>
> The President had already discussed the Indochina situation with me personally. He was not pleased with the fact that the Vichy French of Indochina had collaborated with Japan. He was in favor of the establishment of a United Nations or international trusteeship under whose care and tutelage Indochina could secure independence according to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.
>
> Neither General Wedemeyer nor myself has ever been given a definite written directive on the political policy regarding Indochina.
>
> Indochina was originally placed and has remained in the Chinese military theater under the supreme command of Chiang Kai-shek. Wedemeyer, as chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek, has been constantly faced with the necessity of making military decisions pertaining to Indochina.
>
> I will not attempt to outline the military situation or the operations of our Air Force in Indochina, as all of the facts pertaining thereto are available to you through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The fact to bear in mind is that Indochina is and has been since the beginning in the China theater of war under the supreme command of the generalissimo.
>
> The French Ambassador and the military mission have become exacting in their demands for American support for the French activities in Indochina. The French demand American war supplies as a matter of right. A considerable number of refugees have come over from Indochina into China.
>
> Wedemeyer has in all cases possible furnished these refugees food, shelter, medical supplies, hospitalization, and transportation, and has flown some of them to Kunming and some to India.

In my last conference with President Roosevelt I informed him fully on the Indochina situation. I told him that the French, British, and Dutch were cooperating to prevent the establishment of a United Nations trusteeship in Indochina. The imperialist leaders believed that such a trusteeship would be a bad precedent for the other imperialist areas in southeast Asia.

I told the President also that the British would attempt with the use of our lend-lease supplies, if possible our manpower, to occupy Indochina and to reestablish therein the French imperial control.

I suggested to the President that for my own guidance and in order to clarify Wedemeyer's position, I thought we should have a written directive. The President said that in the forthcoming San Francisco Conference there would be set up a United Nations trusteeship that would make effective the right of colonial people to choose the form of government under which they will live as soon as in the opinion of the United Nations they qualified for independence.

Recently there emerged two points that have influence on the Indochina controversy. In the San Francisco Conference China seemed to have stood with Russia for the kind of United Nations international trusteeship for dependent people that President Roosevelt favored.

The American delegation at San Francisco seemed to support the theory of the imperial control of colonies and dependent nations by the separate or combined imperialistic nations, not by a United Nations trusteeship. These two points seem to indicate a change in the American policy.

There is always the possibility that by reason of lack of correct news from the conference, both ourselves and the public here may misunderstand the American policy. There is a growing opinion throughout Asia that American favors imperialism rather than democracy. This in my opinion is unjustified and should be corrected. I am certain America does not favor imperialism. If America is not opposed to imperialism in Asia, it is in conflict with the Roosevelt policy; it is in conflict with the Hull policy; it is in conflict with the principles of the Atlantic Charter; it is in conflict with the principles of the Iran Declaration; it is in conflict with the policies which all of the nations, including the imperialistic nations, gave support when they were asking the United States to join the fight for liberty and democracy.

It is in conflict with the policy on which the United States committed lend-lease, all of the American resources for war, for democracy in Asia. It is in conflict with the policy that the United States invoked as our reason for the defeat and the destruction of the Japanese imperialism.

On May the 11th I sent a telegram to the Secretary of State indicating that it would be helpful to me in view of the increasing importance of Indochina as a factor in the dispute between imperialism and democracy if the Department would telegraph for my secret information the substance of the Yalta decision on policy in regard to Indochina that has changed the Roosevelt policy.

In that telegram I stated that I was familiar with the Roosevelt policy but I am seeking now to ascertain whether or not the Roosevelt policy has been changed. Under date of May the 18th the State Department replied:

"No Yalta decision relating to Indochina known to Department. Military and political policy papers now under consideration will be transmitted for your secret information when approved."

This May 18 telegram from the State Department is not in the same words but to the same effect as President Roosevelt's telegram to me dated November the 17th, 1944, which said:

"The United States policy with regard to Indochina cannot be promulgated until after the consultations with the allies at the forthcoming combined staff conference."

In other words, I had been definitely directed verbally by President Roosevelt in regard to his policy in Indochina, but we in this theater have never received a written directive on the political policy of the United States in Indochina itself. It is in this situation we find ourselves when Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Supreme British Commander in southeast Asia informed Wedemeyer by cable that he is flying British sorties into Indochina, which is not in his theater, without the consent of the theater commander, the Generalissimo, and without the consent or cooperation of General Wedemeyer.

This military phase of the situation is being submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Wedemeyer. Lord Mountbatten is using American lend-lease supplies and other military equipment to invade Indochina and to defeat what we believe is the American policy.

Attention is called to the fact that Lord Louis very recently requested General Sultan, United States India-Burma commander for a large increase in lend-lease supplies that will enable him to defeat the Roosevelt policy in Indochina and reestablish imperialism there.

If you, sir, are opposed to Lord Louis' political objectives in Indochina, I suggest that our Government stop giving him lend-lease supplies and deny him the use of American forces and other American resources.

The move of the imperialist powers to use American resources to enable them to move into Indochina is not for the purpose of participating in the main battle against Japan, and such a move would have only two political objectives: the reestablishment of the imperialism in Indochina, and the placing of the British forces in a position where they could occupy Hong Kong and prevent a return of China to that area.

It would clarify the situation in Asia for all of us if we could be given one, a definite Indochina policy, a definite Hong Kong policy, or if we could be directed to follow what we know to have been the Roosevelt policy in both areas.

PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO HURLEY ON INDOCHINA

On June the 10th I received from the State Department the following cable:

The President thanks you (for the Ambassador from the Acting Secretary) for your considerate telegram in regard to the problem presented by the reestablishment of French control in Indochina and the British desire to reoccupy Hong Kong, and fully appreciates the difficulties in which you and General Wedemeyer may be placed on account of the lack of specific directions, in respect to both of these problems which have been under careful study here, both in connection with the discussions at San Francisco.

I have also received your message No. 1548 of June 6, and regret to say that there has been a delay in replying to your early one coming—

that is "owing," this is a carbon copy, and I am not reading it well—

owing to the study which has been required in these matters, in connection with the present developments in the Conference.

The President has asked me to say to you that there has been no basic change in the policy in respect to these two questions, and that the President's present policy is as follows.

You see, that tells me there has been no change.

Now, let's read what follows.

The President assumes that you are familiar with the statements made by the Secretary of State April 3, 1945, with the approval of President Roosevelt, in which Mr. Stettinius declared that as a result of the Yalta discussions the trusteeship structure, it was felt, should be defined to permit the placing under it of such of the territories taken from the enemy in war as might be agreed upon at a later date, and also such other territories as might voluntarily be placed under it. The position thus publicly announced has been confirmed in conversations which are now taking place in San Francisco in regard to trusteeships.

Throughout these discussions the American delegation has insisted upon the necessity of providing for a progressive measure of self-government for all dependent people, looking toward their eventual independence and incorporation in some form of federation according to circumstances and ability of the people to assume these responsibilities.

Such decisions would preclude the establishment of a trusteeship in Indochina, except under the French Government. The latter seems unlikely. Nevertheless, it is the President's intention at some appropriate time to ask that the French Government give some positive indication of its intention in regard to the establishment of basic liberties and an increasing measure of self-government in Indochina before formulating further declarations of policy in this respect.

In the meantime, the President has explained to the French Minister that whereas we welcome French participation in the war against Japan, the determination of the exact extent that it would be practicable and helpful to have the French join us in such operations must be left to the commander in chief of the United States Armed Forces in the Pacific.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are at present engaged in a study of the possibilities of French help along the lines of the following suggestions; while avoiding as far as practicable any unnecessary or long-term commitments with regard to the amount or character of any assistance which the United States may give French resistance forces in Indochina, this Government should continue to afford such assistance as does not interfere with the requirements of other planned operations. Owing to the need for concentrating all of our resources in the Pacific on operations already planned, large-scale military operations aimed directly at the liberation of Indochina cannot, however, be contemplated at this time.

American troops would not be used in Indochina except in American military operations against Japan.

French offers of military and naval assistance in the Pacific should be considered on their own military merits as bearing on the objective of defeating Japan as in the case of the British and Dutch proposals.

There would be no objection to furnishing of assistance to any French military or naval forces so approved, regardless of the theater of operations from which the assistance may be sent, provided such assistance does not involve a diversion of the resources which the Combined Chiefs of Staff consider are needed elsewhere.

With regard to the British desire to resume control of Hong Kong, the President is fully aware of the importance which the Chinese Government attaches to the return of this port to its control, and considers that arrangements should be made between the British and the Chinese Government, with whatever help we may give at the proper time, to conclude a mutually satisfactory settlement, which does not prejudice either the legitimate aspirations of the Chinese people or the particular strategic requirements of the present war against Japan.

The President is glad to have your assurances in regard to the instructions which the British and Russian Ambassadors have received to support the unification of all the Armed Forces in China under the National Government and to the end that the aspirations of the Chinese people and the support of their efforts to achieve a free, united China. We hope you will continue to keep us fully informed about various aspects of the problem which you mentioned.

To that I replied that—

I received your directive and it will be complied with so far as it lies in my ability to do so.

Now, my purpose in reading that is that there again you have a reaffirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter after Yalta, after they had been surrendered, and there you have an entirely different policy, a change of policy, to support of imperialism and a departure from the support of the principles that we said we were fighting for in the Atlantic Charter.

Now I am ready to return to Senator Hickenlooper's question.

Senator McMahon. How long did it take?

Chairman Russell. I beg your pardon?

Senator McMahon. Have you any estimate as to the length of time it took? I am curious.

Chairman Russell. The committee reassembled at 2:32.

Had you concluded your statement, General?

Senator Hickenlooper. My time for asking questions has expired. I will have to ask further questions on the next round, because my time has now expired.

General Hurley. I am sorry.

Senator Hickenlooper. That is all right.

Chairman Russell. Senator Stennis.

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Flanders.

Senator Flanders. No questions.

Chairman Russell. Senator Long.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon.

Senator MCMAHON. In looking through the Washington Post files of November 29, 1945, on page 2, column 2, there is a report of a speech made by General Hurley before the National Press Club on November 28. It contained the following direct quotation:

> "The only difference between Chinese Communists and Oklahoma Republicans," he said, grinning, "is that the Oklahoma Republicans aren't armed."

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AND FUCHS CASE

This morning General Hurley in his testimony stated that the atomic-energy investigation had been made and had been certified to security, and that 6 months later Dr. Fuchs had been turned up.

That statement made by General Hurley was, of course, made, I am sure, in ignorance of what the facts were. But I think it should be stated for the record that since the Atomic Energy Commission has taken over the administration of the project neither the investigation nor the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has charge of making investigations, has turned up anyone who has breached our security.

It may well be that that will come to pass, but the fact of the matter is that so far none has been disclosed.

The Fuchs case and the other cases to which you have referred took place when the project was under the administration of General Leslie Groves, who was in charge of the Manhattan District. I think it is very important that the record should be straight on this point.

HURLEY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINESE COMMUNISTS, 1945

Now I would like to read into the record at this point, Mr. Chairman, some statements by this witness made when he was before the Foreign Relations Committee in 1945, and I quote from page 128 of a hearing dated December 6, 1945:

> Senator BRIDGES. General Hurley, in view of the statement which you have made here, in view of the letter written by Secretary Byrnes to a Member of the House and published and which you put in the record yesterday, would you be surprised if you were informed that a new directive or new directions have been given to General Marshall to the effect that he shall tell Chiang Kai-shek that certain concessions must be made to the Chinese Communists, and that our military aid and perhaps credit and so forth an so on will be held up unless that action is taken?
>
> General HURLEY. Well, the fact is that I continuously told the Chinese Government myself that it must approach the Communist problem, the Chinese Communist problem, from a broad, generous, statesmanlike attitude, and that the Government should be willing to make the most liberal political concessions to the Chinese Communist Party. The only requirement should be that it become a political party instead of an armed belligerent looking for arms with which to fight the Government of China, which we had recognized.
>
> Senator BRIDGES. General Hurley, when you went over there was your major directive, that you received privately, as I understand from your testimony yesterday, to prevent the collapse of the National Government of the Republic of China, and to keep them in the war against Japan?
>
> General HURLEY. Yes.
>
> Senator BRIDGES. What if the efforts of Mr. Service and others in the State Department had been carried out, and their recommendations, and the Communists, which were a very effective and belligerent group in China, were armed? Would that have interfered with the major policy entrusted to you as Ambassador to China?
>
> General HURLEY. If the Chinese Communists had been armed at that time, if they had been armed by us or by Russia or by Great Britain, it would, in my opinion, have made the collapse of the National Government inevitable, and the

documents I have asked the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to obtain I think will prove that the object was to arm the belligerent and withdraw support from the Government, which in my opinion was contrary to the American policy.

Whose objective was that, General Hurley, Senator Bridges asked.

General Hurley. I have stated that it was the objective of the Communists, the Communists armed party, and please distinguish between them and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, because they are different, and all of this Marshall Stalin and Commissar Molotov had been telling me, and throughout the entire period of the vicissitudes through which we passed so far as I know they have kept their word to me, that, as I stated yesterday, Russia—and this is my own analysis; it is not a quotation—does not recognize the Chinese armed Communist Party as Communists at all. Russia is not supporting the Chinese Communist Party. Russia does not desire civil war in China. Russia does not desire the division of China and the setting up of two governments. Russia desires closer and more harmonious relations with China.

Since these conversations with Mr. Molotov and Generalissimo Stalin, Russia has concluded with China the Sino-Soviet Pact and has exchanged letters solemnizing every one of these agreements.

The agreements, incidentally, which were made subsequently to Yalta, and as a result of the Yalta agreement.

I have read—

the general said—

that the Soviet has transgressed certain matters that involve the territorial integrity and the independent sovereignty of China, but frankly I have no evidence that would convince me that that is true. I believe that the United States and Russia are still together on policy in China.

DATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF ATOM BOMB

Now the general made a further statement yesterday, Mr. Chairman, in which he hazarded the opinion that the atomic bomb was completed before the Yalta Conference. This was a most astounding declaration to me because it flies in the face of all of the facts that we have been able to develop in 5 years of being connected with the committee.

I remember very well when the late Senator Vandenberg asked General Groves a question about this on November 29, 1945, and General Groves answered Senator Vandenberg, and it will be found in the hearings, to the effect that that absolutely was not so, that the bomb was exploded as soon as it was ready.

An official classified history of the Los Alamos project in the files of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy indicates that even the scientific computations on an atomic bomb had not been fully completed by March of 1945. In his official report on the winning of the war in Europe and the Pacific, General Marshall stated:

> For years the full resources of American and British science have been working on the principle of atomic fission.

General Groves' testimony on November 29, 1945, was as follows:

> The real secret of this development does not lie in the work that was done at Los Alamos, which was the development of the bomb itself; it was in the preparation of the material, that was the hard job.
>
> We were on the brink of failure; in fact, we were over the edge on the failure side many times and for long periods of time.

Then General Groves stated further in June of 1946 in an article in the Military Engineer:

> On July 16, 1945, the first atomic bomb was detonated in New Mexico—the first and only test. After 3 years of intensive effort and the expenditure of

almost $2,000,000,000, those in charge knew with certainty, for the first time, that this thing could be done.

Gen. Thomas F. Farrell, deputy to General Groves, was even more explicit in an official report to the War Department, reprinted in part in the Princeton edition of the Smythe report. Referring to the test explosion he wrote, and I quote:

> As the time interval grew smaller and changed from minutes to seconds, the tension increased by leaps and bounds. Everyone in that room knew the awful potentialities of the thing that they thought was about to happen. The scientists felt that their figuring must be right and that the bomb had to go off but there was in everyone's mind a strong measure of doubt. The feeling of many could be expressed by "Lord, I believe, help Thou mine unbelief."

General Farrell, I might say for the record, was a very highly esteemed employee of the District, in charge of construction, and has a very high place in the annals of the Manhattan project.

HURLEY VIEW ON CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND NATIONALISTS IN 1945

Now, I would also like to read into the record at this time an interview with General Hurley, which took place on Monday, April 2, 1945. This is from a transcript of the minutes prepared by the State Department, of a press and radio conference that the General had, and I quote the general's answer:

> You gentlemen should know, though—I believe you all do know that it is a matter of common knowledge that the Communist Party of China supports the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. That was generally referred to as the people's three principles of China. The three principles are government of the people, by the people, and for the people. All the demands that the Communist Party has been making have been on a democratic basis. That has led to the statement that the Communist Party in China are not, in fact, real Communists. The Communist Party of China is supporting exactly the same principles as those promulgated by the National Government of China and conceded to be objectives also of the National Government.
>
> Q. Sir, I am not sure that I understood that last sentence. You said the Communist Party is supporting the same principles as the National Government of China.
>
> A. Yes.
>
> Q. Could you tell us what is the divergence between them? How do they differ?
>
> A. Well, as a matter of fact, the divergence between the parties in China seems to be not in the objective desired because they both assert that they are for the establishment of a government in China that will decentralize authority and conduct itself along democratic lines, employing democratic processes. The divergence between them is the procedure by which they can be achieved. To go a little further, the Communist Party would like for the National Government to inaugurate certain reforms immediately and to do this, they have suggested a bipartisan coalition government. The National Government, that is, the Kuomintang Party, has stated that it has a program outlined by the liberator of China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen whereby the authority of the Government of China is to be returned to the people of China under a constitution and not to an aggregation of political parties.
>
> The National Government of China contends that it is now in the process of a meeting being held on the 5th of next month of a program whereby it will return control of the government to the people. The National Government claims that it would not be justified in turning over the authority of the Government to any organization or political parties or any coalition of politicians, but that it is the attitude of the National Government to return the control of China to the people and let the people select their own leaders.
>
> Q. General, what is the real difference between the Chinese Communists in China and the Communists in America, Britain, and elsewhere?

I want the record particularly to show this answer.

Senator **Knowland**. What is the Senator reading from?

Senator **McMahon**. I am reading from a press conference of the witness held on April 2, 1945—Monday April 2. Here is the answer to the qeustion:

> What is the real difference between the Communists in China and the Communists in America, Britain, and elsewhere?
>
> A. Well, I know the difference between the Republicans and the Democrats in Oklahoma but you are getting too deep for me when you are trying to make me outline the difference between foreign political parties.

Then there are several asterisks which appear in the interview, and then another question:

> Is this Communist delegate who has been appointed to the Chinese delegation really a Communist so far as you know?
>
> A. I think he is. I do know that he was their representative at Chungking and that he is now in Yenan and I have had many conferences with him. Now, to say whether he is a real Communist as you understand communism, I would not say that. I don't know because there is a question of whether any of the Chinese Communists are real Communists; but I do say this: That he does belong to the Communist Party and does cooperate with and serve that party. Now, to determine what is the degree of communism——

Chairman **Russell**. Senator McMahon, I regret to tell you that your time has expired.

Senator **McMahon**. I would like to finish the sentence.

> Now, to determine what is the degree of communism and what degree of communism it is I could not give you a definition of that.

Mr. Chairman, I have some other excerpts that I would like to put in the record. I suppose I will have to put them into the appendix, will I not?

Chairman **Russell**. How long are they?

Senator **McMahon**. They are not lengthy at all. I suppose they are about—well, I have one short quotation from Congressman Engel. I could read both of them into the record if I was given another 45 seconds.

Chairman **Russell**. Is there objection to his having another 45 seconds? The Chair hears none.

NATURE OF CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Senator **McMahon**. I want to quote from an address that Representative Engel made on December 8, 1945, when he addressed the Veterans of Foreign Wars in the State of Michigan:

> The most surprising thing I learned about this so-called Communist leader was that he was not a Communist at all—

meaning Mao Tse-tung—

> Joe Stilwell said he isn't; Pat Hurley said he isn't, and Joe Stalin called him an "ersatz Communist."

Now, the second quotation is short; and it is dated November 26, 1945, from his letter of resignation, where General Hurley stated:

> I am purposely omitting from this short paper a discussion of my negotiations with Great Britain and Russia for the recognition of the territorial integrity and independent sovereignty of China and the procurement from both of these nations of an agreement to support the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for themselves a free united democratic government.

This came after Yalta, which this witness, of course, does not think very much of.

> These negotiations, as you know, were successful and so far as Russia is concerned, were solemnized in a treaty and exchange of letters.

I have got a great deal more, but my time is up.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you desire to comment on that?

General HURLEY. Why, yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. The witness is accorded that right.

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AND FUCHS CASE

General HURLEY. It is quite long on the atomic energy matter. I had followed it, but I do recall that Senator McMahon presided on an investigation of that, and I may be mistaken, but I thought his report covered the Atomic Energy Commission and not a few months of that organization.

Senator MCMAHON. It covered all of it, General, but the point was that you don't know apparently that these spies were all under the Manhattan District. We investigated the Atomic Energy Commission, General. You didn't know that.

General HURLEY. Let me admit, so you don't have to say it, there are a lot of things I don't know, sir, but it isn't necessary to say that to me, because I am not going to quarrel with you about what you have said.

But I do know that your report did give the Atomic Energy organization a clean bill of health, a certificate of purity, and two of those acquitted by you are now under sentence of death, and Dr. Klaus Fuchs——

Senator MCMAHON. That is a downright misstatement of the facts. That is a downright misstatement of the facts.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, gentlemen, we will talk here one at a time, and——

General HURLEY. Then they are not under sentence of death, and Dr. Klaus Fuchs——

Chairman RUSSELL. Just one moment, please.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. We will proceed here in an orderly way. We have until now. I am in the hope that we will be able to conclude these hearings by next week, and I trust that we will keep our tempers, take our place whenever it comes, and then make such statements as each of us sees fit, without engendering any great heat.

You will proceed, Mr. Witness.

Senator MCMAHON. Mr. Chairman, I rise to a question of personal privilege. This witness has perverted a record of a committee of which I am chairman. He has stated something that every member of that committee knows is directly controverted by the facts of that investigation.

I think I have a right, as a Member of this Senate and as a member of the committee, to point out before this record goes out to the public that this is a downright misstatement of the facts.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, Senator McMahon, you have a right to rise to a point of personal privilege, and I recognize that right. However, we must proceed here in an orderly way.

I do not think that the right of personal privilege extends to the right to make the point at any time the person desires to make it.

When the witness has completed his statement, if you desire to make a statement of personal privilege, I will recognize you, but I prefer that you not interrupt the witness.

Senator McMAHON. I shall abide by the ruling of the Chair, of course.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, sir.

General HURLEY. On the atomic energy, I am not accusing Senator McMahon of any misstatement of fact, but I reassert that after his report—whatever it is, and I read it, and I thought it did clear these people; if it didn't I stand corrected—but I do know that then Dr. Klaus Fuchs confessed in London and Harry Gold confessed over here, and I do know that two people have been sentenced to death for treason and that others are in the penitentiary since that report was written.

If I am mistaken about that, I am willing for him to present that in the proper light to the public. I don't even resent the fact that he has charged me with misstatement of fact. If he has misstated me any place during all that long question he asked me, if he has misstated anything, I would rather say that he has been mistaken about something. I certainly don't want to engage in any personal controversy.

WARTIME COALITION EFFORTS OF UNITED STATES IN CHINA

Now, let me see if I can dissect that long statement. Remember that I was under a wartime directive in a theater of war to unify the military forces of China. That was wartime. It was not after the war. I was doing everything in my power to bring those forces together for the purpose of defeating Japan, and the President was saying "Hurry up; get it done."

Then the President had agreed with me in a decision which I made; and, understand, these policies are generated—they are evolved—as you go along, and one of the policies evolved by me and reported was not to arm the Chinese Communists with lend-lease supplies unless and until they had acknowledged the sovereignty and placed themselves under the command of our ally, the Republic of China.

In that interview that he gave, where I was saying everything and the President had directed me: "Go as far as you can toward showing that these people are pursuing policies that will justify their amalgamation in the military forces for the benefit of protecting our enemies." But what they don't quote in that again is the same interview that I said: "We will not arm any war-lord parties or any other organization in China unless and until they acknowledge the sovereignty of our ally."

Now, while Senator McMahon has referred to his record in that thing—and this is the hearing of the Tydings committee to which I will revert again—he seems to have misunderstood what I was saying in that interview.

I agree, gentlemen, that there are many of these records of which I am not proud. I was performing a wartime service, just as a man is that goes over the top or hits the beaches; I was carrying into effect the directive of my President.

COMMUNIST VERSION OF HURLEY EFFORT IN CHINA

But now let us see how the Communists took that same thing that Senator McMahon now says shows my misunderstanding of the situation.

In a conversation between John Stewart Service and Philip Jaffee, the Communist editor of the Amerasia magazine, which was taken on a disk by the FBI and is recorded in this statement—now, let us see what is the difference between Senator McMahon's understanding of what transpired at that time and the understanding of the Communists.

> Mr. Jaffe—

I won't read all of it, because it is too long for the record. He says—Service says:

> They're apparently avoiding any controversy with the Soviets.

That is what I was doing in those things you quoted.

> They are staying, hoping on the Argentine thing, and there seems to be some indication that they are trying to play up to the Russians, hoping for some sort of understanding with the Soviet.

That is what the Communists were saying at that time.

> JAFFE. Well, they are not talking that way privately.
>
> SERVICE. Well, they certainly publicly are openly avoiding being placed in opposition.

Then there is a statement by the Indian representative that I don't make out.

> JAFFE. I guess there only things—

It is struck out.

Did you get a chance—

Service says:

> Did you get a chance to look them over?
>
> JAFFE. [Unintelligible.]
>
> SERVICE. The reason I had the same idea out in China before I came home—that the President might be playing that sort of game and was playing a very deep game in not revealing his hand to the Chungking Government—but, when I got home and found out the violence, the bitterness of the argument going on here, I dropped it. I mean, if so, there wasn't any reason for the State Department to be smacked down more or less. There wasn't any reason for Hurley to be kept in the dark.
>
> JAFFE.—

This is the Communists, Senator, and this is the res gestae of that interview that you have been talking about—

> Well, I will tell you what happened, Jack. I have been thinking about that hard. I think Roosevelt recognized after he appointed Hurley that it was a mistake to appoint him. But once Hurley did his dirty work there was nothing—it would have to take time. I think, of the three big nations, we are the only one in which an individual plays such a big role. It is inconceivable that a Soviet Ambassador would operate as an individual, but here it happened. And I think that Hurley put Roosevelt and the whole country on the spot, and Roosevelt was trying for a way to get out—sending Hurley to some very important area where there was some difficulty; so I can't imagine that Roosevelt changed his ideas about China overnight, and he would have been delighted if he could find some excuse for firing the guy. But, of course, Hurley put us in such a terrible spot and has still got us on that spot, where we can't move any longer without defying the Government.

Now, that's what the Communists thought about that interview where I went along way toward the Communists.

Now, the Senator didn't say that in that same interview I announced that the policy was not to arm the Chinese Communists, whose purpose it was to overthrow the National Government, which President Roosevelt had directed me to uphold. That was the purpose of the conference, and I was told, "Now go as far as you can toward them," and I did. And, if it was wrong, why, condemn me for it. I am not thin-skinned. Why you can say these bad things about me.

Now let me read on.

> "Well, what I said about the military plans is, of course, very secret."

Now understand this is John Service talking to a Communist, a Communist who was found in possession of all the Amerasia papers, some 1,800 of them. We know he had them because they were recovered by the FBI. And he said, "What I said about the military plans is, of course, secret."

> JAFFE. Well, that was talked around about.
>
> SERVICE. That plan was made up by Wedemeyer's staff in his absence. They got orders to make some recommendation as to what we should do.

Now, I think I will skip a lot of that because I am encumbering the record, and then I will get down further to where Service is talking about me in this interview that the Senator has read so splendidly and so effectively.

> But if you get Hurley there, Hurley to be consistent, why if you get Hurley there putting his influence probably behind—Hurley has all the way down the line—

and, Senator McMahon, you asked me to pay attention to one part of yours, and I have and I will answer—

> Hurley has all the way down the line only recognized Chiang Kai-shek, and our Government is to strengthen Chiang Kai-shek and to support him and to bring all the forces in China under Chiang Kai-shek's control. If he says all this publicly, he is going to be just sitting there laughing. He is going to have a hard time refusing to take Chungking officials.

Now, that is the secret record, and I tell the chairman that this is the transcription from a disk taken by the FBI and is the contemporary statement from the interview that Senator McMahon has read.

NATURE OF AMALGAMATION EFFORTS IN 1944, 1945

Now, he said that I told the newsmen that the Communists in China supported the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen and wanted democracy. Well, I also told that Joe Stalin supported the Atlantic Charter because he signed it.

It was a fact, and at the time the Senator is speaking about, I have here in the white paper at page 74 the five-point agreement which has been signed by Mao Tze-tung and is the only agreement signed by him, and now if the Senator will see what I was talking about in that interview:

> (3) The coalition National Government will support the principles of Sun Yat-sen for the establishment in China of a government of the people, for the people, and by the people. The coalition National Government will pursue policies designed to promote progress and democracy and to establish justice, freedom of conscience, freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and

association, the right to petition the Government for the redress of grievances, the right of writ of habeas corpus, and the right of residence. The coalition National Government will also pursue policies intended to make effective the two rights defined as freedom from fear and freedom—

and this is where the Communists are talking directly to President Roosevelt—

the rights defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want.

Now, if I understand Senator McMahon correctly, he is saying unkind things about me because I told that that document was signed by the Communists as their objective in China at that time during the war.

What I said in that statement was giving them the best we could give them and at the same time saying that we will not arm you for the purpose of overthrowing our ally.

Now, I don't know whether that explains it or not, but I think possibly I have gone quite a ways.

CHARACTERIZATION OF CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Now, there was another one that was awfully bad about the Oklahoma Republicans, and I said that they were agrarian reformers, but there is one special difference between them and the Chinese armed Communists, and that is they were not armed, and I believe that the newsmen laughed maybe at me, maybe with me, when I said if they would permit us Republicans to arm we would have a better chance with these Democrats; but, now that the Senator recites that in seriousness to try to compare my directive in a theater of war in time of war with a policy of interference with the civil government after the war was over, I think without a doubt there isn't a basis of comparison, and I am not going to say about the Senator's form of thinking or his judgment what he said about mine.

I acknowledge that mine is not the same quality as his, and his may take precedence.

Now, let me just get one other point. He said that I said that the Chinese Communists were not like the Soviet Communists. Well, that was a kind statement.

Senator McMahon. General, do you mind an interruption?

General Hurley. No.

Senator McMahon. As a matter of fairness, I did not characterize what you said at all. I was simply reading what you said, and now you are explaining what you said. The only place that I challenged what you said was in regard to the investigation of the Atomic Energy Commission.

I made no reference, no interpretation of anything that you said. I simply read from the record.

General Hurley. Well, Senator, I am glad to say that I stand corrected. I misunderstood you on that; but will it be all right now to proceed?

I believe that I said to you gentlemen of the committee that, by direction of President Roosevelt, I went to Russia, and while I was in Russia Marshal Stalin permitted me to go to the Battle of the Don Basin, generally known in history as the Battle for the Encirclement of Stalingrad.

I not only slept in the houses and the huts and the dugouts of the farming country people of Russia; I slept in the snow with the Russian Army.

I had an opportunity, not in Moscow, but in Russia, to see communism.

Then Marshal Stalin permitted me to go to Baku, to the oil fields there, and refineries, and then coming up through the Georgian mountains and that military area, and I was with the Russians in their attack on the Axis, as the Axis was driven out of there, toward Grosznia.

Then I traveled the full length of Siberia, all the way from Fairbanks, Alaska, to Moscow.

I knew communism as it existed in Russia. I couldn't buy a nickel's worth of anything, anyplace, except from the Soviet Government.

Now, I go up into the Communist area of China, for conferences with Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Lao Tze-hung, and Chu Dok.

I could name dozens of people who are educated Communists, and who unquestionably are the same stripe as the Russian Communists; but what do I find?

I find the followers, the Chinese followers of these people, even in the capital of communism, at Yunan—I find the stores open, the stock market open, the highest bidder getting the property, money being exchanged, the profit motive in operation.

Now, when anybody tells me that that is communism, I know that they are mistaken.

Understand, I said, in this record, that the objectives of the leaders of the Communist Party is the Soviet brand of communism; but I said that the Chinese who are following them, they are people to whom the Russians have promised peace and security and food. They don't even know what Russian communism is.

And, I go further to give the Senator something else to quote the next time:

There is not now, after the conquest of China, there is not 1 percent of the Chinese people who are Communists.

DIRECTIVES FOR HURLEY'S CHINA MISSION

Now, of course it is all right to be called up on a situation like this, and to have to answer for what you did in wartime. I did a lot of things under a directive that forced me to do things that, if I were left to my own inclinations, I wouldn't do; but I say to you now, and I repeat again, that I served President Roosevelt during the war with a whole heart. President Roosevelt's objective, as Commander in Chief, was to win the war; and, when he gave me a directive, it wasn't a question about what Pat Hurley thought; it was about the unification of the effort to fight for the victory and for the principles that we said we were fighting for, at the time.

Now, since the Senator has gotten off on this, they have printed an awfully nice book here. It was some of the secret testimony and the report of the Tydings committee, and I would like, before I leave the subject on which the Senator worked, to say that any statement made by me, in that turbulent area—in the turbulent era, if any misstatement was made by me, if it is pointed out to me, I will gladly admit it.

I have never claimed that I was really perfect in my conclusions.

All I say is that I was doing the best I could, and after I had relieved, as I told you this morning, General Stilwell, my friend, when the criticism was strong that Roosevelt had made a mistake in sending me to China, as you have read, and that the Communists were taken in. I have here a telegram from President Roosevelt after I had declined the ambassadorship. I said to him, "You had better let me remain a military officer so you can relieve me without an explanation, just as you have relieved Stilwell."

The telegram came back, and it would be immodest for me to state it, but it is in the most glowing terms, and he tells me: "There isn't anyone who has a better grasp of the situation, both militarily and diplomatically in China than yourself," and he asked me to take the ambassadorship after all this criticism was leveled at me.

SOVIET COOPERATIVENESS IN 1945

Now, I was trying to find—and maybe, Senator, you could do me a favor—I have not been able to find it—let's see, it is at page 80–87, where I wanted to quote another statement from Senator McMahon—this is really worth while, because everyone says, "Why hadn't you answered this sooner?"

Well, it was in one of these star-chamber proceedings, where I didn't even know it had occurred. I was tried in absentia.

Senator McMahon. What page are you reading from?

General Hurley. I have found it, Senator, I believe, on page 80.

> I have stated—

and this is quoting Hurley—

> that it was the objective of the Communists and the Communist armed party, and please distinguish between them and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, because they are different, and all of this time Marshal Stalin and Commissar Molotov had been telling me, and throughout the entire period of the vicissitudes through which we have passed, so far as I know, they have kept their word.

You quoted that, Senator, I believe. Let me get that: "They have kept their word."

Well, they had up to that time; they had not been let off the hook at Yalta. As I stated yesterday, "Russia"—and this is italics now, and it is not a quotation—"does not recognize the Chinese armed Communist Party as Communists at all. Russia is not supporting the Chinese Communist Party. Russia does not desire civil war in China. Russia does not desire the division of China and the setting up of two governments. Russia desires closer and more harmonious relations with China." Then they say the italics are supplied. This is my own analysis, not a quotation. That is made to read as if that were my analysis of the Russian-Chinese situation. What I am saying, gentlemen, is that it is my analysis of what Stalin and Molotov said to me; it is not a quotation, because I could not quote them from memory. I am analyzing for the President and for everybody else what they said to me, and here I am pilloried because of that report, which is still, in my opinion, an honest outline of what happened.

Then they quote me along, and they finally quote John Service, and they finally cleared me in this sentence in secret, but in relieving me of one smear they put on another, saying:

> Thus, it would appear that the shoe of communism would appear to fit the foot of Patrick Hurley more snugly than it does John Service; yet we regret with

all our being any suggestion that Patrick Hurley is anything other than a loyal American doing what he conceived to be his patriotic duty.

Now, of course, I am grateful to have one smear taken off me, but I kind of don't like to have the other smear placed upon me.

QUESTION OF ARMING CHINESE COMMUNISTS AGAINST JAPANESE

To come again to the statement that the Senator has made, I have shown you that even in the white book the very words that I was telling the public is signed over the signature of Mao Tze-tung, and I was repeating it as something favorable, while I was announcing, "We will not arm them until they have acknowledged the sovereignty of our ally."

Start through with a lot of the primary problem of military assistance—but I want to come now to a statement where the Communists, through our representatives in China, were demanding that we change the policy and that we arm the Communists.

When I arrived in Washington, I was confronted by a report from my own Embassy in Chungking, which recommended—and I will find it here sometime, some place, and it is not in any of these quotations that you have. I have to get that now before I can go on. I have got my papers messed up a little bit. China documents. It wouldn't be in there. Oh, yes, it is in here—"George Atcheson. Report February 28, 1945." It is No. 12.

George Atcheson in his report, after saying a lot of the very kind things about my administration that Senator McMahon has been saying, confronted me with a report when I arrived in Washington, in which he tried to reverse the policy which we had generated—that we would not arm the Chinese armed Communists unless and until they recognized the sovereignty of our ally.

Senator McMAHON. General, again I say, all I did was read your own record. I haven't made any comment.

General HURLEY. I know; but you took them out of context and out of time, and you tried to make them peacetime statements, where they were complying with a war directive.

I don't know of anyone who could have done a better job of taking the truth and presenting it in a way to make it state something that is not, not quite factual.

Now, what he really said was that "We recommend that the President tell Chiang Kai-shek in no uncertain terms that we will cooperate and supply the Communists."

Senator WILEY. The date?

General HURLEY. That's February 28, 1945.

Well, I am in Washington; they call me up on the carpet, and they put me through why we won't, why we should. Now, who did that? Who was doing it? Who were the career men who were trying to reverse the policy?

Why, here it is in their own telegram:

> This telegram has been drafted with the assistance and the agreement of all the political officers of the staff of this embassy and has been shown to General Wedemeyer's chief of staff.

Now I am on the carpet. There are pages of the white paper that dragged everything in that the Senator has dragged in to try to discredit what I was doing about not arming the Communists. And here is the conclusion by the State Department itself, at page 92 of the white paper:

> General Hurley strongly opposed the course of action recommended above, and it remained the policy of the United States to supply military matériel and financial support only to the recognized National Government.

Now, everybody said, "If the State Department is sabotaging your policy, how did you get a decision like that out of the State Department?" The answer is: I didn't; I got it from Franklin D. Roosevelt. He sustained me in that controversy.

Then after that I go over to where I am to give an interview, and the President said, "Now make it as easy as you can on them and say everything favorable you can, and don't destroy your basis for a possible unification of the armed forces in China," and that's what is being quoted out of time and out of text. And it does look pretty, really as if I had lost my perspective and didn't know very well what I was talking about; and if that's what Senator McMahon is trying to prove and it will make for friendship between the Senator and myself for the sake of this argument I will admit—I don't care what they say about me.

I have here also for the Senator's benefit about 20 pictures, photostatic copies of about 20 articles from a newspaper in New York called the Daily Worker, in which they seemed to have understood what I was doing when I declined to arm the Chinese Communists who were attempting to overthrow our ally.

Now, I don't know whether I have covered this sufficiently or not, and I will be glad to submit to any further questions.

Senator McMahon. I haven't got any more time.

Chairman Russell. No, you haven't any time, Senator.

Senator McMahon. The witness started answering my question at 3:24. It is now 4:10.

General Hurley. You will admit, Senator, it is quite an extensive question. I did my best.

Senator McMahon. I know you did, Mr. Secretary, and thank you very much.

Senator Wiley. You are a provoking creature, Senator.

Chairman Russell. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Sparkman?

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I have been away all day today, I am sorry to say, so I will pass at this time.

Chairman Russell. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Under the unanimous-consent agreement of this morning, Senator Smith is recognized, he having exchanged places with Senator Brewster.

HURLEY'S DIRECTIVES ON CHINA MISSION

Senator Smith. Ambassador Hurley, could I ask you to clarify for me if you will just what your mission was when you were sent to China in 1944?

Was it to bring together the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek, and the Communist forces in the common struggle against the Japanese? Was that your main mission?

General HURLEY. Senator, I fortunately have the complete answer to that in writing.

Senator SMITH. Have you already testified to this point or not?

General HURLEY. No, sir. I will be glad to testify, and it is what I thought I would present as the next subject, because so far as that is concerned, let me explain.

I have read into the record the letter from the President to Chiang Kai-shek when I was assigned there as the President's representative, his personal representative. We had an Ambassador there. I was a military officer. I was on General Stilwell's staff at that time.

Then the President, as I have related, asked me to become Ambassador, and remember this was after all the shake-up when everybody said I put Roosevelt on the spot and I was in a bad way, but the President asked me to become Ambassador, and I wasn't favorable to it because I said:

> From your standpoint you ought to leave me where you can relieve me without a lot of public discussion. I will go ahead and do the work, but you should keep yourself where you are in a flexible position and can take me out.

Well, he came back with a very complimentary telegram which I have alluded to, and he asked me for the good of the cause to become Ambassador. About that time Edward R. Stettinius was appointed Secretary of State.

Now I knew Stettinius well, and Stettinius sent me a cable, a query in which he asked me to please tell him—now you see, I have the military reporting directly to the President. Now I am Ambassador, and Stettinius as my chief said:

> What is your directive? What is your plan? What are you doing in China? Would you mind giving me a statement?

Well, I didn't send him all the papers, but I did say:

> Replying to your No. 1681, December 20, 1944, in all my negotiations it has been my understanding that the policy of the United States in China at present—

Now understand this doesn't go back; this is the immediate policy that I was on—

> 1. To prevent the collapse of the National Government.
> 2. To sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic and as Generalissimo of the army.
> 3. To harmonize the relations between the Generalissimo and the American commander.
> 4. To promote the production of war supplies in China and to prevent economic collapse.
> 5. To unify all the military forces of China for the purpose of defeating Japan.

Senator SMITH. Is that meant to include the Communists?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir. To unify all of them. Well, now, I could go ahead and read this entire report to you. I gave him a full report on China including some of the statements that Marshal Stalin and Molotov made to me in Moscow. I was, in other words, giving him everything I knew as well as telling him what my directives were.

I sent the Secretary this by cable, but I sent a copy of it also to President Roosevelt so that they could get together, and if that were no longer the policy, they could change it.

CONFIRMATION OF DIRECTIVE

But in due time I received a telegram that says—

For the Ambassador. I have read with great interest—

this is dated January 4, 1945—

I have read with great interest and appreciation the report and analysis of the current situation in China contained in your telegram of December 24, as well as in your letter of December 6.

The information you have given me and your comments thereon affords me a valuable insight into the problems with which you are faced and for which you are seeking solutions with characteristic energy and acumen. China is now and will be in the postwar period of major vital importance. I trust you will continue to keep me fully informed.

Your telegram of December 30 has just been received and is being studied. Your analysis of the situation strikes me as sound.

With best wishes for the new year.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS.

Now, what I am telling you, the Commies and some of the boys, not all the boys, in the State Department said I was evolving my own policy, and I was criticized very severely.

But what I have submitted to you now, Senator, shows, I believe, I recapitulated, I shortened up what I believed to be all the directives I had received in that situation from the President or from the Secretary of State, and I stated them in five sentences, and here is the reply and there never was any question about what was the purpose for which the President sent me to China.

Now, this is awfully long to read, and I am not a good reader, but if the chairman wishes me to do it, I have no desire to keep this out of the record, and I would submit it for the record. But I want to say before I submit it that it was a coded document and, so far as I know, while this is only a copy, it has not been paraphrased or decoded.

REPORT ON CHINA TO STETTINIUS

You may put that in the record or may not. It would be helpful to the record, because it states on the transmission from personal representative of the President and a military officer to the status of Ambassador. It is my first report to Stettinius.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, the matter will be printed in the record and following the procedure of the committee, will be reviewed by Admiral Davis as to whether or not it shall appear in the public record.

(The document referred to above reads as follows:)

TOP SECRET—URGENT

DECEMBER 23, 1944.

(The following message is top secret and is from Hurley for the eyes of the Secretary of State only.)

PART I

Replying to your No. 1681, December 20, 1944. In all my negotiations it has been my understanding that the policy of the United States in China is: (1) to prevent the collapse of the National Government; (2) to sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic and Generalissimo of the Armies; (3) to harmonize relations between the Generalissimo and the American commander; (4) to promote production of war supplies in China and prevent economic collapse; and (5) to unify all the military forces of China for the purpose of defeating Japan. This is a broad outline of our mission. When we arrived in China relations between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell and approach a deadlock. Battles were being lost. The Chinese Government was facing collapse. Stilwell was recalled. The American General Wedemeyer was appointed to succeed Stilwell as chief of staff to the Generalissimo and commander of American forces in China. The China theater was separated from the India-Burma theater. With the cooperation of the Generalissimo, General Wedemeyer had reorganized the United States Army Staff in China by (1) relieving and replacing several high officers and adding competent personnel; (2) under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek, Wedemeyer has effected some drastic changes in both the Chinese General Staff and Field Commands and has also regrouped armies and changed both tactics and strategy; (3) Wedemeyer has placed an American general in command of the service of supply; and (4) for the first time the American and Chinese military staffs are coordinated and functioning together in a manner that is having a splendid effect upon the morale of the Armed Forces.

PART 2

During all the period of military reorganization I was also discussing with the Generalissimo changes in the administration of the civil government. China is a republic in name only. It is a personal government. Perhaps it might be called a benevolent dictatorship. The avowed purpose of Chiang Kai-shek and his government is to make China a united, independent democracy. "A government of the people, for the people, and by the people." To promote the progress of democratic processes in administration. As you will note later these are also the avowed objectives of the Chinese Communist Party. The critics of Chiang Kai-shek, especially among Americans, condemn him for not being able to create a democracy in China during the war and at once. It should be apparent to men of understanding that the creation of a democracy in China is to be a long and difficult undertaking and cannot be fully achieved until the masses of China have been educated. The Generalissimo has, since our arrival, made certain drastic changes in the members of his cabinet and the administration of the civil government. The critics say he has not gone far enough which, of course, is true but he has gone quite a distance for a first step. He will go further. The present members of the civil administration are cooperating with the American Embassy, the American Military Establishment, and all the American agencies. There was in the past a tendency in the Government to bypass the Embassy on some matters and deal through the Army and a corollary tendency to bypass the Army if it was thought that dealing through the Embassy would be more expeditious. We have no desire to fix responsibility for that situation on the Embassy, the Army, or the Chinese Government. We are happy to report that the Generalissimo, the Foreign Office, the National Government of China, the Chinese military officials, the American military officials, and the Embassy are cooperating and the results of the united effort are beginning to show in the military situation.

PART 3

At the time I came here Chiang Kai-shek believed that the Communist Party in China was an instrument of the Soviet Government of Russia. He is now convinced that the Russian Government does not recognize the Chinese Communist Party as Communists at all and that (1) Russia is not supporting the Communist Party in China; (2) Russia does not repeat nor want dissensions or civil war in China; and (3) Russia desires more harmonious relations with China. These facts have gone far toward convincing Chiang Kai-shek that the Communist Party in China is not an agency of the Soviet. He now feels that he can reach a settlement with the Communist Party as a Chinese political party without foreign entanglements. When I first arrived it was thought that civil war after the close of the present war or perhaps before that time was inevitable. Chiang Kai-shek is now convinced that by agreement with the Communist Party of China he can (1) unite the military forces in China against Japan, and (2) avoid civil strife in China. I might add here that Chiang Kai-shek has requested permission from the Soviet Government to send a personal representative to confer with Marshal Stalin. For this mission he has chosen the present Acting President of the Executive Yuan who is concurrently Minister of Foreign Relations, Dr. T. V. Soong. The Soviet Foreign Office has advised that they will receive Dr. Soong the latter part of February or the first part of March. This mission is intended to establish closer and more harmonious relations between Russia and China.

PART 4

With the consent, advice, and direction of the Generalissimo and members of his cabinet and on the invitation of the leaders of the Communist Party, I began discussions with the Communist Party and Communist military leaders of China for the purpose of effecting an agreement to regroup, coordinate and unite all the military forces of China for the defeat of Japan. The defeat of Japan is, of course, the primary objective but we should all understand that if an agreement is not reached between the two great military establishments of China civil war will, in all probability, ensue. I received cordial cooperation from the Communist leaders. They submitted through me to the National Government a plan for a coalition government and the unification of the military forces. The Communists also acknowledge the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and pledged themselves to support the establishment in China of a government "of the people, for the people and by the people"; they pledge themselves also to support all the individual rights of man and to promote the growth of democratic processes in government. The Kuomintang and the National Government then had an opportunity to make a settlement with the Communists. They neglected or did not choose to do so at that time. They said the Communist plan was not acceptable to the National Government. The National Government did, however, submit a counterproposal which was not acceptable to the Communist leaders. We are in daily conferences with the Generalissimo and members of his cabinet endeavoring to liberalize the counterproposal made by the National Government to the Communists. We are having some success. The Generalissimo states that he is anxious that the military forces of the Communist Party in China and those of the National Government be united to drive the invader from China. The Communist leaders declare this is also their objective. I have persuaded Chiang Kai-shek and others in the National Government that in order to unite the military forces of China and prevent civil conflict it will be necessary for him and the Kuomintang and the National Government to make liberal political concessions to the Communist Party and to give them adequate representation in the National Government. Chiang Kai-shek has appointed a new Committee which is now working out a plan that he believes will be feasible and on which he hopes a working agreement can be reached with the Communists. The Kuomintang is trying to avoid the use of the word "coalition." They do not want to admit that they have formed a coalition with the Communists. The Kuomintang still hopes to keep China under one-party rule. Notwithstanding all this you should bear in mind that the Communists have acknowledged the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and have accepted nearly all of his avowed principles. There is very little difference, if any, between the avowed principles of the National Government, the Kuomintang and the avowed principles of the Chinese Communist Party.

PART 5

There is formidable opposition to the unification of the Chinese military forces and the coalition of the Chinese political parties. We find some opposition to the unification of China among the "diehards" of the Kuomintang and of the Chinese Communist Party. The greatest opposition to the unification of China comes from foreigners. There is a great current of public opinion in China that is directed by those who believe that their interests in Asia will be more definitely safeguarded if China is divided against herself than there would be if China should establish herself as a free, united, democratic nation. Generally speaking, the opponents to unity in China are the imperialist nations who are now fighting for the reconquest of their colonies in southeast Asia and for the reestablishment of imperialistic colonial governments in the colonies. All of this group try to convince the Chinese that everything America does to unite and strengthen China is interference in Chinese internal affairs. Each of these nations and some of their dominions have embassies in Chungking and wield some influence not only with the government, but, through their agents, among the people of both free and occupied China. The agencies that are working along those lines are (1) the Embassy of the Netherlands; (2) the French Embassy; (3) the British Embassy; (4) the Canadian Embassy; (5) the Australian Legation and (6) the office of General Carton de Wiart, personal representative of Prime Minister Churchill. In addition there are some American military officials and diplomatic officers who believe that the present Chinese Government will eventually collapse and that there can be no military or political unification of China under Chiang Kai-shek and his "diehard" supporters in the Kuomintang. This group expresses the opinions (1) that the Generalissimo has made a deal with Japan; (2) that without such a deal his government would collapse; (3) that the Communists should not unite with the National Government; (4) that the Communists should not permit their troops to be united with the Chinese Army, and (5) that the United States should deal with the Communist Party and not with the National Government. I have not been impressed by any of the arguments made by the imperialists and other opponents of a unified China but I am enumerating them here so that you may have them definitely before you and give them what weight you think they deserve. The senior officers of the embassy are in agreement with me in these matters. The final argument that is intended to convince us is that America's policy to unite the military forces of China; to help China win the war; to prevent civil war in China and to establish a free, united, democratic Chinese nation is detrimental, if not completely destructive, to the position of the white man in the Orient. Nearly all of the arguments against the unification of China should be generally classed as the stock arguments of the imperialists and of all others who oppose the principle of the Atlantic Charter.

This is a quick reply to your message which I received late yesterday. I am sending it by Navy radio as I have found that to be more expeditious as well as more competent than commercial radio.

General HURLEY. Does that answer you question?

FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL IN CHINA

Senator SMITH. That answers the immediate question; yes. Of course, you have already referred to the fact that while that was your conception of your responsibility, there seemed to be some difference of opinion among those in China with regard to what the objectives were and there seemed to be complications in your dealings with those representatives of the State Department there.

I read from your letter of November 26, 1945, in the white paper on page 581, or rather, I read from 582 in your letter of resignation to President Truman.

After reciting what appears to be your conception of your objectives, you said:

> While these objectives had the support of the President and the Secretary of State it is no secret that the American policy in China did not have the support of all the career men in the State Department. The professional foreign service men sided with the Chinese Communist armed party and the imperialist bloc of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against herself. Our professional diplomats continuously advised the Communists that my efforts in preventing the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States. These same professionals openly advised the Communist armed party to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the National Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control.

Then later you say:

> I requested the relief of the career men who were opposing the American policy in the Chinese theater of war. These professional diplomats were returned to Washington—

and so on.

I was just reading that to see if I am correct in my understanding of the difference of opinion between your conception of your mission and that of the people on the ground, which led to the break between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist group and the Communists with some of our people supporting one group and the Government ostensibly still recognizing the Nationalists.

It has caused me great confusion and it seems to me a good deal of trouble which has now culminated in this misunderstanding of MacArthur dates back to some of those differences of opinion that started at that point.

Am I wrong in that, or was that the inception of the difficulty we had with our whole far-eastern policy as you see it?

General HURLEY. I couldn't say it was the inception, Senator, but what you have stated is true of the period concerning which you have been asking the question.

I found that the career men were passing secret information to the Chinese armed Communists, and I hold in my hand a report dated October 10, 1944, subject The Need for Greater Realism in Our Relations With Chiang Kai-shek, to General Stilwell. This is signed by John S. Service, and it came to me through the Communists.

The Communists at that time—I hadn't yet been to the capital of the Communists and hadn't conferred with Mao Tse-tung or Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, or General Wong. They were unknown to me at that period, but a man named Len Su-han, a very intelligent Communist—and he was of the Soviet type—he came to me to discuss the situation because they believed at that time that their interests lay in supporting a democratic government for the time being.

But please be assured that all their conversation led me to conclude that their ultimate objective was communism, and these things quoted out of time to indicate that I didn't get it and didn't understand it are just absurd.

What to do to overcome that is to read what the Communists say and what the Daily Worker says of the period.

SERVICE REPORT TO STILWELL ON CHINESE COMMUNISTS

But now let's turn to the John Service report to General Stilwell, and stop me from reading it when I have said enough.

Now, remember, this doesn't come to me from the career service man, John S. Service; it comes to me from a representative of the Communist government. The report is to general Stilwell:

> Our dealing with Chiang Kai-shek apparently continues on the basis of unrealistic assumption that he is China; that he is necessary to our cause. It is time for the sake of the war and also for our future interests in China that we take a more realistic line. The Kuomintang government is in crisis. Recent defeats have exposed his military ineffectiveness, and will hasten the approaching economic disaster. Passive inability to meet these crises in a constructive way, stubborn unwillingness to submerge selfish power in democratic unity, and the statement of Chiang himself to the Peoples Political Council on October 10 are sufficient evidence of the bankruptcy of the Kuomintang leadership.
>
> With the glaring exposures of the Kuomintang failures, dissatisfaction within China growing rapidly, the prestige of the party was never lower, and Chiang is losing the respect he once enjoyed as a leader. In the present circumstances the Kuomintang is dependent upon America for survival, but we are in no way dependent on the Kuomintang.

Now, there is the issue. From here out it gives the "We need not fear the collapse of the government." Well, I am directed to uphold the government.

Now, I complained about this, and they—the reply of James Byrnes, the Secretary, was—and I was not permitted at that time to reply to him—that these young men should be encouraged to make reports of this kind to their superiors. It contained a lot of information, he said.

He was against the Nationalist Government, our ally, whom I was directed to uphold. He was in favor of the Communist Party whom I had declined to arm; but he said he was reporting to a superior something that should be encouraged; that intelligent criticism should be upheld.

Well, that was not the charge I made. I didn't care what he reported to me or the general or to the State Department. Any report of this kind that came to me I forworded to the State Department.

What I complained of was that he was supplying this information to the Communist armed party in China, and that is just a statement of what I was referring to, Senator, in my——

Senator SMITH. How did that statement get to the Communist armed party in China? It is addressed to General Stilwell apparently.

General HURLEY. It is addressed to General Stilwell but the Communist who gave it to me told me it was delivered not to him but to the Communist headquarters in Yenan by John S. Service, the author of it.

Now, I don't know—there are some letters attached to it. There is one from John Service himself, and after coming across this, I then inquired, and I did find that while I didn't have a copy of it myself, the report was in the General Stilwell file, so he did report to a superior, but I didn't complain about his reporting to a superior nor did I complain about what he said to a superior, but I complained about the fact that he was undermining the American policy in China by giving that kind of a report to the Chinese armed Communists.

Does that answer your question?

Senator SMITH. Yes; thank you very much.

I guess my time has expired.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes; it has.

The questioning has again come around to the Chair.

I do not care to ask any questions right at this time.

I do desire to make a very brief statement for the record.

STILWELL'S RECORD AND HIS VIEWS ON CHIANG

I am sure it is unnecessary for me to disclaim being any expert on China. I have not read the Stilwell papers that have been ordered to here today.

I did meet General Stilwell on an occasion when I was in China in 1943. I had no opportunity to be with him over any lengthy period. He was a very reserved man, was not a glib talker, and at that time I thought that he was a man who was frustrated by his inability to accomplish what he hoped to do in waging the war against Japan, from his position in China.

I did not get any impression that he was other than a brave and loyal American soldier. I could not believe that he had the slightest purpose at any time of doing anything in China except to carry on the war against Japan, and to the very best of his ability, and in the interests of victory over our enemy.

I remember he told me one little incident, when he was getting ready to go to Burma, and he called for some troops of one Chinese general, or one war lord—of course I don't recall their names—and stated that that war lord would not give him troops unless another war lord, another general, likewise furnished a certain number of troops, so that he would not be more powerful than the other Chinese general.

The record bears some statements about Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's opinion of General Stilwell.

The general is silenced. He is dead, but there is one little report in the white paper where he gives his views of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

I do not undertake to express these as being my views in any way, but in justice to a man that I took to be a gallant American soldier, I want to read that brief statement in the record so that at least his opinon might be mentioned in the record, along with that of Chiang Kai-shek.

This is on page 68 of the white paper, and purports to be from a report from General Stilwell to his superiors in Washington.

It states, and I quote:

> Chiang Kai-chek has no intention of making further efforts to prosecute the war. Anyone who crowds him toward such action will be blocked or eliminated. * * * Chiang Kai-shek believes he can go on milking the United States for money and munitions by using the old gag about quitting if he is not supported.
>
> He believes the war in the Pacific is nearly over and that by delaying tactics he can throw the entire burden on us. He has no intention of instituting any real democratic regime or forming a united front with the Communists. He, himself, is the main obstacle to the unification of China and of cooperation in a real effort against Japan. I am now convinced that for the reasons stated the United States will not get any real cooperation from China while Chiang Kai-shek is in power. I believe he will only continue his policy and delay, while grabbing for loans and postwar aid, and for the purpose of maintaining his present position, based on one-party government, a reactionary policy, or the suppression of democratic ideas with the active aid of his gestapo.

I am not informed as to the facts. I do not undertake to testify, but just to get the views of General Stilwell in the record I have read that brief statement from one of his reports.

Senator Connally?

(No response.)

There is no necessity for calling around the table. Senator Smith has examined since any member of the Armed Services Committee, so I call on Senator Bridges.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT, APRIL 1945

Senator Bridges. Mr. Chairman, on June 11, 1951, there came to my attention as a member of this joint committee information from a person who stated that Secretary Acheson had misinformed the committee when he stated that the Army was most anxious to get the Russians into the war against Japan. Now, this individual stated that the exact opposite was true.

I was then given, and it has been shown to individual members of this committee, a document bearing the date of April 21, 1945. It contains 12 conclusions and recommendations. The entire document consists of two typewritten pages, double-spaced; the date and the form of this document indicates to me its time of preparation.

It is the most interesting document that has come to my attention since the development of this hearing.

As a result of that, I addressed a letter to Chairman Russell of this committee, dated June 12, 1951:

The Honorable RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL: In accordance with established committee procedure, I am writing to request that you obtain, at the earliest possible moment, a document which I believe will be of tremendous assistance to the committee in the conduct of this inquiry.

It is my understanding that in the early spring of 1945, a group of specialists in the War Department G–2, under the direction of Col. Joseph A. Michela, carefully considered the question of the impending attack to be made upon Japan by the Armed Forces of the United States. It is my understanding that after carefully considering all the problems in connection with the attack upon Japan that this group of experts in our military intelligence prepared a paper about April 21, 1945, summarizing their considered view as to the ill effect of Russian entry into the Pacific war.

It is my understanding that the document which I am requesting contains, among other things, at least 12 conclusions and a recommendation. I understand that since this was the work of about 50 senior specialists and was a project of considerable importance in the G–2 Department that it was submitted directly to General Bissell, who was at that time the G–2.

Since I believe this document to be of considerable importance, I earnestly request that it be procured as expeditiously as possible for the use of this committee.

Sincerely yours,

STYLES BRIDGES.

Each day since that time I have inquired of the staff of this committee as to what reply we have had to it. Today I received a letter——

Chairman RUSSELL. I might say, Senator, that I forwarded your letter the very same day on which it was received.

Senator BRIDGES. Yes. I want to say that is part of the record I want to make—that on June 12, the day it was received, Chairman Russell forwarded to Secretary Marshall this letter:

Hon. GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There is enclosed a copy of a letter dated June 12, 1951, addressed to me by Senator Bridges in which he requests a document concerning the effect of entry by Russia into the war against Japan.

I shall appreciate your furnishing the document requested as soon as possible for the use of the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations.

Please permit me to call your attention to the urgency which Senator Bridges attaches to this request.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD RUSSELL, *Chairman.*

So Senator Russell forwarded it the day the request was made. Today on June 21 he addresses a letter, copy of which I read:

DEAR SENATOR BRIDGES: There is enclosed a reply from the Acting Secretary of Defense to your request of June 12 for an intelligence report which purported to show the effect of an entry by Russia into the Pacific war.

Sincerely,

RICHARD B. RUSSELL.

The letter enclosed is dated June 20, 1951:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On June 12, 1951, you forwarded a letter from Senator Bridges of the same date requesting that a copy of a study concerning the effect of Russian entry into the war against Japan be furnished for the use of the committees. Senator Bridges believes such a study was made by intelligence officers in the War Department in the early spring of 1945.

A thorough search has been made by the Department of the Army in an effort to find the document requested. To date it has not been located. It is the opinion of a number of people contacted in the search that if such a study was ever prepared it was but one of many studies made on this subject and, since no action was taken on its recommendations, it was probably destroyed.

The Department of the Army will continue to search for the document, and if it is located you will be advised immediately.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT, *Acting Secretary.*

TEXT OF INTELLIGENCE REPORT OF APRIL 12, 1945

Inasmuch as that is the recorded viewpoint, and because I have what is purported to be and what I believe to be this document, I will now read it into the record.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I did not understand what the Senator says it is purported to be.

Senator BRIDGES. It is purported to be the recommendations of the senior officers of the War Department in the Army recommending against bringing Russia into World War II in the Japan phase of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And is this purported to be a copy of the document which you had requested, which they said they can't find?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Is that dated prior to the Yalta conference?

Senator BRIDGES. No; it was after Yalta but before Potsdam, the situation before the information relative to the details at Yalta were known:

1. The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war would be a political event of world-shaking importance, the ill effect of which would be felt for decades to come. Its military significance at this stage of the war would be relatively unimportant.

2. Many military experts believe that the United States and Great Britain without further help possess the power to force unconditional surrender upon Japan, or to occupy both her islands and mainland possessions.

3. It may be expected that Soviet Russia will enter the Asiatic war, but at her own good time and probably only when the hard-fighting stage is over.

4. The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war at so late a moment would shorten hostilities but little, and effect only a slight saving in American lives.

5. It is not believed that any diplomatic action we either take or fail to take, or any concessions we make now or in the foreseeable future, will influence Soviet Russia to speed up or retard her entry into the Asiatic war.

6. Strong enough to crush Japan by ourselves, the United States should make no political or economic concession to Soviet Russia to bring about or prevent an action which she is fully determined to take anyway.

7. The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war would destroy America's position in Asia quite as effectively as our position is now destroyed in Europe east of the Elbe and beyond the Adriatic.

8. If Russia enters the Asiatic war, China will certainly lose her independence to become the Poland of Asia; Korea the Asiatic Rumania; Manchukuo the Soviet Bulgaria. Whether more than a nominal China will exist after the impact of the Russian armies is felt is very doubtful. Chiang may well have to depart and a Chinese Soviet government may be installed in Nanking which we would have to recognize.

9. To take a line of action which would save few lives now, and only a little time—at an unpredictable cost in lives, treasure, and honor in the future—and simultaneously destroy our ally China, would be an act of treachery that would make the Atlantic Charter and our hopes for world peace a tragic farce.

10. Under no circumstances should we pay the Soviet Union to destroy China. This would certainly injure the material and moral position of the United States in Asia.

11. It should be reiterated that the United States Army is by no means united in believing it wise to encourage the Soviet Union into the Asiatic war.

12. The President of the United States would be well advised, before he made any commitments to Russia in Asia which would clearly have dire political and

moral consequences for the United States, to consult that particular American field commander who is steeped in every phase of the Asiatic war and in the political background of that struggle.

RECOMMENDATION

General MacArthur should be summoned to Washington immediately. The President should consider the all-important matter of Soviet Russia's entry into the Asiatic war with General MacArthur eye to eye. All other political and military personages should be excluded from this conference.

AUTHENTICITY OF REPORT VOUCHED

Now, I understand, and I put that in for what it is purported to be. I have reason to believe it is an accurate thing. I believe it is the most important document that has been presented here in this thing, because it shows conclusively that the military were informed and had studied this subject, and were alive to the consequences and everything that has occurred in Asia, in China, and that was predicted in this military preparation.

Now, Mr. Chairman, if there is anybody who challenges this to be authentic, then I would like to have called some of the men now alive who prepared that document. Unfortunately, Colonel Michela was killed—he had charge of it—but there are now alive Col. Percy Black, Col. Truman Smith, Col. Harvey Smith, Col. Edmund Delaney, Col. Hugo Kenyon, Col. Jadwin, Col. Yeaton, Col. Mayer, and Col. Booth, all of whom, I understand, had a hand in preparing this document; and it is inconceivable to me that a document of this importance that contained those statements and recommendations and findings could be lost and destroyed by the Department of Defense.

I was told prior to this that that is probably the answer that would be forthcoming, and I am not surprised at the answer that the distinguished chairman of this committee received from the Department of Defense.

So, therefore, I make it a part of the record. I cite this as some of the men I have heard who helped in preparing it. There may be others. Some of these may not have played an important part. Some of them, perhaps, did, but if there is a question and a challenge as to whether that is true or is authentic—that statement—then the only thing to do is to call them in, inasmuch as the Department of Defense has been able to lose a very striking document of this kind, so important, so all-inclusive, so accurate in its presentation and prediction of things to happen, and things that have happened, and that we go to that extent.

That, Mr. Chairman, completes the record; and I, for one, appreciate very much your cooperation in speeding the inquiry, and as you have always been most fair in getting everything for the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. Mr. Hurley, I would like to ask you two questions that are of importance in this inquiry.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Senator GREEN. I wonder if the Senator would yield to me to ask a question? This morning I made no objection here and if I had it would have been my turn to go on.

I have been here, I think, longer than any other Senator, I mean, in constant attendance, and I have unfortunately been either out of the room attending a conference or with the Senate at times when my name was reached.

It was about to be reached if you had not preceded me, and you asked unanimous consent to have Senator Brewster take your place. I made no objection; Senator Brewster did take your place, and I have not been able yet to recover mine.

Senator SMITH. I wouldn't want to do anything——

Senator GREEN. Would the Senator kindly yield to me to ask a question?

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, the only point I want to make on that was that I thought I just exchanged places with Senator Brewster, and I was recently recognized in lieu of Senator Brewster, and I asked at the beginning of my questions—now we are in the next round, as I understand it in order. I do not want in any way to handicap my distinguished friend from Rhode Island, and if the Chair thinks I should yield to him at this time for any reason—I do not quite understand the point—but if I should I would be glad to do it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not see why and I do not know why the matter should be submitted to the Chair. That is not a parliamentary question.

Senator GREEN. The point is, Senator Smith, that if you had not asked that special privilege or if you had asked and I had objected you would have had to go on, and since you said you couldn't go on, Senator Brewster would not have substituted for you and I would have gone on. But since Senator Brewster was substituted for you I was unable to go on.

Senator SMITH. I do not think that is quite accurate, if I may say so, because Senator Brewster took my place, and you would have immediately gone on after Senator Brewster; that was the next turn.

What happened was it went, as I understand it, to the Armed Services Committee at the other table, and we never got beyond the next gentleman on the Armed Services Committee. Senator Cain, I think, was next; and I understood this was a new round.

Chairman RUSSELL. This is the second round.

Senator SMITH. Does the Senator wish to question now because he has some other engagement? His turn will come on next if I go on now. You are continuing a little further, are you not, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, we intend to run to 5:30 and I hope we can have an evening session this evening.

Senator SMITH. I am not quite clear as to the point, Mr. Chairman. It seems to me that I should go on in the regular order.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the Senator has that right.

Senator SMITH. I only have a few questions to ask Mr. Hurley, and it seems to me that I am not doing anything unfair to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Senator GREEN. Let him go on. This morning when the Senator asked unanimous consent that Senator Brewster take his place since he wanted to leave, I did not object. I showed him the courtesy, and now he refuses to show me a similar courtesy.

Senator SMITH. I regret exceedingly if he thinks I have declined to pay him a courtesy.

COMPETENCY OF CHIANG

Mr. Ambassador, I want to ask you about two important personages in these hearings. One is Chiang Kai-shek himself. Reports have been built up that he had all kinds of corruption around him; that he was subject to corruption, and that his government lost the confidence of the people, and that there was no reason why we should continue to support him.

I want to get a little picture from you of your contacts with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and with his environment and with that side of the picture if you can give it to me.

General HURLEY. Yes, I will be happy to do that. So far as Chiang Kai-shek was concerned in my relations with him he cooperated completely. I can say that I attended nearly all of the military conferences with General Wedemeyer, and all of these suggestions that he intended to withdraw from the war at any time, in my opinion, are unfounded.

He did stay in the war, and he did fight the Chinese army to victory. His army was in contact on VJ-day.

Now, as to Chiang Kai-shek himself, to continue his picture, before I was assigned out there, we did seriously consider who was available in case we did not decide that Chiang Kai-shek was the best man in Asia for us to support, and I have said that I do not want to quote President Roosevelt, and I have refrained from it in anything except his writing—I do not have this in writing. Therefore, if you will permit me I will use as my own because I did accept it and did use it, and that is that Chiang Kai-shek was the only topflight Asiatic leader who is a Christian and anti-Communist, and who notwithstanding the fact that he had fought nearly 30 years of civil war in China and 8 years against Japan, part of it as our ally, it was believed when I went to China that he was the man that we should support.

Consequently, as the President, in his letter of July 7, I believe, said—it is in this document, the white paper, at page 57, and I think that that answers your question about whom we considered as being most acceptable to the United States, in China at that time.

On page 66 of the white paper, it is stated:

> It was particularly this rapidly disintegrating military situation in east China which gave the most serious concern to President Roosevelt. As he saw it the first step in the solution would be the appointment of an American general to the command of all Chinese armies. On July 7, 1944, the President sent the following message to the Generalissimo:
>
> "The critical situation which now exists in my opinion calls for the delegation to one individual of the powers to coordinate all the Allied military resources in China, including the Communist forces * * * I am promoting Stilwell to the rank of full general and I recommend for your most urgent consideration that you recall him from Burma and place him directly under you in command of all Chinese and American forces, and that you charge him with the full responsibility and authority for the coordination and direction of the operations required to stem the tide of the enemy's forces. I feel that the case of China is so desperate that if radical and promptly applied remedies are not immediately effected, our common cause will suffer a disastrous setback."

That is the end of that quotation; and that is from President Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek; and it said that he would place the American general, Stilwell, where? Under Chiang Kai-shek.

Now, that subject, Senator, was fully discussed, but it resulted in this kind of a—not a written directive, but an admonition to me from the President, to this effect: "When you are upon the ground, consult with General Stilwell and others, and advise me whether I am making a correct selection of the man to whom we will give our support, both military and matériel, in China."

Now, I think that possibly answers your question of what Roosevelt thought of him.

He left it open, but so far as Chiang Kai-shek is concerned, nearly everyone testified to his integrity, and his professional ability. He was an educated soldier. He had been educated at the military academy in China which is the equivalent, the Chinese equivalent, to our West Point.

In all my negotiations with him he never once broke his word, even when he was in a difficult situation where an evasion or a chance to patronize. If he changed his orders, he reversed himself in a very manly form.

I read the testimony by General Wedemeyer that he never at any time had difficulty in cooperating with Chiang Kai-shek.

Now, does that answer your question?

OTHER LEADERSHIP IN CHINA

Senator SMITH. Yes. It still leaves me in a quandary as to why, in the light of the testimony like that and others we have, we suddenly seemed to have backed away from supporting him. You need not trouble yourself further. You have given some evidence before as to why that probably happened.

General HURLEY. Well, to go just one step further, I said to General Stilwell: "If the United States decides to support someone else in the National Government other than Chiang Kai-shek, assuming that all our treaties, all our commitments, are to and with the National Government, and that the person who is selected in his stead should be a man who is in the government we have recognized, with these limitations and qualifications, whom have you to suggest that might be recognized by us instead of Chiang Kai-shek?"

General Stilwell told me then, "Well, I wouldn't make a positive recommendation, but I would suggest that you look into the qualifications of Gen. Li Tsung-jen."

I sent for General Li, and after many conferences with him, I didn't believe that he possessed the qualifications for leadership in a crisis that were possessed by Chiang Kai-shek.

After I left China, General Li was elected vice president of China, and when the armistice was forced upon Chiang Kai-shek—I shouldn't say that. I don't know whether it was forced upon him or not, and I am not going to express an opinion. When the armistice was declared, after a while when Chiang Kai-shek saw he had no longer the support of the American Government—and remember that in a situation such as he was confronted that seemed to me to mean life or death—when he didn't have that support, General Li, whom General Stilwell had recommended to me, became the president of China and the Generalissimo of the army.

So the civilian Government of China, while it was fighting the Communists, did have eventually the general whom General Stilwell had suggested to me.

Now I understand that General Li is in New York at the present time, and I certainly am not going to testify in any way that would be disparaging to him. I think that he is a sincere man and a man of splendid capacity. But he was the only one who was suggested as a possible replacement, shall we say, for Chiang Kai-shek. And we had to look for replacements because we didn't know whether Chiang Kai-shek had left or whether he would continue to cooperate. And eventually General Li in a very precarious situation did come to the presidency and the command.

Now does that answer it?

Senator SMITH. Then, as I understand, he retired later and Chiang Kai-shek is now the president; is that right?

General HURLEY. Wel, I don't think he retired. I think be became sick and left China, and he was still president when he left. But there was a vacancy, and in that situation Chiang Kai-shek returned and, as you know, made an attempt to take over, but the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that his army was, I think, disheartened and discouraged, and the result I think is as well known to you as it is to me because I was not there at that time.

Senator SMITH. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain.

AMALGAMATION OF COMMUNISTS AND NATIONALISTS IN CHINA

Senator CAIN. General Hurley, I am by no means certain that I understood what the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. McMahon, was driving at in his earlier colloquy with you, but my presumption is that he was endeavoring to establish as being so that you, Patrick Hurley, did not recognize anything dangerous or destructive about the Chinese Communists and that you were anxious to amalgamate the Chinese Communist and Nationalist armies.

Permit me to ask you a question or two to see whether my understanding of what you believed in is substantially or accurately correct.

I have been led to believe from what you have said that until the day the war was over your directive was as coming to you from the highest authority in this country: do everything humanly possible in your power to get those two different armies together for a joint effort against our common enemy, Japan. Is that completely correct, sir?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. The Senator from Connecticut asked you no questions of any kind about the possibility or desirability of amalgamating those Chinese Nationalist and Communist armies after the war was over. I think we ought now to understand what your thinking was postwar.

General Hurley, are you aware of the fact that in June of 1946 H. R. 6795 was before a House committee? The purpose of this bill was to amalgamate the Chinese Communist and the Nationalist armies. Do you know anything about that bill, General Hurley?

General HURLEY. In forty what?

Senator CAIN. In June of 1946.

General HURLEY. No. I was out at that time.

Senator CAIN. May I ask where you were at that period?

General HURLEY. I was up the canyon in New Mexico.

Senator CAIN. With reference to this bill about which I interrogated the present Secretary of State, he said this, on page 5629 of the record:

> General Marshall worked out with the two parties—

First let me give the preceding paragraph, which makes the explanation somewhat more clear. It reads:

> If you were going to put the army together, you had to put it together, and the army which would then be the National Army of China, had to be armed and equipped and officered.
>
> General Marshall worked out with the two parties the proposals for doing that, which I thought were very good and he thought were very good, and everybody else thought, so far as I know, were very good, and the whole purpose of this bill was to provide some equipment and arms for this new National Army.

Have you suggested to us that your advice at no time was sought on this piece of legislation, which in the postwar period would have amalgamated the Communist and Nationalist armies of China?

WISDOM OF AMALGAMATION ATTEMPT

General HURLEY. I was not consulted on that by anyone.

Senator CAIN. The Secretary of State again with reference to this proposal to amalgamate these antagonistic forces said this, and I ask you to tell me if you understand what the Secretary of State was talking about:

> I have already pointed out that the same thing was done in countries in western Europe without bringing that bad result about.

I ought to say, General Hurley, that I had suggested to the Secretary that it would be my own view that it would be completely unrealistic to endeavor to amalgamate Communist and Nationalist armies and that very evil results would flow from any such attempt, and his answer was that he thought my fear was not a valid one and particularly because apparently under the leadership of this country we have since the war amalgamated Communist and free armies in certain countries in western Europe. Can you throw any light on what the Secretary had in mind, sir?

General HURLEY. Well, of course, I would only be guessing that he is possibly talking about Mikhailovich in Yugoslavia, who had. I believe, an anti-Axis, but was executed after Tito took over for the Communists.

Senator Cain. Well, if that is the example the Secretary of State had in mind, the example worked in reverse, because in that sense the Communists became the supreme power and the free forces were liquidated.

General Hurley. I am not sure that that is what the Secretary meant, but I do know that after Tito took over Mikhailovich was executed.

Senator Cain. General Hurley, have you any time since the end of the war recommended or stated that it was in America's national and selfish interest to attempt to amalgamate the Communist and Nationalist armed forces of China.

General Hurley. On the contrary, I pointed out our own policy as stated by Cordell Hull, which is noninterference in the government in time of peace, and a peacetime effort to force a coalition or amalgamation is an interference in the internal affairs of government, but my advice was not asked on that, and what I said I think maybe you have reference to some newspaper interview or something I said at the time.

Senator Cain. No. I do not, sir.

General Hurley. Well, at that time I did point out that it was an interference in the internal affairs of China, and much has been written to the effect that my efforts in China at unification of the military forces for war purposes and in the theater of war was just the same as that followed after the war in General Marshall's administration out there.

Well, I, of course, wasn't very drastic about it, because I am always careful not to do back-seat driving when someone else has the responsibility, and so far as General Marshall is concerned I have assumed from the beginning that he was attempting to carry into effect a directive just as I had been, but I will go a little further on that, or I will let you continue to ask me questions, but I have an answer to that as to where that idea came from.

It came from another aide memoire from Chiang Kai-shek dated September 19, 1945, and remember that that is a month and several days, 4 days, I believe, after VJ-day, and he said to me—and I am quoting this from Chiang Kai-shek:

> Recent reports appearing in the press indicate that the United States Government is establishing a political advisory board for General MacArthur to assist in determining United States policy in the Far East. Mr. George Atcheson—

that's A-t-c-h-e-s-o-n, different from the Secretary—

> and Mr. John S. Service are among those included in this advisory group.

And again quoting from the same aide memoire:

> Mr. Atcheson and Mr. Service are generally accepted in China as men of strong convictions that a coalition between the Communists and the Kuomintang parties should be arbitrarily imposed. They both have expressed views that are definitely unfriendly to the Central Government of China and clearly reveal their support of the policies of the Communist Party. The Communists are now placing great stress on this fact. They know that Mr. Atcheson and Mr. Service are sympathetic and they interpret the above-referred-to appointment as indicative of the change in the United States policy.

Senator Cain. Is my understanding clear and correct, sir, that even during the war when in pursuance of your directive and because you believed in that directive you attempted to bring the two divergent forces together but only on the understanding that before any American assistance of any kind was going to go to the Chinese Communist armed forces, that it would be necessary for them to recognize an allegiance to the sovereignty of the Republican Government of China?

General HURLEY. Our ally, the government that we recognized that was the basis of any consolidation or unification, and it was for war purposes to bring the forces together to defeat Japan.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

HURLEY'S RELATIONSHIP TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

General Hurley, earlier in the afternoon you related from some source available to you portions of a conversation which took place between a Mr. Jaffe and a Mr. Service as they were a part of the noted Amerasia case. I think you said that Mr. Jaffe related to Mr. Service that you, General Hurley, were proving to be an embarrassment to the President of the United States, then Mr. Roosevelt, and that he, Mr. Roosevelt, was looking for an opportunity to fire you at the earliest possible moment.

This morning you indicated to us that as of the time that the late President Roosevelt died, you were fulfilling a mission in his name.

General HURLEY. Your latter statement is of course correct, and your first question as to what I was reading from, I was reading from: "State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Pursuant to Senate Resolution 231," and at page 87 of that document.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir. Without desiring to spend any time on Mr. Jaffe, I think the record would benefit from a comment or two from you about the nature and the closeness of your relationship with the late President, for against what you have told me so far today until the minute the President died, he held you in the highest possible regard and had a respect for your judgment and abilities. Whatever you care to say I will appreciate.

General HURLEY. As I stated this morning, that I served President Roosevelt with a whole heart, and if there was any place that I didn't have his unqualified support, I never found it out.

My relations with the President were close, and in a conversation that took place about where we would fight the war first, I of course thought we should attack our enemy, Japan, first, and I had sent him and Cordell Hull messages while I was running the blockade.

I wasn't in the diplomatic service then, I was in the Army, and I was running the Japanese blockade for MacArthur, and of course I thought we should attack our primary enemy, Japan. He sent for me to come home, but not until after he had made me Minister of New Zealand, where we thought the attack was being directed, and he told me what I had already heard but what I was not in complete agreement with, and he told me that we had decided and agreed to fight in the Atlantic an in Europe first an that we would have to conduct holding operations against Japan, but to apply the force of America on the battles of Britain and Russia who were then—and I said that I thought that Stalin and Churchill would in all probability be able to hold their enemy until we got rid of ours, and he told me that that was by no means certain at that time and he believed that the best strategy was to fight in the Atlantic and in Europe first.

And then he turned to me in his inimitable way and looked me straight in the eye and he said, "Now what is going to be your attitude on that," and my reply was, "Mr. President, I am grateful to you for having permitted me to even discuss that situation with you, but I am surprised that you would ask me such a question. Your decision, sir, is an order to me, and if you have decided to fight in the Atlantic and Europe first, I will do everything in my power to make your decision successful and the proper decision."

And it was then he said, "Well, I knew that. Now I want you to get ready to go to Russia."

Now that is how it started, and I had been in the Southwest Pacific, I had been running the blockade and I had been made Minister to New Zealand and I came home and he sent me then to Russia.

Now, understand, please, whenever President Roosevelt expressed his decision to me, he was my Commander in Chief, and regardless of what I thought about the decision, I made it my decision and I, as I said this morning, served him with a whole heart and I believe that he supported me to the day of his death.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, General.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green?

SECRECY OF MILITARY PLANS AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN MAJOR DECISIONS

Senator GREEN. General, several times in your testimony you have stated that you thought it was not only justifiable, but desirable to keep military plans secret, have you not?

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. Now, on what basis was that?

General HURLEY. What basis?

Senator GREEN. I mean, how do you justify that?

General HURLEY. I justify that by saying that in a government by the people, the decision to enter into a project and commit the people to a war is something on which the people have a right to be considered.

When that authority is given, however, and the United States is committed to a war, the strategy and the plans should be kept secret.

Senator GREEN. Well then, how can you explain the distinction to the people? I am not disagreeing with you, but I want to know how you draw the distinction.

General HURLEY. Well, for instance, we have a very grave controversy now about how to fight the war in Korea.

I think, in a government by the people, if you decide to fight in Korea, to commit the nation to war in Korea, that the people cannot make correct decisions if you don't tell them how you are committing them. I think they should know. But, as soon as you are committed, as soon as the troops are in motion, that becomes a military and a strategic problem, and I have great confidence in our military personnel and leadership.

Senator GREEN. Well, do you justify it on the ground that if it were known, it would be known by the enemy, and therefore it might be impossible to carry out the plan? Is that the basis of it?

General HURLEY. I believe that is the basis.

Senator GREEN. Why is not the same thing true of the diplomatic plans?

General **Hurley**. Well, if the diplomatic plans have to do with military operations, that then becomes a military matter, instead of a commitment of a nation to a war.

Senator **Green**. But I mean when you are once committed to a certain policy, in carrying out that policy, why is it not equally necessary for the diplomatic plans to be kept secret; otherwise the enemy would know those and would be able to defeat them?

General **Hurley**. Well, I don't believe that I follow you, Senator, because the diplomatic plan must be, must conform to the decision of the nations to be committed to a proposition.

I think possibly I am not quite getting what you mean. But I do believe that the plan, the purpose to commit a nation like we were committed at Yalta, is not a proper matter to keep secret from the people, and especially if it did have war significance up to VJ-day, there was no excuse in keeping it from the people after the war in August to the following 24th of March before they told the people that they were committed. There is a period of peace—I haven't counted the months, but 8 or 9 months—that that was kept secret from the American people when there was no military purpose involved.

WHERE IS SECRECY JUSTIFIED?

Senator **Green**. Well, I wasn't speaking about an explanation of a particular plan; I am talking about plans in general. Is it not just as desirable in order to be successful in diplomacy to keep your plans secret until the objective is reached as it is in the case of military plans?

General **Hurley**. Senator, I would have to disagree to that. A peculiar thing for a Republican like I am to say this, but I am committed to Woodrow Wilson's theory of "open covenants, openly arrived at," and I think that is in basic disagreement with what you are asking me now.

I do believe that in a government by the people, the people can't make correct decisions if they are not given the facts. And I do believe that in diplomacy—I can understand why certain diplomatic elements that become military when they are engaged in the military operation in time of war, but those are not the decisions that the people have to make.

Senator **Green**. No; but in time of war the miiltary andt he diplomatic are usually greatly involved, as they are in Korea, are they not?

General **Hurley**. Yes; I think that is true—that they are.

Senator **Green**. And so in that case the same principles would apply as to——

General **Hurley**. Well, I wouldn't apply a principle, Senator. I don't want to be contemptuous, but I would take the specific situation and get a concrete problem, and then I would decide whether it had the military aspects that put it in the military-strategy plane rather than diplomatic approach.

Senator **Green**. But in many such cases you would justify secrecy?

General **Hurley**. Sir?

Senator **Green**. In many such cases you would justify secrecy?

General **Hurley**. I wouldn't say in many. They would be very limited.

Senator GREEN. Well, in some such cases you would justify secrecy?

General HURLEY. I would answer that "perhaps."

I would have to see the case. It would have to be a concrete case, and I would have to apply to it in my own way the consequences that would flow militarily from making a diplomatic move public.

Senator GREEN. You have had long experience in diplomacy and in military affairs both, and if you were to exercise that judgment yourself, as to when it would apply and when it would not, should not other diplomats or military leaders justify themselves in the same way that you do justify yourself?

General HURLEY. Well, with me I would, like I presented the problem to my President, and like I accepted his decision about where we would fight.

Senator GREEN. Yes.

General HURLEY. And that was his decision, and when he told me it was his decision it became mine.

Now, of course, you can say that he was the civilian head also, but he was talking to me, an Army officer, as my Commander in Chief.

Senator GREEN. Well, the same thing would be true of his successor as Commander in Chief; would it not?

General HURLEY. If he told them, a career man in the State Department, that it had to be kept secret, I think they would obey his injunction, or retire.

Senator GREEN. Yes. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, what is the pleasure of the committee? Would you proceed now for sometime or come back this evening at 8 o'clock?

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, as I have told you, it is impossible for me to be here this evening because of the dinner the Secretary of State is giving to the President of Eduador; and I think some of us are going to that, so I will not be able to come this evening.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, it is impossible for me to be here this evening; but I have just one question that will undoubtedly take a little time for the Secretary to answer. I have one question that I would like to ask him.

Chairman RUSSELL. Suppose we proceed here and see.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am perfectly willing to stay now.

Chairman RUSSELL. It seems that it would inconvenience Senator Smith who cannot be here this evening; so, let us proceed and see where we go.

Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper?

LEAKS OF STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL IN CHINA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Hurley, the succeeding question that I wanted to ask you on my last round was in connection with your associations with Service and Davies and the political adviser or advisers or the members of the State Department delegation in China, and the circumstances surrounding your request for the recall, at least, of one or more of those, and their attitude toward the Communists.

I would like to have the record show as much as you think is expressive of that situation. I shall not attempt to ask individual questions, but I would like for you to proceed in your own way there.

General HURLEY. I wonder if the committee remembers in this recording disc of the FBI the conversation between Mr. Jaffe, the Communist editor of the Amerasia magazine and John Service, a career man in the State Department?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I recall that. I was a member of that subcommittee. I hasten to add that I did not join in the report nor approve it.

General HURLEY. Do you recall that in that recorded conversation, which is transcribed in this record, that Mr. Service said to the Communist—Mr. Jaffe—and I will find it here in a moment—

> Well, that was talked about around about. That plan was made in Wedemeyer's office in his absence. They got orders to make some recommendations as to what we should do if we landed in Communist territory. They had several of them—

and again this is a quotation of Service's statement to Jaffe:

> Well what I said about the military plan is, of course, very secret.

Now, the plan that Mr. Service was talking about there that had been considered in Wedemeyer's staff came out marked "top secret" under date of January 29, 1945.

This plan and the fact that we would cooperate with and arm whatever forces we found on the China coast when and if we landed, seemed to have caused a movement in China where the Communists were either—they claimed they fought their way through the Japanese line, but they were moving back of the Japanese line toward the coast where, I believe, not having read this statement or having seen it, the Communists had received some word of where we were going to land, and they were going to get there. That is what Service is talking about in this disc.

I immediately called a meeting with General Wedemeyer, with his G–2, Colonel Dickey, with my own top assistants, and a map was shown where this movement was taking place.

I said, "Now, the Communists claim that we are going to land some place down on the Chantung Peninsula." I believed at the time it was going to be farther south, but I told what they believed, and I told them that I had picked up from the Communists a secret document, supposed to be secret, but I didn't think it was ours at all.

Wedemeyer said, "I think that Gen. J. E. Hull, of the General Staff," assistant to the Chief of Staff in the Operations Division in Washington, "has sent out a plan that was prepared, I believe, in the State Department, and it gives the short-term objective of the United States Government in China, and it gives the military mission."

And here it is, the same document that I had gotten from the Communists.

Now, that document is dated January 29, 1945, and the Yalta secret agreement was made on February 1 of that same year. This comports with the Yalta secret agreement, but it is actual and here it is, the letter that I got later, a copy of a letter, from General Wedemeyer, that came to his office.

It had never come to me as Ambassador. This secret document was made available to the Communists at Yenan, China. I charged at that time that in my opinion, while I was not able to prove it, I did check those who had traveled to Yenan at that time, and one of them was John Stewart Service, and I find now in this secret paper that the secret military—that the military information I gave you is secret, and he refers again to this document.

Well, I relieved Mr. Service and I didn't make these charges except that he was pro-Communist, that he was attempting to assist the Communists, that he was not in favor of the policy, but I didn't say he was Communist, and I didn't say at that time that he had betrayed military secrets.

But now I have the same document that we picked up with the Communists in China and have his own evidence on the disk, that the document he delivered to Jaffe here—and this was in a few days after he arrived from China after I relieved him, and he was arrested by the FBI.

Now, for the record, I will read this, Mr. Chairman, if you wish me to read it, and put it in the record at this place.

Chairman RUSSELL. You can exercise either option you desire.

STATE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENT OF JANUARY 29, 1945, ON CHINA POLICY

General HURLEY (reading):

> The short-term objective of the United States Government is to assist in mobilizing all of China's human and material resources for the prosecution of war against Japan.
>
> We are using our influence to bring about a greater degree of political and military unity and to achieve greater efficiency and volume in the production of war matériel. We are supplying China with materials for direct military use and for industrial purposes connected with the war effort.

To that I had no objection. Next—

> Our long-time objective in China is to assist in the development of a united, democratic, progressive, and cooperative China, which will be capable of contributing to the security and the prosperity of the Far East.

With that there is no objection.

> The mission of our military authorities in China, we believe, should be focused for the present upon the short-term objective described above. Undoubtedly measures devised to contain Japanese forces in cooperation with the Chinese will result in a degree of rearmament of the Chinese forces, but it is believed that measures undertaken at this time to rearm China in order that it might become a strong Asiatic power would be impracticable.
>
> We would like to see the rearmament to such extent as may be practicable to all—

underline "all"—

> Chinese forces willing to fight the Japanese.

Now, I call attention to the fact that that is in conflict with the policy which was to not arm the Chinese Communists unless and until they acknowledged the sovereignty of our ally, the Republic of China.

> But the present unsatisfactory relations between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists, even though it is generally conceded that they could effectively use quantities of small-arms ammunition and demolition material, however, if operations are undertaken along the China coast, it is suggested that our military authorities should be prepared to arm any Chinese forces which they believe can be effectively employed against the Japanese, and that they should at an opportune time so advise the Chinese military authorities.

Now, that explains why the movement of the Communists toward the coast.

It is our purpose, as indicated above, to utilize our influence to bring about both the short-term and the long-term objectives, the unification of China, and it does not necessarily follow that China should be unified under Chiang Kai-shek.

However, with regard to the short-term objective, Chiang appears to be the only leader who now offers a hope of unification.

The alternative to the support of Chiang—

I can't read this, this is blurred—

for the [something] of our immediate object might be chaos.

With regard to our long-term objective, it is our purpose to maintain a degree of flexibility which would permit cooperation with any leadership in China that would offer the greatest likelihood of fostering a united, democratic friendly China.

Developments in this regard would, of course, have a bearing on any plans to assist the peacetime rearming of China.

[Deleted.]

With regard to possible military operations against Hong Kong, we have felt that it is undesirable from a political point of view that American forces should be employed for the reoccupation of the island, or the adjacent Kowloon leased territory.

ROLE OF STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL IN LEAKS TO COMMUNISTS

Now, what I call to your attention is the fact that that is the same document that Mr. Service refers to in this list.

Let me say what I told the committee previously—that is, the Foreign Relations Committee: That with much of that short-term and long-term objectives I have no quarrel whatever. I do not quarrel with the military principle that when a force lands, the commanding officer will use whatever force is there available to him for the accomplishment of his purpose; so, as a military principle, I agree that if the Communists were at that port, it would not only be the best thing for the commander to do, it would be his duty to utilize any force at his disposal for the accomplishment of his objective.

But, what I am complaining of is that I don't get this, that I find it with the Communists in China.

I come back here and, for the first time, today, I didn't know that it figured in here, but here is a secret hearing in Washington, where a secret list, taken by the FBI has Mr. Service referring to the same document in his conversation with Mr. Jaffe, the Communist.

Now, please separate what I am including today from the reasons for relieving Service and John P. Davies and Raymond Ludden. They were the three, I think, that were up there; but I relieved others and I didn't give any reasons. I didn't call them Communists, because I couldn't prove that. I said that they were sabotaging the American policy and were in favor of the overthrow of our ally by the Chinese Communists.

Now, does that clear that up, to some extent?

Senator Hickenlooper. It is certainly helpful.

Has my time expired?

Chairman Russell. Yes, your time has expired, Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator McMahon?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman?

DISCUSSION OF YALTA AGREEMENT WITH CHIANG AND STALIN

Senator SPARKMAN. General Hurley, I regret that this morning I had to be at another committee meeting and I missed that part of your testimony. I don't want you to go over anything that you covered this morning. If I should ask you anything pertaining to that, I wish you would just say so.

I listened with great interest to your preliminary statement yesterday, and particularly with reference to the part that the Yalta agreement played in it.

Now, when did you first learn of the provisions in the Yalta agreement affecting China?

General HURLEY. I first learned of them in Washington about less than 2 months after, and I didn't get the agreement but I learned of them from President Roosevelt.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now he delegated you, did he not, to go to see the Generalissimo? Weren't you delegated to contact the Generalissimo and to discuss the matter with him?

General HURLEY. On the contrary, I was told I couldn't discuss the matter with the Generalissimo, and it was the following 15th of June, and I was told that under no circumstances must I tell the Generalissimo or anyone connected with his administration of the Yalta secret agreement.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I didn't have reference to February. I mean that eventually you were the one, you and General Wedemeyer together, were you not, or General Wedemeyer accompanied you and you gave the presentation. Isn't that true?

General HURLEY. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now when did you first discuss the Yalta agreement with Stalin?

General HURLEY. I think the record will show, Senator, that it was on the 17th of April 1945.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did you at that time ask him to modify it in any way, or did you just discuss the manner in which it was to be put in operation?

General HURLEY. Well, I testified to that this morning, and I quoted and would quote for you again from the white paper.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is all right, if it is in the record this morning.

General HURLEY. Yes, it is in the record, and Averell Harriman was present at that time, and——

Chairman RUSSELL. Just a minute. General, you referred to statements that Mr. Harriman made, but if you made any specific statement with respect to Stalin's attitude toward modifying the Yalta agreement, I didn't get it and I was sitting here all morning, and I made a note to ask you that question when my time for examination came.

General HURLEY. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. You discussed in great detail yours and Mr. Harriman's views about where he said that you were overly optimistic and overly enthusiastic, but you never did state anything about what Stalin said about the modification, unless I am badly deceived and I don't think the record will show that I am.

General HURLEY. Well, I concede that you may be correct. I thought that I had.

But what I said I discussed with Marshal Stalin has been written in the Saturday Evening Post, and I don't mind reiterating it. I do believe, Senator, that it is in the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I will apologize if it is.

Senator Cain asked the question. Senator Cain, did you get the impression that the witness discussed his conversation with Marshal Stalin as to whether he would or would not modify the Yalta agreement?

Senator CAIN. No, sir. My own recollection is that the witness testified that he went off to visit with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin at the request of President Roosevelt to secure or discuss a modification. But I don't think the witness discussed that phase of his conversation.

General HURLEY. Do you recall that I said that in the British House of Parliament the question was asked if a statement I made in Chungking was correct?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir; I do.

General HURLEY. And the Government replied that it is substantially correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. You did make that statement.

General HURLEY. And that was modification of the policy outlined.

Now, let me make a statement in regard to Stalin.

STALIN REACTION TO YALTA AGREEMENT MODIFICATION

What Averell Harriman says on my report on my conversation with Stalin is factually correct. In other words, he wasn't questioning that Stalin did say to me what I said he said and what I said to Stalin.

Now I don't recall just exactly the wording, but I asked Stalin, I said: "You told me before that you were going to support the Republic of China, and that you were not in favor of a divided China, and that you were opposed to imperialism in China, and that you would support the aspirations of the Chinese to establish a self-government or a democratic government for themselves."

Stalin answered that he still would do that. Well, now it was after that that he asked me, "Have you seen the Yalta agreement?" To which I replied with one word, "Yes," and I said, "Is your statement now standing in the face of the Yalta agreement?" And he replied, "Yes," and that was the basis of my conversation, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right. You went there on instructions from President Roosevelt. Did you report back to President Roosevelt?

General HURLEY. No. President Roosevelt was dead, but I reported to President——

Senator SPARKMAN. To President Truman?

General HURLEY. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did you send a telegram back?

General HURLEY. Yes; it was a telegram, and——

Senator SPARKMAN. Is that in the record; is that in the white paper?

General HURLEY. Yes; the substance of it is in here as the State Department—unfortunately, I do not have a copy of that. I sent it from Moscow and in some way or another I don't have the copy of the cable that I sent; but if I can find Averell Harriman's statement, he no doubt had it, because he criticized me, and he didn't criticize me unjustly, I will say that; that I thought his criticism was mild and well-taken.

He said that he didn't question the factual accuracy of my report, but that he thought that I had taken at face value what Stalin said to me, and that I was overoptimistic about it. I think that is a true representation of what occurred.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

CHINA POLICY IN 1945

Now, General Hurley, you stated yesterday that you felt that our policy in China started downward at the time—dated from the Yalta agreement. I find that a little difficult to reconcile with the testimony that you gave before the Foreign Relations Committee on December 5, 1945, when you stated that we had a strong American policy in China.

You did, as you stated here, make reference to the lower echelon's interferring; but if you remember, just about the day after you resigned, Secretary Byrnes, I believe it was, issued a statement as to our American policy; made a public announcement, and I am quoting from your testimony at that time.

You said:

> Mr. Chairman, if that public announcement of American policy had been issued by the State Department before I returned from China, I would not have returned. If that public statement had been made by the State Department before I tendered my resignation, I would not have resigned.

Now, that was December 5, 1945, nearly a year after Yalta.

General HURLEY. All right, Senator, would you do me a favor? Would you read what that policy is, and I will tell you the difficulties about it. What had Byrnes said?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. He quoted, as I recall, Secretary Hull's statement from 1941, and said it had never been revoked, and it was still our policy, and that the one government for us to support was the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek.

General HURLEY. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes; that is true.

General HURLEY. Yes. Well, that was—but he at that time—the pro-Communists in the State Department were saying that I was the man who had chosen to support the Chiang Kai-shek government, and I quoted Cordell Hull on them then, but he said—didn't he use these five points that I related awhile ago in answer to the Senator's question? If I can get what he said, Senator, I could tell you where the policy diverged from that statement made by Secretary Byrnes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, it is rather lengthy, and we are trying to bring this to a close. It was a good statement; I am not condemning you for what you said, because it was a good strong statement, the one that Secretary Byrnes made.

General HURLEY. Well, if it is the statement that I think it is——

Senator SPARKMAN. It is one that you placed in the record yourself.

General HURLEY. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

General HURLEY. Well, if it is the statement I think it is it has all of Marshall's directive—all of General Marshall's directive—in it except that part—and I am not trying to use words quoted, which directed him to withhold support or aid to Chiang Kai-shek until he had settled or composed his differences with the Communist Party.

That was interpolated in that directive, after Byrnes first issued it. It was put in by the State Department some place, and that is the part of the directive, if I understand correctly what the Senator has reference to, to which I did not agree because it wasn't in the directive at that time, and that left it so that all the Communists had to do was sit back and wait for Marshall's plan to fail, unless Chiang Kai-shek agreed to accept the Communists on their terms.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course, at that time you still believed that Russia was living up to its agreement under the treaty with China, did you not?

General HURLEY. I believe more than that; I believe that notwithstanding the fact that we released Russia in the secret agreement at Yalta on the question of the territorial integrity and the political independence of China, that up to the time I left there, Russia had not taken any action that would indicate that they had departed from the last conversation that I had with Marshal Stalin.

SUCCESS OF HURLEY'S AMBASSADORSHIP

Senator SPARKMAN. When you went to China in 1944 you felt that the Nationalist Government was in a rather shaky condition, didn't you?

General HURLEY. I believe, and I think the President believed and the military believed, that the very language used in my directive to prevent the collapse of the Republic of China indicates, Senator, that we thought it was in a very precarious situation.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes; I was interested in one observation you made in the course of that hearing in which you said that at the time, talking about when you were sent over there:

> At the time it was predicted even on the floor of the Senate I understand by my good friend Senator Brewster, that nothing short of a miracle would prevent the collapse——

General HURLEY. And Senator Chandler.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, and Senator Chandler, of Kentucky.

> * * * that nothing short of a miracle would prevent the collapse of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China.

General, I want to say this. I think all of us looking back now upon what happened in China must come to the conclusion that things did not work out there as we hoped they would. I am talking about after the war, but I think a lot of it is hindsight rather than foresight. I believe General Wedemeyer said that was true. Don't you think that is true?

General HURLEY. Well, I think if I haven't been wasting time on the record that I have made here and the documents I have introduced, I wouldn't say that it was hindsight on my part because I pointed out to the fact where we had departed from the American policy.

I thought that I was the halfback in the game, not the Monday morning halfback, because my record is there and it shows that I thought that our policy—and I said, Senator at that time—that there was a third world war in the making. Now that isn't hindsight.

I said it at that time and I said our policy if we continued that policy will lead to a third world war, and I expressed the desire that we support the United Nations.

I am not making that today but it has come true and there is more of it coming true, but I was expressing what at that time was my conviction. I was familiar with the principles with which we were operating and I certainly did not have then nor do I have now any vindictive attitude toward the people who did their best and still failed.

Now they told me to keep China in the war. Well, I succeeded in that, in keeping it in the war to a finish. The next thing you will notice President Roosevelt directed me to keep the Chinese Army in the field. We succeeded in doing that, but then he told me to unify all the military forces of China for the purpose of striking Japan.

On that I failed miserably and completely, and sometimes I think when a man does the best that is in him and he renders his service to the country to the best of what ability he has, it is all right to say that he should have been replaced at the time.

I think if he is not doing well, he should be replaced. In war you can't continue to hold on. For instance, we didn't hold on to my friend, Stilwell, when he had gotten to an impasse where we were losing the war, but I am not indulging in recriminations. I am indulging in self defense.

Why, I have been plastered all over this Nation as the kind of a man who has delivered my country to the situation by which it is now confronted, and I am not guilty.

Now if somebody in here who is supposed to be favorable to communism has talked about ordeal by slander, well, I never favored any of those principles. Yet everybody is picking out little details and putting in a different context and a different time.

Why, I am in favor of individual liberty, self-government, regulated free enterprise and justice according to the American system, and I have never supported anything else, and yet I am on the defensive and have been for 5 years.

Now I didn't come here because I want to vindicate myself. This is the first time I have mentioned it during these hearings, but I did want to put in the record something that indicates that possibly I was fighting for the principles that have made America the greatest unit on earth and the principles that I believe were surrendered in secret by our diplomats.

Senator SPARKMAN. General, I will say I never heard those charges made against you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired.

General HURLEY. I have a brief case full of them that I would put in the record if it would do any good, but I don't want to do that.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is not the issue.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

I might have the record show that I departed from my regular order there and called upon the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee.

General HURLEY. I would like to say this to Senator Sparkman. I appreciate the fairness of your examination. I think you have been absolutely fair to me in every way and I wanted to express my gratitude to you, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, thank you, sir. We are looking for the facts, that is all.

General HURLEY. Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO RETAIN HURLEY AS AMBASSADOR

Senator KNOWLAND. General, unfortunately I had to be out for a time during the examination today so I do not want to repeat any questions which may have been asked during my temporary absence to the Appropriations Committee, but from time to time there have been indications that your original service in China had not met with the approval of the President.

I do not believe that is correct on the record. I am sure that it is not. I would like to ask whether or not at the time that you returned to the United States whether you were tendered or offered the ambassadorship to stay on in China and whether the termination of your mission was at your own volition?

General HURLEY. You mean when I resigned as Ambassador?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

General HURLEY. Yes. I talked to President Truman and President Truman asked me to return to China, and I told him in very short form that I believed that I was being undermined in China by our own State Department, not by all of them but by some of them, and it was just too great a task for a man to have to carry his own State Department on his back while meeting the Communist and Kuomintang controversy on the other.

That while I do have considerable energy, it is just too much to undertake to go through this in peacetime, and I would like to be relieved, and he said, "Well, I would like for you to go back."

Senator KNOWLAND. What was the approxiate date of that?

General HURLEY. That was approximately October 1945, and I said to the President:

"I am not well. I am running a temperature every afternoon and I won't tell you positively that I won't go back because I appreciate what you have said. I thought you were about ready to fire me and I thought I would relieve you of that by just getting out. Besides, I was a wartime servant and the war is over," but I said:

"If you will give me 30 days to go and sit out in the mountains and recuperate, I will come back and we will talk over the situation."

Now here is a situation for which I owe President Truman an apology. I came back and I found that the men I complained of were all in the places where I left them, no changes had been made. The same old situation prevailed.

About that time someone called my attention to the Daily Worker and the Chicago Sun and to certain speeches made by a man who was supposed to be a Communist Member of Congress named Delaney, all of which indicated to me that my secret reports to the State Department were made available to the Communists.

Some of them quoted me as having said that there are people in the Chiang Kai-shek government who are corrupt and should be thrown out. The whole purport of the publications—I was already persona non grata with my own State Department, and the purport of them, I believe, was to make me persona non grata with the government I was trying to uphold in China.

REASONS FOR HURLEY'S RESIGNATION

The situation looked hopeless to me. And then Wang Shihchieh, the Minister of Foreign Relations, had told me that my good friend, Jim Byrnes, had said to him that the war was over and they were going to give my place to a deserving Democrat.

So I said, "Don't let us have a controversy about this. You take it."

Well, about that time a Dr. Qoa, who was at the United Nations, came down to warn me again that if I would go to China, the idea was to get me over there and find some pretext for public discharge.

Well, I didn't quite believe that, but the publications of my secret statements in the Daily Worker and in several other left-wing papers and publication of facts that could be obtained no place except from the State Department—I became convinced and I think now that I was wrong in including President Truman in it, and without going back after his generous offer, I resigned, sent him my resignation, and I understood that he was aggrieved because he had fully understood I was going back and the plane had been set up to take me.

I want to acknowledge that the later developments in the Amerasia papers have indicated to me that I was—in my mind—I didn't tell it to anyone because I didn't know any facts, but I had made up my mind that I was being shot in the rear by my own organization, and I quit without going back to the President.

I think that I had wrongly concluded that he was responsible primarily for the things that were being published that were injuring me at home. But since then, since the Amerasia case, I have been convinced that the information was being obtained from the documents that were stolen or taken from the State Department and sold or given to the Amerasia magazine in New York, where the FBI found them and recovered them.

So that is where the information possibly was coming from that in my mind I was charging against others.

And, I have been convinced that President Truman had nothing to do with it; and I am happy to make this public statement to that effect.

Senator **Knowland**. Now, this may have been answered during my absence. If so, don't repeat your answer—but, did President Roosevelt ever give you a directive relative to imperialism and the treatment of it, on your mission to the Far East?

General **Hurley**. Yes, sir.

I read my query of the State Department, after the President's death, and told him categorically what my directives were; and I read that into the record, and read the State Department's reply into the record, so that is covered, I believe, completely.

Senator KNOWLAND. Then, I merely want to say—and I have no further questions—except to express as one member of this committee, my appreciation for your having come here.

I think that you have contributed a great deal of information, much of which was new to me and, I believe, to many members of this committee; and I think that it is extremely helpful that a man who had the full confidence of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, on a very important mission to the Far East, and to other sections of the world, will come here and aid this committee in developing the facts so that we may better understand our present situation, and the various factors which led up to the developments now confronting us.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thought somebody else might have a turn?

Chairman RUSSELL. You have had two turns, and everyone else has had.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If it is up to me, I will ask a question.

General Hurley, are there any details of importance and factual—I know there are volumes of details, but are there any specific details which you feel are necessary to round out this situation with regard to policy in the Orient?

As I say, I mean, I am thinking of certain important items which may have been omitted from your testimony, or upon which you have not been interrogated?

STATE DEPARTMENT LOYALTY INVESTIGATION

General HURLEY. Yes, sir; there is an important subject and that is in regard to the hearing on the Yalta papers.

I have al ot of details here that I was prepared to use, but it seems that it has been covered largely in the questioning.

I have here the correspondence between myself and Senator Tydings in regard to the hearing before the Tydings committee, and I think, if I don't wear the chairman out, it will take me only—I am not going to read all of this but there is something in the record, and three telegrams that I would like to put in the record because of the fact that the secret record which I have been supplied with only now, and I dictated this roughly last night, and I take this from page 1443 of the hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, commonly known as the State Department Loyalty Investigation:

> Senator McMAHON. Let me make it clear as to what I want. I want Hurley's philosopy, Hurley's view; I want the documentation of those views.
>
> Senator LODGE. That is perfectly all right with me.
>
> Senator TYDINGS. We do not want them next year. We want them soon.
>
> Mr. RHETTS. We will be glad to prepare that out of the material that we have here, including the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.
>
> Mr. MORRIS. I think also we should have General Hurley's testimony.

Here is the point:

> Senator TYDINGS. I have been in touch with General Hurley several times. The most recent time was several days ago. He does not want to testify. He tells me he has nothing to contribute to the testimony that he contributed before the Foreign Relations Committee.

I have so stated to the committee in a message, and so stated to the press.

I urged General Hurley to come and testify, but he does not want to come, because he says he cannot bring out anything that is not already known.

Now, the reason that I am taking some exception to that is because it has just come to my attention—please understand me—that Millard Tydings is a friend of mine of 30 years' standing.

OFFER TO TESTIFY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS IN STATE DEPARTMENT PROBE

Here is the telegram which I sent to Senator Tydings under date of June 20, 1950:

Senator MILLARD TYDINGS,
Senate Office Building:

Pursuant to our telephone conversation, also press, of today, it is indicated that you may call me as a witness in the investigation which your committee is conducting. I have testified regarding the defeat of the American policy in China by career diplomats and others. At that time I requested through Chairman Connally some 16 documents which I requested that the State Department decode and send to the investigating committee to make available to the public. The documents were not furnished. Before I appear this time and go through a repetition of what occurred last time, may I ask if you will now procure the decoded documents from the State Department necessary to support my testimony. Also I now request that I be supplied with the decoded documents from the State Department on which was based the distortions published in the Daily Worker, in the Chicago Sun, and by Congressman DeLacey on the floor of the House, and by many other pro-Communist writers and authors. It is clear that these attacks are based directly on documents to which the pro-Communists had access in the State Department and which are not available to the public. I will furnish a list of the additional documents. I would like these documents to be decoded and given to the public.

Senator KNOWLAND. Might I ask a procedural question there, Mr. Chairman?

Yesterday or the day before I understood that you were going to supply such a list for this committee. Did you ever supply this committee with the list of those documents?

General HURLEY. I shall do that now. I have the documents here. I can suply you with the documents if you wish, but they are not decoded. That is why I didn't use them before. I have never broken a code and I wouldn't do it, although I was getting wiped over the nails.

If these decoded documents are not furnished, it would seem futile for me to appear again and undergo another smear attack from the enemies of my country who had access to these secret documents of our Government that are not available to me.

Now that is what I told Millard. Now what does Millard say?

Just received rumors to the effect that you had told some Senator you had been summoned to appear Monday. Of course, we both know no summons has been issued to you. In view of your conversation with me on the telephone yesterday, I have notified the committee that I do not intend to ask you to testify as a witness, for unless we could get these secret documents your testimony would be the same as that before the Foreign Relations taken several years ago. In view of the fact that we cannot get these documents, I am not issuing any subpena for you to appear, to come to Washington and testify.

MILLARD TYDINGS.

Nod does that state the same reason that Millard stated to the committee that I was not appearing? It was a question of secret documents.

Millard said, "He does not want to testify, period." Well that might be all right if he stopped there without any conditions.

> He tells me that he has nothing to contribute that he has not contributed to the Foreign Relations Committee. I have also stated to the committee and to the press. I urged General Hurley to come and testify, but he does not want to come. He says he cannot bring out anything we do not already have.

Now I submit to you, gentlemen, that that isn't exactly what the situation was.

Now here was the last telegram, and all these things went by Western Union:

> Fully agree regarding the understanding stated by you not to issue summons. Possible basis for rumor when you first advised me that I would be summoned to appear Tuesday next, I canceled Tulsa talk on the ground that I expected to be summoned to go to Washington. After my later understanding with you, I reinstated the Tulsa engagement.
>
> Second—basis for rumor—

and so forth. And finally I closed by telling—

> With kindest regards and your agreement not to issue a summons still stands.

But what I am telling you, I didn't know what Senator Tydings had told the committee that I had nothing to offer. I declined to come because I would not be furnished the documents on which to base my testimony.

Now, I think that that is all I want to say about that. I had written a lot more about the committee and what its findings were and what I thought of them, but that is merely an opinion.

DOCUMENTS FOR INCLUSION IN RECORD

Now, we can hurry along if you wish me to. I will give you the list of documents that I asked Senator Connally for before or if you wish here they are by number, the same documents that I had when I appeared, and the State Department would not decode them, and I was not permitted to use them, but I have testified so freely this time, and without any purpose to avoid hearing me, that I feel rather satisfied about the situation, and I don't believe that I would achieve anything for the public service now by putting these secret documents in the record.

I do believe that, if the Senators would permit me, I would like to have in the record in full my statement in regard to my directive and my analysis of the situation in China for Secretary Stettinius, when I became Ambassador.

I think that clears up about what my directive was, and I don't think that I should proceed to put all of this matter into the record now because, frankly, some of it is obsolete, and some of it is intended to show the divergence of the policy being followed in peacetime in China from the wartime directives that I had, and that seems to me now like it is past history, and I don't believe that we would serve the public interest and welfare by putting all these documents in at this time, 5 years after; but I am willing to put them in if the Senators wish me to.

Chairman RUSSELL. Which one of them is it that you desire to offer for the record, General?

General HURLEY. The one I desire to offer for the record is a message dated December 23, 1944, the following message from Hurley, "Eyes alone for the Secretary of State," and that is where he asked me what my directive is after I had been President Roosevelt's personal representative and had become Ambassador—I was transferred from the President to Secretary Stettinius—and he is trying to find out from me what I am doing in China, and he asked me what are my problems.

Chairman RUSSELL. Does it also contain your reply?

General HURLEY. Sir? This is my reply to him.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well. That matter, I am informed, has already been placed in the record at page 7654.

Do you desire to offer any other of the papers?

General HURLEY. Yes. I would like to offer for the record, before closing, my statement—it is 3 pages long on the white paper, and that was issued some time ago, and I think it clears up a lot of the matters we have been discussing here—if you can forgive me, Senator, for taking this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is all right. You have got a lot of papers there.

General HURLEY. What I am doing, if you gentlemen do not object—I think we could conclude——

Chairman RUSSELL. You may put into the record any matter you feel should go in there.

General HURLEY. I am having an awful time now finding that. It is the last thing I found. Here it is, and it is 3 pages, and attempts to give the Hull policy, and closes on the note of the Acheson reply.

Chairman RUSSELL. That matter will likewise be printed in the record.

(The document referred to will be found in the appendix of this record.)

General HURLEY. That, I believe, gentlemen, concludes as far as I know, my statement. I am ready to answer any questions, but so far as I am concerned, I think I have had a fair hearing, and I am grateful to you, sir, for the very generous opportunity you have given me to express myself to the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I appreciate your statement, General. I feel like I am the witness' representative here sometimes, without regard to his viewpoint, and I try to see that every witness has an opportunity to present any matter to this committee that he desires to bring to our attention.

Do you have any questions, Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

DISCUSSION OF SECRET YALTA AGREEMENT WITH CHURCHILL AND STALIN

General Hurley, you have testified that as a result of several personal conversations with the late President Roosevelt in early spring of 1945 you were directed by the President to go and confer with Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Great Britain and Marshal Stalin in Russia about modifications of the Yalta Agreement. Is that correct, sir?

General HURLEY. That is correct.

Senator CAIN. You have likewise testified recently in answer to a question by Senator Sparkman that at or about the same time you were directed not to discuss the Yalta Agreement with the Generalissimo. Is that correct, sir?

General HURLEY. That is true.

Senator CAIN. May I ask you who and for what reason you were directed not to discuss the Yalta Agreement, which concerned China, with Chiang Kai-shek, while being directed to discuss the Yalta Agreement with the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Marshal Stalin?

General HURLEY. I was directed first by the President not to do it because Chiang Kai-shek was not a party to it, and the discussion with Prime Minister Churchill and with Marshal Stalin was discussing it with men who were parties to it.

Now, understand, we didn't make the discussion—I didn't make the discussion of the Yalta secret agreement the paramount objective. What I was doing was asking them would they again agree to the reinstatement of the American policy which upheld the territorial integrity and political independence of China and endorsed the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish self-government for themselves.

Now, that might be considered, Senator Cain, as an oblique attack on Yalta, but what I was doing was, I was afraid I would never get signatures to repeal—in fact, I knew after Roosevelt's death I would never get it.

I was trying to get an agreement on principles that would return us to our pre-Yalta status and the support of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

General HURLEY. That is about the way I approached it.

Senator CAIN. May I ask you how long was it after your conversations with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin that you and others, I think, in your company were permitted or encouraged to discuss the Yalta Agreement with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek?

General HURLEY. I sent a cable from Chungking telling the Secretary of State that Chiang Kai-shek's government and others in Chungking seemed to know the details, and I thought it would be advisable, in order to keep the confidence of Chiang Kai-shek, for me to be permitted to discuss it with him. And I received a reply that I would not discuss it with Chiang Kai-shek or reveal to him the Yalta secret agreement until I was specifically directed to do it.

When I received my directive, it was from the President.

Senator CAIN. General Hurley, you were directed by the late President Roosevelt to discuss particular or desired changes in the Yalta agreement with Mr. Churchill and with Mr. Stalin.

It is my understanding from your testimony that you did discuss those changes with both of those gentlemen and that it was your hope and your expectation as a result of those conversations that the changes would be put into active force as you had been led to believe that those two gentlemen agreed to the proposed changes.

Am I stating you correctly, sir?

General HURLEY. Yes; you are not quite going far enough. I believe that the Yalta secret agreement was a disgrace to my country and I wanted to get out from under it if I could. And I asked the President, and he told me to go and talk it over with these two men and see if we could ameliorate it in some way to make it conform again to the traditional American policy in China; that is about what happened.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir; to the very best, then, of your understanding and recollection, the late President, Mr. Roosevelt, agreed with your premise that grievous mistakes had been made and agreed to in Yalta.

General HURLEY. He didn't agree at first. He thought I was mistaken but the fact that he sent me to London and to Moscow indicates that he was very much disturbed about it at the time that he sent me there.

Senator CAIN. One last question, if I may, sir.

DATE OF RUSSIA'S DECISION TO ENTER JAPANESE WAR

You have testified on yesterday that you had a personal conversation in 1942 with Marshal Stalin in Russia, during which he gave you every reason to believe that Russia was determined in due time to engage in a Pacific war against Japan. Did I understand you correctly, sir?

General HURLEY. Yes, I think he put it that he would join us in the war against—in fact, he broke off the conversation. He said, "You think I am talking about my enemy and I am not mentioning yours." And I said, "Well, I agree. I have been waiting for you to do that."

And then he specifically told me he would join us, but to join at that time or to let it become known that he anticipated joining might bring Japan down on his rear.

Senator CAIN. Did you ever have reason, General Hurley, between 1942 and 1945 to doubt that Mr. Stalin was going to carry out his intention to engage in the war against Japan?

General HURLEY. None whatever.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

General Hurley, will you permit me to say this, as an individual and as a member of this committee. I have known you as a friend, for whom I have a real fondness and a respect, and during the several years I have been in the Senate I have listened with wonder and always with interest to the attempts of big and small men in and out of Government to malign you, to criticize you, to discredit you, and to expose you to venom and ridicule and intimidation.

It was not for those reasons until this hearing that I have made up my own mind that you are eminently qualified against your own background and your own experience to be the highest type of witness before a Congressional committee, and I consider it, as I have said to several other witnesses, a real privilege for this American to have been in the company of a man who believes so strongly in his own Nation and its welfare.

PROCEDURAL MATTER

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have a brief procedural matter which perhaps should be mentioned now. This morning I requested Admiral Davis to secure if possible from the Defense Establishment a paraphrase of the cable sent by General Ridgway to General Collins. I hope that that paraphrase may be furnished at the earliest possible date because I want to proceed with a procedural matter before this committee, and I think we will need the paraphrase available.

That was a document dated I think late last year, either in late November or December.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you request that?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes, I spoke to Admiral Davis this morning.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not recall having received a letter from you.

Senator KNOWLAND. No, that is correct, but this is a document which they had sent over which I had had a chance to examine as one of the committee of two, but because of it being a coded document, it could not be made a part of the record, and I wanted to inquire as to whether it could not be paraphrased so it could be discussed.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sure Admiral Davis will endeavor to get it.

DETAILS OF STALIN-HURLEY TALK ON JAPANESE WAR

My curiosity is so intrigued that I must ask the general one or two questions. General, what did Stalin indicate would be the quid pro quo or what was he going to get out of it by going into the war with Japan?

Just because he was friendly to us or why was he going to throw his forces into the war against Japan?

General HURLEY. Well, we had already been attacked at Pearl Harbor and he was very anxious for us to mount the cross channel, the English Channel attack on the Axis, and what he was telling me was the idea that the strategy of fighting in Europe first was the strongest strategy, and he also discussed with me the fact that I believed that Japan could use the resources that she was conquering in China and Indochina and in Burma—well, she hadn't gotten to Burma yet, but she was in Java and the East Indies, and that meant oil and supplies.

But he said, "You are overstating the capacity of Japan to bring those war supplies into play against you."

He estimated it would be a year and a half before she could organize herself to do that, and then he talked about her manufacturing capacity, she had to rely on Germany, and Germany had her hands full at home, and it was then he said he was trying to get me to agree that the fight in Europe was essential, but then he stopped after his big argument to say to me:

> I haven't mentioned your enemy, Japan.

And then was when he related to me what I have just told you about Japan's incapacity to get ready to use her matériel in the war, and then out of a clear sky he categorically told me:

> It is my purpose to join the United States in the war against Japan when the situation in Europe justifies exposing my rear to a powerful enemy.

Now that is about what he said. Then he turned aside and had a conversation with Mr. Molotov, and Molotov was telling him or he was telling somebody that it was dangerous, it would get out. Well, of course it didn't. I didn't give it to anybody but President Roosevelt.

And then in my report to the President, if it is ever brought out publicly—and I haven't brought it out—it will show that I said while Stalin's commitment when stated by him was definite, but subsequent conversation and inquisitions by Molotov watered it down to such an extent that I admonished the President to get it definitely and in writing.

That is not what I went to see him about, and it came up in the conversation and I asked the President to make that definite and certain, but I did report that he did say that he would, and I have read that he made the same commitment to Harry Hopkins and I have read also that during the Moscow conference during the war he made that statement or something similar to it to Secretary Hull, so I don't think there is any question but what he was talking all the time about joining us, but what was read here today indicates that we had a lot of people who were saying we don't want Russia in the war, we will have trouble.

Chairman RUSSELL. I heard that and, of course, that has not yet been found in the War Department. I know Senator Bridges in absolute good faith—I might say since we are talking about what was told us, President Roosevelt told me that Stalin made that statement in 1943.

I mean he told me in 1943 that Stalin made that statement when I came back from a mission I undertook on behalf of the Congress to various areas of the war, but at that time Stalin was at peace with Japan, Russia while fighting very courageously had been very grievously wounded, lost a great deal of her industrial capacity and some of her most highly developed areas, and I was puzzled that Stalin made the statement.

REASONS FOR RUSSIA'S DECISION TO ENTER JAPANESE WAR

I knew he had made that, but when you told Senator Cain that you never had any reason to doubt that ne intended to come into the war, I was wondering as to whether he was coming in without any reason on earth except to lend us a helping hand. I am frank to say that I doubt that Mr. Staline had that kind of altruistic purpose.

General HURLEY. Well, if I left that impression, I think I either misstated—because one of the reasons he was coming in was because he wanted our commitment for the cross-channel movement into France.

He was also not with me but with Hopkins, was angling for the lend-lease that finally amounted to $12 billion, and if I left you the impression that Stalin was altruistic about it, I didn't mean to.

He had reasons why he would acquire something by that promise at that time. I think that that is correct.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, could I add just a word? It does not make any difference on or off the record.

In 1943 I happened to have been in the Army and assigned down in the southern end of Italy. In our headquarters there came a Mr. Vishinsky and a small group of Russians to see how the war was being carried on in those days, and during the time he was there and in my presence he said substantially what General Hurley has testified to, and what you said the late President said to you.

And he went on to say in answer to my query why, he said: "We have long wished to maintain ourselves in that area of the world, and the war is going to be helpful to that end."

General HURLEY. Thank you.

WITNESS' INTEGRITY

There is this one thing I would like to say to the chairman. I have testified quite broadly here in regard to my former testimony, and so forth, and if testimony comes in subsequently that is questioning the correctness of any statement I made, I mean I don't want to come back if someone disagrees with me, but if there is any question of integrity or veracity raised, I would like the opportunity to defend myself.

Chairman **Russell**. Well, General, I want to make this statement in the record: I sat here and heard Senator Cain talk about all the attacks he had heard made on you. I have never had any man in conversation with me doubt your integrity or veracity.

General **Hurley**. Thank you.

Chairman **Russell**. As far as your intentions or your purposes are concerned. I was surprised to hear the Senator say that you had been so belabored on all sides.

I can't say that I have heard you as a topic of conversation any great many times, but I have never been in contact with these people who wanted to assassinate your character. I just had not known.

Senator **Cain**. The general, sir, in one of the telegrams he read as having been sent to Senator Millard Tydings used the name of a man called DeLacey—Hugh DeLacey. Hugh DeLacey was a resident of the State of Washington, and a Member of the Congress, and recognized Communist sympathizer, and he was but one of many to whom I made direct reference who stumped that western part of our country maligning General Hurley as I have never heard anybody else castigated. And I think the general knows precisely what I refer to.

General **Hurley**. Yes. They came into my own town on public engagement, platform, all over the State, all over the Southwest. It was a continuous performance. I believed that possibly they were hurting me, and I am happy, Senator, that you didn't hear it.

Chairman **Russell**. Well, General, we appreciate your presence here with this committee and your testimony to this committee. You have occupied a very prominent part in one of the most stirring periods of world history. You testified to us about momentuous events and great personalities, and have given us in forthright fashion, in the best American tradition, your views of the policies that would best serve the country that you love.

We appreciate your testimony, and we are glad to have had you here with us.

General **Hurley**. There is one word I would like to say.

Chairman **Russell**. Do you want this on the record?

General **Hurley**. Yes, I would like it to go on the record.

Chairman **Russell**. All right.

General **Hurley**. In testifying this afternoon, I testified that Chiang Kai-shek received this news in the way he did. I haven't put in the record all the correspondence that I had with the State Department querying—Why have we a right to agree to give Port Arthur, Port Dairen? And why have we a right to give away the Kuriles and part of Sakhalin? What right have we to give away the Manchurian Railway?

I have the replies from the State Department on all of those, but I think it would just be carrying it ad infinitum, unless I were attacking the State Department, which I am not. I am defending my own record.

Chairman **Russell**. Well, gentlemen, the committees will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 7:04 p. m. the committees recessed to reconvene at 10:04 a. m. Friday, June 22, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

FRIDAY, JUNE 22, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee of Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:04 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, George, Smith of New Jersey, Green, Hickenlooper, Sparkman, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, and Flanders.

Also present: William H. Darden, chief clerk; Verne D. Mudge and Mark H. Galusha, staff members, Committee on Armed Services; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committees will come to order.

Gentlemen of the committees, the witness today is a very distinguished soldier, Maj. Gen. David G. Barr. General Barr has served his country in two World Wars. He fought in Korea where he led the Seventh Infantry Division during the Inchon landings. He holds some of his country's highest decorations, including the Silver Star for gallantry in action, and the Distinguished Service Medal, and the Distinguished Service Cross.

General Barr has had considerable experience in the Far East, the area around which these committees' inquiries are centered. He was chief of the Army Advisory Commission in Nanking, China, from January 1948 until he assumed command of the Seventh Infantry Division in Japan in May 1949.

General Barr, I understand you but recently are out of the hospital. We regret to hear you have been indisposed. If at any time the session of the committees becomes too strenuous for you, if you will inform me, we will take a brief recess.

General Barr. I am quite fit now, Senator. Thank you very much.

Chairman Russell. Fine. I am glad to hear you have recovered.

The committees have instructed me to administer the oath to all witnesses. You will therefore stand and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear the evidence you shall give these committees upon the matters under inquiry will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General Barr. I do.

Chairman Russell. General, before we start questioning, or hear any prepared statement you might desire to make, I think the committees would be interested in getting a brief statement about your experiences in Korea.

Senator STENNIS. We would be very much interested, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Tell us about our troops over there, and the enemy; not a lengthy statement, but we would be interested to have a brief statement.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. DAVID G. BARR, UNITED STATES ARMY, ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COL. MALCOLM F. GILCHRIST, STAFF OFFICER, GENERAL STAFF

General BARR. What I have here is in detail; I have no prepared statement.

As you know, I left Korea early in February. There was suddenly a very noticeable and decided change, at that time, in the morale and efficiency of our troops.

I don't know to what this can be attributed, altogether; but they suddenly had gotten to where they believed in themselves.

They believed in themselves to where, when they were in small bodies, surrounded, they survived in that they would properly organize themselves and their position and use all of their firepower.

That is something I felt was neglected in the early days of the war, perhaps due to the lack of adequate training, which the facilities are never available for, in time of peace, where you can use live ammunition.

My opinion of the army in Korea today is the very highest. I don't think our country has ever had a finer or more efficient army than the Eighth Army is, in Korea, today.

BARR'S COMMAND DURING NOVEMBER ATTACK BY CHINESE

Chairman RUSSELL. General, at the time of the first mass attack by the Chinese troops in Korea, where was your division located?

General BARR. The major portion of my division—that is, all my division less one combat team—was on the Yalu River.

Senator WILEY. The Yalu?

General BARR. Yes, sir; at Hyesanjin. One remaining combat team was some 20 kilometers from Hamhung.

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe the Seventh Division was with the Tenth Corps at that time.

General BARR. The Seventh Division was under the Tenth Corps, and the Tenth Corps was an independent corps.

Chairman RUSSELL. When did you first learn that there were considerable bodies of troops, enemy troops, in the area in which your troops were then located who were about to take the offensive? Did you have any knowledge of it before the blow actually fell?

General BARR. No serious Chinese attack was launched against my division as a whole. The troops that I had just accepted were in the vicinity of Hamhung, the Thirty-second Infantry Battalion and part of the Thirty-first Infantry were sent up to Hagaru to join the marines at the Chosin Reservoir and to relieve the Fifth Marine Division on the east side——

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean regiment.

General BARR. Regiment—on the east side of the reservoir. Two days after the arrival of the first troops they were attacked up there. That was December 1.

That was only one battalion arrived up there perhaps on the 2d of December. It practically effected the relief of the Fifth Marine Regiment. The next day, the middle of the afternoon, Colonel McLain, the Regimental Headquarters, Thirty-first Infantry, one battalion of infantry, and the Seventy-seventh Field Artillery, part of that combat team, arrived.

They lacked about 3 miles of closing up before dark on the battalion of the Thirty-second Infantry. The Thirty-second Infantry, during that day made an advance of about 3 kilometers. Their reconnaissance had revealed no Chinese nor Koreans; it had been unopposed.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is that the outfit that took such a terrible beating up there?

General BARR. Yes, sir; that is a part of the Seventh Division that took such a terrific beating, and in that engagement I lost Colonel McLain, the commander of my Thirty-first Infantry, and Lt. Col. Don Faith, who commanded the Thirty-second Infantry Battalion, attached to the Thirty-first. His wife received the Congressional Medal of Honor yesterday.

Chairman RUSSELL. A great many of the men escaped over the ice of the reservoir where it was frozen?

General BARR. Yes. This column of infantry attempted to come out, to fight their way out. Many of the officers were killed. I don't have the exact number, but certainly an abnormal number, and finally, after dark the troops began to infiltrate back over the ice, and across country. They suffered great hardships.

CHINESE COMMUNIST TACTICS

Chairman RUSSELL. How did the tactics employed in the attack of the Chinese Communists compare with our method of attacking enemy forces? Did they do it in masses or by movement of tremendous numbers of men or by laying down a barrage and following it with a skirmish line, or what?

General BARR. No, sir. They, at that time, were attacking almost altogether with infantry and with great masses, getting in close to your position before they opened fire, but opening fire in great volume.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have any estimate as to the comparative number of the forces engaged in that——

General BARR. It was estimated at the time that there were two divisions engaged against at least two infantry battalions, and one battalion of artillery.

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe we lost the artillery there.

General BARR. We lost the equipment; we destroyed the equipment.

Chairman RUSSELL. I see.

General BARR. We had no way of bringing it out; the bridges had been destroyed and the tanks had been destroyed which were completely blocking the road, and we had no equipment to remove them.

CHINESE COMMUNIST EQUIPMENT

Chairman RUSSELL. How did the Chinese destroy the tanks?

General BARR. With antitank guns.

Chairman RUSSELL. They had antitank guns?

General BARR. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Effective antitank guns?

General BARR. And one tank was disabled on the road by a mine.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know where these antitank guns were manufactured? Did you ever see one of them?

General BARR. No.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know whether they were Chinese make, American guns, or Russian guns?

General BARR. I did not see any of the guns that were employed there. At one other place I saw a gun that was of Russian manufacture.

Chairman RUSSELL. Antitank gun?

General BARR. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. How were these Chinese infantry equipped?

General BARR. If I may go back, my memory is better now. Some of these tanks were destroyed by American bazookas that had been captured.

Chairman RUSSELL. That were in the hands of the Chinese?

General BARR. Yes, sir; that is from the information given me by my officers.

Senator WILEY. May I ask this: I understand when you were retreating it was necessary to destroy, is that right? In this case when the Americans were retreating, it was necessary for them to destroy some of our own tanks?

General BARR. Oh, no, sir. These tanks were destroyed in trying to fight their way through to this surrounded detachment.

Chairman RUSSELL. How were the Chinese infantry equipped, General?

General BARR. Well, with burp guns and a mixture of guns from Japanese make, American make, many American and Russian.

Chairman RUSSELL. They must have had quite a logistical problem keeping them supplied with ammunition.

General BARR. They did have a logistical problem, but their supply system is entirely different from ours. We believe that the equipped division can go in and fight about 6 days and come out. If it has to fight, it is depleted at the end of that period and they have to pull it out.

A man goes in with everything he's got to have for that period on his body, so it isn't like we are supplying them in battle. They don't do that.

REASONS FOR RETREAT

Chairman RUSSELL. Was the disaster suffered by that combat team attributed to the fact they were overwhelmed by superior numbers or was it due to the fact that the men were panicked?

General BARR. No, sir; it was attributed to the fact they were overwhelmed by superior numbers. They were not completely surprised when the Chinese reconnaissance first started against the troops. They were cognizant of it, and when the main attack came everyone was alerted.

They were not caught asleep or anything like that. It was just the strength of numbers that overwhelmed them and the fact that they were pushed off of their better position in the very initial stages and this great mass of Chinese were able to prevent their ever regaining a high position. They were down on the lake shore principally.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did the two regiments that you had up on the Yalu River at that time have any difficulty in making their way back the point of evacuation?

General BARR. Compared to the difficulty we had at Choshin Reservoir, very little. We had a great deal of difficulty with the cold weather, narrow roads, and mountain passes, and occasional skirmishes with North Koreans. I had three passes that led in from the Fusan Reservoir. That is the one that joins next to the Choshin Reservoir where there were Chinese troops.

I kept those passes blocked at all times and on two of them we had Chinese pressure against them. However, the Chinese were never able to cut my road of retreat and I came down to a village called Pungsong. The situation was becoming more critical all the time.

I moved the troops about 13 miles cross country on foot and put them on a railroad and brought them out well away from the Chinese. However, the next day I was able to bring my equipment down over the road.

Chairman RUSSELL. You did save most of the equipment of those troops?

General BARR. Yes, sir.

BLOWING UP OF RESERVOIR

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you have any orders with respect to whether or not you should destroy those reservoirs, blow them up, or do any damage to them?

General BARR. No, sir; I didn't have any orders as to whether I should blow them up or not.

If I may comment, there didn't appear to be much reason for blowing them up. All of the machinery for the manufacture of electricity had been removed from them. They had been completely stripped of all their equipment, power plants—the ones that I saw.

Chairman RUSSELL. Just a naked dam?

General BARR. Just a naked dam, with a shell of a building that formerly contained the dynamos or generators.

Chairman RUSSELL. I assume the Russians had moved those out.

General BARR. That is the assumption; yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

General BARR. I know northeast Korea; northwest Korea may be different.

LIAISON BETWEEN CORPS AND EIGHTH ARMY

Chairman RUSSELL. There has been a great deal of discussion, General, as to the lack of liaison between the Tenth Corps and the Eighth Army. Do you have any knowledge as to whether or not the communications between those two bodies of American troops was sufficient, or as to whether or not any failure of liaison contributed to the losses that we sustained?

General BARR. No; I haven't, Senator. I can't answer that question. I was well away from Tenth Corps headquarters all the time. I landed way up at Iwon, a considerable distance away. I don't know what the relations were between the Tenth Corps and the Eighth Army at that time.

Chairman RUSSELL. You landed, I believe, farther north than any other Americans.

General BARR. Yes, sir. I landed, I believe, some 110 or 120 miles north of Wonsan. The Wonsan minefield, of course, delayed the landing on the east coast for some 3 weeks.

Chairman RUSSELL. Where were the Tenth Corps headquarters?

General BARR. Hamhung.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were you in constant communication with corps headquarters?

General BARR. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. No difficulty there?

General BARR. Normal difficulties only.

FOOD AND CLOTHING OF TROOPS IN KOREA

Chairman RUSSELL. How were the men in Korea supplied, General? Were there considerable difficulties with the weather? Did they have adequate food, clothing? How about winter clothing, We have heard a good deal about their failure to get winter clothing.

General BARR. There was never any shortage of food in Korea. You didn't always get the type of food you preferred.

The clothing—my division when we were equipped with winter clothing were equipped to fight south of the thirty-eighth parallel. We would have liked after we got up as far north as the Manchurian border to have had heavier equipment, heavier clothing. We were given relief insofar as gloves were concerned. We got adequate gloves. We had parkas but not the heavy fleece-lined parkas that are preferable in a climate like that.

I feel that every effort was made to get the proper clothing.

The footgear was all right. I had everything I needed in that, unless I should have demanded that Alaska experimental type, which I wouldn't have.

We were short spare parts on trucks at times.

We didn't have the proper weight oil at all times, in 10, 20, 30, 40, whatever you need. We needed about 10 in that climate, and it was very difficult to get it. However, I never got to the point where I felt that the people above me were not doing the best they could, and that what they were accomplishing was not a reasonable performance.

CHINESE COMMUNIST CLOTHING

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know anything about how the Chinese were equipped? How did they stand this weather? Did they have adequate heavy clothing—parkas?

General BARR. I know the Chinese equipment very well. Not equipment but their clothing. They wear this heavy padded cotton clothing, packed with the cotton like in a comforter for a bed.

Chairman RUSSELL. Quilt?

General BARR. Quilt. So long as that clothing doesn't get wet, it is very warm. If it gets wet, then it is just soaked and it is hard to dry out. They were not clothed nearly so well as our troops. They are not accustomed to being clothed that well. They would take the cold better than our men.

Chairman RUSSELL. We heard some of them had on tennis shoes.

General BARR. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Had on what?

Chairman RUSSELL. Tennis shoes.

General BARR. Tennis shoes. Yes; many of them had on tennis shoes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Even with being as hearty as they are, didn't they suffer considerable from that bitter cold weather?

General BARR. Oh, they did, indeed; especially when you would recover wounded from the battlefield, they would invariably be badly frozen, much worse than our people, and we had some very bad ones.

A man wounded on the battlefield, unless he is recovered right away—it was below-zero weather, and I had about a week or 10 days when it was 23 or 28 below—his feet and hands and ears are going to freeze.

THE YALU RIVER

Chairman RUSSELL. Were there any bridges across the Yalu River at the point where you had your division?

General BARR. I might say a word about the Yalu River at this time. The Yalu River is about like Rock Creek. There really isn't much to it up at Hyesanjin.

Chairman RUSSELL. Up where it rises?

General BARR. Yes.

Senator WILEY. It would be good if we had the map here. This man knows what he is talking about.

Chairman RUSSELL. He has been in Korea.

Senator WILEY. Yes. Let's have that map. That is the first time we knew the Yalu River was nothing more than Rock Creek.

General BARR. That is up near the source. It becomes larger as it flows down.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gets to be quite a river.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You can jump across the Mississippi.

Senator WILEY. Up at Lake Itasca.

General BARR. There was no bridge that had not been destroyed. However, the day we arrived at Hyesanjin there was about a 6-foot channel that wasn't frozen. Four days later it was frozen solid.

Chairman RUSSELL. The reservoir was frozen to where men could walk across it; is that right?

General BARR. I had no large reservoirs up there.

Chairman RUSSELL. I thought your combat team was on the east side of the reservoir.

General BARR. That was over entirely out of this particular sector. In other words, they went west from Hagaru. I had the Seventeenth Infantry in the vicinity of Hyesanjin, which is right here. This is the village of Hyesanjin on the opposite side of the bank, and about 300 yards upstream there is a Manchurian village, which is really a better village than Hyesanjin. It had not been destroyed. Hyesanjin was about 85-percent destroyed.

Senator WILEY. Where is Rashin?

General BARR. What, sir?

Senator WILEY. Rashin.

General BARR. Do you know?

Colonel GILCHRIST. Up the east coast. It is just off the map here, sir.

General BARR. I am not familiar with it.

Chairman RUSSELL. That map doesn't get to it.

General BARR. My other regiment, the Thirty-second, was at Samau, which was just south of Hyesanjin, right here; and I was occupied during my time up there, cleaning out this area in here of all enemy troops.

Chairman RUSSELL. All they had to do was to step across that creek, to get into Manchuria?

General BARR. I was not allowed to cross the creek, nor was I supposed to fire across it, and I never did.

Chairman RUSSELL. But the enemy, I suppose, if you got hot behind them, they would simply go over there?

General BARR. They all went across, but didn't fire, after they got across.

FIGHTING ALONG THE YALU

In our patrol, for a period of a week or 10 days, we fought every day. We would start out in the morning on a very strong patrol made up of infantry, tanks, and artillery which would hit the enemy, and he would fight us for 2 or 3 hours and start to withdraw, and then we would have reports from him and his demolitions would be heard, and he would withdraw 3 or 4 miles, leaving the road completely blown to pieces, with every bridge blown up, and any obstacle he could put in the road, he did.

It would take us practically the remainder of the day to get the road cleared so that we could get over that 3 or 4 miles.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did they mine that road?

General BARR. They mined the road, they mined boulders over the banks of the road, blew up all the culverts and bridges, and we had one or two streams we couldn't cross with our equipment, without bridges being put in.

Then, invariably, the next morning we would be confronted with the same thing.

At the time I received orders to withdraw, we had just about completed clearing out the area, and those that were left had retreated across the Yalu River.

Chairman RUSSELL. They were North Koreans?

General BARR. They were North Koreans.

I didn't encounter any Chinese.

Chairman RUSSELL. Apparently there wasn't too good a liaison between the Chinese and the North Koreans, was there, General?

General BARR. Well, as things developed, I don't think the Chinese cared to come up there. They could wait and better cut me off; if I remained there another week, perhaps the Chinese would be there to block my retreat, or withdrawal.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, that map does not show the Yalu boundary, does it, all over Korea?

General BARR. This black line is the Yalu?

Chairman RUSSELL. No, sir; that is the line which we were holding.

THE IWON LANDING

General BARR. The corps headquarters were at Hamhung, the port at Hamhung, that is where we withdrew from. This is Iwon; that is where I landed.

We landed over an open beach. There were no buildings whatsoever, and no facilities. We felt very good about the landing; we thought we executed it very well because we had little proper-type landing craft. We had to unload from large ships into small vessels.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you have any opposition at all?

General BARR. No, sir; no opposition at all. We put one battalion ashore more or less under combat conditions, established a bridgehead around the area; but we had no fight at all.

My pride in the debarkation of the division was the expeditious manner in which we did it, and not the battle that we had to fight.

Chairman RUSSELL. Had the Seventh Division been in combat prior to those landings?

THE INCHON LANDING

General BARR. The Seventh Division was first in combat at the time of the Inchon landing, not for the assault landing, but immediately after the assault landing.

We went ashore into the beachhead established by the marines, and immediately started operations in the area south toward Suwon and southeast toward Seoul.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you meet any serious opposition in your movements after the Inchon landing?

General BARR. Yes. When we started to try to advance in the direction of Suwon we had to really fight our way. We took Wonsan without too much difficulty, because when it was decided that we wanted to recover the Suwon air base, to take it as quickly as you can. Well, we had fought the enemy so hard for 2 days in that area and they appeared to be so completely demoralized that I took the chance on sending an infantry company, a tank company, a battery of artillery, with necessary supporting troops, preceded by my division reconnaissance troops, into Suwon, and we went straight on, bypassing Suwon, but on to the airfield, with very little resistance.

They were pouring fire on the side of the road all the way down there.

Senator WILEY. Where is that on the map?

General BARR. Suwon is right here; it is one of the principal air bases, and figured very conspicuously in the initial fighting at the time of the invasion. Here is Seoul right here.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were you transferred to the other coast prior to the fall of the North Korean capital——

General BARR. I was transferred—the plan initially was to assist in the capture of the North Korean capital by landing up here at Wonsan, and going around to the west to assist in the capture. The opposition in mine fields at Wonsan proved to be much greater than had ever been contemplated, and it took a long time to clear it out.

After this engagement at Suwon, and after the capture of Seoul, my division was moved south to Pusan overland. From Pusan we embarked to go to Wonsan. We remained abroad ship, I believe, just 1 day short of 3 weeks, and then we were ordered to proceed to Iwon and debark there. The initial idea was that the Seventh Division would participate in the capture of Pyongyang.

Chairman RUSSELL. The point I wanted to get was that all of your men had had some combat experience before the disaster——

General BARR. Oh, yes, sir. My division was well shaken down, and combat worthy in every respect at the time of the disaster.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, sir.

Now, are there any questions on the Korean operations before we start on the experiences in China?

Senator KNOWLAND. I do have a procedural matter that will take probably less than a minute.

Senator STENNIS. Pardon me, Senator Knowland, I wanted to ask one question, Mr. Chairman.

STRENGTHS OF UNITED STATES AND CHINESE TROOPS DURING NOVEMBER ATTACK

Did you say two divisions of the Chinese troops were against two battalions and one regiment of your troops? Was that what you said?

General BARR. Two battalions of infantry, and the better part of a regimental headquarters, and one battalion of artillery.

Senator STENNIS. And two divisions of——

General BARR. The original intent was to send one combat team up there; infantry regiment, combat artillery, and certain supporting troops. They had not all arrived there at that time.

Senator STENNIS. I see.

General BARR. And one battalion of the Thirty-second was with one of the Thirty-first because it was in the vicinity of Hamhung, and they wanted to get it up there as soon as possible. That was the one commanded by Colonel Faith who was killed.

RIDGWAY VIEWS ON USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS ON FORMOSA

Senator KNOWLAND. I think we are all familiar with the fact that in this morning's paper the United States representatives at the UN had requested of the UN nations to furnish additional troops for the Korean operation.

This paraphrase results from the message which was sent by General Ridgway to General Collins in late December 1950.

I mentioned it in the record of yesterday, and the paraphrase of that message has now been furnished for the committee reading as follows:

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL COLLINS

The following is personal and for your eyes only.

1. In conference with General MacArthur shortly after my arrival we discussed the United States governmental action taken on his recommendation, that Chinese Nationalists forces on Formosa be permitted to operate without delay and without limitations against the mainland of south China. He stated, emphatically, that in his view Communist China is putting its major military effort into the Korean operation and is very vulnerable in the south. He believes that a Nationalist offensive in that area, launched at the earliest practicable date would, even if only moderately successful, relieve pressure on our forces in Korea.

2. Considering his recommendations entirely as related to my responsibilities to the United States Government and the UN allies for our ground operations, I am convinced of the logic of this recommendation. I feel I would be negligent were I not to state my full concurrence at once. I shall advise General MacArthur that, from my position referred to above, I have indicated my concurrence to you in this recommendation in a personal communication for your eyes only.

RIDGWAY.

Senator WILEY. Date?

Senator KNOWLAND. December 1950. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was there any procedural question?

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, the procedural question that I had raised yesterday, it had been classified as a top secret document. This morning General Mudge informs me that they have declassified the paraphrase, so that clears up the point raised yesterday.

CLEARANCE OF RIDGWAY AND STRATEMEYER ARTICLES

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, might I raise a question of a letter you sent to me, the reply of Robert A. Lovett——

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sorry, I did not understand you.

Senator SMITH. You wrote me under date of June 20—that is two days ago—saying:

> I am enclosing a copy of a reply which has been received from the Acting Secretary of Defense in answer to a question you asked of General Marshall concerning the clearance by the Department of State or the Department of Defense for the article by General Ridgway which appeared in the May 22 issue of Look magazine.

My question to you, Mr. Chairman, is whether the answer from the Department of Defense signed by Robert A. Lovett, Acting Secretary, dated June 19 has been incorporated in the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. It has not, but it may be.

Senator SMITH. I would like to offer it for the record. Now would you prefer to have it in the body of the record? Now would you prefer to have it in the appendix or shall I read it?

Chairman RUSSELL. As I recall, it is not a very lengthy letter. You might read it.

Senator SMITH. This is addressed to Hon. Richard B. Russell, chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, and reads as follows:

> DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In the course of his testimony before the Joint Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee, General Marshall was asked whether General Ridgway had submitted the article which oppeared in the May 22 issue of Look magazine for prior clearance by the Department of State or the Department of Defense. General Marshall was also asked whether General Stratemeyer had submitted for similar clearance his answers to the questions put to him in the interview by the U. S. News and World Report.
>
> It has been ascertained that neither General Ridgway nor General Stratemeyer submitted the material in question for prior clearance. Look magazine did submit General Ridgway's article to the Department of Defense before publication and it was cleared.
>
> It is not known whether General Ridgway or General Stratemeyer submitted their material to Far East Headquarters, which would have been the first step in clearance.
>
> Faithfully yours,
>
> ROBERT A. LOVETT,
> *Acting Secretary.*

BOMBING MANCHURIA, USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS, AND ECONOMIC BLOCKADE

Chairman Russell. All right, sir. General Barr, we have under consideration here a number of matters. One question that has been broadly discussed before the committee is the method of waging a war against Communist aggressors in Korea. Do you care to give to the committee your opinion as to the advisability of bombing the Chinese bases, Communist bases in Manchuria and other installations in Manchuria?

General Barr. I think certainly at this time that we should take every precaution not to do anything which would spread this war, start a world war III. The military situation as it is today, I do not feel that we should.

Chairman Russell. When you refer to the military situation as it is today——

General Barr. The military situation in Korea.

Chairman Russell. What is your judgment as to the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea? Why should not the Chinese Nationalist troops tendered by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to the United Nations be incorporated in the forces in Korea?

General Barr. Of course, should we take those troops out of Formosa, Formosa is left without defense. I haven't personal knowledge at this time, but it is my opinion that the Chinese ground forces in Formosa today are only sufficient to defend Formosa should the Communists ever get in against the Formosan shore.

Of course, if we assume the protection of Formosa, it is another problem. To use these Chinese troops in Korea and to abandon them to their fate after the Korean War would present quite a problem at the time, I am sure.

I do not feel that the contribution that could be made by the Chinese troops on Formosa today would be very great in Korea.

Chairman Russell. Have you ever been on Formosa?

General Barr. Many times, sir.

Chairman Russell. When were you last there?

General Barr. In January of 1949.

Chairman Russell. What is your opinion, General, as to the advisability of imposing economic sanctions against the Chinese Communists in the way of a blockade?

General Barr. I really don't consider myself qualified to discuss that. My views would only be a layman's views. I have so little knowledge on the complications that might result from the application of a blockade.

I think, of course, the means that theoretically are in force at the present time if they are carried out, I think the results should be good. It is always questionable as to whether various people or various countries are going to put the same interpretation on what are war supplies.

Chairman Russell. Well, assuming that all the members of the United Nations did put the same interpretation on it, I suppose you would favor it.

General Barr. Yes, sir; I would favor it. I would certainly not favor the United States going alone on it.

Chairman **Russell**. You think it should be done through the United Nations?

General **Barr**. Absolutely; yes, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. When did you first serve in China, General?

CHINA EXPERIENCE OF WITNESS

General **Barr**. I arrived in China on the 27th of January 1948.

Senator **Wiley**. 1948?

General **Barr**. 1948. And I left China on the 29th of January 1949.

Chairman **Russell**. What was your rank and position?

General **Barr**. I was a major general in command of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group in China.

Chairman **Russell**. Did you have an opportunity to observe the Chinese Nationalist forces during that period?

General **Barr**. I did not observe the Chinese Nationalist forces actually in battle. I observed them out of battle on many occasions, and I inspected their training, exercised supervision over the training, and inspected some places.

Also I maintained very close contact with General Sun Li Jen, who was in command. I had a detachment with American officers and enlisted men.

STRATEGIC VALUE OF FORMOSA

Chairman **Russell**. What is your opinion as to the strategic value of Formosa to the defense of the United States and the other areas for which we have responsibility?

General **Barr**. I think the strategic value of Formosa to the United States is principally in not letting the other fellow have it. So far as we are concerned, I think we could get along very well without it, but an enemy on Formosa would have an advantage.

Chairman **Russell**. What are your views with respect to the policy this Government should follow toward the present Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa? Do you favor the assistance, military and economic, to that Government?

General **Barr**. I do.

Chairman **Russell**. Gentlemen, my time has expired. I didn't charge myself with all of the time with respect to the operations in Korea, because I thought that the committee would like to hear about that. Senator Connally.

NATIONALIST STRENGTH IN NORTH CHINA IN 1948

Chairman **Connally**. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief.

General Barr, you said you hadn't observed the Nationalist forces in battle. That is, in North China. I want to interrogate you a little about the operations in North China when Chiang Kai-shek had his troops there.

Did he or did he not have a very large contingent of troops in that area at one time?

General **Barr**. Chiang Kai-shek had a great concentration of troops in Manchuria, in the Mukden-Kirin-Changchun-Ssupingkai area, and the next body of troops coming south was the Peiping garrison under General Fu Tso-yi.

General Fu Tso-yi had, I believe, up to about 11 armies there, which was something around 150,000 troops, perhaps.

When I said I had not observed them in battle, I meant actually fighting on the front line. My directive prohibited that. I had observed their training and advised on their training. I had checked on their equipment.

REASONS FOR NATIONALIST LOSSES

Senator CONNALLY. I want to ask you about the equipment. Somewhere I read your testimony or heard it about the supplies and equipment which Chiang Kai-shek received from the United States in which you were quoted as saying that you never saw Chiang Kai-shek's forces lose a battle on account of lack of ammunition or equipment and supplies. Is that correct?

General BARR. Yes, sir. I stated that in my opinion, the Chinese never lost a battle, during my time in China, through lack of arms or ammunition. I am still of that opinion, and I am willing to discuss any particular battle anyone wishes to discuss.

Chairman CONNALLY. Why did they lose them, if they did not lose them on account of arms or ammunition?

General BARR. Principally because of the lack of offensive spirit.

They were imbued with always getting behind a wall and trying to defend a situation from a wall. They were not willing to go out and maneuver.

At the end, the disaster at Mukden, which was really the beginning of the end, it was apparent to me after Mukden fell all of it was going to fall, because over a half-million troops were gone; Fu Tso-yi, in North China, had barely been able to hold his own prior to that time.

From that time on, the will to fight had entirely gone out of the Chinese Army.

Chairman CONNALLY. Was Chiang Kai-shek personally in command, up in those areas, or just through his generals?

General BARR. At the time of the fall of Mukden, the Generalissimo went up to Peiping and personally took command. He took practically none of his staff with him. He did it on his own.

He issued some very good directives up there.

What he ought to have done, had his commanders in the field really carried it out, he was certain to have been rewarded with a certain amount of success.

They did not carry out his instructions. General Wong was ordered to attack on September 26, I believe, and he didn't attack for some 10 or 15 days after that; but the Generalissimo did run that battle. He didn't run the battle, but he was in station at Peiping throughout the fall of Mukden and the Chinchowo-Hulutao area, but he didn't have his staff with him. His staff was uninformed, in Nanking.

SURRENDER OF NATIONALIST TROOPS

Chairman CONNALLY. After the fall of Mukden and other points, did Chiang's armies retreat into South China, or did large amounts of them surrender?

General BARR. The vast majority of them surrendered.

As a matter of fact, none came into South China, from shortly after my arrival on, there.

In fact, it was in March of 1948, I saw the hopelessness of the situation in Manchuria. At that time I tried to get the Generalissimo to withdraw from Manchuria altogether and defend North China; but that he could not do. He said he wouldn't consider it under any conditions, citing numerous reasons for it; and up to the very last, I could not get him to withdraw his troops from Mukden until the battle had been completely lost, and it was a case of getting out as many survivors as he could get out.

Chairman CONNALLY. But large numbers of Chinese troops did surrender——

General BARR. To the Chinese Communists.

Chairman CONNALLY. To the Chinese Communists?

General BARR. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, when that happened, Chiang's fighting power in that area was destroyed, was it?

General BARR. After the fall of Mukden, General Fu Tso Yi didn't have a chance in Peiping, in my opinion. However, if you talked to him, he talked as if he did have a chance. He went on a march to the northwest with a large part of the army out of Peiping, and on that march he dropped off some four or five divisions at very small cities.

It so happened that most of these divisions were surrounded and left off at the place from whence they came.

He came back into Peiping with the remainder of his troops and elected to stay there and fight it out.

Of course, as we all know, there was no real fight for Peiping. Peiping was surrendered, I believe, on January 22 without fighting.

Chairman CONNALLY. Without fighting?

General BARR. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Where was Chiang in the meantime?

CHIANG'S RESIGNATION FROM THE PRESIDENCY

General BARR. He returned to Nanking, his capital, immediately after the disaster in the north. I am not able to find the date right now. I have it in the papers that I have here. But the Generalissimo remained in Nanking then until he decided to temporarily withdraw from the Presidency, and he turned it over to Li Tsung-jen.

Prior to his withdrawal he informed me that he might withdraw, and at that time he told me he was going to advise me if he did decide to withdraw. This he did.

He sent for me about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. I talked to him. He told me when I arrived he was going to leave town at 4 o'clock, and I stayed with him until about 10 minutes of 4 when he got in the automobile and drove out to the airfield to take off.

Chairman CONNALLY. Where was he going?

Senator SMITH. May I ask what the date of that was?

General BARR. We can find it for you, Senator. I don't have it—don't remember it at the moment.

Chairman CONNALLY. Where was he going when he left?

General BARR. He went down south of Shanghai to where he came from. He followed the Chinese tradition of going down to sweep the tomb of the ancestors.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT NECESSARY FOR USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS ON FORMOSA

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, you were interrogated by Senator Russell about the advisability of sending Chiang's troops on Formosa up to Korea. Would that not involve a tremendous logistical difficulty in supplying them and training them and getting them up there?

General BARR. To Korea?

Chairman CONNALLY. Yes.

General BARR. The logistics would have to be carried by the United Nations forces over there. The Chinese would be capable of no logistics whatsoever.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is what I am talking about.

General BARR. They would be entirely dependent upon us for logistical support and for the equipping of these troops with equipment suitable for supply from American soldiers.

Chairman CONNALLY. In Korea?

General BARR. Yes, sir. And knowing the Chinese as I do, they would be entirely dependent upon us.

Chairman CONNALLY. You were the highest-ranking American officer in China at that time?

General BARR. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. And you spent how much time, something over a year there?

General BARR. I spent just a few days over a year. Throughout that time I was very close to the Generalissimo. I knew him very well, both him and Mme. Chiang, and all the high officials in the Government and in the army, navy, and air force.

I might say no doors were closed to me. I could see anyone I wanted to see.

STRATEGIC VALUE OF FORMOSA

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, you expressed the opinion a while ago, I believe, that in order to hold Formosa defensively it would be advisable to keep Chiang's armies there?

General BARR. Yes, indeed.

Chairman CONNALLY. I believe your view was not that Formosa would be of great strategical aid to the United States but that it would be bad if some other power was able to come in and take over Formosa.

General BARR. Yes.

Chairman CONNALLY. Is that correct?

General BARR. That is right.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is your view?

General BARR. Correct.

Chairman CONNALLY. I believe that is all for the present, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

BARR'S DIRECTIVES ON CHINA MISSION

Senator KNOWLAND. General Barr, you mentioned that during the year you were in China you had not visited the troops on the fighting front because of your instructions. Do you have a copy of the directive under which you went to China with you?

General BARR. I haven't the one under which I went to China; no, sir. I have one that was received just a few months before my departure from China.

Senator KNOWLAND. Is that the one that dealt with not having American officers or enlisted men in the forward areas?

General BARR. That is correct, sir; and they would not participate in any operational matters whatsoever. But, as I stated before the committees, when I came out of China I had additional instructions from the Department of the Army which authorized me on a personal basis to give operational advice to the Generalissimo.

Senator KNOWLAND. I understand that.

General BARR. I expanded that to include his supreme general staff, and in doing this I availed myself of four of my officers as assistants to work with me.

Senator KNOWLAND. That would be in GHQ really?

General BARR. That is correct; yes, sir. Both on the government and the military level, which is practically the same in China.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, I would like to ask this question: Those directives which you received to keep at the GHQ level rather than going down to divisions or regiments or battalions, as General Van Fleet did in Greece, made the type of assistance which you were authorized to give to the Republic of China quite different from the type of assistance General Van Fleet was authorized to give to the Greek legal government in that country, did it not?

General BARR. From my understanding of the authority under which General Van Fleet operated, it was something completely different.

Senator KNOWLAND. I did not get your last answer.

General BARR. I say, from my understanding of the directive that General Van Fleet operated under, and I have never seen the directive, it was entirely different from mine.

Senator KNOWLAND. Entirely different.

General BARR. In other words, he was also responsible for the operational activities; I wasn't.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is my understanding.

General BARR. I assisted in the preparation of plans; what should be done, but so far as the actual implementation of the plans, neither I nor any of my people could be there.

EQUIPMENT REQUESTED FOR GENERAL FU IN 1948

Senator KNOWLAND. During the time you were in China, did you hear of the incident in late 1948 wherein there had been a general agreement on the part of Admiral Badger and our American Ambassador to China, and I believe, possibly, you concurred in it, if you were there at the time, asking for some assistance to be sent to North China while North China was still in the hands of the forces of the Republic of China, and that after a lapse of about 5 months, a shipment did arrive comprising about 10 percent of the request, and when the shipment arrived, a large part of the machine guns had no tripods; the BAR's had no magazines; there were no spare parts; a number of the rifles had no magazines?

Had that incident been called to your attention, either when you were in China or subsequently?

General BARR. Yes, sir; I have considerable knowledge on it, Senator Knowland. That shipment of equipment that you refer to came to China as a result of my urging the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give us something to arrive in China now to lift the morale of the Chinese people and the Chinese Army.

Every effort was made to get some equipment on the way, and as a last resort the Department of the Army directed General MacArthur to furnish whatever he could furnish, and if necessary, that his stocks would be refilled.

A list was furnished to the Department of the Army of what General MacArthur could furnish. It was stated at the time that it was maintenance for spare parts, and some of the component parts would probably be missing. It was decided that those would be furnished from the United States on the first ships arriving.

This equipment arrived about the middle of November on United States Navy ships. I believe there were 1,210 tons on it, which is a small portion of what later arrived—two LST's to be exact, that belonged to the United States.

I received my first report on the condition of this equipment from Admiral Badger, who said that he had received a report from Gen. Fu Tso-yi, who had received the equipment up at Tientsin.

I immediately started an investigation to determine what the condition of the equipment was. In chasing down item by item on the report, the condition of the equipment was greatly—the poor condition of the equipment was greatly exaggerated. There was a lack of some tripods, some magazines for Browning automatic rifles, and other items.

I immediately communicated via cable with General MacArthur, and within the next 3 or 4 days I had every spare part to these rifles, and every component part that could possibly be supplied from Japan, flowing from Japan to Shanghai, and they were delivered.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is on the 10-percent shipment of the original request; is it not?

General BARR. That is correct; yes, sir, and I think that is the only part that has ever been under question. That came from Japan. I might say that was part of the rolled-up equipment. It was packed, boxed, and created just after World War II, and the inventory of what was in the box was put on the box.

In the time available, it did not permit CINCFE to unpack and recheck all this equipment. Had they done that the equipment would have been arriving from the United States before it arrived from Japan. In other words, this was a token shipment of equipment that was supposed to go to North China to raise the morale.

REASONS FOR THE DELAY IN SENDING THE EQUIPMENT

Senator KNOWLAND. The request for that equipment had gone in about 5 months earlier; had it not?

General BARR. The request for that equipment, along with much other equipment.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes, along with other equipment; this was 10 percent of the amount.

Now, you are familiar, are you not, with some of the shipments we have more recently been making to our North Atlantic allies, and in fact to Indochina and other places? We have diligently supplied them with equipment. I have personally seen us deliver destroyers to certain European countries for the morale value and otherwise.

We have loaded planes aboard French aircraft carriers so that they would get there in short order. Doesn't it appear to you that 5 months, under the desperate conditions about which you yourself have testified to in North China, and Admiral Badger has testified to, is a pretty long period of time?

General BARR. It is a long period of time, Senator, but the authorization under which we were operating I believe—I am not familiar with what we are doing now, but I am sure that the authorization is entirely different.

I believe the initial act of Congress appropriated $125,000,000 which could be used as the Generalissimo saw fit, the 3d of April——

Senator KNOWLAND. The 3d of April of 1948?

General BARR. 1948; yes, sir. The money was made available on the 28th of June, and I don't believe authority for the Department of the Army to actively participate in furnishing this equipment was available until about the 28th of July when a directive from the President directed the Department of the Army to assist and supply such equipment as it could from surplus stock.

However, prior to that time, thinking that eventually this would probably be done, a survey had been made to determine what was available, but it was only on the 28th of July that the Department of the Army was authorized to go ahead with this project.

MILITARY AID TO NATIONALISTS IN 1948

Senator KNOWLAND. You have mentioned in January of 1949 that the Generalissimo retired temporarily from the Presidency of the Republic of China. When you were in China, were you familiar with the fact that certain representations are reported to have been made to the Republic of China that very little aid could be expected from this country as long as the Generalissimo remained in the Presidency?

General BARR. Not specifically on that basis, Senator. At the time that I went to China of course there was absolutely no military aid coming to China and none came to China prior to this $125,000,000 grant. I did not hear it said that it was due to the fact if the Generalissimo stepped out that conditions would be different. I never head that.

Senator KNOWLAND. But when you went to China as I understand your testimony to be, that you went there on the 27th of January of 1948 and that no aid was going to China at that time and none arrived until this first shipment of 10 percent of a $16,000,000 shipment which arrived in either late November or December of 1948.

General BARR. There is one exception to that, Senator, and I haven't any records on it here now, but I remember I believe it was in March when Mukden was being hard pressed. The Chinese pressed us very hard for ammunition and they said Mukden was going to fall unless they got it, and so forth, and the Ambassador and myself cabled the United States and finally the United States did ship some ammunition over there.

Very little of it was ever shipped to Manchuria, however. It was determined that the ammunition situation up there was not as it had been represented although this considerable lot of ammunition was received in China and that was well prior to the 30th of November.

EQUIPMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALISTS IN 1948

Senator KNOWLAND. Are you familiar with the testimony of Admiral Badger before this committee to the effect that he had personally witnessed a situation in North China where some unequipped Chinese divisions that were going up to take the places of others in the front actually lined up and received from outgoing divisions their rifles and other equipment so that they could go up with a reasonable complement of arms?

General BARR. Well, I read that Admiral Badger had testified to that. That is rather common in the Chinese Army. If a division is going really out of the line back to the training area, they always exchange some equipment, and of course it has been done in our Army, too, in shortages of equipment when people going back to the rest area turned over equipment to those going back to the front.

Senator KNOWLAND. Of course, in the days prior to World War II, I think we can all recall where we were training some of our troops with stovepipes labeled "mortars" and trucks labeled "tanks."

You normally do that not by choice but because you lack the equipment. Certainly in your Korean operations you would have been very unhappy if you had to operate under that basis; would you not, General?

General BARR. We would have indeed. Of course, during the time that I was in Korea, there was never a division in a rest area. They were always fighting.

General Fu Tso-yi's troops were probably the best-equipped troops. Well, the troops in Mukden were as well equipped as General Fu Tso-yi's troops, but his troops were certainly better equipped than the troops in south China, west China——

Senator KNOWLAND. What is the allotment for American troops going up into an operation, General, roughly?

General BARR. Oh, I should say at least 120 rounds on a person, 60 per man, but other ammunition is available to our troops.

Senator KNOWLAND. Are you familiar with the fact that Admiral Badger has testified that there were cases in which the Chinese troops were asked to go up on an operation with anywhere from 3 to 15 rounds per man?

General BARR. No; I didn't know that Admiral Badger testified to that, but I don't agree with it. I think after the battle was over there was always ammunition left. There was certainly more than three to six rounds.

CIRCUMSTANCES IN BATTLE AT WEIHSIEN

Senator KNOWLAND. Were you familiar with the engagement in which the admiral mentioned—I don't recall the city at the moment where the Chinese Nationalist forces suffered very heavy casualties, ran out of ammunition, and as a matter of fact used other weapons that they could lay their hands on in order to resist an overwhelming attack of Communists?

Senator SMITH. Will the Senator yield? Was that Weihsien?

Senator KNOWLAND. I believe so.

General BARR. Yes, sir; west of Tsingtao. The battle of Weihsien was really not a battle. The Nationalist troops in Weihsien never fought. The local Provincial troops fought well to the west entrances of Weihsien. Weihsien is composed of two walled cities practically one within the other.

When the fighting became very hard on the west entrance, the Nationalist troops withdrew into the east city. When the Communists came into the west city, they were on high elevation looking down on the throats of the Chinese Nationalists in the east city.

The Chinese Nationalists, I think there were about three divisions, were observed the next morning marching to the southeast. So far as I know and so far as the report accepted at that time in China, the regular Nationalist forces never fought at Weihsien.

Senator KNOWLAND. Was that a tactical situation because the high ground had finally been taken?

General BARR. The high ground should have never been taken because the Nationalist troops should have defended it instead of depending upon the local Provincial troops. They were the troops that were there and equipped with the ammunition and the weapons.

Senator KNOWLAND. Did you have any observers at Weihsien at the time?

General BARR. No, sir; I never had observers when a battle was going on. We had people that flew over it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Both General Chennault I recall sometime ago as well as others, as well as Admiral Badger, have testified on numerous occasions to their knowledge the Chinese Nationalists forces had given a good account of themselves in various engagements. The reason I raise the question, the Chinese Communist radio about a year ago themselves said that from VJ-day until last year they had suffered a little over I think it was a million and a quarter or a million and one hundred thousand casualties.

Now since that was subsequent to VJ-day and obviously they were not committing suicide or shooting each other, those casualties must have been inflicted by Nationalist troops, and the only reason I raise the question was perhaps some misinterpretation of your prior testimony that gave the impression that Chinese Nationalists never fought in the civil war.

General BARR. Well, I didn't mean to imply that the Chinese Nationalists never fought. However, in this particular battle on Weihsien, I would like to read to you what I wrote the next day after the battle. There were some people up there in airplanes. They weren't combat airplanes. There were some bottles of gasoline dropped there and they showed fear for light as in Korea.

> When these bottles of gasoline ignited and lit the battlefield, it had a tremendous effect on the Chinese attacking, and we found the same condition in Korea. I had my outpost line resistance in the defense of Hungnam lighted by the Navy on two or three occasions.
>
> I learned on April 28 that Weihsien fell to the Communists on the preceding day. Two columns of Nationalist troops were observed from the air moving out of the city to the southeast. It was later learned that the Nationalist troops in Weihsien never actually participated in the fighting, and in their attempt to escape to the southeast they were isolated piecemeal and destroyed. It was expected that the relief columns—

well, that doesn't apply.

In the battle of Weihsien it was contemplated that within 48 hours the city would be recaptured. The Generalissimo ordered troops to advance east from Tsinan and west from Tsingtao. All those troops marched out 1 day's march and turned around and went back, and there was never any effort made to recapture Weihsien.

Senator KNOWLAND. My time has expired.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir; your time has expired, Senator Knowland. Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. General, whom did that report come from that you just read? Whom did you get the information from?

General BARR. The information came from the G–2 section of the Chinese Army.

REASONS FOR NATIONALIST DEFEAT

Senator WILEY. Now, you were in China about a year. Assuming that the statement is correct that there has been a break in the morale of the Nationalist troops, what is your explanation of that?

General BARR. It was brought about in the defense forces, principally the army, due to the fact that they were not properly paid, were not properly clothed, fed, nor were their dependents cared for or taken care of in any way.

The leadership was atrocious, so far as the individual soldier was concerned. No one accepted responsibility for him. If he got breakfast in the morning, it was purely on his own.

Senator WILEY. Did you report that condition to the General Staff or to the people here in this country?

General BARR. I did, yes, sir; and to the Generalissimo many times.

Senator WILEY. I understand. Now, then, once our Government knew that, what steps did they take, if anything, to try to remedy that situation?

General BARR. The Government itself took no steps. They closely observed the actions I took to try to remedy the situation.

UNITED STATES ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY SITUATION

Senator WILEY. General, I think it is the general consensus of all thinking people now, that China in the hands of the Communists is of tremendous significance to the very safety and life of this Nation.

China has been our ally for a good many years; the Nationalist Government has done a tremendous job fighting.

Did you have any directive to try to remedy that situation? I think it is generally considered that Communist "silver bullets," as we know, probably did quite a big job, too. If we were really an ally and sensed that deteriorating influence, why did we not do something instead of merely calling the attention of the Generalissimo to it?

General BARR. Yes, sir; and I employed about 1,300 officers and men giving active advice to the individuals in the field, trying to get them to set up some kind of a logistical system that would improve this condition, and principally to set up some kind of a pay system where the entire money going to a division would not be handed to the division comander to do with as he saw fit.

We spent much time and drew up elaborate plans to take care of a method of remedying all these conditions. It was so foreign to what the Chinese had always been accustomed to and the nature of the Chinese, which of course is to have the squeeze system—it has always been there—they resented it very much. Especially when you got down to the division commander and you told him that you were going to pay his troops, that he wasn't going to pay them, the fight was on right there and then.

We conducted several experiments where we sent Chinese officers out with the system and instructed them how to go out and pay a regiment, but there was never a time when it was properly done.

Senator WILEY. You, of course, know that General MacArthur stated that the end-of-the-war offensive November 24 was reconnaissance in force, and that orders were in the hands of the troops for retreat with the expectation that such retreat might be necessary.

Do you care to comment on that view?

General BARR. No, sir. I know nothing about that, and I think that it was principally applicable to the Eighth Army. At that time I, of course, was with the Tenth Corps, which was an independent corps, over on the east coast.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON CHINA DURING BARR MISSION

Senator WILEY. What other recommendations did you make to our Government when you were in China to try to correct this situation that you have so dramatically delineated?

General BARR. Specifically I made no recommendations to our Government, Senator, except to keep them fully informed and to keep them informed as to the action that was being taken by my advisory group to contribute as much as we could toward the correction of these deficiencies.

Senator WILEY. You were really not there simply in the position of major general of the United States Army. You were there also in an advisory capacity, almost a political-military capacity, weren't you, to diagnose the political, economic, and military situation, and then arrive——

General BARR. I was not specifically charged with that. That was the function of the Ambassador to China. I conferred with the Ambassador practically daily, and I sent cables to the United States, which the Ambassador saw before they were sent wherever they applied to the political situation; but these cables were informative. I never requested that a hundred thousand tons of wheat be shipped over immediately or anything like that.

Senator WILEY. What I am getting at is that those here in America, from what you did advise, were fully cognizant of the situation, the deterioration in the Chinese forces and the fact that the Commies were victorious and pushing on, and taking over China. Yet that information got no further direction to you or no action from the Government to try to remedy that situation; is that right?

General BARR. That is substantially correct, sir.

Senator WILEY. What do you think, now?

USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS ON FORMOSA

Do you believe there is anything the United States can do to improve the situation in China, from our standpoint, for the time being?

General BARR. At the present time, other than assistance that we are giving in Formosa, which is the only thing that we have to build anything on, I know of nothing we can do, sir.

[Deleted.]

Senator WILEY. What do you think of Ridgway's suggestion, where he agreed with MacArthur back in December——

General BARR. What was that? For the invasion of the China coast?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General BARR. I don't think we should do it, sir.

I mean, the amount of support required in the involvement would be terrific.

Senator WILEY. In other words, Ridgway, as I gathered from the wire that Senator Knowland read this morning, felt that MacArthur's suggestion on the utilization of Chiang's forces at that time, as a pressure group or as a checking up with the insurrectionists was wise. There are about a million and a half of those fellows now in China, as you probably know, that are in absolute insurrection against the Communist government. That suggestion, you feel, would be inadvisable at that time, or now, in order to relieve pressure on Korea, and whatever else it might accomplish?

General BARR. I feel that any such effort as that would be necessarily of such a small nature——

Senator WILEY. Of what?

General BARR. Would be of such a small nature that its effect in Korea would hardly be felt—and with the difficulty of communications in China, it is so far removed from Korea. And at the present time I feel that there are sufficient troops in east central China and in southern China to take care of anything that might be launched from Formosa.

Now I don't know, Senator; that is my idea.

Senator WILEY. Well, you know, as a matter of fact it is history now, that after we had announced our policy of blockading Formosa with our fleet, that the best armies of the Chinese Communists were moved up north and went into the conflict in Korea against our troops? You know that, don't you?

General BARR. Yes, sir; I remember reading it.

Senator WILEY. Yes. Well, now, at the time you were in China, did you believe we should continue aid, or did you think we should get out of China at that time?

General BARR. At the time I got out of China?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General BARR. I felt that we should get out. There was nothing in my opinion that could be done to help China.

I might say that I am devoted to the Chinese people. I feel they are the most enduring, hapless, hopeless, helpless people in the world.

OPINION ON CHIANG

Senator WILEY. I would like to get your personal reaction as to the character of Chiang. You said you knew him very intimately, he and his wife both.

General BARR. Much has been said about Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. So far as my association with him is concerned, I found him to be honest. He has made many promises to me as to what he would do in carrying out my recommendations. He was seldom ever able to carry out my recommendations due to pressure from outside sources.

For instance, one of the things that perhaps contributed as much as anything else to the fall of China is their failure to conscript their educated youth. Any youngster in China that has any educaion at all, that can really read and write, is not conscripted. Now for those people they provided the youth divisions down on Formosa. They were permitted to enlist in youth divisions for 2 years, with the promise at the expiration of the 2 years they would be given college educations at Government expense. And also——

Senator WILEY. Well, your personal judgment of Chiang was then that he was honest, reliable?

General BARR. That is right.

STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL IN CHINA

Senator WILEY. Now, while you were in China on this mission, did you have any contact with State Department folks there? If so, who were they?

General BARR. I had daily contact with the Ambassador and his assistants.

Senator WILEY. Who else——

General BARR. Ambassador Stuart, Mr. Lewis Clark, Mr. Livingston Merchant, and many others, of course.

Senator WILEY. Did you find any of the State Department crew that were in dealings with the Communists or reporting to the Communists?

General BARR. No, sir; I did not.

Senator WILEY. You knew nothing about that, anything of that kind?

General BARR. No. I do not believe it was taking place at that time.

Senator WILEY. You do not?

General BARR. If I may express a belief. Certainly not on any of the top level, among the people I knew.

Senator WILEY. Well, what I am getting at——

General BARR. There were no Communist sympathizers among the people at that time, I might say.

Senator WILEY. I am glad to get that information. I had reference to some of the—well, I will not name names, because I do not believe in that, but we have had testimony that in some previous years, and this year was 1948, there was a letter turned over to the Communist group.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have about half a minute, Senator, if you can get your question started.

Senator WILEY. Well, I am not going to argue with the chairman. I did get into an argument with him once on time. I thank you.

General BARR. Someone asked for the date the Generalissimo left Nanking. It was either the 22d or 23d of January 1949 and my last meeting with him was on the 22d, and I waited until he drove off in his car before I drove off in mine.

Senator WILEY. I did have one question.

Chairman RUSSELL. Any objection?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair hears none.

MILITARY AID TO CHINA BEFORE 1948

Senator WILEY. What was your information as to the supplies in 1946 and 1947 when you got there that were sent in?

General BARR. I am not familiar about that—I know very little about the details of the supplies that were sent in 1946 and 1947. I perhaps have files here I could get it from.

The greater portion of the supplies that were turned over after the war to the Chinese from the various islands and which amounted to something like $100 million, I believe, went into an organization known as BOSEY—that is, the Board of Supply Executive Yuan.

Theses supplies did not go to the military and they were purchased by China with an idea of making money on them. At the time that I left Shanghai, on the docks there were lots of bulldozers and rock crushers and various things—but all under the control of this BOSEY and not available to the military until the military could put up the money on the line to get it.

I remember that one item was complete American-type dental laboratories. The day I noticed that on the list I went down to Shanghai in the afternoon and I saw in one of the department stores in the window a complete, brand-new American dental laboratory advertised for sale by BOSEY.

Senator WILEY. Did you buy it?

General BARR. No; I did not buy it. I went back to the Generalissimo and said, "You should take this, law or no law."

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

BARR'S MILITARY ASSIGNMENT SINCE 1941

Senator CAIN. General Barr, how much time, sir, have you spent on duty with the General Staff here in Washington during the past 10 years?

General BARR. With the General Staff proper, I have spent very little time here; I have had duty here in Washington with the Army Ground Forces for over 3 years since the war, and duty here with what is now the Military District of Washington for 3 years.

Senator CAIN. But you have spent no time——

General BARR. With the General Staff proper.

Senator CAIN (continuing). With the planning sections of the Pentagon.

General BARR. That is correct, sir.

Senator CAIN. General Barr, in the briefest possible form, would you give me your assignments in the last 10 years.

General BARR. In the last 10 years? That would take us back to 1941.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir; just at the beginning of the war.

General BARR. At the beginning of the war threat, I was on duty in Washington, as G–3 of the military district headquarters. I immediately went to Fort Knox, Ky., where I became deputy G–4 of the Armored Force. Some 3 months later I became G–4, and if I remember correctly in something less than a year I was chief of staff of the Armored Force.

From the position as chief of staff of the Armored Force, I went in 1943 to London where I was deputy chief of staff of the theater.

Some time in December, I believe, or perhaps, November, I succeeded to the position of chief of staff for the theater. In January I was transferred, with the other top people in London, to the North African theater where we took over comparable positions.

I was chief of staff of the Mediterranean theater until August of 1944, when I left there as chief of staff of the Sixth Army group, which invaded the southern coast of France.

I served as chief of staff of the Sixth Army group until the end of the war. I returned to the United States, and served as G–1 of the Army Field Forces in the Pentagon Building for 3 years. Of course, the first year was during the demobilization.

Since that time I went from that position to China; from China to Japan, where I commanded the Seventh Division, and I am now at the Armored Center.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir. That experience has been both broad and varied, and, I take for granted, very interesting.

CAPABILITIES OF NATIONALIST FORCES

General BARR. I was last in Formosa in January of 1949.

Senator CAIN. General, when were you last in China?

General BARR. On the 29th of January 1949.

Senator CAIN. During your China tour of duty how much time did you spend in the south of China?

General BARR. When I first went to China there were no activities in south China that required my attention.

After I had been there for several months, they started trying to build up a force in the Canton area. I made several trips down there, I believe, four trips down there, and spent 2 or 3 days on each occasion.

The build-up never amounted to a great deal. There were lots of promises; they were going to do lots of things, but nothing ever really materialized. I dealt quite a bit on those trips with T. V. Soong.

Senator CAIN. General Barr——

General BARR. And I later, at the request of T. V. Soong, and with the approval of the Generalissimo, established an advisory group in Canton.

Senator CAIN. General Barr, how much did you see of the Chinese Communist armies in the south of China?

General BARR. I saw nothing of the Chinese Communist armies.

Senator CAIN. I have asked these questions because I want to press a little bit, sir, with reference to a colloquy you have just had with the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. Wiley.

General BARR. All right, sir.

Senator CAIN. I am not unmindful that both Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Gen. Matthew Ridgway have strongly recommended that the Chinese Nationalist troops be employed on the mainland of China in order that the pressure against our Allied forces in Korea would be substantially decreased.

You have testified that you think the Nationalist forces now on Formosa ought to remain there, and I want to ask you, General, to be as definitive as you possibly can in support of your recommendation, which is completely at variance with the recommendations this committee has been considering as having come from General MacArthur and General Ridgway.

General BARR. Well, from my knowledge of the Chinese troops, I feel sure that with any attempted invasion of Formosa to any extent, with any less strength than they have there, would probably be successful unless we prevented it.

I feel that the impact of their attempting to make a landing on the Chinese coasts or to launch a campaign in the Canton area would be so small it would have practically no effect on the war in Korea.

DEFENDING FORMOSA

Senator CAIN. General Barr, would it not naturally follow that if this Government permitted the employment of Formosan troops on the mainland of China that this Government and our allies would assume the defense and protection of Formosa? Could any other possible construction be placed on the question?

General BARR. If we permitted them to do it while they have the Seventh Fleet over there operating as they are there today?

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

General BARR. We would certainly be protecting Formosa; I mean, that would be the only hope for surviving if they took the army off of it.

Senator CAIN. You mentioned earlier in your testimony that if the United States was to assume the defense of Formosa, the question would be entirely different as to the possible employment——

General BARR. But even if the United States assumed the protection of Formosa and gave no other assistance whatsoever, I do not believe that the Nationalist forces on Formosa could successfully invade the mainland of China and maintain themselves on the mainland. Is that specific?

EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMANDO RAIDS

Senator CAIN. General Barr, as a very junior and unimportant officer in the last war, I found, to my complete satisfaction, that commando raids were extremely effective for psychological reasons, among other reasons.

Now, it has been testified that there are some 600,000 Chinese Nationalist troops on Formosa. The testimony differs widely as to how many of those troops are combat worthy. Some witnesses have indicated they thought most of them were, and others have said that they thought 50 percent of them were, and so on.

But, let us assume, just by way of argument, that 20,000 of those 600,000 troops could be committed for commando and guerrilla activities on the mainland of China. Would it be your professional opinion that that would not be a solid contribution to an effective waging of the war by the allied forces?

General BARR. I think that the only way that they could be committed is as commandos, and I quite agree with you in the experience of World War II, that you get good results for such raids to go on. Initially you would send in a raid, and perhaps if that was successful you would send in a bigger raid, and maybe eventually you could decide at what place, if anywhere on the mainland, you could hope to establish a base.

POSSIBLE NATIONALIST ATTACK ON MAINLAND

Senator CAIN. General Barr, perhaps you are familiar with General MacArthur's testimony, which was that he thought a decision by our Government ought to be made to permit the Generalissimo to employ his forces on the mainland of China.

General MacArthur did not favor a large-scale amphibious attack.

General MacArthur recommended that the Generalissimo ought to be permitted to use all of his troops, or such part of his troops as, in the opinion of the Generalissimo, was proper.

That is what I am driving at, that if we take the reins off the Generalissimo, General Barr, and permit him to use some portion of his troops in an attack on the mainland, the very threat, no matter how small the attack was, of a larger attack coming would certainly, from my point of view, cause the Chinese Communist high command to reevaluate that situation in the south of China and presumably to take some of their troops now in Manchuria and send them to the south of China for defensive purposes.

General BARR. I think there is one point upon which all of that hinges, and that is: Are we going to provide the protective sanctuary for them to operate from, that is, Formosa? That is what we must resolve—if we are going to permit these people to operate against the China mainland from Formosa, while we do not let the Chinese Communists operate against Formosa.

Otherwise, clandestine operations are about the only thing I see that the Generalissimo can do.

Senator CAIN. General Barr, are we not now providing a sanctuary on Formosa for the Chinese Nationalist forces?

General BARR. That is right; but if I understand correctly, Senator, we are not permitting the Nationalist forces on Formosa to fight the Communists on the mainland.

In other words, the situation would be changed, because we would be permitting the Nationalists to fight the Chinese Communists, but would not permit the Chinese Communists to come into Formosa and fight the Nationalists.

Senator CAIN. In a simple effort to be more successful in the Korean War, and to permit the Chinese Nationalists to take part in their own war—that is why I keep pressing this question——

General BARR. I would agree with you 100 percent, we would be delighted to have them do it, if we should withdraw from Formosa.

No invasion would be successful, would succeed without complete logistical support from the United States, or some other nation equally well qualified to take care of it.

Senator CAIN. As the Russians are now logistically supporting the Chinese Communists who are destroying, as best they can, American and allied forces, General Barr, you will not think that this question is indiscreet, sir, I trust not; but you are actually testifying that your only knowledge of the Chinese Communist strength in the south of China has come to you from hearsay—you are not testifying that with your own eyes you know what the situation is?

General BARR. I misunderstood your question. When you asked that question, I thought you were referring to the time that I was in China. As of the present time, I know nothing of it other than what I have read in the newspapers.

Senator CAIN. And you have not been in the South of China——

General BARR. No, sir.

Senator CAIN. Since sometime in 1949?

General BARR. Nor have I kept up with it. I am incompetent to testify on that.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

POSSIBILITY OF RUSSIANS IN CHINESE COMMUNIST FRONT LINES

General Barr, you have testified that your military mission was not permitted to observe combat activities in the front lines. May I ask if to your knowledge the same restrictions were imposed upon Russian missions that may have been with the Chinese Communist armies during your period in China?

General BARR. We had many rumors about Russian missions and Russian officers being with various Chinese Communist units. We were never able to in any instance verify those reports.

Senator CAIN. And one of the reasons why you couldn't verify those reports was that you were prohibited from visiting the front lines?

General BARR. That is right. But, of course, there were other means of getting information that you could sometimes run down—a report that a Russian airplane had come in had gone so-and-so and so-and-so, and you could find out whether that was true or not.

Senator CAIN. General Barr, was it your own opinion, on the basis of what you were told by others as they came back to you from the front lines, that Russian military personnel were attached to combat units of the Chinese Communist Army?

General BARR. No. Not in China; I definitely do not believe there was.

Senator CAIN. You heard many rumors there were, but you didn't have an opportunity——

General BARR. No doubt in Manchuria there were perhaps some Russians at one time, but not on the front lines. I definitely don't believe there was on the front lines.

FIGHTING QUALITIES OF CHINESE NATIONALISTS

Senator CAIN. General Barr, during the course of these extended hearings I have become convinced that America is not only in the future going to continue to recognize the Republic of China but we are going to support the Republic of China as best we can; and, therefore, we want to know as much as we can about those whom we are supporting.

You have indicated, and I think you did so when you testified before other committees in years gone by, that the fighting qualities of the Chinese Nationalist forces were not of a very high order. Would you take whatever time you think is proper to tell us why in your opinion the Chinese Communists who, on the basis of the record, have fought so well in Korea, fight better than do the Chinese Nationalists whom this country is determined to support?

General BARR. May I read from a report that I have?

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

General BARR (reading):

> Initially the Communists were content to fight a type of guerrilla warfare, limiting their activities to raids on lines of communication and supply installations. The success of their operations, which were purely offensive, instilled in them the offensive attitude so necessary to success in war.
>
> On the other hand, the Nationalist strategy of defense of areas they held developed in them the "wall" psychology which had been so disastrous to their armies.
>
> As the Communists grew stronger and more confident, they were able by concentrations of superior strength to surround, attack and destroy Nationalist units in the field and Nationalist-held cities.
>
> It is typical of the Nationalists in the defense of an area or a city to dig in or retire within the city walls and there to fight to the end, hoping for relief which never comes because it cannot be spared from elsewhere.
>
> I have been unable to convince the Chinese that in the defense of a city from attack by modern methods of warfare, it is necessary to take up positions farther away from the walls where maneuver is possible.
>
> Further, I have been unable to convince them of the necessity for withdrawing from cities to prepared areas when faced with overpowering opposition and certain isolation and defeat while the opportunity still exists for them to do so. In some cases their reasons for failure to withdraw and save their forces were political, but in most cases I believe that they were convinced that by defensive action alone they could through attrition, if nothing else, defeat the enemy.
>
> Because of this mistaken concept and because of the inability to realize that discretion is usually the better part of valor large numbers of Nationalist troops were lost to the government.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired.

Senator CAIN. I would ask unanimous consent, sir, if I might ask just one question of the witness.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, Senator Cain will be permitted to do that.

Senator CAIN. General Barr, against everything you have just read, would it not in your opinion increase the initiative and a desire for combat and aggressiveness in the Chinese Nationalist forces if they were encouraged to participate in commando and guerrilla activities on the mainland of China?

General BARR. I would have to add encouraged and supported. Without the support necessary to do it, the will to fight of the Chinese soldier would not be there. I think the Chinese soldier properly led and properly taken care of is a fine soldier, but without being properly supported, I do not think so.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have you read all that you wished to read, General?

General BARR. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George.

INADVISABILITY OF BOMBING IN MANCHURIA

Senator GEORGE. General, you in answer to a question propounded by the chairman said that at this time you did not think it would be wise to risk the chance of extending the war by going across the North Korean boundary.

Was that your opinion when General MacArthur's forces were close to the boundary?

General BARR. Yes, indeed. It never occurred to me that we would think of crossing the Yalu River.

Senator GEORGE. Did you think it was wise to use airpower to break up troop concentrations, depots, across the river at that time?

General BARR. No, sir; I did not at that time, and I do not today feel we should do that.

Senator GEORGE. Why not at that time, General?

General BARR. Because of the probability of bringing on a third world war and the fact that between the Manchurian border and our defensive positions after the withdrawal we had a considerable area in which to use our Air Force.

Senator GEORGE. I understand after you withdrew. I am asking about the situation before you withdrew. You thought the probability of bringing on a third world war——

General BARR. The engagement was so short, Senator, that had we gone in and started bombing in Manchuria, the effect would not have been felt on the battlefield in time to have affected that engagement at all.

Senator GEORGE. The second day after they had moved en masse it wouldn't have been felt?

General BARR. They were present on the battlefield then. It was too late to get them back in Manchuria.

Senator GEORGE. Not the whole of them, was it?

General BARR. So far as the number that caused the withdrawal of the Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps, I believe after the battle once started, practically all the troops that participated in that battle were already across the Yalu River.

Senator GEORGE. Where did they get their supplies? Where were their supply lines?

General BARR. The supply lines as we know supply lines, they don't have them. They have thousands of oxcarts and carriers and things like that.

Senator GEORGE. But were they drawing supplies from Manchuria from across the border?

General BARR. No doubt the supplies would have been replenished from across the border.

Senator GEORGE. You don't think it would have been wise to have bombed then at all?

General BARR. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Mainly because you——

General BARR. Feared involvement in another war.

Senator GEORGE. Feared involvement in another war.

General BARR. Of bringing on another war.

Senator GEORGE. Do you have anything to base that on, General, besides just what they say over here in the Pentagon?

General BARR. No; I haven't much access to the Pentagon, but that is my personal opinion. I have no factual studies or anything to base it on.

Senator GEORGE. No factual studies?

General BARR. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now as a matter of fact, if Russia is going to come into this Korean fighting, don't you suppose they have already decided it, or they have decided it conditionally at least, have they not, based on the conditions that might develop?

General BARR. That is a very difficult question to answer. I really can't answer that question. Of course when anyone is going to start a war, they would like to start the war so as to have it appear that someone else started the war, that the United States or the United Nations provoked a war and not the Russians.

As to whether or not they have already made up their minds that they are going to war or they aren't, I can't answer that.

Senator GEORGE. Well, now you are critical of the Chinese for fighting a purely defensive wall city war, as you say. Isn't that same criticism applicable to a fight in this peninsula of Korea if we are to continue to fight a purely defensive action there?

General BARR. But we are not fighting a purely defensive action there. Our defensive action is an offensive-defensive action.

Senator GEORGE. Well, you make it offensive and defensive by retreating and then going back.

General BARR. That is correct, and taking a tremendous toll from the enemy.

Senator GEORGE. Well, after all, that is sort of defensive.

General BARR. Of course we never pay attention to a city. We aren't defending any cities.

Senator GEORGE. Oh, no; I understand that, General, but nevertheless it is a defensive fight that has been back of the philosophy of the Korean War.

EFFECT OF YALTA AGREEMENT ON CHIANG KAI-SHEK

Now had you been in China before you went over there in January?

General BARR. I had not; no, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You had no previous experience there?

General BARR. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you know the Generalissimo very well?

General BARR. At the time that I left China?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

General BARR. I feel that I did; yes, sir. I think I had his complete confidence.

Senator GEORGE. Did he ever talk to you about the Yalta Agreement and how it affected China?

General BARR. Not to any extent; no, sir. He has of course discussed the fact, the help that was coming over from Dairen and things like that, but he never discussed the——

Senator GEORGE. Was he very much encouraged by the Yalta agreement, General?

General BARR. I wasn't there at the time of——

Senator GEORGE. Oh, no; I am talking about when you were there.

General BARR. Well, he was very much chagrined by it at that time naturally?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir. In other words, the fight had gone out of him, hadn't it?

General BARR. I wouldn't say the fight had gone out of him. The fight doesn't appear to ever go out of the Generalissimo himself.

Senator GEORGE. Well, I mean out of his army and out of his leadership. How could they hold China with Korea and Manchuria and all north China gone to the Russians, to the Communists? How could they hold it, General?

General BARR. How could the Chinese hold China?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir; how could they, now?

General BARR. They would find it very difficult if they had lost Manchuria completely.

Senator GEORGE. They had more than 70 percent of all their industries in that area, didn't they?

General BARR. But those industries had never been really available to China.

Senator GEORGE. Well, I mean they were in that area.

General BARR. Their heavy industries were principally around Mukden; yer, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You think it would be very, very difficult for all of China now to defend even if it had some will to do it with all of North China and Manchuria in Communist hands, do you not?

General BARR. I do indeed. They have little chance of success.

Senator GEORGE. I agree with you. I don't believe I have any further questions, General. You were not there when General Wedemeyer was there? He had gone before you went in?

General BARR. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. No further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

SUPPORT NEEDED FOR NATIONALIST INVASION OF MAINLAND

Senator STENNIS. General, I think you have pretty well exhausted the subject already. I have been very much interested in this proposition about getting some Chinese soldiers to fight Chinese soldiers over there, a sort of balance of power proposition.

Now you are an actual fighting soldier from the fighting front and you have been over there. You have military knowledge and you are testifying under oath. I am going to be considerably influenced by what you say.

I understand now you boil it down to a proposition there that you do not think there would be any appreciable harm that could be inflicted by these troops on Formosa over on the Chinese mainland unless we go in there and put them over there on the mainland and support them after we get them there, is that a fair statement?

General BARR. That is correct, sir. With the resources available to the Chinese themselves, it would be negligible.

Senator STENNIS. Now, Senator Cain mentioned about using these Chinese soldiers on Formosa, if they were permitted to take part in this fighting and your reply there was that without their being properly supported——

General BARR. I mean, logistics.

Senator STENNIS. The idea being that without being properly supported, you do not believe that the morale of the troops would be helped any; in other words, that they realize themselves they have got to be supported and supplied with ammunition and then be put across the water and sustained on the mainland. Is that correct?

General BARR. That is correct.

Senator STENNIS. Well, what is the idea as far as you know of this soldier that is on Formosa, what does he want to do about it—as far as you know, or from your impression about it? Does he want to go back in there and fight on the mainland?

General BARR. Senator, I have not been on Formosa since 1949 and it is difficult for me to say.

Of course, they have these youth divisions that originally came into the Chinese Army to save them from communism and the idea they never would have to fight. I do not know to what extent that influence is still alive in Formosa today.

Senator STENNIS. Yes. You have no light you could give use on it. What I want to go back to now is if we carry them over there and support them in the landing and if they were even guerrilla bands, do you think we would have to be prepared to support them on the mainland?

General BARR. For them to survive we would have to be prepared to support them.

Senator STENNIS. Would that support involve us having to send soldiers there on the mainland, our own soldiers I mean, United States troops?

General BARR. You mean to assure success?

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

General BARR. With the strength that is available to the Nationalist Chinese at the present time I certainly think it would eventually come to that, I mean if it were going to succeed. If we did not I believe the mission would eventually fail.

Senator STENNIS. All right. You do not believe that appreciable headway could be made there without our going on the mainland ourselves and supporting them.

General BARR. That is correct, sir.

PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALISTS FIGHTING IN KOREA

Senator STENNIS. All right. What about bringing them over in Korea, though? Do you not think it would be a psychological advantage there to bring in a group of these Chinese soldiers from Formosa and have them go into those battle lines fighting the Chinese troops from the mainland of China, fighting them in Korea?

General BARR. If there were no involvements I would say "Yes." The involvements are so great I would say "No."

Senator STENNIS. That assumes that we would have to protect Formosa otherwise, does it not?

General BARR. We would have to protect Formosa and we would have a moral obligation to help the Nationalists when we clear the situation in Korea.

Senator STENNIS. Well, would we be under any more obligations than to the Koreans or to anyone else who helped the United Nations?

Why would we be under more obligation to these Formosan troops than we would to any other allied troops?

General BARR. I do not say we would be under any more obligation to them but their requirements for help are so much greater than those of any other people except the Koreans themselves. We almost totally carry them at the present time.

I mean, we have no other outlaw government—well, I should not use the words "outlaw government"—but we have no other government that is not on the mainland participating there other than the Chinese.

Senator STENNIS. You think then that assuming Formosa could be properly protected that a very good move would be to bring these troops into Korea and use them against those Chinese troops—do you think they would be good fighters and also it would boost their morale?

General BARR. I think, sir, they would be good fighters if we gave them logistic support, the support the American Army could give them, they would be good fighters on the battlefield, I think, and could give a good showing for themselves.

Senator STENNIS. Well, we have a military mission in Formosa now. Is that a training mission, or just what do they do?

General BARR. I do not know under what directives they are operating. I should not comment on that because I do not know.

QUALITY OF MATÉRIEL SENT TO CHINA

Senator STENNIS. All right. Now, I have heard a good bit about these machine guns being sent there without spare parts and rifles without firing pins, and so on. I never heard much proven about it. You were the gentleman who was there when the equipment was rereceived. You sent for it on an emergency basis, I understand.

General BARR. I brought it from Japan. I mean, I got all that was available from Japan.

Senator STENNIS. You were there and you have first-hand knowledge about those conditions.

General BARR. Well, I do not have first-hand knowledge, because I did not see it. But I offered to send ordnance officers to wherever this equipment was to actually inspect it and determine whether or not the condition described was actually true. By that time the Chinese were admitting it was not as bad as first talked about. And so far as the spare parts, they were flown there from Japan.

Senator STENNIS. Yes; and that was done right away?

General BARR. Right away.

Senator STENNIS. When the condition developed, you had those parts flown in right away.

General BARR. That is correct.

Senator STENNIS. The impression was put out by some sources that this was a trick played on the Chinese, sending over phony material and all. There is no basis for what?

General BARR. There could not possibly be any basis for that.

Senator STENNIS. And this 10 percent you mentioned—I did not exactly understand, but about this first shipment, was this 10 percent of the total amount?

General BARR. I did not mention this 10 percent. Someone else did. There was 1,210 tons—well, I can tell you where this 10 percent comes in, perhaps. In spending this $125,000,000 it was decided that it would be distributed as follows——

Senator STENNIS. Well, pardon me, sir, but I do not think that is important; I just did not catch it. I want to get in a few more questions on my time here.

General BARR. All right.

PAYING CHINESE TROOPS

Senator STENNIS. Now, a little while ago you were talking about the paymaster, the division commander wanted to have charge of paying off the Chinese troops. Now, that bears on what I heard, that there was corruption there—not in the generalissimo but through his subordinates, and that this aid we sent was used to their personal advantage. Will you comment on that?

General BARR. As far as the pay system was concerned, we could never get a pay system installed in China. We wrote up a system for them, very much in detail.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

General BARR. And offered to have people accompany them but who would take no part in the disorder that always resulted from trying to pay.

Senator STENNIS. Did you want to control the pay yourself?

General BARR. No, sir. I could not control the pay, but I was perfectly willing to have officers——

Senator STENNIS. I mean, through your command you wanted to control the payroll?

General BARR. No. I could not control the pay. I wanted the Chinese though to use my recommendations as to how they would pay them, so that the division commander could not divide the money into two bags and put half in his pocket and pay the soldiers the other half when, as a matter of fact, it all belonged to the troops.

Senator STENNIS. So that condition was something that you did find there; and you found it was an actual fact, that it was going on, and it was impossible to cope with it.

General BARR. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. I notice all our witnesses insist that whatever we do should be done now under American supervision. That certainly ties in with your idea about it?

General BARR. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. We are of course impressed with you men that actually dealt with it from the ground level and shared the responsibilities and had the actual knowledge.

USE OF EDUCATED YOUTH IN CHINESE ARMY

Now, you hardly finished the subject of your statement here a while ago when you were talking about these troops—I am referring to the statement that all those that could read and write were mostly exempt from army service.

General BARR. That is correct.

Senator STENNIS. I was amazed at that fact.

General BARR. I won't attempt to use the report. I have quite an article here on it; but, generally speaking, the educated youth of China are not eligible for conscription, and they can volunteer and many of them did volunteer.

They promised them a college education if they would volunteer for 2 years, but had they sat down with a pencil and paper, they could have figured the statistics and that there were not enough colleges in China to educate them in 50 years.

But, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang both agreed, 100 percent, that the division should be broken up and the educated youth should be scattered throughout China, preferably in the supply system and the supply installations where, if they want a spare part, they have to show a picture and, believe it or not, if you go in and show a picture of what you want, they will take the picture and go away and come right back with it, with the part desired. How they do it, I don't know, but during the time I was there, nothing was ever done about it.

Chairman RUSSELL. They have a proverb over there that one picture is worth a thousand words.

General BARR. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. There was nothing done to remedy that situation, by Chiang, while he had control of the Government?

General BARR. Nothing more than—well, the colonel has provided this for me. Let's see if I can't brief it down [reading]:

> One of the most serious problems that confronts the Chinese Army today is the improper use of the smartest and best-educated young men in the Chinese Army. In the establishment of the youth divisions all of the well-educated are put into one unit. While this is excellent for this particular unit, the remainder of the Chinese Army is composed of the lower educational levels. That all boils down to the fact that in all the units, other than the youth divisions, the "blind leads the blind." These young men who are middle-school or high-school graduates and those who have completed their training should be sent out to act in the capacity of noncommissioned officers in all the other units of the Chinese Army thereby giving the advantage of education to each squad, platoon, and company in the Chinese Army rather than having it highly concentrated in six youth divisions.

I made any number of efforts, and finally made up a very complete plan as to how many should go here and how many should go there, and on what dates the divisions should be broken up, and so forth, which the Generalissimo approved, but the other governmental departments came into it——

Senator STENNIS. The civil departments of the Government never did really come in and fill that need?

General BARR. No, sir; they refused to do it.

Senator STENNIS. Expressly refused?

General BARR. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, General.

I believe that my time has about expired, has it not, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir; according to Dr. Wilcox.

Senator Smith?

UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO CHINA

Senator SMITH. General, before I begin questioning you, I want to call attention to something in the white paper, a statement by the President of the United States, entitled "Statement by President Truman on United States Policy Toward China, December 18, 1946."

This has to do with the assistance given by the United States to China up to the date of this statement by the President, and I quote from page 691 of the white paper:

> Assistance took the form of goods and equipment and of services. Almost half the total made available to China consisted of services, such as those involved in air and water transportation of troops. According to the latest figures reported, lend-lease assistance to China up to VJ-day totaled approximately $870 million.

And then, here is the important part:

> From VJ-day to the end of February, shortly after General Marshall's arrival, the total was approximately $600 million—mostly in transportation costs. Thereafter, the program was reduced to the fulfillment of outstanding commitments, much of which was later suspended.

And then, later, on page 692, the President's statement goes on to say:

> Aircraft, all nondemilitarized combat material, and fixed installations outside of China were excluded. Thus, no weapons which could be used in fighting a civil war were made available through this agreement.

That, of course, was prior to the time that you were there?

General BARR. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And I just would be interested to know, after you were there, what change was there in that situation?

I am asking that question because of your quoted statement that no battle was lost because of the lack of adequate ammunition or equipment. It is something to that effect, which you are quoted in the white papers as saying.

General BARR. From the time that General Marshall came out of China after his mission over there, when all military aid was cut off, no aid was received in China other than one shipment of ammunition, and later on what came from the $125 million, and provided by Congress in 1948.

Now, most of this stuff that is referred to there, I believe, is the equipment, and so forth, that went to the BOSEY organization, which was not to the military.

Senator SMITH. But it did not have to do with the miltary aid. The reason I am raising this question is that it has been said so frequently by different persons in and out of the administration, that since the Japanese war we have given China some $2 billion worth of equipment of one kind or another, and I never could figure out how that $2 billion could ever have been figured. These figures you just gave us read up to 1946—the President's statement—and indicate $870 million; but that was prior to VJ-day and had to do with the Japanese war. Since VJ-day that has been $600 million, and that is mostly in transportation cost, and none of these could be used in fighting a civil war through this arrangement, is what it goes on to say. I am not quite clear where those enormous figures came from.

I don't know whether you would be able to throw some light on it.

General Barr. I will be unable to do so; I am unable to clear that up for you, Senator; I don't know.

EXPLAINING NATIONALIST LOSSES ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Senator Smith. General, there is another matter that troubles me, and that occurred when Admiral Badger was here. I am going to read just a little, if I may, from the record.

He was discussing the attempted aid to that General Fu Tso-yi, and the fall-down which you have already testified to, regarding the equipment there. I think in the course of his testimony, somewhere, he said that this fall-down of aid to Fu Tso-yi was the straw that broke the camel's back, and probably prevented any successful operation in that north China attempt there that Fu Tso-yi was heading.

Here is the question I wanted to ask you:

> Senator Smith. You also stated—and this is the point of my question—at that time General Barr was the head of our United States Army mission in China. Did he have any responsibility for the movement of this equipment?

I am reading from page 7253 of this record.

Admiral Badger replied:

> No; he had no responsibility for the movement of the equipment until it arrived, and one of the elements of the proposal and which was approved all the way up including the approval of the President was that in order to insure prompt delivery and delivery to the point of application, authority was granted to transport that particular material in United States Government vessels.
>
> Senator Smith. Well, what troubles me is that in the white paper that was issued on China which you are familiar with, General Barr is reported to have said, "Since my arrival no battle has been lost for lack of ammunition or equipment."
>
> I can't quite reconcile that with your story about this particular equipment.

That was the equipment to Fu Tso-yi.

Admiral Badger answered as follows:

> Well, I have given that statement some consideration, and all I can say is that I understand General Barr will be here before this committee and can answer the question himself, but on the other hand there is a great difference between a battle which is undertaken, and inability to undertake battles.

Then, he went on to draw that distinction. You were simply talking about some battle that might have been undertaken——

General Barr. I was speaking of——

Senator Smith (continuing). And he was talking about a plan to carry on a campaign of battle; and he implied there was certainly inadequate equipment for any such plan as that.

General Barr. Certainly, if there had been unlimited numbers of troops, and unlimited amounts of equipment and ammunition, and they had the will to fight, the results would have been different. But with the troops that were on the battlefield, and other troops that could have been put on the battlefield there was no battle lost but what a tremendous amount of ammunition and equipment was not lost with it; and the Chinese would never destroy equipment.

When they lost Ssupingchieh in Manchuria, they destroyed nothing; they literally left hundreds of thousands of tons of ammunition there, and said they didn't destroy it because they would have to destroy the city if they did.

At Weihsien they lost a tremendous amount; at Tsinan they lost a tremendous amount; at Kaifeng the Communists came in and raided them and took away all the ammunition and weapons that they could, and then wrapped the other rifles around trees, just destroyed them, and left them there.

Senator SMITH. Well, do you not agree with the suggestion made by Admiral Badger that had Gen. Fu Tso-yi had this equipment that the Joints Chiefs approved of, that the Ambassador, Leighton Stuart approved of, and I think it was approved here—$16 million of equipment was requested for his support—do you not agree with Admiral Badger that had he had that he might have maintained an effective offensive there in north China?

General BARR. No, sir. After the fall of Mukden, the availability of the Communist troops in Manchuria to come south, I don't think that Gen. Fu Tso-yi would have had a chance in the world, and especially with the situation that had built up in east central China, which was to the south of it. In other words, he had an enemy on the right, an enemy on the left, and an enemy to the front and rear.

Senator SMITH. Then you are in disagreement——

General BARR. I do not agree with Admiral Badger that was the straw that broke the camel's back.

UNITED STATES POLICIES TOWARD CHINA

Senator SMITH. Now, was General Wedemeyer in China on his other special mission at the time you were there in an advisory capacity?

General BARR. No; he had left there some several months before I arrived.

Senator SMITH. Well, I got the impression, maybe erroneously, from his testimony that he didn't quite agree with your conclusion that we had adequate ammunition and we couldn't have made anything out of this Nationalist Army. In other words, I felt he was much more optimistic about what might have been done with the Nationalist Chinese than you appear to have been.

General BARR. Had we had unlimited amounts of equipment and unlimited ammunitions, sir, and broader advisory directive, we certainly could have done more.

For instance, the Chinese never had a strategic reserve. They started out in March of 1949 to organize a strategic reserve of nine divisions. Well, they never got these nine divisions together. They made approximately no progress.

In late October the Minister of Defense came to me and said, "We are going to organize 28 more divisions."

So I said, "How are you going to organize 28 more divisions when you have been trying for 9 months to organize 9 and you have accomplished nothing? So why do you think you can organize 28?"

"Well," he said, "We are going to get the equipment from the United States now, and we can do it."

But those are all built on possibilities of what would have happened if some other condition had existed.

Senator SMITH. Oh, yes; that is always true.

General BARR. Had we given unlimited aid to China and had we given unlimited advice to China, the situation would have probably been different.

Senator SMITH. What I can't understand is how apparently General Wedemeyer was there advising Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at the time of the Japanese War, and apparently Chiang's operations were pretty successful against the Japanese. He has a fine record of success militarily in the use of his own troops and also in trying to get the Chinese Communists to fight the Japanese. Then all of a sudden apparently his efficiency fell off, and our whole policy seems to have fallen off to give him that aid which he needed to succeed in his program; and we took the position—"Well, the Chinese Communists are getting a hold here and we had better recognize them, and so on, and not support the Nationalists any further."

I get somewhere through all the testimony and the white paper and otherwise a shift in our policy from supporting our ally, from supporting Chiang Kai-shek, from supporting the Nationalist troops, to a policy of pressure being put on by our own people there in China, to the effect that the Communists were not so bad after all. It was a pick-up of the Sun Yat-sen rebellion, and perhaps we had better let it come through and call it a day so far as the Nationalists were concerned.

General BARR. Most of that was before my time.

Senator SMITH. I realize that.

General BARR. I was cognizant of that, and I do not agree with the idea, perhaps no one does now, that they were agrarian.

Senator SMITH. Were what?

General BARR. Were agrarian, the Communists.

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN FALL OF NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT

Senator SMITH. May I ask you this question, which interests me a good deal, right in that connection: Don't you feel from the experience you have had and from your knowledge of the whole Chinese situation, that what we have really witnessed has been the conquest of China by Russia through her very skillful method of infiltration, setting up her puppets to do the job for her, setting up her satellites, so to speak, and then taking over?

Haven't we really witnessed the conquest of China by this outside external power, Moscow?

General BARR. No, sir, not totally. Due, too, to the ineptness and inefficiency of the Chinese Government and the ineptness of their military leaders.

Perhaps Russia made some contribution, but actually on the battlefield they didn't. The Communists fought the war over there with much of the equipment and ammunition they got from the Japanese surrender. They got all the equipment up in the Manchurian area, and then after the fall of Mukden, they had unlimited American equipment.

There were four divisions up there fully equipped with American equipment, divisions which General Wedemeyer organized and trained, and were about to attack Canton when the war ended. After the fall of Weihsien and Tsinan and place after place, the Communists had more of our equipment than the Nationalists did.

Senator SMITH. But the Communists initially got the Japanese equipment when the Japanese surrendered Manchuria.

General BARR. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. That surrender was made in Manchuria to the Russians.

General BARR. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And that was under the secret agreement at Yalta. It all goes back to the Yalta secret agreement to get Russia into the war and give Russia what she asked for in that secret agreement, which was to take over the surrender of Manchuria, and turn the equipment of the Japanese over to the Chinese Communists. And that certainly destroyed whatever face Chiang Kai-shek could have had in Manchuria; it took that away. It looked as though the United States and Great Britain had just deserted Chiang Kai-shek and let the Russians in under this secret agreement to bring Russia into the war.

General BARR. I don't know that the Yalta agreement provided for the Japanese surrendering to the Russians or to the Communists; and, of course, we did try to prevent this equipment falling into the hands of the Communists by transporting the Nationalists troops on American naval vessels up to north China. But we——

Senator SMITH. I think we have had previous testimony on that; it was, as a matter of fact, following Yalta that the Russians did take the surrender of the Japs in Manchuria and did turn over the Japanese equipment to the Chinese Communists?

General BARR. That is correct. That actually happened.

Senator SMITH. I am trying to find out what was the succession of events that brought about this sudden change, where the Nationalist Army under Chiang Kai-shek had been successful in bringing the Japanese War to a conclusion and then suddenly the Commies, who had been pestering him all through that period, suddenly the Commies get this material from the Japs and they are the top boys in the struggle from then on; and poor old Chiang and his Nationalists seem to be left out in the cold from that time on.

I am trying to get that picture. I can't blame the Nationalists for losing face under those circumstances.

General BARR. Beginning at that time, the Nationalists were much stronger than the Communists, there is no question about it. But the Communists capitalized on every fault of the Nationalists. The Communists were smart and the Nationalists were not.

Senator SMITH. I agree.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired. You may answer, General.

General BARR. The Communists took care of their soldiers to the very best of their ability. When they took over an area, they mobilized everything in that area to the last straw. It was all theirs, and they did it in such a way as not to make the people resent it too much.

The Communists had no responsibility for government whatsoever. They weren't responsible to anybody for anything, and the Nationalists were 100 percent responsible for the Government in China.

So the difference in the two is very great, and as I said before, in the beginning, the Communists fought as guerrillas, which is offensive type battle, and the man that can fight guerrilla warfare, he is a fine offensive soldier.

The Nationalists only defended. It was only just after the surrender when the Nationalists had their divisions in Manchuria and about the time General Marshall went over, when they stopped advancing north in Manchuria, that was about the last offensive action taken by the Nationalists. From then on it was defensive. That doesn't very well answer your question.

Senator **Smith**. Thank you. I may have a chance to question you further.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Hickenlooper?

CONFERENCE ON ALLOCATION OF 125 MILLION CHINESE AID

Senator **Hickenlooper**. General Barr, what was the date when Mukden fell?

General **Barr**. October 27, I believe. Let me see. November 2, 1948.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. The 2d of November 1948?

General **Barr**. Yes. That is the date it was in full control of the Communists. The Communists first started taking over Mukden on the 22d of October and by the 2d of November their complete occupation of the city had been completed.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Now did you have a conference on August 30, 1948, at the residence of the American Ambassador, Leighton Stuart, at which were present Gen. Ho Yin-chin, Chinese Minister of National Defense, and Lt. Gen. K. M. Chiang in which the priorities or the allocation of this first shipment of arms and equipment on the $125,000,000 loan was decided?

General **Barr**. I don't know about the date. I was present at such a conference.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. There was such a conference?

General **Barr**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. The date would be approximately at that time?

General **Barr**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Now at that conference was it decided that the first priority would be given to the shipment or to the sending of this original shipment of arms and munitions to the troops in north China or to Gen. Fu Tso-yi and to Gen. Wang Yo-wu or whatever that name is?

General **Barr**. I don't know who that is.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. In Shantung?

General **Barr**. At that conference, if I remember correctly, it was decided that of the total equipment received of the United States $125,000,000 appropriation, 60 percent would be off-loaded at Shanghai for the defense of east central China, 40 percent would go to Tientsin area for Fu Tso-yi in north China, and 10 percent would go to Tsingtao for the Shantung Peninsula.

It was also decided at that conference or at a subsequent conference that this equipment coming in from Japan so far as required by him would all go to Fu Tso-yi.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. That would be the first shipment?

General BARR. That is the shipment that came from Japan.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now did Gen. Ho Yin-chin, who was Chinese Minister of National Defense, object to that first priority, that is shipping the first of it north at that conference? Was he overridden by your decision at that time?

General BARR. No, I did not have the power to override the Generalissimo. I mean after all, it was his say-so, but I remember now all the questions were resolved to the satisfaction of all concerned. I mean no person was overruled, no one said, "I will decide against you," after discussion.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me put it this way: Did the representative of the Generalissimo at that meeting at first object to this allocation which was eventually put into effect? But did you recommend that the allocation which was followed be put into effect and eventually secure their approval?

General BARR. I don't remember Gen. Ho Yin-chin's objecting to the priority of it first going there. I believe Gen. Ho Yin-chin objected to letting the lion's share of the $125,000,000 go to north China, but there was no dissension about the priority of this token shipment from Japan.

DELICACY OF CHINESE SITUATION, 1947

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now there has been much controversy, General Barr, developed about this statement which has been mentioned here, a statement by you that no battle was lost by the Chinese Nationalists for want of equipment or ammunition, or substantially to that effect.

And as I recall, you said a moment ago that you disagreed with Admiral Badger—I should not necessarily say disagreed but that your evidence did not sustain the opinion that these Chinese Nationalist troops were sent up with five or six rounds of ammunition on occasions apiece.

As I recall Admiral Badger did so testify based upon his experience. I want to read you what General Marshall testified to when he came back from China on February 14, 1947, before the Foreign Relations Committee. He says, in discussing the Chinese Nationalists:

> The thing is a very confused thing. They—

meaning the Chinese Nationalists—

> sent troops up to North China with only two rounds of ammunition per gun at one time and had some very bad reverses.

He continues:

> The trouble with them is that the ammunition was over in Chunking thousands of miles away where it had come over the Burma Road, and they were in North China.

Now I want to continue the quote:

> They have had all sorts of things happen. That is a very delicate issue in this whole business because if we give them ammunition, we are participating in the civil war directly. On the other hand, if we never give them any ammunition, we have disarmed them because they have American equipment through our decision way back in 1943. So we have a very delicate thing there which I was always hoping was such that the situation would overtake the dilemma, which it has not. We have made no decision with regard to that.

Now that is the close of the quote.

General BARR. General Marshall indicates in there a condition which existed in China. Their distribution of supplies is very bad. They oftentimes have the supplies in China but their communications are so bad that they can't move it from one place to another.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand.

General BARR. In my statement I had reference to specific battles in which I definitely knew that great quantities of ammunition and weapons had been lost to the Communists.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, but the fact is, isn't it, General—pardon me, I did not mean to interrupt. I want you to finish whatever you wanted to say.

General BARR. I was through.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But the fact is—well, I should not make that positive statement. I should ask your judgment on this.

SUPPLIES USED BY RED CHINESE AND NATIONALISTS

It is my understanding, however, that at the close of the fighting, at the end of the Japanese war, that we in effect stopped sending supplies and equipment to the Nationalist Chinese armies in one way or another.

There was a 10-month period when we embargoed and then 10 months to almost a year when no supplies got there even after the embargo was lifted, so that in effect the Chinese Nationalists were operating on the law of diminishing supplies while the Communists in the north were not only operating on the tremendous supplies which they had received from the Japanese surrender but probably on increasing supplies from Russian sources. Is that a fair statement?

General BARR. I don't believe it quite gives the picture because when we came out of China with our Army, we left a tremendous amount of ammunition and equipment in China. It was turned over to the Chinese, and in that of course was a terrific amount of ammunition, and with the type of warfare that they fought in China, the ammunition consumption is not nearly so great as it normally is in our Army, so the amount of ammunition that the Nationalists inherited from us in my opinion was far greater than what the Communists got from the Japanese. That ammunition was not properly distributed as to where they would like to have had it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me ask you this, General Barr. Haven't we lost enormous amounts of ammunition and equipment in Korea?

General BARR. Oh yes; we did in the early days of the war.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is not the United Nations forces but the South Korean forces have lost great amounts of ammunition and equipment in the Korean venture; isn't that true?

General BARR. In the early days of the war we lost considerable equipment and ammunition. The North Koreans and Chinese are now losing it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am talking about the South Koreans losing equipment.

General BARR. Oh yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And that has to be replenished, does it not, General?

General BARR. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Or we can't keep on fighting. And war is a wasteful thing; is it not?

General BARR. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, now I am merely discussing this from the standpoint of my impression that Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalists were fighting with a nonreplenishable stock of equipment while the Communists in North China were fighting with a constantly replenishable supply of equipment.

General BARR. No. If the Russians gave aid to that extent to the Communists during that time, I was not familiar with it. I mean what you say is true, of course.

They did lose equipment but they fought their principal battles during the year that I was there around cities, and in these cities they always had a tremendous stock of ammunition and weapons. At Kaifeng, for instance, they had many more weapons than they had soldiers, and the Communists carted them away or broke them around trees when they raided the city.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you know of battles in which the Chinese Nationalists, running out of ammunition finally fought with their guns, clubs, and with sticks and stones on some occasions? We have had such reports.

General BARR. I believe that was the battle of Weihsien. That is the only one I have ever heard that told about that, and the air force fought with gasoline in bottles and stuff like that. That is the battle that I told about a moment ago where only the provincial local troops fought, that the regular troops did not fight at all. Maybe the provincial troops—everyone says that they fought well, but they were not the troops that should have been put into the key position.

CHIANG'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Barr, do you consider, leaving out his associates, that in the situation in China which may or may not have had a great effect on the conduct of affairs over there, do you consider Chiang Kai-shek an able military man himself, insofar as his own capabilities are concerned?

General BARR. I have to answer that in the negative. No, I don't. You mean an able strategical tactical commander?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not speaking of his own personal ability. I am trying to divorce that from situations which he may have had to accept and which for various reasons he may or may not have been able to control such as defecting generals in far places and things of that kind.

General BARR. No, I don't think he was. I spent considerable time prior to the fall of Tsinan and he would never agree to do it. He kept smiling and said, "General, you are overanxious about it. It is going to be all right," but 2 days after it fell he said, "Well, I was wrong. We have just got to learn that that isn't the way to defend a city."

STRATEGIC BOMBING OF MANCHURIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Barr, getting to Korea, I hate to jump around so, but there are a few questions I would like to ask you, and I only have 15 minutes.

Getting back to Korea, I believe you said that you would not advocate the strategic bombing of the supply depots and the marshaling centers and arsenals and so on in the Mukden area and so on across the Yalu.

General BARR. In Manchuria.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In Manchuria. And you gave as one of your prime reasons for that, the possibility of starting a third world war by such an action.

Now General, this is the question I want to ask you as a military man, not as a politician, in its broader sense.

General BARR. Yes, I understand.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Isn't your reason why you advise against bombing those installations actually based upon political reasons rather than upon sound military reasons for winning a military victory in a theater of action? In other words, aren't you infiltering your military decision——

General BARR. I think it is difficult to completely draw a line of demarcation between the two in that case, Senator. I mean as a military man I would certainly do everything in my power to prevent our country from becoming involved in another war, if I could, and I just can't disassociate the two, so I am afraid I can't give you a satisfactory answer other than to say as the situation stands in Korea today I recommend against doing it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am sorry, my 15 minutes is up. I have three or four questions right along that line.

Chairman RUSSELL. I gave you a little over on that one. Senator McMahon.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman.

DETERMINING DISPERSAL OF CHINESE AMMUNITION

Senator SPARKMAN. General Barr, a few minutes ago Senator Hickenlooper was asking you about this priority that went to North China, and he indicated some belief there that you had overridden the advice of some representative of the Generalissimo. It happened just at that time I was reading some testimony of Admiral Badger and in that he set forth a letter, a personal letter, which he wrote to Secretary Forrestal, in which he told about this conference and about the decision for the priority.

I notice that he refers several times there to the fact that the Generalissimo himself wanted this ammunition sent to North China, and in fact the implication is there that he probably wanted, as you describe it, the lion's share sent to North China.

Is that in accord with your recollection?

General BARR. No, sir; it is not. I am sure that Admiral Badger at the time wanted practically all of it to go to North China. The

Generalissimo specifically denied that he ever agreed to let even the lion's share of it go to North China. Ho Yin-chin was the Minister of Defense, and he was the one that attended this conference.

I was never willing to let the entire amount go to North China because they had no strategic reserve whatsoever. They didn't have one division they could use as reserve. We had a project on trying to equip nine divisions; so to send it all to North China would have been disastrous.

Of course, it mattered little anyway, but the Generalissimo certainly never had any intention of sending all that equipment to North China. I will tell you that.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, at any rate, the amount that was sent in—I will put it this way: The priority that was established was agreed to in the conference by all those present?

General BARR. That is correct; and the amount was established: 60 percent would go to East Central China and be off-loaded at Shanghai; 30 percent to General Fu Tso-yi and be off-loaded at Taku Bar, which is Tsinan; and 10 percent at Tsingtao.

Senator SPARKMAN. Sixty, 30 and 10?

General BARR. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. And it wasn't a case of anybody forcing anything upon anybody; is that what you mean?

General BARR. That is right; except I am sure at that time Admiral Badger would have preferred 100 percent to go to Fu Tso-yi.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, he doesn't say that in his letter, but he does indicate as I stated a minute ago.

SECURING AMMUNITION FOR CHINA

Now there has been a good bit said here about this shipment of incomplete ammunition. I think you have given us more information on it this morning that what we have been able to get anywhere.

I notice also that Admiral Badger in his testimony reminded us that right at that time we had started to rebuild to some extent our own defenses, and that we were short of ammunition and supplies throughout our services generally. Is that in accord with your recollection?

General BARR. Yes. We had disposed of most of our war surplus at that time. It was necessary to make a very detailed survey of every little pile of equipment that happened to be at some station in the United States to get together this much equipment.

Senator SPARKMAN. And following that, I assume that the survey was made in Japan where this equipment was. Do I understand you correctly that this equipment was shipped from Japan?

General BARR. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Was the survey made there under the command of General MacArthur?

General BARR. That is right, to determine what equipment he could make available; and even if it was something that he would need in 3 months, he was told that "we will replenish your stock if you will spare this to China today in order to get it over there."

Senator SPARKMAN. And it is that kind of procedure that was going on everywhere we had armed forces; was it not?

General BARR. That is correct.

Senator Sparkman. And if it was found he did have something available it was shipped?

General Barr. Twelve hundred and ten tons were shipped out of the area for which he was responsible.

Senator Sparkman. And that 1,210 tons that General MacArthur was able to ship is this ammunition that has been described as incomplete?

General Barr. That is correct.

Senator Sparkman. And it came from Japan?

General Barr. That is correct.

Senator Sparkman. The nearest point, I suppose, to that area?

General Barr. Yes, sir. Much of it had been packed several years previously, at the time of the end of World War II.

EMERGENCY CONDITION REGARDING AMMUNITION SPARE PARTS

Senator Sparkman. Yes. Now, did I understand you correctly to say that the spare parts were sent in just as soon after that as you could possibly get them?

General Barr. That's true. The complete allowance of spare parts that go with a gun when you get it new were not available in Japan. However, so far as magazines for the Browning automatic rifle, the tripods and things like that, they were flown in from Japan within the next 3 or 4 days.

Senator Sparkman. I believe Senator Stennis asked you a question indicating that certainly there was no willfulness about sending in incomplete ammunition or supplies.

General Barr. Certainly there was not any willfulness in it. We knew beforehand this equipment would arrive there incomplete.

Senator Sparkman. It was simply—excuse me. Go ahead.

General Barr. And the United States had said that they would supply it from here.

Senator Sparkman. Yes. It was simply an emergency condition that we were confronted with?

General Barr. That is right, and at the insistence of the Generalissimo to get something coming in here so the Chinese people would know that aid was coming from the United States. It was an emergency measure taken at great inconvenience to the Department of the Army.

Senator Sparkman. Now, General Barr, I am not sure that you mentioned this; you may have. I refer to the period from April to September 1947 when we were pulling the marines out, weren't we?

General Barr. Approximately, yes.

Senator Sparkman. Did we not turn over considerable ammunition at that time?

General Barr. It is my understanding that all the ammunition that was available and great quantities of equipment were turned over at that time.

Senator Sparkman. We had 50,000 marines in there, I believe?

General Barr. I am not sure, Senator.

Senator Sparkman. As I recall, the testimony was that there were 6,500 tons of ammunition turned over during that period of time.

OBJECTIVE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS ON FORMOSA

Now, I want to ask you a question or two about Formosa, or particularly the Nationalist troops on Formosa. Admiral Badger stated that the primary objective of the Nationalist troops on Formosa was to defend Formosa. I won't say that Admiral Badger alone stated that; General MacArthur stated that, and I believe all of our military witnesses have stated that.

Do you agree with that?

[Deleted.]

Senator Sparkman. Yes. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

YOUTH DIVISIONS

Chairman Russell. The questioning now comes back to me.

General Barr, you brought in several elements here that I had not heard of before. One of them was these youth divisions. Did I understand you to say that they were organized and recruited on the assurance that they would not be used in combat?

General Barr. The one atTsingtao never fought; no, sir. It was the Thirty-first Army, which was part of that, which shipped one division to Tsingtao and one division to Peiping just before the complete fall of Nationalist China. They were made up of youth divisions. I know the one that went to Tsingtao was not found satisfactory by Admiral Badger.

Chairman Russell. But were they actually thrown into battle?

General Barr. The one at Tsingtao never fought; no, sir. It was evacuated later. They were certainly by far the best trained and the best physical condition of any Chinese troops. I have never seen such fine physical specimens as Sun Li-jen had developed out of these boys. He had used all American training methods with our combat forces and so forth and they were a fine-looking group, but he did not figure that they were obligated to fight.

Chairman Russell. Were they equipped? Did they have any weapons?

General Barr. Oh, yes, they were equipped.

Chairman Russell. I am at a loss to understand—of course, I understand the ways of the Chinese are inscrutable to us in many respects, but why did they organize these people and get them—give them arms and then not fight them?

General Barr. They just started shortly after World War II, and I believe that that was at the time to save them from communism, and was to get these youth under control of the Government where the Government could influence their thinking, and by doing that you saved them from the Communists that were coming.

Chairman Russell. Did they have any ammunition, supplies, if they were elected not to fight?

General Barr. Yes, sir.

Chairman Russell. They had arms and ammunition?

General BARR. That is right.

Chairman RUSSELL. And yet waged no battle?

General BARR. They were never fought during the time I was there. They only had training ammunition. Of course, if Tsingtao had not been committed they would have been given additional ammunition.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did they get those troops off to Formosa? Were they able to evacuate them or where did they go, over to the Communists?

General BARR. The division at Tsingtao was evacuated; I am not sure about the one in north China. I rather think it was surrendered to the Communists. There were two divisions that went up from Formosa known as the Thirty-first Army.

COMMUNIST FEAR OF LIGHT

Chairman RUSSELL. You made another little statement that I did not understand. You said that the Communists showed a fear of light, just as they did in the fighting in Korea.

General BARR. Well, I remember when the story was told about the dropping of the gasoline bottles with straw—bottles with straw and gasoline in them—it illuminated the battlefield where there was a great concentration at the gates of Weihsien, that the Communists immediately ran from it and took cover, and showed great consternation; and I merely mentioned in Korea I had found the same thing, that by illuminating the battlefield it greatly affected the desire of the Chinese to continue their advance. We use illuminating shells with artillery and preferably with naval gunfire, in my experience.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, at this battle of Weihsien, or wherever it was supposed to have been, which was fought with clubs, muskets, and bare hands and sticks and other weapons, you state that the provincial troops did put up a fight there.

DIFFERENTIATING PROVINCIAL AND NATIONALIST TROOPS

General BARR. The provincial troops did put up a good fight. The Nationalist troops did not fight at all.

Chairman RUSSELL. I want you to differentiate for me the difference between the provincial troops and Nationalist troops.

General BARR. The provincial troops are more or less of a kind of militia organization that is under the control of the local government. In other words, it is like the home guard that we had at the end of World War I in some of our cities; I think we had some of them called home guards.

Chairman RUSSELL. We had State guards in World War II likewise.

General BARR. Well, it was similar to that; certainly never as efficient as those other ones.

BATTLE OF WEIHSIEN

Chairman RUSSELL. But they did put up a very valorous——

General BARR. A good fight; yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL (continuing) Battle.

General BARR. But the people who really had ammunition and the weapons didn't fight at all.

Chairman **Russell**. They withdrew?

General **Barr**. They withdrew first from the West City into the East City, which made them very vulnerable to the enemy because the enemy occupied the West City, and they were looking straight down on them, and the next morning they marched to the southeast and were destroyed.

Chairman **Russell**. And another army was supposed to relieve them?

General **Barr**. Troops were supposed to come from Tsinan in the west and Tsingtao from the east. Both advanced approximately a day, and they turned around and went back. They were ordered to again resume the advance, and attack and liberate Weihsien, but they never did it.

Chairman **Russell**. From the information that you were able to secure in China, how did the numbers of the conflicting forces compare—the Nationalist troops as compared with the Communist troops—during these battles?

General **Barr**. Generally speaking, up to the fall of Mukden the Nationalists considerably outnumbered the Communists. After the Battle of Mukden, the Communists outnumbered the Nationalists.

SURRENDER OF JAPANESE ARMS

Chairman **Russell**. Now, reference has been made to the Japanese arms being turned over to the Communists. Were there not considerable numbers of Japanese troops in Nanking and Peiping and other cities?

General **Barr**. I am sure that there were, sir. I am not thoroughly familiar with that, but it is only logical that there were.

Chairman **Russell**. Somewhere during these hearings I ran across a letter that some American officer had written the Generalissimo urging him to get the troops on up to some large city, and I think it is one of the two I named, so that he could take over these Japanese troops.

General **Barr**. We took his troops up to North China in American ships.

Chairman **Russell**. It was stated they were driving trucks and things that he ought to have in his army. Do you know whether that equipment of the Japanese fell into the hands of the Nationalists?

General **Barr**. It all fell into the hands of the Nationalist forces other than that in the Manchurian area.

Chairman **Russell**. So the Communists didn't get all the Japanese equipment.

General **Barr**. Not by any means.

Chairman **Russell**. Do you have any comparison as to how much the Nationalists got and how much the Communists got?

General **Barr**. No, I haven't.

COMPETENCE OF GENERAL FU TSO-YI

Chairman **Russell**. This man General Fu Tso-yi—was he a competent general?

General **Barr**. I think General Fu Tso-yi was certainly one of the most competent generals that the Chinese Nationalists had. He had very fine leadership. He made an honest effort to take care of his troops. He kept himself down on the level of his troops in dress and food. So his qualities of leadership were fine.

As a general in the employment of his troops he was certainly as good as any of the others. I have great respect for him. I think at the last he knew he was going to surrender Peiping, and he did surrender Peiping without a fight.

Chairman RUSSELL. What ever happened to him?

General BARR. He is still in Peiping so far as I know. At first he was treated well by the Communists and now it is reported that he is being treated less well. In other words, he was taken into the Government, I understand, at the time of the surrender.

Chairman RUSSELL. He amalgamated his forces with the Communist forces, such as he had left?

General BARR. I believe so.

POSSIBILITY OF RED CHINESE RETALIATION BOMBING

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, a great many questions have been asked about bombing in Manchuria. I think I started that and you stated that you would not advise bombing Manchurian bases.

Is any part of that based on the possibility that such air as is available to the Red forces in China might attack our forces in retaliation, might bomb our bases?

General BARR. I had not thought of it from that particular angle. No, I do not believe so. I think we could hold our own.

Chairman RUSSELL. [Deleted.]

ADMINISTRATIONAL PROCEDURES IN CHINESE ARMY

Now, you stated that the Chinese division and army commanders in some cases were very careless about the rights of their men to receive their pay and their equipment and food. Was that widespread or just confined to certain armies?

General BARR. No, it was widespread. It was less prevalent in Fu Tso-yi's than anywhere else but he could not observe his people all the way down.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you ever discuss that question with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek?

General BARR. Many times.

Chairman RUSSELL. What was the Generalissimo's position? Did he state the condition did not exist, or he could not correct it?

General BARR. No. He approved every recommendation I made on correcting it but was never able to implement the recommendations. I mean, he had an honest desire to correct it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, if he was the commanding general, I am a little lost. Here is a man who had very wide powers over all China. Why could he not correct it?

General BARR. Because he did not have the intestinal fortitude to slap his old faithfuls down and say to them, "By God, I said to do it—now do it!"

Chairman RUSSELL. What do you mean by "old faithfuls"?

General BARR. People who had been his loyal friends over a period of many, many years and who occupied high positions in his government and in his army.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did he ever in your presence remonstrate with any of these people—or did you have any occasion to be with him?

General BARR. No; I never had any occasion to be with him.

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe you stated that there is no doubt in your mind as to the personal honesty of the Generalissimo.

General BARR. That was my impression of the Generalissimo, that he was honest. As far as my impression—personally, he was never dishonest with me.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were asked several questions by Senator Wiley as to why our Government didn't take action to correct these conditions.

Do you know of any action that we could have taken short of moving in——

General BARR. Certainly we could not have moved in on the Chinese Government, and said "You will do this, and you will do that."

I know of no action we could have taken, other than what we did do.

We did advise them as to what action they should take.

Chairman RUSSELL. It would just require us to send armed forces over there into China, to compel them to do it——

General BARR. I don't think we could have done it, unless we were there with the materials and saying "Feed them this," or "Pay them that."

Chairman RUSSELL. During General Wedemeyer's command in China, we did, as a matter of fact, pay some of the Chinese divisions, did we not, General Barr?

General BARR. We took care of them completely. We gave them complete logistical support; but that was under entirely different conditions altogether.

They were allies, then, engaged in the war.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did not American officers actually supervise the paying of those troops?

General BARR. I am not sure about that.

I could visualize how they were, because they were being paid by American money.

Chairman RUSSELL. But that system had changed by the time you arrived there?

General BARR. The system was never established, so far as the Chinese Army was concerned.

That was a segment of the Chinese Army which was being run by Americans.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were they not some of the troops that were sent to Mukden?

General BARR. Yes, sir; before the division finally arrived in Mukden.

Chairman RUSSELL. But we had ceased our intense supervision before that?

General BARR. We had no obligation to them whatsoever, after the war.

They went right back to the Chinese method.

Chairman RUSSELL. That method of supervision ended with VJ-day, or shortly thereafter?

General BARR. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were any of the marines still in China at the time you were there, General?

General BARR. The detachment at Tsingtao, with the Navy, was there.

Chairman RUSSELL. You had no control over them?

General BARR. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. They were under the commanding naval officer?

General BARR. That is right, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Chairman Connally?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

Gentlemen, I had not observed that it is past 1 o'clock.

I assume that it will be necessary to have an afternoon session; so, if Senator Smith has no objection, we might——

Senator CAIN. Permit me to say, off the record——

(There followed a brief discussion off the record.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Then, gentlemen, if there is no objection, the committee will stand in recess now, until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Thereupon, at 1:08 p. m. the committee stood in recess until 2:30 p. m. that same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Green, McMahon, Sparkman, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Stennis, Knowland, Long, and Cain.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committees will come to order.

When the committees recessed this morning Senator Smith had been called for examination.

QUOTING BADGER'S OPINION ON ADEQUACY OF CHINESE EQUIPMENT

Senator SMITH. General, when my time was called on my first round, as we call it here, of my questioning of you, I was discussing with you your position on this lack of material for General Fu Tso-yi. I think you took the position that even if he had that material, he wouldn't have been able to accomplish what apparently Admiral Badger thought he might have accomplished with that support.

Now I was reading from his statement on that, and I want to elaborate a little further by giving you his explanation of the difference between your position that "Since your arrival no battle had been lost for lack of ammunition or equipment," and his feeling that there was a lack of ammunition and equipment in this particular engagement. He said:

> There is a great difference between a battle which is undertaken, and inability to undertake battles.

And he goes on—this on page 7254 of Admiral Badger's testimony—

> In other words, if you are making strategic plans and looking forward to the possibility of taking the offensive, unless you not only have adequate ammunition but sufficient assurance that you are going to have replenishments for ammunition expended on such an offensive, why you would consider such an offensive operation as not being feasible and it would not be undertaken.

When you consider some of the battles in China, for instance, the battle of Weihsien, and remembering the consistency of the Communist strategy which was always to surround with a superiority of numbers of two, three, and four to one, and you see a defensive force which has been cut off by these surrounding people and they have we will say any number you want, an average of six cartridges per belt, why arithmetically you might say, "Well, six cartridges per belt, if every one hits a Communist, is going to be enough," but it depends on your arithmetic.

I would like to make the point that there is a difference between the arithmetic of saying that no battle was lost due to lack of ammunition—I know that in the battle of Weihsien the defenders lost about 50 percent of their troops, and when the Communists overwhelmed them by their attack on that town, the defenders were not only throwing rocks, bottles, and bricks at them, but they were dropping homemade bombs out of small planes made of bottles with powder in them and ordinary caps. They just ran out of ammunition at Weihsien, and that is all there was to it. It was a tough fight.

And then the admiral continued:

So that I would rather have General Barr, who must have some reason for making that statement—maybe he is correct, but maybe he wasn't fully informed of all the things, and maybe he didn't realize that some of the offensive actions which were planned were found not possible because of lack of sufficient material, one of which is the case that I speak of.

I would also go so far as to say that General Barr in my recollection was certainly endorsing the recommendation of need and advisability of rendering that support to north China at that time, and I am sorry that I haven't got the files of the exchange of dispatches at that time, but I am quite sure that he would agree with me that he favored those recommendations.

Well, I assume that you did; you favored the recommendations for aid at that time to these north China troops.

I interrupt then:

Well, as you say, he will be before us so we can get that cleared up, but I want to try to bring out whether there was a discrepancy between that statement of his which seems to be a pretty broad statement that no battle was lost for lack of ammunition, and your story here of a case where apparently there was a fold-down, and it may have meant the collapse of that north China movement. That is what disturbs me.

Maybe he was thinking in terms of some particular battle where there was no lack of ammunition, and you were thinking in terms of a broad strategy for a campaign where there wasn't adequate backing to justify the campaign.

Then Admiral Badger said this:

And the difference between a battle which is undertaken defensively and the absence of a battle which might develop as a result of adequacy of equipment, manpower, and all it takes to take the offense.

Then I say:

Well, I gather that is the difference between those two statements probably.

and Admiral Badger said:

The statement was made in one of the official dispatches that it had better than a 50–50 chance of success.

Then I said:

And if that campaign had been successful, north China might have been saved, is that the point?

Admiral Badger. Yes, sir; but there were other angles involved in that planning.

That recommendation went forward, as I said, from the Ambassador and from myself, and I am sure Barr, if he wasn't party to it, he was certainly pretty close to it and knew about it, and Roger Lapham.

Now, that involved a plan. The plan involved exchange of Chinese currency.

COMPARISON OF OPINION BETWEEN GENERAL BARR AND ADMIRAL BADGER

And so, it went on into the currency question.

I am only reading that because I wanted to get clear in my own mind how there could have been such a fundamental difference of opinion between you and Admiral Badger, on the effect it might have had on that situation if Gen. Fu Tso-yi had had the support that 6 months before they had agreed he should have. The application of $16 million was the figure, I think, which would have given him the supplies he needed for defense there.

General BARR. I see what Admiral Badger is getting at, there; and if Fu Tso-yi had had sufficient equipment to organize a great number of other divisions, or armies, perhaps the situation would have been different.

At the time that this equipment arrived over there, there were available, coming down from Manchuria, from the reports of the Chinese themselves, 567,000 additional Communists who had never confronted Fu Tso-yi before.

General Fu Tso-yi had been able to only hold his own in north China, against the forces that confronted him.

Now, I thoroughly agree with him that the question of losing battles, that might have been different had he had a much greater force to participate in the battle—might be attributed to equipment that they would have liked to have had, but didn't have.

TIME LAG BETWEEN NEED AND DELIVERIES OF EQUIPMENT

Senator SMITH. What disturbs me is that apparently the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Ambassador, and all those that were in on the investigation of the situation up there, agreed that we should have thus and so equipment, and it was designated; apparently it was figured it would cost about $16 million; the report was sent in, and yet 6 months elapsed, passed before anything began to move; and we had that amount that moved from Tokyo apparently and we used the figure of 10 percent, whatever the percentage was. It came out of stock in Tokyo, and didn't come from our supplies over here.

GENERAL BARR. Senator Smith, I am not familiar with the $16 million part. I don't know from where that figure originated.

In other words, is that what Admiral Badger recommended, the $16 million worth of the hundred twenty-five million be sent over?

Senator SMITH. I will see if I can find that. I understand that Admiral Badger and Spruance and Mr. Lapham, of ECA, and Leighton Stuart, the Ambassador, had studied the situation and recommended that that amount be applied to this particular cause.

That was the recommendation made, if my figures are right, back in July, I think, of 1948, and it wasn't until late November that anything appeared at all and then it was that limited amount. I think they said 10 percent.

That was the equipment that was defective. We took it out of the supply in Tokyo, and, as you said, it went from the supplies there, and it was known that some of it was defective.

General BARR. No, sir; the supplies that were shipped from Tokyo were not in connection with the list, the complete list that Admiral

Badger furnished, but it was so much of that equipment that was available; and it only arrived in China approximately 15 days ahead of relief coming from the United States.

If I remember correctly, it arrived about November 30. Ships from the United States began to arrive about December 1. Is that right?

Colonel GILCHRIST. Yes; mid-November from Tokyo.

Senator SMITH. The report, as I understood it, was made in July 1948, and the recommendation from Admiral Badger and the Ambassador and Mr. Lapham was made and 6 months elapsed before anything appeared at all.

That is what troubled me in studying this thing. There is such a lag between the time of need and any deliveries on our part.

General BARR. Perhaps I am not thoroughly familiar with the recommendation that Admiral Badger made. Was this on a trip that he made to north China with Ambassador Stuart and Mr. Lapham? I was not on that trip, and I didn't know too much about it.

INVESTIGATING CHIANG'S USE OF MILITARY APPROPRIATION

Senator SMITH. I will see if I can find back further in the testimony here where Senator Connally was interrogating him. On page 7210 of the testimony appears the following:

> Chairman CONNALLY. Well, the Congress has already, before your appearance, appropriated $125 million for the use of Chiang Kai-shek as he saw fit. We have still got some of that money, haven't spent it all, presuming that he would purchase military supplies in this country with that amount.
>
> Just how was that amount used? Do you think we could have saved China if we had given them more aid?
>
> Admiral BADGER. That is a pretty broad question.
>
> Chairman CONNALLY. It is—very broad.
>
> Admiral BADGER. But I think we lost our great gamble, a great gamble, with an element of possible success in the specific implementation of that act. We had gone through that area of north China and we had had several things that were very favorable occurring and evident in that part of China.
>
> In the first place, the armies were led at that time by a general named Fu Tso-yi. He was a man who we knew, by close acquaintance and by inspecting his armies, was a very popular and effective leader.
>
> He had, under handicaps, stopped the Communists for a considerable period of time at the Great Wall, and at the time of our inspection he had 11 armies, of which 4 were pretty well equipped, 3 were indifferently equipped—and by indifferently equipped I mean poorly equipped, because you would take a look at their stacks of arms and you would find 8 rifles in a stack, and there might be 3 or 4 different kinds of rifles in the stack.

Senator Wiley then asked:

> What year was that?
>
> Admiral BADGER. That was in late 1948. I would like—I have to go a little slow on this story because I think it is an important one, and I have to do a little thinking.
>
> The Ambassador to China, Leighton Stuart, Roger Lapham, who was at the time head of the ECA, and myself, with a group of Americans, went up to north China and made contact with Li Sun-jen, who was then the governor general of north China, but was not at that time even thought of as the vice president, which he was later elected to.
>
> We talked to Fu Tso-yi, inspected Fu Tso-yi's armies; we visited the villages, we pretty well covered that part of north China; and as a result of that visit we sent a joint recommendation to Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommending that specific support be given to Fu Tso-yi.
>
> It was quantitative and it involved this—

and then he goes on to what it was, and he comes down to the specific recommendation which included the $16 million of equipment.

I have not given you all the last part of that testimony, but that is the gist of it. It was in regard to that default in equipment when he used the expression he thought it was the straw that broke the camel's back in the resistance there in north China.

General BARR. Well, I would like to point out that north China is only one part of China, and of course to the north of it you had the Manchurian force, which was tremendous, something between 500,000 and 700,000 men. He had complete failure in Manchuria and he had complete failure in east central China, and he would not have had a chance in the world of surviving—and if all the equipment had been given to Fu Tso-yi that Admiral Badger apparently wanted to give to him, he would have eventually fallen anyway, perhaps sooner than he did.

Senator SMITH. Well, what surprises me is that if this inspection was made and this recommendation went through and, as he says here, was all approved immediately by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, why were you not aware of that? Why were you not a part of it, if you were in charge of the military advisory group in China?

General BARR. I should have been part of it. It was my sole responsibility.

Senator SMITH. Well, can you not clarify that for us in some way? Is this news to you, as I have given it to you?

General BARR. No. I knew of that trip and I knew of the recommendations. I do not agree that the generalissimo concurred in those recommendations and I hesitate to say that because there have been so many recommendations; perhaps this is one recommendation and he is thinking of another.

Senator SMITH. I do not think he mentioned the generalissimo; he was investigating Fu Tso-yi.

General BARR. Well, he visited Gen. Fu Tso-yi many times.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired.

Senator SMITH. I am sorry I cannot finish. I was trying to see if I could not clarify that story because it was a very good presentation of what Admiral Badger thought was the situation.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

COLONEL FAITH'S BATTALION

Senator CAIN. General Barr, I am always mindful that the Korean battle area is thousands of miles away, but it seems to me in the conduct of that war we are violating much of the military doctrine which in years gone by I have done my best to understand and appreciate, and I know you will let me ask you several more questions on this point.

First, sir, I think you said this morning that Lt. Col. Don Faith's battalion was attached to your Seventh Division.

General BARR. It was part of my Seventh Division; was attached to the Thirty-first RCT; it belonged to the Thirty-second RCT.

Senator CAIN. Would you take just a couple of precious minutes to tell us what the nature of the trouble was in which Colonel Faith lost his life? Was his battalion cut off and surrounded by the enemy?

General BARR. His battalion, not only his battalion, but the entire force consisting of part of the regimental headquarters of the Thirty-first Infantry, one battalion of the Thirty-first Infantry, the Fifty-seventh Field Artillery, and Colonel Faith's battalion, which was the First Battalion of the Thirty-second Infantry, were completely cut off.

They were attempting to fight their way out; my other commanders having been killed, Colonel Faith had succeeded to the command of the entire force, and when he was killed, just about dusk, I understand, the force began to lose control, and that night most of the escapees found their way out over the ice. His force was completely surrounded, and had been surrounded for 3 days.

Senator CAIN. Did you happen to know Colonel Faith personally?

General BARR. I knew him intimately. He is a top man. If I was offered battalion commanders now, and Faith was available, I would say I would want Faith.

Senator CAIN. In very recent weeks I have seen strong men cry in this country when they first heard that Don Faith was missing in action and later that he had been killed.

It happens that I served with Don Faith for fifty-odd days in what is commonly referred to as the Battle of the Bulge, when operating in General Ridgway's command when he had an Airborne Corps.

I make mention of that not in any personal way——

General BARR. Yes.

Senator CAIN (continuing). But because the Germans, at least this was my impression, did more to upset the allied forces and get us off balance by dropping what actually was only a handful of parachutists throughout that forest area.

This morning we were discussing the possibilty of deploying some of the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa as guerrillas and in commando raids in China.

I shall never forget, because of the instance I referred to, how effective such deployment was against us by our enemies, and I address these observations and a question or two to you in your capacity, which I tremendously respect as that of a division commander.

URGING NATIONALISTS TO FIGHT OFFENSIVELY

This morning you said on page 7892,

> Initially the Communists were content to fight a type of guerrilla warfare limiting their activities to raids on lines of communication and supply installations. The success of their operations, which were purely offensive, distilled in them the offensive attitude so necessary to success in war.

My first question, General Barr, if the Chinese Communists became strong offensive fighters because of the success they achieved in guerrilla activities against the Nationalist Chinese, why shouldn't the same result be expected among the Chinese Nationalists if we encouraged or permitted them to engage in guerrilla activities on the mainland of China against our common foe?

General BARR. So far as the training of the individual is concerned, they would seldom become offensive fighters. My answer to your question is they would become more. I often urged the generalissimo to launch limited attacks, anything to make his troops attack, but for various reasons I was never successful in getting it done.

Senator CAIN. And yet I am reminded that you were giving that advice from the highest planning military level in China. None of your agents were out stimulating that understanding and even desire for combat in the combat company and battalion units on the front, that is correct, is it not, sir?

General BARR. On the front. In the training areas my people were with them, but not in the actual battle ever.

MORALE OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN KOREA

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir. General Barr, you said this morning that in the early part of this year you noticed an accelerated espirit de corps and morale among our American forces in Korea, but you did not define that very broadly. I have a conclusion that I ask your advice about.

Would it not naturally follow that in the first of this year most of our units had previously been exposed to combat and had learned to understand it, and as men grow to know more adequately how to protect themselves, they have a greater confidence in themselves as individuals and in the units of which they are a part?

We are building a fighting army in Korea, is that not so, sir?

General BARR. Yes, sir, that is true.

Senator CAIN. We did not necessarily and to some extent we know that we did not take a trained combat army into Korea. Many had to learn their trade after they got there.

General BARR. It certainly was not trained to the extent that it is trained now, and soldiers trained in peace are certainly not the equivalent of those actually trained in battle.

Senator CAIN. They just can't be.

General BARR. There is no way to do it.

VALUE OF TRAINING BEFORE BATTLE

Senator CAIN. As a division commander, General Barr, is it not your opinion that a man can actually only learn how to fight for his life by fighting?

General Barr. Oh no, not altogether. There is certain fundamental and elementary training that he must know. In other words, If he will exactly apply the training that he has got, that has been given in the training centers, and if he will combine with that a certain amount of animal cunning, he will survive on the battlefield, the chances are.

Of course, that isn't altogether true, but his chances of survival are great, but the training that he gets before he goes into battle is very important. That is postgraduate work he does in battle that makes him a real professional.

Senator Cain. Well, I understand how very important that training is, but it is a combination of that training plus combat.

General Barr. That is true.

Senator Cain. That makes him the eminently qualified soldier, is that not a fair statement to make, sir?

General Barr. I agree with you.

FEASIBILITY OF NATIONALIST GUERRILLA FIGHTING ON MAINLAND

Senator Cain. What I am actually getting at then is, as a result of these questions, when is the time going to come when we are going to permit these Chinese Nationalists on Formosa to make themselves competitively the equals of our common enemy?

The fact that we are not employing those Chinese Nationalists on Formosa in limited ways, so to speak, General Barr, continues to disturb me everyday. I just can't understand it. Don't you think that they have something to offer, and the sooner they get at their business of destroying our common enemy, the better our chances for complete success in Korea are going to be?

General Barr. Yes, but I think that they have a task up to their combat capacity on Formosa, to defend Formosa.

Senator Cain. Permit me to labor this just one or two steps further and then I will back away because you are trying to give me all the help you can.

There are some six hundred thousand-odd Chinese Nationalists on Formosa. Having in mind again the example of what the Germans did to American and British forces in the Battle of the Bulge through parachutes, wouldn't it be tactically feasible, because there is no considerable supply problem at all or logistics problem in its entirety, to take a battalion of selected Chinese Nationalists and employ them as guerrillas on the mainland of China, for it would be my opinion that a thousand carefully selected Chinese Nationalists could just upset the equilibrium of all of that southern end of China, because the word of their presence would be there, no household would be safe from one day to the next for fear that one of these guerrillas was going to come and put them out of commission?

General Barr. That is provided they performed up to your expectations.

Senator Cain. Yes, sir, but your testimony has been very sturdy by way of compliment of the Chinese Communists used as guerrillas, and maybe I haven't enough understanding.

General Barr. My only objection to the Chinese Nationalists going back on the mainland at this time is that if they go from Formosa and as we are presently protecting Formosa from the Chinese Communists, we put ourselves into a very embarrassing position.

Senator CAIN. Now we have it, sir. You are giving me—and I do not resist it—a political answer, that is you are considering the political facets of this problem, but you are not directing your attention to the question as a pure matter of military necessity.

General BARR. Well, if we were not protecting Formosa and if I were on Formosa as adviser to the generalissimo in his operations against the mainland, I would advise him to conduct guerrilla warfare, but certainly not under present conditions of our Government.

Senator CAIN. We are having an awful time trying to distinguish between the political and military factors involved in this war, and I do appreciate your assistance.

ADVOCATION OF HOT PURSUIT

In early or mid January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended what is referred to as hot pursuit, the authority for allied aircraft to chase back across the Yalu River any enemy aircraft in an effort to destroy them. What is your view about the desirability of pursuing such a course, General Barr?

General BARR. In other words, if they are in pursuit of the plane, and it crossed the border, should they be permitted to continue to pursue that individual plane—or continue over to bomb bases?

Senator CAIN. Continue to pursue an individual plane, in an effort to knock it out of the air.

General BARR. My personal reaction is that they should be permitted to pursue the individual plane.

Senator CAIN. That is purely a military answer, isn't it?

General BARR. Not to go on bombing missions—I want to make a good distinction between the two.

Senator CAIN. But as a military man you think it would be completely desirable to have the authority to chase attacking aircraft across the river, from whence they came, in an effort to knock them out of the air, and destroy them?

General BARR. I think, considering the probability of repercussions and advantages to be obtained, I would let them do it.

Senator CAIN. I have several other brief questions, if I may, please, sir.

EQUIPMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN KOREA

Is it not true that our forces in Korea are much better equipped today, for logical and obvious reasons, than they were when the first forces were committed last June, a year ago?

May I particularize?

General BARR. I can't answer that question completely, because I think that they are—I think that equipment that has been lost, has all been replaced now.

Senator CAIN. You mentioned earlier in your testimony that some of our tanks were being knocked out by American bazookas which the enemy had captured.

General BARR. Those same bazookas will knock out tanks today, if the enemy has them.

Senator CAIN. But the bazookas which the enemy had, and with which our troops are now provided, fortunately, were not available in the early days over there?

General BARR. They were not available in the early days, but but they were through the time I was in Korea.

Senator CAIN. If you will satisfy my miiltary curiosity on this question?

COMMUNIST EQUIPMENT EMPLOYED NEAR YALU

How much armor, artillery, and mortars were being used against your forces in the time of your greatest combat trouble, up near the Yalu River?

General BARR. At the fight at Suwon, and with the exception of one other tank, I didn't see any tanks employed against my troops at any time. There were none employed against my troops.

I had a very limited amount of artillery employed against them, and a great number of mortars.

The North Koreans and the Chinese employ their mortars very well. They are unorthodox in their way of doing it. They oftentime set them up on the forward slope of a hill, and the observer will be standing right beside the mortar, but they have been very effective.

Senator CAIN. But they were very effective and proficient——

General BARR. That is right.

Senator CAIN. Mortarmen, you would say?

General BARR. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain, your time has expired.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, General Barr.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper?

MILITARY STRATEGY OF WINNING BATTLES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Barr, getting back to the Korean question and the tactics and strategy of this operation, I would like to, if possible, make it completely clear that I would like for you as a military man, on your professional responsibility as such, divorce yourself from all political considerations of global activities and confine your thinking in answer to this question to the strict military situation in Korea, considering the fact that we are in a war in Korea against an enemy that is fighting us. I ask you as a military man, divorcing political considerations completely, whether or not it is accepted and approved military principle that you hit the enemy where it hurts as far back as you can to keep him from supplying and regrouping, in order to win the battle engaged in, if you have the force and power to do it?

General BARR. If the battlefield wasn't limited, I would certainly hit him just as far back as I could.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Pardon me, sir. When you say "if the battlefield were not limited," I submit that is letting the political consideration edge into the purely military situation.

General BARR. My answer can only be "Yes" to your question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, sir.

General BARR. And when quoted, I hope the question will be quoted with it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. I am trying to get at the business of winning battles and getting the ultimate victory that battle should normally win. We can go to the political end in a minute.

Now, let me go further. The Red Chinese are fighting the American forces and the United Nations forces in Korea now. That is, of course, correct, is it not—the Red Chinese?

General BARR. The Chinese forces; yes, sir.

ATTEMPTING TO ISOLATE MILITARY AND POLITICAL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. Now, then, from a strictly military standpoint, and leaving out the politics of the situation, wouldn't you say that acceptable and probably dictated military policy to win the ultimate victory in a war there, would require that we would blockade the coast of Red China to keep them from getting supplies and equipment to enable them to continue attacking and killing our people? I ask this from a strictly military standpoint.

General BARR. It is difficult for me to confine myself to that manner of thinking, Senator Hickenlooper. I have never been taught to think that way—where I would just isolate the military angle from all other angles.

I can't answer your question. I have definitely stated that I am not in favor of a complete blockade of the Chinese coast.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why?

General BARR. Because at the present time I do not feel that sufficient assistance is coming in through that source to seriously affect our operations in Korea. There are certain sanctions, as you might call them, set up at the present time which are working to an extent, if not altogether. And, of course, in anything I say you will feel it comes back to the political, and it does in a way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, General, may I make myself perfectly clear?

General BARR. I think you have, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have the feeling all through this testimony—and it is almost as if it were written on a blackboard A, B, C, this will be the answer—that the military excuses or reasons, and I don't mean excuse in any disparaging way, but that the military reasons have in every instance been colored by the political controls.

I feel that the military has not separated itself and confined itself to the professional military programs, which good military tactics would indicate, to win a war.

Now, I am not saying that in criticism, because I am aware that the military operations under our system must be controlled by overriding political considerations, but that is a different field.

I think it is the job of the military—the job of the military—to outline what is the proper and accepted military operation. Then if political considerations override that and say you can go this far and no farther, that is a political thing; but I honestly have to say that I feel that the military has been putting itself into an untenable position where it attempts to excuse the failure to do the things that a pure military operation would dictate by letting themselves be influenced by the political controls which are separate under our system.

Again I say I don't say that the political controls should not be controlling, because I think in our Government they must be controlling; but I am trying to get at the point that our operation in Korea is a limited operation, not because of the military attitude, but because of the political inhibitions that are placed upon that operation.

Now, maybe I have made myself clear, and maybe I haven't, but we get the answer from the military all the time that it might start a third world war. I submit that that from a purely military standpoint is not the military's consideration. It is the politician's consideration, based upon information globally, and so on.

General BARR. And you feel that the military man should make a recommendation although he knows that this recommendation will appear entirely illogical from every viewpoint except the military viewpoint and will of course be disapproved?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Not necessarily, not necessarily. I will also admit that if the military is given a mission, then the military is obligated to give the military solution of that mission within its limitations. That is very true. But the limitations are political.

ENDING KOREAN WAR

Now, I would like to ask you this, General. How are we going to end this war in Korea? What is the solution there?

General BARR. I have discussed that many times. I don't know what the solution is. I think the time will arrive when we can drive the Chinese out of Korea. I do not know how we are ever going to keep the Chinese out of Korea, because it certainly doesn't seem logical to occupy the Korean border to keep them out. How it is going to end I do not know, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, now, from a purely military standpoint, do you not agree, General Barr, that it would contribute to the discouragement of the North Chinese, of the Red Chinese, to renew their attacks at some future date if they retired back of the Yalu if we used our strategic bombers to destroy potentials such as their armories, or their arsenals and their storage centers and so on that we can reach with our strategic air operations? Would that not be discouraging to them, more so than just letting them retire to a sanctuary and have their supplies untouched and rest up and come back to the fray another day?

General BARR. I can only say that would reduce their capability for making war, at least momentarily.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Exactly. And has not that very philosophy been followed in general in every war we have been in? Have we not attempted as far as we could to destroy the enemy's potential to make war as rapidly as we can reach and destroy those potentials? I mean, have we not followed that policy? Did we not follow it in World War II and did we not try to follow it in World War I and so on?

General BARR. Yes, under different conditions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, the conditions may have been different, but we followed that philosophy in order to bring victory.

General BARR. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, I am not blaming the military. I will make that perfectly clear; I am not blaming the military for not doing some things that I think perhaps ought to be done. But I am trying to fix the responsibility for this indecisive situation in Korea, and it appears to me at the moment that it is a political responsibility and not a military responsibility. I want to make that clear.

But I do feel that our military has given its excuse for the situation based upon considerations that are strictly outside of the military and that it is a political responsibility which is contributing to the indecision in Korea.

I might say that I have asked every witness that has been on this stand, what is our program for victory in Korea, how to stop the killing, how to stop this slaughtering and sacrificing of men, of material, and of treasure.

General BARR. As far as throwing light on what is the program, I am not a capable and competent witness because I know nothing about it. In my capacity as a commander I knew nothing about the higher-level opinion and of course at the present time I am not connected with it in any way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I hope you see what I am trying to get at.

General BARR. I think I do; yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And certainly, if you tell a company commander or a regimental or divisional commander or any other commander that his objective is, say, to "go so far down this road here over the hill, you take that objective," then as a commander that is your business. You do not go any farther, and you do not blame the military man and say he should have gone on farther. That is a decision beyond him.

Did you indicate my time was up, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. No, sir; you have 2 minutes yet.

ALTERNATIVE KOREAN POLICIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, General, would you give me your opinion on these alternatives, so far as the mainland of China is concerned; let us say three alternatives: One is that it would be desirable to have a united Nationalist Chinese Government and organization in China to resist the Reds; that is, get them all together on one united movement.

Another is guerrilla action by even dissociated bands in China to resist the Reds; and a third is to do nothing, that is, not contribute help or support to the resisters of the National Chinese Government against the Reds.

Consider the unification of the Nationalist Chinese on the mainland into one great formidable body, either governmental or military, if that is not feasible or possible at the moment, then wouldn't you say the next most desirable program would be to encourage guerilla or sporadic activity of some strength in South China which would toss the Reds off balance a little and reduce the pressure in other places? Wouldn't that be desirable from a military standpoint if we are going to win this thing?

General BARR. Not under present conditions; no, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then that would leave us nothing but the policy of just staying away?

General BARR. Of holding Formosa.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Sir?

General BARR. Of holding Formosa as we are now doing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There are some five or six hundred thousand potential troops on Formosa. I think it is generally agreed that is the number at the moment, and probably the number of armed troops or equipped troops on Formosa is far less than that; but when we say that the Chinese troops on Formosa are ineffective and we cannot use them for that purpose, isn't it a whole lot like saying, "Don't go near the water until you learn to swim"? Can those troops ever be effective until they can get the arms and the equipment to make themselves effective?

General BARR. But in our support to Formosa, what is our mission? Are we attempting to equip and train those forces to fight as part of the United Nations in Korea or are we attempting to train them to fight for the Nationalists?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I think we can get isolated ideas, but my attitude is that we are in this business, No. 1, to put down aggression, and No. 2, to resist communism wherever we find it. I am not too particular about the methods that we use so long as resistance to communism and to aggression is successful; and I am afraid we may have gone on the idealistic hoped-for solution rather than the practical guerrilla actions and other things which might have a surprising effect, if rumor is true at the present time of the trouble in China.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you desire to comment on this at the present time?

General BARR. No.

ADMIRAL BADGER'S LETTER TO JOINT COMMITTEE

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, before I proceed to the next Senator, I have a letter here from Admiral Badger in which he asks me to extend to the members of the committees his thanks, and the only way I know to do it is to read the letter.

COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER,
New York, June 21, 1951.

DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL: I must confess when I first received word that I was to appear before the joint hearings of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees I did so with mixed emotions. I have assiduously endeavored since my return from China to remain out of the limelight, as I felt that I could be of greater service to my country if I did not become a controversial figure.

I left your committee room on Tuesday with the feeling that my status had not changed as I feared it might, due almost entirely to the courteous and most considerate treatment I received from you and your colleagues on both committees. I was deeply impressed with the very evident earnestness to acquire detailed information which the questioning reflected. I am convinced that the work of your committee will result in a far better understanding by our people of the problems which face us in the Far East and a more concerted and constructive effort to solve them.

Please extend to all the members of the committee my thanks for their graciousness. I trust that my appearance before you may have been helpful in some way to you all.

I am getting together the material on propaganda which you requested and will submit it to the committee in a few days.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

OSCAR C. BADGER,
Vice Admiral, United States Navy.

CORRECTIONS REGARDING WALLACE'S WIRE TO COMMITTEE

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, since you have read a letter, I have one which came from Mr. Henry Wallace, former Vice President of the United States, which I think should be read—at least the opening and closing paragraphs—in the record, addressed to me.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. It is dated June 9. He says:

> I wish to thank you most heartily for introducing so promptly and fairly into the hearings my wire to you of June 5, 1951. In the New York Times of June 8 appears a copy of the transcript of hearings including my wire. Apparently, Western Union made some mistakes in transmittal and I am therefore sending you herewith the correct copy and expressing the wish that the Clerk of the Committee may use the correct wire instead of the somewhat mangled version in which there were some obvious mistakes—

and then he encloses in the typewritten letter the wire which he says was given to the Western Union, and he closes by saying:

> Again thanking you most warmly for the courtesy, I am sincerely yours,
>
> H. A. WALLACE.

I want to say for the benefit of the record that I turned over to the committee for inclusion the original wire from the Western Union, so if there were any mistakes in it, it was in transmittal and not in my copy, and from my office, and I ask that the wire, as he says it was sent, be included in the appendix in the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The document referred to will be found in the appendix of this record.)

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, if we get a letter from President Truman, the record will be complete. [Laughter.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon?

BARR'S TESTIMONY IN 1949

Senator McMAHON. General, I had an opportunity to hear you testify on your experiences in China and what happened, in the spring of 1949.

General BARR. That is correct, Senator.

Senator McMAHON. And my recollection is that you appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee for the best part of a half day?

General BARR. That is right.

Senator McMAHON. That was the occasion when the Foreign Relations Committee was considering a bill that would appropriate some five-hundred-million-odd dollars for further aid for the Nationalist Government. Do you remember that?

General Barr. Yes, sir.

Senator McMahon. And the Foreign Relations Committee at that time heard you and Admiral Badger, and the men in the State Department who were in the Far Eastern Division. Were you there, General, for all of the testimony or only while you testified yourself?

General Barr. No; I was not. I was only there during the time that I personally testified.

Senator McMahon. And your testimony at that time was part of a very complete review that we had of the situation in China as it existed then, and of the causes which had brought the condition about.

You will recollect that some money was appropriated as a result of those hearings for further aid to China, was it not?

General Barr. I don't remember whether it was or not.

Senator McMahon. Yes; we did. We appropriated some further aid. I take it, General, that your testimony to this joint committee is pretty much a repetition of the testimony that you gave before the Foreign Relations Committee?

General Barr. It would naturally be so. As far as I know it was my considered thought at that time and I have not changed my ideas since.

Senator McMahon. I see. Well, I merely recall that for the record because there has been the effort made in some quarters to create the impression that the Congress of the United States at no time was ever told about what was happening in the east, and I thought it was well that at least in the presence or rather in the person of yourself there was living evidence that on one occasion as part of a long series of witnesses you made your contribution by giving your estimate and recollection and advice as best you could, and I am glad that this record contains it.

I have no further questions.

Chairman Russell. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Sparkman.

THINKING OF A TRAINED MILITARY MAN

Senator Sparkman. General Barr, I want to follow up just one matter. I think we can do it very briefly. First let me ask you this. You may have already stated, but if so I did not get it. How long have you been in the military service?

General Barr. How long have I been in the military service?

Senator Sparkman. Yes.

General Barr. Since 1917. I came in in World War I.

Senator Sparkman. That is 34 years.

General Barr. Yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. And I did hear you detail your various assignments during the last 10 years in answer to a question from Senator Cain.

General Barr. That is correct, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Hickenlooper has asked you several questions with reference to operations particularly in Korea, but I want to ask you as a military man and one who has had considerable experience in the military, is it possible to separate, to draw a clear line of differentiation between the military and the political or diplomatic either in case of war or in making our military commitments?

General BARR. In the thinking of a trained military man I don't think that he is able to draw that clear line of demarcation between the two.

Senator SPARKMAN. And in this modern world where isolationism is practically a thing of the past and interdependence of various nations is recognized, and under the United Nations set-up, doesn't it become even more difficult to differentiate?

General BARR. Oh, yes; I certainly think so.

Senator SPARKMAN. Military commitments follow diplomatic decisions, do they not?

General BARR. They do.

PURE MILITARY DECISIONS

Senator SPARKMAN. And it is your feeling that even in the limited war in Korea provided we want to call it that, I call it a war regardless of whatever anybody else may call it, and it is limited certainly; I think everybody has testified that it is limited. Whether you call it military or political decisions, the purpose behind it is to limit it insofar as possible to that area and to the present foes that we are fighting; is that correct?

General BARR. That is correct. We certainly don't want to bring on a world conflagration or even one greater than this.

Senator SPARKMAN. Many times the military may not do a thing that perhaps if there were no other factors to be taken into consideration it might do because of these other factors entering into the picture; isn't that true?

General BARR. If the military man only considered the military factors and went ahead and acted upon them, he probably wouldn't remain a military man very long.

Senator SPARKMAN. I know there are hundreds of incidents, but there is just one that I happened to think of. During the Second World War when the Germans were occupying Paris, we never bombed the main part of that city, did we?

General BARR. No.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now purely from a military standpoint it might have been advantageous to blast them out, mightn't it, but we did not do it. We saved the city and even declared it an open city after the Germans moved out, didn't we?

General BARR. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. Or the French did, or whoever was responsible for it?

General BARR. The action taken was the equivalent of an open city.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is what?

General BARR. The action taken was the equivalent of declaring it an open city.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Now, would you say that that was a military decision that may have been very largely effected by political considerations?

General Barr. Not to bomb the city of Paris?

Senator Sparkman. Yes.

General Barr. Well, I don't feel that any military man over there in control ever considered bombing the city of Paris; and Paris, as a military target, was not essential military target.

Under the same conditions, I recommended to the Generalissimo that he not bomb Peiping after it was captured——

Senator Sparkman. Yes.

General Barr. I did everything I could to get him to stop bombing Mukden after its capture, because all he was doing was killing his own people.

Senator Sparkman. We were very careful not to bomb the Holy City, in Italy.

General Barr. Yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. And, I suppose we could find literally hundreds of incidents that perhaps might have been different, had a purely military decision been followed, but where political factors were taken into consideration.

I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. The questioning recurs to the Chair.

I pass.

Chairman Connally?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Wiley?

HONEST DIFFERENCES OF OPINION

Senator Wiley. I was interested, General, in this discussion as to the necessity of our leaders, both political and military, in recognizing the significance of both the political and the military facets in any world conflict, or in any local conflict.

Of course, you will realize that when men take both of those into consideration, they still can honestly differ as to results, don't you?

Thus, you realize that MacArthur took into consideration, naturally, the political and the military, and he drew the conclusion that he didn't think it would necessarily involve us in a third world war, and the reason you feel that he should not have bombed north of the Yalu was that, in your judgment, as others have stated here, that it might involve us in a third world war; isn't that right?

General Barr. There is a possibility it might be.

Senator Wiley. Yes.

General Barr. And I am not an authority on it. You perhaps know much more about the background than I do.

Senator Wiley. That is what I mean; honest men can differ, particularly when they are thinking about the imponderables of the future.

Now what do you conceive are our objectives in Korea, briefly? What really are our objectives there?

General BARR. I am afraid I will have to answer that I don't know what our prescribed objectives in Korea today are.

DEALING WITH COMMUNISM IN THE FAR EAST

Senator WILEY. How do you believe we should deal with communism in the Far East, now that you have spent a year, 1948–49, in China, and now that you have been in Korea, and have realized the over-all impact of what it means if we eventually lose all of China to the Communists? How should we deal with communism in the Far East?

General BARR. I think we should do everything within our power to confine communism to the Chinese borders at the present time in the hopes that some day some portion of China at least might be regained. At the present time I see little that we can do in China proper.

Senator WILEY. Well, now, this brings us again to the political and military question. Don't you think it would be advisable from the standpoint of relieving pressure on Korea if we just lifted the dual blockade, that we have got now between Formosa and the mainland?

We are blockading the Reds from——

General BARR. If we withdrew the Seventh Fleet and said we no longer have any claims on Formosa?

Senator WILEY. No.

General BARR. What do you mean by dual blockade, sir? I don't understand that.

Senator WILEY. By that I mean we simply said to the Reds, "You can't come to Formosa," and said to Chiang, "You can't go to the mainland." Now if we just withdraw that "Thou shalt not," don't you think that would be of valuable effect as far as relieving the pressure on Korea? Announce to the world——

General BARR. From a political viewpoint, I would certainly say we could not do that as long as we are protecting Formosa and furnishing a sanctuary for the Nationalist troops in Formosa.

Senator WILEY. Well, maybe that is the answer.

General BARR. That is a political answer.

Senator WILEY. My question in effect follows the first one: What is to be our policy in relation to communism in the Far East? And then I asked whether or not you don't think it would be advisable for us to immediately take the initiative and simply say, "Our fleet will remain but we will no longer contain Chiang on Formosa."

General BARR. Well, we are indirectly participating in the war with the Nationalists versus the Chinese Communists.

Senator WILEY. Aren't we directly in the war now with the Communists of China? I don't know any more direct method when they have given us 175,000 casualties.

Well, if you don't care to answer it, we will proceed.

General BARR. It is not a lack of desire to answer; I don't know the answer.

Senator WILEY. I think that you might just disassociate yourself from the impact of both of these elements and realize the United States of America is faced with a terrific challenge by the Communists all over the world, and it is our business to hit them wherever we can effectively. And following Senator Cain's suggestions this morning, and we have suggested them before, it seems to me that that would be a wise move: no longer to say that we are going to contain Chiang if he wants to go to the mainland.

General BARR. I don't feel that the Generalissimo could send a force against the mainland at the present time unless it was completely supported and transported by other countries and other nations.

EMPLOYMENT OF NATIONALIST TROOPS ON MAINLAND

Senator WILEY. I understand that was your answer. But we have testimony of General MacArthur, and now we have the undisputed testimony of Ridgway that utilization of Chinese forces, or taking the ban off, would be a good thing.

So there we see a difference in a military judgment again.

But if there are, as we understand, a million and a half forces in China that are actually operating against the Communists, and if the people themselves are getting so sick and tired of the lack of fulfillment of the Communist promises, they are in a mood themselves to do something if they can just feel the impact of Chiang's forces, and the folks in the inland, the insurrectionists, can get a little help.

It seems to me that that is the policy that should be put into effect. I think we are moving in that direction, and I would like to get your judgment on that.

General BARR. If they have a million and a half Chinese in southern China who are willing to fight for the Nationalist cause, it seems to be a question of when we can withdraw protection from Formosa and let the Nationalists take care of themselves.

Senator WILEY. Of course——

General BARR. A million and a half guerrillas in South China is a considerable force.

[Deleted]

Senator WILEY. Let's put the question a little bluntly.

General BARR. At the present time, Senator, I know of nothing that we can hang any kind of an operation in China on. I am not well informed on the subject at the present time.

Senator WILEY. Well, you don't know anything to the contrary then, either?

General BARR. No.

Senator WILEY. Then the question is: Don't you think that commando raids, as suggested by Senator Cain and the rest of us, would in itself have a very wholesome, disintegrating effect upon the Communists in China?

General BARR. If the conditions exist where there are a million and a half people who are anxious to see the Nationalists come back in, it would certainly be heartening to them to see commando raids come in.

UNREST IN CHINA

Senator WILEY. Can you tell me from your year's experience whether the 400 million common people in China, are communistically inclined? Did they favor the Communists at that time? Did the common fellow that is only about one meal away from starvation favor the Communists?

General BARR. Generally speaking, he wanted a change.

Senator WILEY. At that time that is what you thought?

General BARR. He was a Communist because they wanted the change.

Senator WILEY. Now they have the change, and all the evidence is they are sick of the change. If that is fact, then I ask you: Isn't it time that something definite and certain be done in that direction? Now you use your political and military judgment both.

General BARR. If all the conditions were set up and you knew that these conditions were set up in China and there were no limitations on our commitments on Formosa, it would certainly be an ideal time to go back in. But to my knowledge, those conditions do not exist today that would justify such action.

Senator WILEY. You said a few minutes ago you didn't know.

General BARR. I don't know. I said to my knowledge.

Senator WILEY. In the world contest with communism—and of that you have some general knowledge—do you believe that time is operating on our side in the Far East?

General BARR. At the present time I think, considering China lost, that we are making some progress in the Far East.

Senator WILEY. Do you believe the Chinese people by themselves can achieve emancipation from the Commies?

General BARR. No.

Senator WILEY. Then if you believe that, isn't it time that we do something instead of simply carrying on in a forward march and a backward march as we have been carrying on in Korea?

General BARR. I do not think that the time has arrived when we can do anything about China. I hope some day it will arrive and I hope at that time we can attack the problem diligently and secure success, but today I do not feel is the time.

EFFECT OF YALTA AGREEMENT ON CHINA

Senator WILEY. Pardon me if this is repetition, but I think you stated that the effect in your judgment of the Yalta agreement on the Chinese people was, to say the least, not very constructive. Is that right?

General BARR. The Chinese people as a whole, I do not think that as a nation they knew much about it until after years. I am sure it was not pleasing to the Generalissimo or to the people of his government, as naturally it would not be.

Senator WILEY. If it was not pleasing, what was the effect, in your judgment, upon this man and his group that had been fighting so valiantly against the Japs for so many years and had done apparently as our ally a grand job? What was the psychological effect? Put yourself in his position. What was the effect?

General BARR. He resented it.

Senator WILEY. What?

General BARR. He resented it.

Senator WILEY. Well, but here was a man and here was a group, tired and worn. They had expended millions of lives fighting for their country. That man would do more than resent it, do you not feel? Do you not think it contributed seriously to the final disintegration of the forces of Chiang?

General BARR. No; I do not think so, Senator.

Senator WILEY. You do not think it had any effect?

General **Barr**. I do not think the Yalta agreement had any considerable effect on the final fall of Chiang.

Senator **Wiley**. You think it just was resented by Chiang.

General **Barr**. And his—members of his government—the educated class in China.

Senator **Wiley**. If you were let down by an ally like that, what effect would it have on you? Would you just resent it, after you had been valiantly fighting side by side for years?

General **Barr**. Yes; I would resent it, an agreement like that.

Senator **Wiley**. Had you reached an estimate of the capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist forces prior to 1949 and, if so, what was your estimate of them?

General **Barr**. No; I know nothing about it prior to 1948 and my studies since then have not been broad enough that I would attempt to answer that question.

Senator **Wiley**. Are you ready to hammer, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman **Russell**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. You are the greatest knocker I know.

Chairman **Russell**. And I was just being gracious in giving you one more question after your time had expired. I am just trying to be pleasant.

Senator **Wiley**. I appreciate your favoritism.

Chairman **Russell**. Just trying to be pleasant, that is all. Senator Bridges?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Saltonstall?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Morse?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Knowland?

PAY SCALE OF CHINESE SOLDIER

Senator **Knowland**. General Barr, during the years you were in China, were you generally familiar with the pay scale of the Chinese soldier?

General **Barr**. At the time I was familiar with it—or what it was supposed to be. He seldom got it. At the present moment I could not tell you what it was. It was practically nothing, as you no doubt know.

Senator **Knowland**. I would like to read you some figures given by Gen. Pai Chung-hsi in November 1949. I wrote them down at the time of a conference with him.

A private, $1, that is Chinese, per month; corporal, $2; sergeant, $3; lieutenant, $4; first lieutenant, $5; captain, $6; major, $7; a lieutenant colonel, $8; a colonel, $9; a general who was assistant to Gen. Pai Chung-hsi, and I am not sure of his capacity, whether chief of staff or not, $20. And I understood General Pai got about $30.

Would those figures seem out of line—with the amendment that you have mentioned, because General Pai himself mentioned to me that was theoretically what the pay was supposed to be, but they did not always get it.

General BARR. I think that is approximately correct, Senator, but I have forgotten long since what the pay was. Very, very small and seldom got by the soldiers. The officers got it.

Senator WILEY. Was that American dollars?

Senator KNOWLAND. No, Chinese.

Chairman RUSSELL. A month?

General BARR. A month; yes, sir.

COMPETENCE OF CHINESE OFFICIALS

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to ask you this. You testified that in your judgment while you were not necessarily an admirer of the Generalissimo's strategic abilities, I understood you to testify as far as his loyalty to China and his integrity, and so forth, you did have a high regard for Chiang Kai-shek. Is that correct?

General BARR. That is correct, sir. If I may comment, his outstanding sin was his loyalty to his old friends, many of whom were not worthy of his loyalty.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now were you also acquainted with some of the other leaders? The reason I want to raise this question, of course I think undoubtedly anybody who has any knowledge of the Far East recognizes that probably China had more than its share of people who had betrayed its trust, and 5 percenters and so forth, and took advantage of the situation there, but there is a misconception that is somewhat prevalent that almost everyone in China was corrupt and that there were few if any people of capability and competence.

Now that is contrary to such observations as I have made and people whom I have had great confidence in who have spent years in China. Did you know General Sun Li-jen who graduated from VMI?

General BARR. I know him very well.

Senator KNOWLAND. Is he generally considered to be a competent officer?

General BARR. Hs is a very competent officer. He is completely honest so far as I know. He has been held back by the Nationalists. The Generalissimo's old friends resented him, and invariably when Sun Li-jen seemed to be coming up he was pushed down again.

Senator KNOWLAND. Did you know K. C. Wu?

General BARR. I know K. C. Wu very well. He is a very able, a very courageous, and an honest man so far as I know.

Senator KNOWLAND. Before my colleague from New Jersey mentions it, he is a graduate from Princeton University.

General BARR. Is that so?

Senator KNOWLAND. From my observation of him he has been a very capable, courageous civilian official and I have seen something on two occasions of the work that he has been doing on Formosa.

General BARR. K. C. Wu was mayor of Shanghai during the period I was there, and in the latter days there when they were setting up in Formosa I had quite a few dealings with him. I knew him throughout my entire stay there.

Senator KNOWLAND. And without listing them as individuals, while you undoubtedly ran into many people in whom you had little confidence, and you felt that the Generalissimo made a mistake in maintaining positions of responsibility, would it not also be true that during your year in China you met also many who were trying to do a job under very difficult conditions and who would not be in the category of incompetence or corruption?

General BARR. Yes, I indeed met some who could have done a good job, but they couldn't get the job purely on their ability to do the job. They didn't have the connection that was necessary to get the appointment to the job.

At times I have urged employment of a certain individual for a certain job. The answer was always, "Well, he is not known. He is completely unknown."

Senator KNOWLAND. But China is not the only country that has had that unfortunate situation from time to time.

General BARR. No, that is very true.

Senator KNOWLAND. I have seen it in Europe and other places.

HONESTY ACCORDING TO CHINESE CUSTOMS

General BARR. And in China you find many people who according to Chinese customs are honest. The idea of squeeze in China is ingrained into the people. They do not consider that as being dishonest. If you are working for me, I am your immediate boss and your pay is turned over to me, they do not feel it is wrong for me to take a fourth of it and give you three-fourths of it.

Now we have that class. Then we have the other class that is completely corrupt. They would stoop to anything.

Senator KNOWLAND. This morning in your testimony you mentioned I think quite properly the old Chinese military system of paying the troops by sending the pay to the division commander and then he would take his percentage and pay the troops something less than they were supposed to have received.

I was wondering whether you were familiar with the fact that on Formosa for the troops that are now there, that General Sun Li-jen has instituted the American system of paying at the pay table so that each soldier comes up and receives his pay?

General BARR. Sun Li-jen is the only one I have ever dealt with on that problem that honestly wanted to cooperate.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, my information is both personally there and since then that that is the system that has been followed in the island of Formosa.

General BARR. These people had something in defense of their system. I have discussed it with division commanders and they would all say, "General, how am I going to run my division if we don't do it? We have to buy extra rations, we have to buy kerosene for the lights, we have to buy this, that and the other. I get no funds from no one. If I don't take part of the soldier's pay, they don't get it."

So that they felt they were spending the money for the men, that is the more honest of them did. Some of them actually took the money and did not better the living conditions of the soldier at all.

LOGISTICS OF THE CHINESE FORCES

Senator **Knowland**. I am sorry, General, that you didn't get a chance to get back to Formosa after January of 1949; because in both 1949 and particularly in 1950, when I was there, with a year intervening, I made it a point to visit a number of the supply depots because General Wedemeyer, and others, had previously told me that logistics was one of the great weaknesses of the Chinese forces.

And, I particularly insisted on going to various supply depots and not telling them which ones I was going to until I got in the car, and was on the way.

I want to say that in those that I visited, I have seen very few supply depots that were better run, the equipment in more orderly arrangement, and more properly classified, with the records on it, than I saw in a number of these supply depots that they now are running.

Maybe they have learned their lesson the hard way, and realize this is their last chance, and they are making almost superhuman efforts to remedy some of the obvious defects which you had seen earlier, in China.

I don't know whether you are familiar with the fact that in November of 1945, General Wedemeyer returned to China with certain instructions and comments that he had received from various echelons of the Federal Government, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it was a memorandum which he handed to the Generalissimo on November 10, 1945, and he is quoting the Joint Chiefs at that time—he said:

> They declared plainly American military aid to China will cease immediately if evidence compels the United States Government to believe that any Chinese troops receiving such aid are using it to support any government which the United States Government can't accept,

and this is the point I call your particular attention to:

> to conduct civil war, or for aggressive or coercive purposes.

Now, wouldn't that put a severe restriction on the Government of the Republic of China in restoring order, if they were told that they would get some equipment, but they couldn't use it in conducting civil war, to fight communism?

General **Barr**. Would you mind reading that again? I am not sure I get the meaning of it.

Senator **Knowland**. He is quoting the Joint Chiefs. He said:

> They declared plainly that American military to China will cease immediately if evidence compels the United States Government to believe that any Chinese troops receiving such aid are using it to support any government which the United States can't accept—

General **Barr**. That doesn't prohibit anything.

Senator **Knowland**. But the next does:

> to conduct civil war.

Now, would you tell me how you could bring order in a country, against armed Communists, if they were prevented from using the equipment to conduct civil war, against the Communist forces?

General **Barr**. I know nothing about that document, at all.

Senator **Knowland**. Now, I direct your attention——

General **Barr**. It is the first time I heard of it.

BARR'S DIRECTIVE IN CHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, I direct your attention back to my examination this morning, when I asked about your directive, in contrast to the directive given to General Van Fleet in Greece; and you quitely properly testified, which is the fact, that General Van Fleet, in Greece, where a civil war was going on against the Communists, had a directive which permitted him to go, not just up to the GHQ level, but down to the division, and, I believe, the regiments and the battalions, to supervise the equipment which we were sending, and to help train and help lead, by advice, at least, the troops that were engaged against the Communists.

Now, your directive was nothing like that. It kept you up at the GHQ level——

General BARR. I permitted my group to assist in the training of the Chinese Army, the organization of the Military of Defense, and I, personally, was permitted to advise the Generalissimo on operational affairs.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is right, but you were not permitted to go down to the level of those that were actually engaged in fighting the Communists in China.

General BARR. That is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, that is one segment of the situation on this direction and help which the American mission could give.

The second segment of it is that there is evidence before this committee, both in the documents I have cited and others, that when we did give some material aid from time to time we did put strings upon that aid, as in the case of this memo to the Generalissimo on November 10, 1945, which, of course, was after V-J day.

Don't you feel that is quite a sharp contrast from the situation in Greece, as you understand it?

General BARR. Yes. The instructions covering our advice to be given in China was entirely different from that in Greece; not the same premise at all.

Senator KNOWLAND. One final question on this round, General: Was your chief of staff General Brink, and did he have, so far as you know, the same general views regarding the capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist forces and whether or not they had never lost a battle for want of equipment?

General BARR. General Brink was the head of my joint advisory group made up of Army, Navy, and Air Force. To say that he was or wasn't, I couldn't do that. I don't know. We never had any serious arguments about that or anything like that.

He seemed to feel that eventually if I would give the Chinese time enough they would get around to doing what we wanted them to do, but some of the things they had had a year on, and events interrupted any further progress.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, that is as far as I can pursue this at this time.

General BARR. There was never any clash between Brink and me that I was cognizant of.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time is up.

Senator George?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

BARR AND BADGER ESTIMATES OF CHINESE EQUIPMENT

Senator SMITH. General, I have just one or two questions, if I may. Your famous quotation which we referred to many times that no battle has been lost for lack of ammunition or equipment has had such an effect on various persons in the administration that I must pursue the matter a little further. I have heard Secretary Acheson quote that quotation and it appears in the white paper, and it has been used by various administration supporters as to our policy in the Far East.

Now, the incident that brings out apparently a difference of opinion between you and Admiral Badger appears in the testimony of Admiral Badger. I read from part of it. I want to read just a little more in order to get the record entirely clear.

On pages 7212 to 7218 there are various statements by Admiral Badger that I want to put in the record now and have you comment on them at an appropriate moment.

Chairman RUSSELL. What are those pages?

Senator SMITH. Pages 7212 to 7218. In the first place, on page 7212, after Admiral Badger had referred to this investigation to which we referred a minute ago, Senator Wiley asked him:

> Is this the report you sent to Washington?

Admiral Badger replied:

> This is a personal letter. I think it is in a personal letter to Secretary Forrestal.

And then a little later he quotes his letter to Secretary Forrestal at the bottom of the page on 7212:

> "The following day at General Fu's invitation I inspected the better part of three of his armies, one of which had just returned from service in the field, one being prepared to go into the field, and the third army that had been under training but which was unequipped in arms and ammunition and therefore incapable of action. These armies were very impressive in their appearance, actions, and spirit. Their loyalty to General Fu was unmistakably of the highest degree. General Fu told me during this tour that he had a total of 11 armies, four of which were well equipped, three of which were fairly to poorly equipped, and four of which were unequipped. He stated that he could do little more than to keep the Communists out of the area with his equipped armies and that he was constantly employing them on a defensive basis to meet Communist thrusts from various directions; he stated that if he could obtain equipment for the four additional trained armies he would then be able to set up an offensive to the Northeast stabilizing the Chinhuangtao-Hulutal Corridor and for the eventual relief of Mukden. He explained that in relieving Mukden he would reopen a channel of supply for about 300,000 of the best troops in China (many of them American trained and equipped) which were cut off there and were very lacking in American munitions."
>
> They had some ammunition, but I had contact with that crowd up there and would fly in every now and then, and they averaged three or four cartridges per man. They couldn't go on the offensive and were pretty well locked in.

Then he goes on to say he discussed with General Fu the question of what he needed and General Fu made up a list.

On page 7214 Admiral Badget made this statement:

> When he made it up that list came to me, came to the army advisory group in Nanking and to the Ambassador. As a result of that a recommendation was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically listing this equipment and recommending this supply of arms, which we estimated at a total value of $16 million, based on the cost of Marine equipment—which was all I had with me. And that has been presented I think. It is known as the first priority group—aid to China from the $125 million.

Then he says on page 7215:

> That recommendation went forth about in July of 1948. We felt that we had, I might say, the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of that program which came back almost immediately, and surprisingly so. I mean just 2, 3, or 4 days.
>
> Chairman **Connally**. They approved it?
>
> Admiral **Badger**. Oh, yes. Then nothing happened. Now I want to point out this because this is my story about that. The generalissimo had achieved the great moral effect in north China by giving all items of United States military aid to the support of north China.
>
> That was the critical spot, and he said everything coming from the United States, military aid for the support of China, would go to north China.

General **Barr**. At no time while I was in China did the generalissimo to my knowledge ever make such agreement or ever commit himself that way.

Senator **Smith**. It wasn't an agreement, it was the recommendation of the generalissimo.

General **Barr**. He had the complete say so.

Senator **Smith**. I am reading from Admiral Badger now.

> That build-up was great for morale there, and in a dispatch sent jointly by the agencies in China, the ambassadors, the chief of the army advisory group, myself, and Roger Lapham, we emphasized the fact that the conditions up there which we had observed, popularity of government, support of the armies, enthusiastic armies, loyalty to their leader and a fairly capable leader pointed to this as the most promising thing that we had seen in China for a couple of years.
>
> Then to make a long story short, nothing happened. Questions as to even the prices, what it was going to cost these people, were not forthcoming, and remembering that that was approved by the Joint Chiefs, had the authority of the act of Congress and had the approval of the President, a period of 5 months went by before we could actually get any action.

Then there is a little further conversation back and forth, and on page 7217, after the shipment had been made of the 10 percent we discussed, and the deficiency in that equipment, he said that General Fu reported as follows, and I quote General Fu now:

> The above-mentioned weapons are not in good condition, and for the most part cannot be used. I do not know how or why these weapons were forwarded in an incomplete state.

EQUIPMENT SENT TO FU TSO-YI

Then Admiral Badger goes on:

> The result was that General Fu Tso-yi, who had his back to the wall at that time at Tientsin and Peking in effect had his generals say, "Is this what we have been waiting for?" and they collapsed within 2 days.

And then on the next page, 7218, the admiral says:

> It was the straw that broke the camel's back, in my opinion.

I just want it clear in the record what Admiral Badger's position was. He apparently had the support of the Joint Chiefs, of the Ambassador, and it refers here to the military commission and so forth. I just want to ask you whether that was yourself, or whether you were not familiar with this particular transaction that Admiral Badger laid so much stress on.

General **Barr**. I know about that particular action. I heard about it after it happened. At the time I was not in on it at all.

Senator **Smith**. Well, let me ask you this, because I am confused, General——

General Barr. As for the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I know nothing about that. I know that the generalissimo at no time ever made a decision that all of the aid bought with the $125 million would go to north China.

Senator Smith. I don't know that he included that in the whole amount. All he said was that Gen. Fu Tso-yi had achieved a great moral effect in north China by giving all items of United States military aid to the support of north China.

Senator Knowland. Will the Senator yield? I think I can clear up the situation.

I think Admiral Badger's testimony went to this $16 million item.

Senator Smith. Yes.

Senator Knowland. Which was to go to north China, and not the whole hundred twenty-five million. I think that is what he was referring to there, and only 10 percent of that $16 million item was what was finally delivered.

Senator Smith. I think that is a correct statement if we look at the record.

General Barr. In the shipment that came in from Japan it was not based on any particular amount of money. It was based entirely upon what was available, and everything that was on the Chinese list of requirements that was available was shipped. Everything in that shipment was on Gen. Fu Tso-yi's then high priority list and was given to Gen. Fu Tso-yi. Some of it was shipped short of maintenance parts and that was known at the time it was shipped. There were some mistakes made in not shipping clips for Browning automatic rifles and tripods, as I have said. I arranged for and had those flown from Japan within 3 or 4 days and delivered.

Senator Smith. The fact does remain that nearly 6 months elapsed before this list was sent in and this recommendation of the Joint Chiefs before any action was had at all.

General Barr. I can't speak for the War Department. I was in China at the time. Of course, even in getting $16 million worth of equipment to be delivered to the Chinese, the necessary machinery for the Department of the Army to go into action to deal with the Chinese and to have money transferred from the congressional appropriation for the Chinese to the Department of the Army had to be set up.

This was not set up, I am practically sure, prior to July 28, 1948; and up to that time it was impossible for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to spend any of that money.

Senator Smith. It was after that that the request came in. It was in July 1948 that the testimony shows it first came in, and it wasn't until——

General Barr. When did it come in?

Senator Smith. I think the testimony shows July 1948.

Senator Sparkman. That is right—top of page 7215.

General Barr. July 1948.

Senator Smith. Yes; I am trying to get the facts straight on this, General. Yes, it says at the top of page 7215 that the recommendation went forth about in July of 1948. It reads:

> We felt that we had, I might say, the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of that program which came back almost immediately, and surprisingly so. I mean just 2, 3, or 4 days.

Chairman **CONNALLY**. They approved it?

Admiral **BADGER**. Oh, yes. Then nothing happened—

for 6 months.

That is the thing. I only raise that point because I am trying to get in the record here at least the opinion of one of our military and naval people in the Far East that there certainly wasn't in this one incident at least adequate ammunition and equipment for the immediate objective of that particular situation.

BARR'S DIRECTIVE RELATIVE TO BADGER'S POSITION

Let me ask you this to get my thinking clear. What was the relation of your directive out there to Admiral Badger's position in the Far East?

General **BARR**. There was no relation. We were independent agencies.

Senator **SMITH**. Wasn't the Navy in some way in charge of general overseeing of the mainland of China? That has come up before in this hearing.

General **BARR**. Not to my knowledge.

Senator **SMITH**. General MacArthur had the islands and the Navy had the mainland of China, and Korea was in the hands of the State Department. I think we had that testimony.

General **BARR**. Not to my knowledge. Our Ambassador was——

Senator **SMITH**. What were your relations——

Chairman **RUSSELL**. Had you finished your answer, General? You started to say something about our Ambassador.

General **BARR**. Our Ambassador was the overriding agency in China of the United States. I was an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the Ambassador exercising supervisory control over me and my keeping no secrets from the Ambassador.

Admiral Badger had no control and no responsibility whatsoever for the joint United States military advisory group in China.

Senator **SMITH**. Well, he and Ambassador Leighton Stuart and Mr. Roger Lapham apparently had a hand in this investigation, and in making this recommendation which was apparently approved by the Joint Chiefs, according to Admiral Badger's testimony here.

I am trying to reconcile, if I can, his testimony with your statement that no battle was lost because of lack of ammunition and supplies or equipment, whatever it was. I am still confused on that. I don't think we have an answer to it.

General **BARR**. Of course, when I made that statement, I had reference to the fact that there were other things that contributed to winning a battle other than ammunition and equipment.

So far as the actual battles I know of, there was never one that ended but what there was an abundance of ammunition still available which was captured by the Communists. However, that other all-essential thing, the will to fight, was missing.

Senator **SMITH**. Of course that is applicable to any situation. The will to fight is very important.

General **BARR**. But there was never any battle fought but that I know of considerable quantities of ammunition and weapons were lost to the Communists.

Senator SMITH. Well, that might be true too, but the fact remains that Admiral Badger presents a case that one of the best Chinese generals there was, General Fu, was unable to get the supplies that he asked for to meet a very critical situation he apparently was holding in north China. I just can't reconcile——

General BARR. Well, at that time the situation in north China in Gen. Fu Tso-yi's area was not any more serious or as serious as it was in other parts of China.

Senator SMITH. That is probably true. All Admiral Badger was pointing out is that there were situations in which in his judgment we hadn't given the ammunition and supplies that were needed to meet the issue in hand, and that was the case he presented and I asked him about it to reconcile it with your statement which I have asked you about. That is what I have been doing to try to get you to clarify that discrepancy between the views of our two most important military leaders.

General BARR. I obtained a copy of that list. I was not in on the original conferences and heard about it by chance, and after some effort got a copy of the list.

Senator SMITH. Well, General, I don't see how that is possible when you were in charge of military operations out there.

General BARR. I was not with the party that made the inspection up there. I didn't know the party had been up there until sometime later.

Senator SMITH. Well, I am still left in the dark.

General BARR. It was my responsibility, Senator; no question about that. I was the one that should have done it.

Senator SMITH. I wonder if it would not be possible for the Department of Defense to give us a statement on that particular situation that Admiral Badger has testified to and that you have testified to. I see my friend, the colonel here, smiling as though he had some information, and I would like to have him prepare it or anybody else in the Department of Defense for the record, because I am not satisfied with the replies to that question.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Smith.

Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

CONTEMPLATING NATIONALIST INVASION OF MAINLAND

Senator CAIN. General Barr, you have told us several times, sir, that in your opinion it would be necessary for us, the United States, to logistically support any movement of Chinese Nationalist troops on Formosa against the mainland. I think that is what you have told us, sir.

General BARR. By the United States or some other country having the power of doing it.

Senator CAIN. Is there a legitimate distinction to be made between a large-scale movement from Formosa to the mainland and a small movement consisting of, say, a thousand Chinese Nationalists for commando-raid purposes?

General BARR. I don't believe that I can answer that question because if such a thing were being considered, I would have nothing in the world to do with it. It would be considered by the Joint Planning Staff, and to say whether they would differentiate between a large invasion and a small invasion and decide to do the small invasion but not a large invasion, I couldn't say. So far as I am concerned, so long as we are protecting Formosa with the Seventh Fleet, that would not be undertaken.

Senator CAIN. I am concerned about this logistics problem because much of our conversation these days is of events which may or may not develop in the future.

There are something more than a half a million Chinese Nationalist troops on Formosa, and it is my understanding that they all got there through their own means of transport. How did they get from the mainland to Formosa?

General BARR. Through the Nationalist Army means of transport.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

General BARR. Yes, they had a great number of LST's and they had other commercial ships, you see, that we had given them or sold them after the war, and they were moved in there on that. I don't know the condition of that equipment today. The condition of it when I left China was very bad.

Senator CAIN. Well, do you have reason to believe, General Barr, that they no longer have that means of transport now on Formosa which got them from the mainland to Formosa?

General BARR. No, I have no reason to believe that they haven't. So far as I know, little of it has been lost.

Senator CAIN. Well, if we assume by way of argument that the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa still have a major portion of the transport which took them originally from the mainland to Formosa, we can safely conclude that the Chinese Nationalist troops could support out of their own means a limited operation on the mainland of China.

General BARR. It would have to be very limited, Senator, because in invading you land under entirely different conditions than where you have got your harbor to discharge your cargo. Some of this equipment would not be able to get within several thousands of yards of the shore.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir. Under the assumption that the United States might be required to logistically support a movement of Chinese Nationalists from Formosa to the mainland, would that present any very real problem if we wanted to do it?

General BARR. Well, it would depend entirely upon the requirement on our facilities elsewhere. If there was no requirement elsewhere and we wanted to do it, of course the facilities could be made available.

SUPPORTING ALLIES IN KOREA

Senator CAIN. Without desiring to be critical of anybody else, could we not reasonably assume that the United States at the present time is supporting in a major way and in most instances every other nation with whom we are joined in the Korean operation?

General BARR. Well, that is certainly in the political sphere, no question about that.

Senator CAIN. Well, sir——

General **Barr.** I would not say everyone. I will say there are nations we are giving support to that we have allied ourselves with.

Senator **Cain.** Well, what I want to establish in this record for people who are going to study it is that we should not be frightened of supporting the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa because it appears to be an undeniable fact that the United States is supporting everybody else in one way or another.

General **Barr.** I am 100 percent in favor of supporting them in every manner except to actually participate in their battles. As far as building them up to where they could be a great potential some day, the sky is the limit as far as I am concerned.

CHARACTERIZING CHINESE FIGHTING TACTICS

Senator **Cain.** I thank you, sir. Now, we have often from other witnesses had the Chinese Red characterized to us as being fanatics, fanatical in their zest for combat and in their enthusiasm for the cause they are supporting.

Out of your experience do you think that characterization is reasonably valid, General Barr?

General **Barr.** When the Chinese Reds first came into the picture, Senator, from the descriptions given me by my men and officers who were in contact with them and who fought them I felt that that was true.

But subsequent fights, subsequent actions of the Chinese army in Korea caused me to doubt that my assumption was correct.

Senator **Cain.** General Barr, we have been told by other witnesses that the South Koreans in many, many instances showed evidence of real fear against the Red Chinese invaders. I wonder if in your opinion the North Koreans would show a comparable fear of Nationalist Chinese if the united command employed Nationalist Chinese on our allied side in Korea.

General **Barr.** I dare say that if the Nationalist Chinese fought in the same manner in which the Communist Chinese fought the South Koreans that the reaction would probably be the same.

Senator **Cain.** Do you think, General, it might be a worth-while experiment to find out?

General **Barr.** Not under present conditions, no, sir.

Senator **Cain.** I thank you, sir.

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Green.

CLARIFYING CONFUSION IN TESTIMONY

Senator **Green.** General, there has been a good deal of confusion in the testimony and it has caused a confusion in the questioning, I think; perhaps it was caused by confusion in the questioning.

I think perhaps it would be well to get back to fundamentals in this whole discussion, as to who is at war, and if there is a war.

As I understand it, and you correct me if it is not straight, when North Korea attacked South Korea the United Nations undertook to implement its announced principle and declared it aggression, that is, unjustifiable attack on a friendly country; so that there is war between South Korea and North Korea. Is that your understanding?

General **Barr.** Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. And the United States is not at war. It is the United Nations. Is that not true?

General BARR. United Nations forces.

Senator GREEN. United Nations forces?

General BARR. That is right.

Senator GREEN. We are making the greatest contribution but not the only contribution. Now, the other party to the war is North Korea and they are being given, of course, aid by the Chinese. That is true, too, is it not?

General BARR. Yes.

Senator GREEN. Is China at war with South Korea?

General BARR. No; China is giving assistance to the North Koreans who have invaded South Korea. Now, while they have never declared war on South Korea, they are in fact at war with South Korea. The Chinese Government denies they are actively supervising or furnishing such assistance—however, we know it to be different.

Senator GREEN. That is, the Chinese Government does not admit that the Chinese who are fighting in North Korea against South Korea are doing it under its direction or consent?

General BARR. I am not sure about that, sir. As far as I know they do not accept responsibility for it.

Senator GREEN. Well, if that position is correct and you are correct in your assumption, then of course China is not at war with anyone concerned?

General BARR. That is right.

Senator GREEN. Well, then, if China is at peace with South Korea and we are at peace with China and if we attacked or bombed Chinese cities, we would be doing an act of aggression against China, would we not?

General BARR. That is so.

Senator GREEN. In other words, we would have precipitated the war and if the United Nations acted on its principles it would have to declare us the aggressor——

General BARR. If we as an independent nation went in and did that.

Senator GREEN. Yes. I think you have helped to clarify the situation a good deal. And that is one of the reasons why we should be loath to spread war, not only because it might lead to the third world war, and not only because it would draw the Russians into it, but also because it is an immoral act, against the principles of the United Nations which we have helped to set up and which we regard as the principal hope for peace in the world. Is that not true?

General BARR. It is.

Senator GREEN. I now should like to clarify the discussion which you had with Senator Hickenlooper and then with someone—some other Senator who tried to follow up the idea of—what was it?

General BARR. No battle having ever been lost due to lack of ammunition?

Senator GREEN. No. It came out of that. It seemed to me there was a misunderstanding——

ALLOTTING UNITED STATES AID INSIDE CHINA

General BARR. Oh, Admiral Badger's statement that the Generalissimo wanted to give North China all the United States aid?

Senator GREEN. Yes.

General BARR. Undoubtedly there was some misunderstanding, because I am sure Admiral Badger does not feel that way about it. I think it was Senator Knowland that commented—that pertained to the $16 million only and that is understandable and acceptable to me.

Senator GREEN. That is a possible explanation, then?

General BARR. Yes, sir; and I know Admiral Badger does not feel the Generalissimo ever agreed to give North China all the equipment bought with the $125 million.

POLITICAL OR MILITARY MATTERS

Senator GREEN. There is one other point, and that is the distinction that was drawn between military matters and diplomatic matters, and I think you very wisely observed that they were always combined or almost always. Aren't they necessarily combined? The military are used to carry out an objective, and the very fixing of the objective must be a diplomatic matter other than a military matter, is that not true?

General BARR. Yes, indeed. In considering any recommendation that the military man has to make on a high level he must consider all factors, and then after considering all factors he considers it as to whether or not his recommendation is an intelligent recommendation, fully realizing that one of these factors that he considered may rise up to control his recommendation; but he feels, at least, there is a calculated risk in there which he is willing to take.

He fully recognizes the fact that the diplomat or politico will enter into it if he has a right to make a decision if he can make it overriding his recommendation. But he is not going to send in a recommendation that he knows is going to be disapproved, and he, too, will disapprove, were he in the position of the other man.

Senator GREEN. And, therefore, it is really nonsense to discuss considering military matters apart from the diplomatic because the diplomatic fixes the objective.

General BARR. So far as the conduct of a war on the battlefield it is because it would cause the enlargement of the war.

Senator GREEN. Yes. I think that relieves us of the difficulty which we find we were up against if we tried to absolutely distinguish between the two, and when you are asked what you would do from a military standpoint regardless of what the objective is, it is impossible to answer that question—it is an impossible question to answer.

General BARR. That is right.

Senator GREEN. That is all I have to ask you.

General BARR. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. I will pass, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Sparkman?

CHANGE OF ORDER LIST DELAYED AID SHIPMENT TO CHINA

Senator Sparkman. General Barr, just one or two questions. I want to read you a further statement from Admiral Badger and get your comment on this.

On page 7222, Admiral Badger was asked as to the explanation for the delay in getting goods moving into China during this period of 1948 that we have been talking about, and this was his reply:

> It seemed to be a number of things rather than any specific thing. Of course, the fundamental behind the thing was that although this particular aid in quantity had been approved by the necessary authority, the law stated that it couldn't be provided unless it was requisitioned through diplomatic channels by the Chinese Government. I found that the Chinese Government, however, had under a list known as priority 1, submitted that list. I found that the availability of material had to be examined. You will remember we were getting short; we were thinking of rearming our own military forces, and the availability of the material had to be examined by the Army which caused some delay.

In your opinion, is that a correct statement?

General Barr. Yes; that statement is correct. The fact that it had to come through diplomatic channels I do not think delayed it a great deal. I gave the Chinese much assistance in the preparation of their first requirement for $125 million worth of equipment.

That was brought to this country by a mission from China. After the Department was permitted to go to work in assisting the Chinese and to actually sell to the Chinese the transfer of funds, this entire system was changed at the insistence of Admiral Badger; a completely new list was submitted to the Department of the Army by Ambassador Koo on the 20th of September, which destroyed or nullified all the work that had been done on this previous list. They had to again start working up a new list of requirements, and a new list of prices under different conditions.

At the same time this was submitted, there was a commitment, at least, by Admiral Badger, that this equipment would be transported to China in American vessels, free of charge.

All of these things had to come in for reconsideration and had to go through the necessary agencies for readjustment, so that changing the requirements at that time certainly operated to delay the arrival of this equipment in China; while it may have resulted in the Chinese getting it cheaper because they did not have to pay the transportation on it. It was transported in naval vessels. Do I make myself clear?

Senator Sparkman. Yes. You may have stated that previously in your testimony.

General Barr. I have not.

Senator Sparkman. But if so, I have missed it.

General Barr. I have not stated it previously.

Senator Sparkman. I think a great many of the members around this table have not known of this change in the order. In other words, I think we are all pretty well agreed that under the law passed by Congress, and the various procedures laid down by Congress, the priority list submitted in the early part of July as to which I believe Admiral Badger said, and I think you agreed with him, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved it promptly—Admiral Badger said within 3 or 4 days, and that was in July 1948——

General Barr. But they approved it for supply when and if available.

Senator Sparkman. Yes, I understand it.

General Barr. They didn't obligate themselves to fill it.

Senator Sparkman. I understand that. But I was going to say that I think many of us have been unable to understand the long delay between July and November when it was filled, and I think you have given us an explanation that we have not known heretofore; namely, that it was upset by this second list in September.

General Barr. Right. And another thing that caused the delay—for 30 days after the Chinese were told what was available in the way of small arms and small arms ammunition, they spent about 30 days shopping around seeing if they could buy it from wildcat outfits before telling the Government to go ahead.

Senator Sparkman. And they had a perfect right to do that?

General Barr. They had a perfect right to do it.

Senator Sparkman. Yes.

General Barr. But they should have accepted the responsibility for the delay occasioned by that.

LACK OF NATIONALIST RESISTANCE

Senator Sparkman. Yes. Now, General, there has been a whole lot said here about your statement that no battle was lost for lack of ammunition, and Ambassador Stuart has been quoted a good many times. On page 7387 there was placed in the record of the hearings the full statement by Dr. Stuart. It is rather lengthy and I don't have time to read all of it, but I think it would be enlightening to everybody who reads the record to read that. But I want to quote a brief portion from it.

> The recent Communist drive has met with little Nationalist resistance. Northeast combat command sources and military observers admit that many Nationalist withdrawals were premature and without military necessity. The words "strategic retreat" have lost all significance. As a result the Communists possess almost complete initiative and are able to maneuver practically at will.

If I understood your statement correctly this morning, that is in line with your own thinking; is it not?

General Barr. It is, indeed. After the fall of Mukden there was very little resistance.

Senator Sparkman. Now, I want to read another quotation from Dr. Stuart's statement, and I want to read a whole paragraph here. It includes in it this statement about their being short of ammunition. But I want to read the whole paragraph in order that we may get the whole picture, and I quote:

> By holding the initiative, the Communists are able to keep the Nationalists scurrying over the countryside, thereby causing depreciation of Nationalist motorized mobile equipment and depletion of sorely needed supplies. Communist transport, on the other hand, consists almost wholly of draft animals. Persons in direct contact with the Nationalist troops in rural areas state there are insufficient small arms and ammunition to arm all combatant troops now in the field. These reports are so consistent, some, though not necessarily full,

> credence must be given them. The Communists also are underarmed, but by guerrilla tactics and surprise night attacks they are able to cause greater loss of weapons and expenditure of ammunition by the Nationalists than by themselves.

Do you wish to comment on that? Do you see anything in that that conflicts with the statement that you have made?

General BARR. I don't see how he used the thought that the Communists caused the Nationalists to expend a greater amount of ammunition than they, the Communists, expended.

Senator SPARKMAN. You may not have caught that phrase. He said "by their guerrilla activities." I think that is the words he used—

> But by guerrilla tactics and surprise night attacks they are able to cause greater loss of weapons and expenditure of ammunition by the Nationalists than by themselves.

General BARR. Oh, yes; I think I get the idea there, from that.

That was it, the Nationalists lost in battle, the greatest number of weapons and ammunition, more ammunition than the Communists did, because they were always on the defensive and the Communists were on the offensive and they were the ones that were capturing the equipment and the ammunition.

Senator SPARKMAN. And according to his statement, they were maneuvering at will.

General BARR. They were always maneuvering at will——

Chairman RUSSELL. Had you finished your statement?

COMMUNISTS HELD INITIATIVE

General BARR. I was about to say, from the time I arrived in China, throughout my year there, the Communists at that time had the initiative. It was never wrested from them.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, I want to quote the concluding paragraph from Dr. Stuart's letter, because I think he more or less sums it up there, in this:

> There is every reason to believe that punitive military action against the Communists, unless succeeded by overwhelming military occupation, will not save Manchuria to China. It is high time for Nanking to be realistic and replace its present impotent disliked regime in Manchuria with one which will be supported by the local population and would thereby serve to weaken the Communist movement. It may be, and some think that it is, too late to accomplish this purpose. Without some such effective measure there are many indications that it will be only a matter of some months, perhaps 6 to 9, before Manchuria will be lost.

Do you agree with that statement?

General BARR. When was that statement made, do you know?

Senator SPARKMAN. I will give you the date in just a minute: July 1, 1947.

General BARR. July 1, 1947? Well, that was a considerable time prior to my arrival in China; but certainly from March 1948 that condition existed.

Manchuria was already lost. The only think to have done then was to get the troops out, if we could, and by March, I had thoroughly familiarized myself with the battle conditions and learned about as much about China as I could; and I had definitely felt that Manchuria was lost and all troops should be withdrawn from Manchuria.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is all.

Chairman Russell. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. The questioning comes to me.

General, you have testified here as to the capacity of this General Fu.

General Barr. Fu Tso-yi.

FU TSO-YI'S SURRENDER AT PEIPING

Chairman Russell. Yes, Fu Tso-yi. You stated that he was an able soldier and you paid quite a tribute to his character. Admiral Badger likewise spoke in very glowing terms of this Gen. Fu Tso-yi. If I recall correctly, General Wedemeyer also spoke very highly of this Gen. Fu Tso-yi. The Senators around this table referred to him as one of the best men in China. The thing that disturbs me about this is that here is a man that you speak of in most glowing terms but who you say later went over to the Communists.

General Barr. He went over under desperate conditions. No one knows exactly what the agreement was. There was, of course, a period of build-up when some people said there was going to be a great battle and Gen. Fu Tso-yi is going to fight to the last man. There were others that felt that there were slow negotiations going on under the table and eventually there would be a capitulation.

By surrendering to the Communists, he saved his troops. He couldn't have held Peiping under any conditions.

Chairman Russell. How did he save them? It seems to me there is a lot of difference in saving your troops and saving their lives in military operations, and in delivering them over to your enemy.

General Barr. That is correct, His troops were captured rather than killed. That is the only thing. He did not do the Nationalist cause any good. Of course, had he been willing to withdraw his troops to the south and join with the troops at Tsujung, his troops would have been saved for the defense of central and eastern China and perhaps the Communists would not have gotten to the Yangtze River.

Chairman Russell. Well, whether it is true or not, press reports state that a great many of the Chinese soldiers that have been attacking our people in Korea were former Nationalist troops.

General Barr. That is right.

Chairman Russell. And you stated that this Fu Tso-yi went into the Communist Government, and I asked you if the troops were amalgamated with the Communists and you said that you assumed that they were.

General Barr. That is right.

Chairman Russell. What I can't reconcile is this great tribute being paid a man who, according to anything that I had ever conceived of in warfare, had committed about the most reprehensible act that a military man could be guilty of.

General Barr. Those opinions were, of course, formed prior to this, and there are people today, people who are very loyal to the generalissimo, Chinese, and very loyal to the Nationalist Government who still feel that Gen. Fu Tso-yi was loyal in everything he did.

I thought personally at the time that Gen. Fu Tso-yi was gradually preparing his army for the surrender of Peiping. He went on a march to the northwest in which he lost some four or five divisions in small towns. He had lost a division here and a division somewhere else.

Most of those divisions were lost in the towns from which the men came originally. In other words, I felt that they were just left there for demobilization.

Gen. Fu Tso-yi finally came back into Peiping with what he had left and what remained in Peiping, and on January 22 the final surrender of Peiping was arranged and Gen. Fu Tso-yi went into the Communist government, I have been told. I cannot prove that.

Chairman Russell. Well, when did you become suspicious of Fu Tso-yi?

General Barr. I realized that Gen. Fu Tso-yi was preparing for the surrender of Peiping when he took his armies to the northwest and he left five divisions up there in the country from which they came. He was taking his own army home. That was by deduction.

Chairman Russell. Well, as a responsible American official there in China, you certainly did not favor supplying him any arms if——

General Barr. This was after this had happened, after the arms incident.

CONTROVERSIAL SHIPMENT OF ARMS

Chairman Russell. Now you stated that these arms that did come down there that have been the subject of controversy had no tripods and the BAR's had no magazines, came from Japan.

General Barr. That is correct.

Chairman Russell. Of course none of us would have the slightest reason to believe that either General MacArthur or any member of his staff or any of his subordinates would have had any reason for trying to deliver a psychological blow that would knock Fu Tso-yi out of the war, if he was stanch in his patriotism to the Nationalist Government.

General Barr. Quite the contrary, I am sure General MacArthur would have done anything in his power to have kept him in power.

Chairman Russell. Well, do you suppose someone up there in Japan had some better evidence than you did at that time as to Fu Tso-yi's character and intentions in setting down these weapons that could not be used so that when they fell into the hands of the Communists and Fu Tso-yi turned traitor to the cause to which he was supposed to be devoted, that they could not use these weapons against the Nationalists?

General Barr. No, sir; I don't feel so at all. I think that the equipment was packed in the early days after the war by labor on Okinawa, on any one of the many islands in the Pacific that we occupied, packed and boxed and shipped with a list put on it as to what was in it and didn't actually have in it what the list said, and it was shipped on the list, because to open all those boxes and inspect it would have delayed the shipping of it until after equipment was arriving from the United States.

In other words, it was all packed by foreign labor.

Chairman RUSSELL. Whether it was good, bad, or indifferent such as Fu Tso-yi did get did turn up in the hands of the Communists?

General BARR. The Communists no doubt have every piece of it today.

Chairman RUSSELL. You had no reason to believe at the time that delivery was made that Fu Tso-yi was contemplating treason to the Nationalist Government?

General BARR. No, sir; but I had little belief that that would have any major effect on eventualities in China. He was so greatly outnumbered there was not a chance of his survival.

ALTERNATIVES OPEN TO FU TSO-YI

Chairman RUSSELL. Was there any route open to him to get out from that dangerous area with his forces?

General BARR. Yes; at one time there was a route for him to get out. He could have come down to Tientsin and part of his troops be lifted out by water, or he could have come down to the Suyo area.

Chairman RUSSELL. If you didn't believe he could possibly get out, why were you approving these arms to him?

General BARR. The arms went up there before this condition existed. This was before the decision had to be made as to what he was going to do.

I think I told a committee here once before that there were three alternatives open to General Fu Tso-yi, and I think he was given the privilege of selecting what he was going to do. One was to take his army back to the northwest and try to fight as an independent warlord. Many of his people came from out there.

The other was to remain and fight in Peiping to the last in defense of the city. The third was to come south and join the east central forces.

The Generalissimo elected to stay and defend Peiping and pretended to the very last, or at least gave lip service to the idea that he could defend Peiping. I knew he could not defend Peiping for the last several weeks.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you advise the Generalissimo that in your professional opinion he could not?

General BARR. Yes, many times. I urged the Generalissimo not to let Fu Tso-yi make the decision, but make General Fu Tso-yi do what he wanted him to do, which I doubt that he would have been able to do at that time.

Chairman RUSSELL. As I understand the testimony, in the last chapter of Fu Tso-yi's service in the Nationalist Army he didn't elect any of the three you said he had open to him, but on the contrary went over to the enemy.

General BARR. He elected to defend Peiping, but he did not defend Peiping.

Chairman RUSSELL. You said defend it to the last extremity.

General BARR. He did not do it. It was a negotiated surrender, and from my best information, to begin with, Fu Tso-yi was given a good position with the Communists.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you. Senator Knowland.

COST OF EQUIPMENT SENT TO CHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. General, you were speaking of some delay, in answer to Senator Sparkman's question, in the Chinese themselves on agreeing to a list and wanting to do some shopping around. Are you familiar with the fact that one of the reasons for that looking around was the fact that we were charging in many instances the Chinese National Government, the Republic of China, the full price of equipment, which in many cases was 10 times as much as we were charging for the same equipment to Greece and Turkey?

General BARR. I am not familiar with the comparison, but I do know that the Chinese were told that any equipment that was not in surplus supply in the United States, that had to be taken from the required United States stocks, they would have to pay the replacement cost of equipment, which protected it 2 years. That was in an effort to save money, no question about it.

Senator KNOWLAND. And at the same time we were turning over to Greece and Turkey and some of the other nations we were helping equipment that was running just 10 percent of what we were charging the Republic of China.

General BARR. I don't know about that.

Senator KNOWLAND. Those figures are in hearings before the combined Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on the arms implementation bill, because I went into them myself and got the testimony on it.

Now, are you familiar with the fact that at the time that they were doing that and claiming that we did not have equipment in surplus, subsequent to that time, under the arms implementation bill we provided for $450 million of excess equipment for our allies in both Europe and Asia, primarily in Europe, of some $450 million in the 1949 arms implementation bill, and the next year an additional $250 million of surplus or excess equipment; so that we couldn't have been that short to charge——

General BARR. I believe that the obligation made to Greece and Turkey was made a year in advance of those made to China.

Senator KNOWLAND. I think that is true, but subsequent to that we had excess equipment made available to the other countries for which no charge was made, except for packing purposes.

My only point, General, is that if you have the will to aid, there is a way to get the aid to the people that you want to help. I mentioned the fact that we load planes upon French aircraft carriers and get them there and we sent equipment to Indochina and we get it there in a matter of weeks.

This shipment took 5 months. I am prepared to document it at the proper time how certain requests for aviation gasoline laid around in the Department of Commerce for a period of 5 or 6 months, so that for some strange reason, it seems that there isn't the priority or the urgency given to the situation in China which we feel is necessary to give to other areas of the world.

When you are holding on by your teeth, as they were apparently in north China, it seems to me that if there had been the will to aid, you would not have had to wait until the final contract was negotiated.

The preliminary work could have been done on the day the Congress passed the bill in March of 1948, so that when the President finally gave his approval, everything would have been in order and ready to ship.

That is the only question I raise, whether there has been the will to assist the Republic of China and prevent its collapse.

General BARR. That is on the governmental level, and of course, I don't know about it. I know that I informed the Chinese that the American surplus stock had been completely exhausted and that much of the stuff they wanted would have to be replaced in the American stock, which was required equipment.

Senator KNOWLAND. That advice you gave them obviously was not of your own knowledge, but from information that you had received from the United States.

General BARR. That is right.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yet subsequent to that time we found out that there was $450,000,000 and $250,000,000 and perhaps some more that actually was excess at a little later date.

General BARR. I know nothing about those amounts.

CHIANG'S PRESIDENCY AND ITS RELATION TO UNITED STATES AID

Senator KNOWLAND. This morning I questioned you briefly and I thought possibly you might have had a chance to review in your own mind this question of the period approximately in January of 1949 when the Generalissimo determined to give up for the time being at least the Presidency of the Republic of China and was succeeded by General Li Sun-jen. I would like to again ask you of your own knowledge there, either personal knowledge or from reports from Americans holding other posts in China at the time, whether there was directly or indirectly word sent to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to the effect that he was unlikely and China was unlikely to get any aid as long as he remained as President of the Republic, but that if he should retire, the chances of getting aid would be greatly improved.

General BARR. To my knowledge no such word was ever sent to the Generalissimo. There were people in China who said that, but so far as I know, no such——

Senator KNOWLAND. You conveyed no such word to him?

General BARR. I certainly did not.

Senator KNOWLAND. You have no knowledge of how such word if any reached him?

General BARR. No; if such word reached him.

Senator KNOWLAND. If such were agreed to, I would like to—at the time you were there—let's see, you left at what date in January of 1949?

General BARR. The 29th.

Senator KNOWLAND. Was that prior or just after the Generalissimo retired?

General BARR. Just after he stepped down on the 22nd.

NEGOTIATED PEACE MEANT UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

Senator KNOWLAND. At the time leading up to his retirement was the general impression that if the acting President Li took office that they might be able to negotiate a satisfactory settlement with the Chinese Communists who were then north of the Yangtze river?

General BARR. I think that was a hope among some of the Chinese people—that as soon at Li took over they might have a negotiated peace. However, as the Generalissimo said many times, they soon found out that the negotiated peace was unconditional surrender.

Senator KNOWLAND. Did you in discussions with Acting President Li feel that he believed there might be a hope of negotiating some kind of a settlement?

General BARR. No; that was not on my level. I avoided discussing that with him. That was the Ambassador's job.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I would just like to read into the record at this time from some notes which I made on November 28, 1949, when I was in Hong Kong, in an interview with the Acting President Li, who was then in the hospital waiting to go to the United States for an operation, and these are the notes [reading]:

> Li said when he took office as Acting President 10 months ago he did so with the hope that China might have peace. Communists did not want honorable peace but only complete surrender of non-Communist groups. The Communists had the backing of Russia in increasing demands so that no agreement could possibly be reached.

I will say parenthetically that he pointed out that time after time he had advised his negotiators to yield on certain points. They would yield and then the Communists would come back with increased demands.

Now, going on to read the notes—

> President Li thinks this was for use in world war III or for an invasion of the Communists was that if an agreement could be reached, he favored demobilization of the army, with only a small force kept. This was so soldiers could return to their farms, homes, and jobs in helping to build China. The Communists insisted on keeping an army of at least 3,000,000 men for 3 years.
>
> President L thinks this was for use in world war III or for an invasion of southeast Asia.

That is the end of the notes.

I would say that that indicates that as a result of his dealings with the Communists he came to a point of view which the Generalissimo had, that there was no compromise with them.

General BARR. I think Li Tsung-jen came to that point of view very early in the game. He got nowhere with his negotiations. In other words, they told him right in the beginning it was unconditional surrender, and I think what he says about the Communists insisting upon maintaining an army for some time of 3,000,000 men is most likely true.

SELECTING LI TSUNG-JEN AS ACTING PRESIDENT

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland, will you answer one question for me?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Because I consider you are greatest expert on China in the Senate. This man Li was the Vice President of Chiang Kai-shek?

Chairman RUSSELL. They were selected by the Kuomintang Council rather than by popular plebiscite?

Senator KNOWLAND. That is correct. They have a group that is kind of like a convention of some kind that is held. My recollection is—maybe the general can bear me out—he was not the original choice of the Generalissimo to be Vice President, but he was a very popular man and one who had an excellent reputation as governor, I think, of——

General Barr. That is right. The convention broke up overnight and reassembled the next morning because the Generalissimo made some statement, he indicated he wanted somebody else other than Li.

Senator Knowland. That is right.

General Barr. And Li Tsung-jen, along with two other people got up and said, "We withdraw," and they threw the whole thing in chaos.

Senator Knowland. Finally they met and he was elected. But he had an excellent reputation, and his particular province, as I understand it, was one of the model provinces. I think he was an associate of General Barr's in some period of time.

General Barr. He was up at Peking during the time I was there.

RECOGNIZING ABILITY OF CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Senator Knowland. I would like to ask this: You stated earlier in answer to a question regarding your prior testimony—and of necessity it would have to be the same, which I agree would not change your viewpoint, except for this: Do you not now have a much better appreciation of the force and the equipment of the Chinese Communists than possibly you had when you were in an advisory position to the Republic of China?

You have now been a division commander in Korea. You have come up against some of these same Communist troops, with Russian equipment, which the Chinese Nationalists have had to face. American forces were forced to retire and other UN forces were forced to retire. Does that experience at least not give you a little broader perspective on the type of opposition which the Government of the Republic did face and now faces?

General Barr. Yes; it does, indeed. I will never make the statement that I could have taken two or three American divisions and whipped the Communists in China, because I couldn't have done it.

Our type equipped division, our heavy equipment, the results would have been very bad. I mean this guerrilla warfare—I saw it first in this war in Korea, and it's terrific.

BARR'S PREVIOUS TESTIMONY

Senator Knowland. I just want to sum up one or two loose ends which I thought might be helpful. I think—and I believe it was done in a way that you are not responsible for, at least in whole—I think that your testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, and at least that part which had been used, probably I could fairly say was the most damaging evidence to the Republic of China which has been made available to a congressional committee. It was used to offset the testimony of General Wedemeyer and many others who had a different point of view.

I think possibly some of it had been taken a bit out of context, and perhaps if you had had more time to go into a broader explanation, perhaps it would not have seemed so detrimental to the Republic of China as it appears to have been used for.

As I understand your testimony today, you would certainly agree that it is not in the best interest of this Nation to have a Communist-dominated Asia?

General BARR. Yes, indeed.

Senator KNOWLAND. You would agree that a Communist-dominated China makes a possibility of a Communist-dominated Asia much greater than if China was a free country under the Republic of China?

General BARR. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. Your viewpoint is that while we don't need Formosa as a base ourselves—and I don't know anyone, General MacArthur or anyone else, who has advocated that we should use it as a base—you do agree with each one of our Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of National Defense, Secretary Marshall, that it would not be in our best strategic interest to permit Formosa to fall into unfriendly hands?

General BARR. That is right.

FREEDOM OF ACTION FOR NATIONALISTS

Senator KNOWLAND. You have testified that you have not been on Formosa since January of 1949, and as a keen military observer, I think you would agree that much could happen or could have happened in the 2 years that have intervened since you were there.

Assuming for the sake of the discussion here that Genral Sun and K. C. Woo and others have made substantial efforts to rebuild the morale, equipping, insofar as it is within their limited means to do so, the forces on the island of Formosa, and that they have at least a substantial number—we won't argue about the numbers, but they have a substantial number—of non-Communist Republic of China troops there at the present time, by your own discussion here earlier in the day, if you were the military commander, in General Sun's place, wouldn't you feel that unless they have an opportunity to take some affirmative action that the problem of morale, of continuing to be permanently on the defensive would be a very difficult problem for any general?

General BARR. Yes; but, at the same time, I would have to examine my thinking to determine whether or not I would be willing to give up the support of the Seventh Fleet in order to obtain this freedom of action.

Senator KNOWLAND. I wanted to come to that.

General BARR. Maybe I am back on the political end again.

USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS IN KOREA

Senator KNOWLAND. I wanted to come to that next, General, because you have been over in the Korean theater where you have been occupied with a division in combat, and I am not sure how much of the broad picture you have been able to get, keeping as busy as you were.

The testimony before this committee shows—and I am not going to give the exact figures, but the approximate figures, for security reasons—that the United States of America alone has over 300,000 of its forces in Korea; that the Republic of Korea has over 150,000 troops there; that all the rest of the 15 or 16 United Nations members that are aiding us in this collective-security action altogether have only approximately 30,000 troops in Korea, which is roughly 10 percent of the forces that the United States of America has there, and is very roughly one-half—less than one-half—of our combat casualties alone.

My question is this: Four days after the Korean aggression the Republic of China on Formosa offered 33,000 out of its more than 500,000 troops to be used in Korea to resist aggression. That was on the 30th of June of last year. That offer was turned down for two reasons that were given at the time: One, that they were needed then on Formosa because of the uncertainties.

Secondly, if they were accepted in Korea, they might encourage the Chinese Communists to enter the conflict and, of course, at that time they were not in the conflict.

Now, do you not believe that at least as to that second reason given, that it might encourage the entrance of the Chinese Communists, that in late October or early November when the Chinese Communists themselves became aggressors across the Yalu that that reason was eliminated?

General Barr. Well, certainly after the Chinese had already come in.

Senator Knowland. My question to you is this, because you have seemed so adamant, that if the Chinese Nationalist forces are permitted to participate in this war, that ipso facto our Seventh Fleet must be withdrawn.

I call your attention—which I certainly don't have to call your attention to because you have just been fighting the Communists over there—that they are now engaged in an aggressive war against us.

We have had over 70,000 battle casualties, which is twice the number of all the rest of the troops supplied by UN members all put together.

Under those circumstances, when the offer of the Republic of China was renewed after the Chinese Communists themselves had entered the conflict, and assuming that those 33,000 troops could be spared from Formosa, what would be the objection of giving our forces in Korea that much additional help when today the United States representative at Lake Success or at the United Nations is calling upon our allies to increase their contribution because we are once again getting ourselves a little thin?

General Barr. Well, again, that brings us back to the same political consideration, Senator Knowland, and my replies are certainly not very revealing on the subject.

But I still feel that as long as we are protecting the Nationalist Government in Formosa that we cannot permit them to wage a war either directly or indirectly against the Chinese Communists. Now, we are not at war with the Chinese Communists theoretically.

Senator Knowland. Senator Green was in here, and I am frank to say that I got a little bit befuddled—I am sorry the Senator is not here now because I do not want to make the statement in his absence when I certainly did not make it in his presence——

Chairman Russell. Senator, I have let you go on, on the theory that we might conclude with General Barr this afternoon. So I have allowed you to run 10 minutes over your time, hoping we could wind up with the general today. I would like now to ascertain about the length of time of the questioning that is likely to follow so that I can determine whether to take a recess now until tomorrow morning or continue.

Senator KNOWLAND. I can finish, I am sure, in another 10 minutes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have any idea how long you will take, Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. I can finish in 10 minutes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. I will require no time.

Chairman RUSSELL. We will proceed, then.

NO DECLARATION OF WAR

Senator KNOWLAND. I was saying I was a little befuddled by the argument advanced by Senator Green that in effect we are not at war with the Chinese Communists.

Now, theoretically, I agree that is correct. There has not been a declaration of war by us on them, and as far as I know they have not served us with a declaration of war.

But the fact of the matter is that our troops are in force in Korea today; that if it were not for the Chinese Communists the North Korean situation would have been liquidated long before this; and certainly the casualties which we have suffered since late October or late November when the Chinese crossed the Yalu in force have been attributable primarily, if not exclusively—because there are still a few North Koreans fighting—to the aggression and the conflict which the Chinese Communists are having with us. Is that not correct?

General BARR. Yes; that is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. So that I am a little at a loss to understand how we are not engaged in a major—well, in a limited conflict, if you want, but at least a substantial conflict—against the Chinese Communists in Korea.

Now, the reason I am pressing this point is because you are a man of considerable reputation who has testified before the Foreign Relations Committee before and whose testimony heretofore has been I think very damaging to the cause of the Republic of China.

Now, what I am trying to get at is, inasmuch as we are now engaged not by our choice but by their choice with the Chinese Communist forces, what is wrong even if the Seventh Fleet remains there, with the Chinese National forces contributing to the common effort to help establish the collective security system in Korea and to resist aggression?

I get back to the point that Senator Stennis had raised earlier. Instead of making these Europeans—largely Europeans and Americans fighting oriental Communists, why should we not add, to the Filipinos and the Thailand troops who are there and who are contributing under their United Nations obligation, the troops of the Republic of China which today is a member of the United Nations, which we recognize as a legal government of China, which is a charter member of the United Nations, and is a permanent member of the Security Council?

What is wrong with accepting their share of the contribution to help balance up these forces so we do not carry 90 percent of the load?

General BARR. You mean the United States accepting it, or the——

Senator KNOWLAND. No, the United Nations accepting it.

General **Barr**. If I were on the United Nations, my feeling would be the fear of bringing on a general war, if you permitted an open attack on China, itself.

Senator **Knowland**. I am not talking about an open attack on China.

General **Barr**. Under the mutual agreement treaty between China and Russia, Russia would be bound to come in.

Senator **Knowland**. I am not now directing it to raids on the China coast, though we will come to that.

I am directing it now to the accepting of the offer of a charter member of the United Nations, to contribute as many troops, 33,000, as all the rest of the United Nations have put in, altogether, a year after the war has broken out in Korea, and using them in Korea.

I mean, I am trying to get your point of view, because it differs——

General **Barr**. I only have two points, and I have stated them many times.

One is that it is questionable in my mind, as to whether the troops on Formosa could adequately defend Formosa, if it were not also protected by the Seventh Fleet; and, the other is the likelihood of bringing on a general war; and I can only repeat those answers.

Senator **Knowland**. Well, now, as to the first one, obviously the generalissimo and General Sun and K. C. Wu, and others responsible for the government of Formosa and the protection of 8,000,000 Chinese there, they are going to be just as concerned as you are about protecting Formosa, so I assume they would not have offered them——

General **Barr**. They would be very, very hopeful that they, if they made that commitment, in the United Nations, that the United Nations would reciprocate by giving them the same protection.

Senator **Knowland**. Do I understand that you agree, or do not agree that it would be detrimental to have Formosa pass into unfriendly hands?

I understood that you thoroughly agreed with the Joint Chiefs on that.

General **Barr**. It would be detrimental.

COMMANDO-TYPE RAIDS ON CHINESE COAST

Senator **Knowland**. The second point was that in November, as you probably know, General MacArthur recommended that the Chinese Nationalists be permitted to make commando-type raids upon the China coast, for the purpose of relieving the pressure on you, and our other commanders and soldiers, in Korea.

In late December, as was established by the record today, General Ridgway, who was the successor of General MacArthur, sent a cable, unknown to General MacArthur at the time, to General Collins, Chief of Staff, in which he fully concurred in the advisability and desirablity of doing that in order to relieve the pressure upon our forces in Korea.

Were you familiar with that?

General **Barr**. No, only so much as I have read in the press.

Senator **Knowland**. One last question, General. I understood you to testify in regard to the Yalta agreement that the representatives of the Republic of China, the President and his leading officials, were disappointed or shocked or chagrined.

General **Barr**. They were resentful at the time.

Senator KNOWLAND. Resentful of the Yalta agreement?

General BARR. Yes.

YALTA AGREEMENT RELATIVE TO FALL OF CHINESE REPUBLIC

Senator KNOWLAND. Which we both can thoroughly understand, but then I was a little confused at your later testimony that in your judgment the Yalta agreement did not contribute to the fall of the Republic of China, and I wanted to make sure as to whether I understood you properly.

The Yalta agreement, as you know, turned over the Manchurian Railroad to a joint operation, presumably between the Russians and the Chinese which the Russians largely dominated, turned over Dairen and Port Arthur. It put that, and the subsequent acts which followed Yalta put the Soviet Union in Manchuria and in a place to give aid to the Chinese Communist forces, and the testimony before this committee at least to date has seemed to be rather clear that that gave the Communists pretty much of a stranglehold on Manchuria.

Now the reason I am confused is that I have generally understood that the person who controlled Manchuria at least had a considerable advantage in the move to control China. Don't you believe that is correct?

General BARR. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. So that at least by taking that second bite of the apple, wouldn't you say that the Yalta agreement did contribute to the ultimate downfall of the Republic of China?

General BARR. It no doubt was a contributing factor. I understood this morning the way the question was put to me it was a major cause of the downfall of China. In other words, China might not have fallen had it not been for the Yalta agreement. I think China would have fallen.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, then it is a question of degree as to how large a contribution it was.

General BARR. That is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. But it at least was a contributing factor. I wanted to get that clear.

General BARR. Of course had the Chinese been able to use Dairen and had they been able to keep a line of communication open to Mukden, it would have been of great assistance to them.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain, you said you had some more questions.

Senator CAIN. General Barr, this will take but several minutes I think, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I apologize to you, Senator Cain, for letting Senator Knowland run over, but I am sure Senator Knowland will do you the courtesy of staying here until you conclude your questions.

Senator CAIN. I thought it was most proper in order that the Senator could have a continuity to his approach.

DRIVING RED CHINESE OUT OF KOREA

Against my very limited but very thoughtful study through the years of both history and war, I have felt for some months now that the Korean conflict in all of its ramifications is without parallel in history, and that the conduct of the free nations is both unbelievable and incredible.

I sit here every day and all day and most willingly in hopes that my curiosity about some of these matters can be cleared up. I thought I had heard everything until I read this morning's New York Times to which I wish to make the briefest sort of a reference in a moment or two.

On page 7919 of your testimony you said:

> I think the time will arrive when we can drive the Chinese out of Korea. I do not know how we are ever going to keep the Chinese out of Korea. * * *

Will you tell me as best you can, sir, what you have in mind as to the time and under what circumstances we are going to drive the Red Chinese out of Korea?

General Barr. That was a rather general statement. I feel that our strength, our combat efficiency will eventually build up in Korea to where perhaps we would be able to drive the Chinese Communists out of Korea, but we cannot keep them out of Korea unless we occupy the border, which we certainly do not want to do. That was perhaps too general a statement. Maybe I shouldn't have made it.

Senator Cain. General Barr, is it your view that the allied forces can drive the Red Chinese and the North Koreans as aggressors out of Korea with the present total strength the free nations have committed today in Korea?

General Barr. I can't answer that question, Senator, because I don't know the relative combat efficiency of the two forces.

ADDITIONAL UN FORCES NEEDED IN KOREA

Senator Cain. Thank you, sir. Permit me to make reference to the New York Times of today.

Ernest A. Gross, deputy United States representative, said in a letter to Secretary General Trygve Lie of the United Nations on yesterday, June 21, this:

> There is a real need for additional forces from member states in the light of massive Chinese Communist concentrations in the area and of their continuing aggression.

That observation made by Mr. Gross in an official manner does not indicate, does it, that the free forces think they can repel the aggressor with the troops now available?

General Barr. It doesn't indicate that, no. He wouldn't be asking for additional help if it did.

Senator Cain. What startled and actually shocked me about this additional troop need, as written about in the New York Times, was this:

> Mr. Gross asked Mr. Lie to relay the United States appeal to the members concerned, asking them to "give immediate consideration to making an initial contribution of ground forces of substantial character, consonant with their respective capabilities and other responsibilities."
>
> "Further, it is requested that member governments be asked to notify the Secretary General of offers in general terms, detailed arrangements to be made by the respective member governments and the unified command," the letter concluded.
>
> United Nations officials said the letter—

on this most critical of all subjects, a letter which said we want some immediate help from all of our allies in Korea—

United Nations officals said the letter would be forwarded to Mr. Lie, who is in Copenhagen preparatory to taking a vacation in Norway.

Just as one American, my feeling has no resentment in it to you, General Barr, of any kind, but does that paper indicate to us that the management of the United Nations lies not in the unified command, which already has caused or had 170,000 American casualties within it, but lies entirely within the hands of one human being, who any time he leaves New York and goes to Denmark or on a vacation in Norway must be tracked down to wherever he is before we can even get a "yes" or "no" from our allies?

It is for that reason, sir, that I said this is an unbelievable war, in which men are dying while other men are taking holidays; and that is why I asked you what you meant when you said, "I think the time will come when we can drive the Red Chinese out of Korea."

I pray and share your hopes, sir, that that day will come, but on the basis of our present battle plans and until we can find Mr. Lie to ask him to ask others for more contributions, we can have no assurance of it, sir.

I thank you and am grateful for your testimony.

APPRECIATION OF GENERAL BARR'S TESTIMONY

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, if there are no further questions, this will conclude the examination of General Barr.

General, I want to express to you my personal thanks and those of the committee for your appearance here and for your assistance to us in matters which we have under inquiry.

I shall not resort to any comparisons, but I do wish to say that I have never seen a witness who answered questions more directly than you have, and I am sure that no one could have listened to your testimony without being impressed by your sincerity and the honesty of the conviction that moved you to the different positions that you have taken.

I am glad to say that the way you have stood up under this grilling indicates that I was somewhat in error this morning when I referred to your recent indisposition. You must have had a toothache or something of that nature, but I heard that you were ill.

We thank you, sir, for your assistance to the committees and for your long and patriotic service to our country.

General BARR. Thank you very much, Senator Russell. I greatly appreciate the consideration of the committees in questioning me.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to join the sentiments of the Chair and I know all the other committee members feel the same way about this gentleman's fine contribution here with such close proximity to the battlefield in Korea and these problems in China. He has helped me wonderfully.

General BARR. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committees will stand in recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

(Whereupon at 5:40 p. m. the hearing was adjourned to reconvene on Monday, June 25, 1951 at 10:03 a. m.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

MONDAY, JUNE 25, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:03 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committe on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, George, Smith of New Jersey, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Fulbright, Tobey, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, and Flanders.

Also present: William H. Darden, chief clerk, Verne D. Mudge and Mark H. Galusha, staff members, Committee on Armed Services; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman **Russell**. The committees will come to order.

Senator **Knowland**. Mr. Chairman, I have a procedural matter.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Knowland.

ADMIRAL KING'S VIEWS ON RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN JAPANESE WAR

Senator **Knowland**. On June 16, 1951, I addressed a letter to Admiral Ernest J. King, reading as follows:

> Dear Admiral: As you know, the Joint Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee has been conducting hearings relative to our far eastern policy.
>
> Among the policy decisions that were made that appear to have had a far-reaching effect in the Far East, was the bringing of the Soviet Union into the war in the Far East. The facts indicate that their troops entered Manchuria 6 days prior to the Japanese surrender on August 14, 1945.
>
> It would be very much appreciated if you would send me any information available to you relative to your viewpoint and that of the Navy Department regarding the desirability of bringing the Soviet Union into the war in the Far East and such other facts that you might be able to present which would be helpful to the committee in the understanding of the problem.
>
> With best personal regards, I am
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> William F. Knowland.

I received today the following answer from Admiral King, dated June 21, 1951, addressed to me, reading as follows:

> Dear Senator Knowland: In reply to your letter of June 16 I am pleased to inform you that at the time of the Yalta Conference (February 3–10, 1945) I was agreeable to the entry of the U. S. S. R. into the war in the Far East. It was the belief of the Navy that Japan could and should be defeated without an invasion of the home islands. Our contention was that blockade and bombard-

ment could bring about Japanese capitulation and that in connection with this course of action, engagement of the Japanese armies in Manchuria by the Soviets would hasten that capitulation.

When the late President Roosevelt asked me about making concessions to Premier Stalin in order to get him to "play ball." I replied that I would concede him only the southern half of the island of Sakhalin and that as a "sop."

My expectation was that the Soviets would enter the conflict in the Far East sooner than they did, but perhaps Stalin and company were getting back at the Allies for not opening up the second front in Europe sooner than they did.

I would remind you that as the Navy member of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff my job was advisory in nature. I did not attend any of the meetings between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin and consequently I have no first-hand knowledge of decisions reached, policies formulated or agreements made thereat.

With kindest personal regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

ERNEST J. KING,
Fleet Admiral.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, I have another procedural matter which I would like to bring before the committees, if this is the proper time.

Chairman RUSSELL. You might as well do it now, as any other time, Senator McMahon.

POSSIBLE TESTIMONY BY HARRIMAN

Senator McMAHON. Well, now it will be recalled that Averell Harriman was the only witness who was scheduled for a hearing by these committees who has not been heard.

The determination to relieve Mr. Harriman of the obligation to testify was made by the subcommittee before we heard from this very unusual character, Patrick J. Hurley. The recommendation was made to the full committee before we had heard from Mr. Hurley.

I believe that it would be a mistake to close this record without the testimony of Mr. Harriman who was present at Yalta. I have very much in mind Winston Churchill's admonition that we better not spend so much time on the past that we will lose the present and endanger the future, but at the same time we must remember too that we are making and have made a record here which will undoubtedly affect history. It would seem to be an obligation in view of Mr. Hurley's testimony, particularly his testimony with regard to Yalta, the circumstances that surrounded it, that we have the testimony of a man who above all others that I know of has information in regard to that conference, the circumstances surrounding it, what immediately preceded it and what followed it.

I personally would like to see these hearings close. I, like all the other Senators, have much work backed up that we ought to get about. I do not wish to delay, but I bring for the consideration of the committee the problem that I have presented.

If perhaps it is decided in the interests of speed that you want to close this hearing, then I would ask unanimous consent to print in the record at the conclusion of General O'Donnell's testimony a sworn affidavit from Mr. Harriman bearing upon the Yalta Conference and what went before it and what went after it, and I make that request.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

Senator KNOWLAND. I have no desire to object to the request of the Senator to have Mr. Harriman come before the committee if in the judgment of the committee they want to extend the hearings, but it would seem to me that if he was going to make a lengthy sworn affidavit, the same right of cross-examination of Mr. Harriman then should be available to the other members of the committees that has been available to the other witnesses before the committees.

I reach no final conclusion on it, because I thought we had generally agreed that the hearings would terminate and perhaps if we have Mr. Harriman, we should balance that off with perhaps another witness.

But I would not want at this time to agree to a lengthly affidavit from Mr. Harriman and foreclose us from the right of cross-examination of Mr. Harriman.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, Senators have from time to time introduced material into the record, have they not?

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh, yes; that has been quite a common practice ever since the hearings opened.

Senator McMAHON. Would the Senator from California object to my introducing on my own responsibility a statement by Mr. Harriman into the record?

Senator KNOWLAND. No, I certainly will not object to your introducing it, but I would want a little further time to consider whether under those circumstances we would want Mr. Harriman to be present in person.

Senator McMAHON. Would you support a motion if I made it calling Mr. Harriman as a witness before the committees?

Senator KNOWLAND. I haven't any final conclusion on that matter, but if there is going to be a substantial sworn statement from Mr. Harriman, then it would seem to me that the proper procedure would be to have Mr. Harriman here where he could be examined fully in regard to the Yalta Conference and other matters. I might prefer to handle it in that way.

When will he be back?

Senator McMAHON. I understand he will be back on Friday. I have been in contact with him, and I frankly would prefer not to hold up the hearings, not to have him called as a witness simply because it would delay.

On the other hand, I feel very keenly that there must be a statement from Mr. Harriman in this record.

Now, of course, if permission was refused to put it into the record, I suppose I could take it over and read it on the floor, and it would be before the people of the United States. It would not make a great deal of difference.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, might I say that there is certainly no desire on my part, if Mr. Harriman has information which you think is that vital, to not having it made available to the committee.

My only point goes to the fact that since Mr. Harriman is one of the few people who attended the Yalta Conference, then it seems to me that if his statement is going in, that the members of the committee who might want to examine on certain phases of it, should have that opportunity, so it would seem to me in that way you would get the statement that you want, and we would not be foreclosed from an examination of Mr. Harriman on the stand.

Senator McMAHON. You understand that I am not desirous of foreclosing that examination.

Senator KNOWLAND. No.

GETTING A PREPARED STATEMENT FROM HARRIMAN

Senator McMAHON. I would suggest this then, Mr. Chairman: Mr. Harriman—I suggested, through his representative, that a statement be prepared by him, and he will be coming back by boat, although I am not sure, and he will have time to work on that statement, and prepare it.

I presume that we will, regardless of the fact that we close the testimony today, have perhaps some more meetings in order to talk about our business, and at that time I could make a formal motion. Has the chairman any suggestion on that?

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, we had hoped, and the Chair personally, earnestly had hoped, that we might be able to conclude the taking of the testimony before these committees today.

We will undoubtedly be compelled to have a number of other meetings of the committees before we conclude all of our work in connection with these hearings.

We have had matters read into this record by members of the committees. The whole question of whether or not other witnesses will be called is one that is in the power of the committees, as a whole, the majority of the committees.

I might suggest that the Senator from Connecticut obtain the statement to which he refers, and that he might submit a copy of it to the Senator from California, and give him an opportunity to acquaint himself with what the statement contains, and then at a later time and in the future course of the committee, with respect to Mr. Harriman's testimony, that would be in the jurisdiction of a majority of the committees.

A majority of them could call him here, or the Senator from Connecticut could read his statement into the record on the floor of the Senate or into the record of these committees at some subsequent date.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, when we arrived at a settlement here by the subcommittee appointed, it was unanimous, and you talked as chairman of the subcommittee of the full committee, with Mr. Harriman. He felt all right about it.

Now this proposal of Senator McMahon raises a new issue here—whether or not we are going to open up the committee.

Now I think that the first I had heard about it was right this morning. Couldn't we delay any decision on that until this afternoon when we have a little time to think about it.

For instance, when I agreed to eliminate some of the people that we were asking for, why, it was agreed to eliminate Mr. Harriman, and if we are going to call Mr. Harriman, I would like to talk to Senators who are interested in one or two other witnesses and we bring them before us at the same time. But I would like an opportunity to discuss with them, and then perhaps this afternoon decide it.

Couldn't we leave it, if it is satisfactory to the Senator from Connecticut, open to this afternoon so we could reach a decision on it?

Senator McMAHON. I would prefer to leave it the way the Senator from Georgia, the chairman, suggested. I will go ahead and get the statement, we will have future meetings of the committees, and I can raise the procedural question at that time.

I do not think the Senator from New Hampshire was present when I made this point.

Senator BRIDGES. No, I was not.

Senator MCMAHON. That Harriman was the only witness who had not been before the committee who was originally scheduled. In that point he is unique.

Secondly, I feel most strongly about the testimony, unusual testimony, of one Patrick J. Hurley, that has been given here before this committee, and I think that it would be important that Harriman's testimony be received. I just wanted the Senator from New Hampshire to know it seems to me to be a case not to be measured by the usual rules that may be applied to suggestions of other witnesses.

Chairman RUSSELL. I hope, gentlemen, that we will proceed according to the suggestion I made that the Senator from Connecticut get the statement Mr. Harriman might desire to make, and he will furnish a copy of it to the Senator from California.

Senator SMITH. Might I suggest that some of the rest of us get a copy of this. I am very much interested in Mr. Harriman's coming before the committees and would like to see a copy of the statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. Inasmuch as the Senator from New Jersey is the member of the committee who first made the motion that Mr. Harriman be requested to appear before the committees, I think it is nothing but proper that he will receive a copy of it. If the Senator from Connecticut will not furnish him with it, or the Senator from California declines to let him see the one he has, if the Senator from Connecticut will furnish me a copy, I will have the staff of the committees make some copies of it.

Senator MCMAHON. I will get out a thousand copies, and I am sure the Senator from New Jersey will get one.

Chairman RUSSELL. Then the committees will determine the course of action.

Does the Senator from Washington have some procedural matter?

MOTION ON PARAPHRASES OF DECEMBER 29 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE TO TOKYO

Senator CAIN. Yes, I have one procedural question, Mr. Chairman. On Friday, June 8, I offered the motion that before our hearings were to be concluded that either the JCS as a whole or its Chairman be returned as a witness to broaden the committees' understanding of some apparent discrepancies in the several paraphrases of December 29, 1950.

My only question is: May I ask the chairman what he has in mind for the disposition of that motion.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I recall the Senator making that motion, and it is before the committees. I thought that the Senator's motion, though, related to the discrepancy as to who attended a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Sunday, April 8. That was my recollection. But there are so many motions that have been made and so much has transpired, and of course the Chair is subject to error in addition, that I could be mistaken about it.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that, with reference to the item you have in mind, it was the Senator from Oregon, Mr. Morse, who offered a motion to be acted on at a later date that the Chairman of the JCS would come back to tell us something more about the first meeting, as I recall, in the Chairman's office.

Chairman RUSSELL. That could well be, but since the motion was made, General Bradley of course had written a letter to the committees.

Senator CAIN. That is my understanding.

Chairman RUSSELL. For the record, which undertook to explain the confusion about the incident.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir. My motion dealt entirely with the paraphrase of December 29, 1950.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the Senator has a right of course to make his motion, and if he desires action to be taken on it now——

Senator CAIN. I would only ask advice of the chairman. I would much prefer not to impose upon the time of our witness.

Chairman RUSSELL. The chairman would suggest that if it would suffice for the purposes that the Senator from Washington has in mind, that if the Senator would address a letter to me with respect to this, we could handle it through another procedure and secure a statement from whatever official supervised the preparation of the paraphrases as to the reasons for not including the entire document.

Senator CAIN. My feeling, Mr. Chairman, is that I would rather if these is to be a time later on to discuss several pending motions, to defer any further consideration of my motion until a later date.

Chairman RUSSELL. I thank the Senator. There will be, I might say now, that the present purpose of the Chair, if the hearings are concluded today or tomorrow, is to call a meeting of the two committees for Wednesday or Thursday to discuss procedures, or in common parlance, where do we go from here, and at that time all of the motions that are pending will be subject to action by the committees as well as any other matters that might arise.

Senator CAIN. That means, sir, if I may ask, that if the hearings are concluded today or tomorrow, it will be on an understanding that they can be reopened against the approval of some of the motions.

Chairman RUSSELL. I stated at the time we voted that the committees were unanimous in its vote to conclude the hearings after the testimony of the four witnesses was received. It is still within the power of the committees to reverse themselves and to order other witnesses before the committee.

Senator CAIN. The only reason I have spoken, sir, is that the JCS on two occasions have given us two paraphrases, and I personally would prefer to have them talk to us verbally rather than from the written word before the hearings are over.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committees have the right and the power to summon the JCS if they see fit.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, I hope you won't call the committees together Wednesday morning or Thursday morning. Make it in the afternoon or night, because we have got to take up the tax bill on Wednesday. We start Wednesday morning, but we will not be all day on it, and we will not be all day on it Thursday. We could meet in the afternoon.

Chairman RUSSELL. Before I issue any call for the committees I will consult with my colleague to minimize the confusion as much as possible.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I understand from your last statement it will be possible to present some exhibits for the record. I have a few here that I will not take the time today to introduce.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator will have ample opportunity to do that. As a matter of fact, we have not yet received all of the material that has been requested. We can't close the record now. I did not intend to close the record.

I had hoped we could conclude taking of oral testimony from witnesses.

RECORD OF THE WITNESS

Gentleman of the committee, if there are no more procedural matters, I should like to present the distinguished witness before these committees for today's session. The witness is Maj. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., of the United States Air Force.

General O'Donnell has been one of our top commanders in the Air Force, served in that capacity in World War II. He was in the Philippines at the outbreak of World War II. When the United States was forced into the war, he was stationed there, having led the first squadron of B–17 Flying Fortresses across the western Pacific. His group immediately engaged the enemy and fought in the air and on the ground until they were forced to withdraw to Bataan and later to Mindanao, some eventually being evacuated to Java.

Before the war in the Philippines was 2 days old, General O'Donnell earned the Distinguished Flying Cross when, forced off the ground by an enemy air attack upon Clark Air Force Base, Manila, he proceeded individually to Vigan where he attacked a heavy cruiser and destroyer escort. Because of mechanical trouble with the bomb releases, he was forced to make five runs over the target while subjected to heavy antiaircraft fire and, during the last run, by enemy fighters.

Later, he commanded the Seventy-third Bomb Wing, that was a B-29 wing, and he led it on the first Superfortress attack made on Tokyo.

Since the war, he has held a number of high positions in the Air Force, including the command of the Far Eastern Air Force Bomber Command, from July 8, 1950, until January 10, 1951.

We are glad to have this distinguished soldier before these committees.

General O'Donnell, the committees have directed me to administer the oath to all witnesses. You will therefore please raise your right hand:

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give these committees upon the matters under inquiry shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General O'DONNELL. I do.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have a seat, General.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. EMMETT O'DONNELL, JR., UNITED STATES AIR FORCE; ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COL. C. GEORGE DOYLE, STAFF OFFICER, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Chairman RUSSELL. General, do you have any prepared statement, or statement you desire to make to the committees?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir; I do not.

Chairman RUSSELL. Suppose you tell us a bit, first, about the operation of the bomber command during the time that you were its commanding officer in Korea; your objectives, and what means were taken to achieve those objectives?

BOMBER GROUPS TO KOREA

General O'DONNELL. I think it is best to tell you a little of our actual set-up out there. When the war broke out, I was in command of the Fifteenth Air Force, which is part of the Strategic Air Force of the Strategic Air Command.

I was stationed at March Field, Calif., and several weeks, 2 weeks after the war was being fought, I believe it was, or on July 2, it was decided to send a few B-29 groups out to the Pacific. I was selected to head these groups and was sent out there, so to speak, on loan.

I was not stationed under the Far East Air Force Command, I did not belong to them; I was on loan, on temporary duty. Throughout the time I was out there commanding the Far East Bomber Command I retained command of the Fifteenth Air Force back here in the States.

I think that is important to bring up because while I was in command of that effort out there, I still was cognizant of the global and world-wide plans of the Strategic Air Command and was always aware of them.

In the first place, we pride ourselves in the Strategic Air Command on our ability to retaliate quickly. We have had many exercises during the last few years, taking our groups to England and to the Orient. We have streamlined our packages and equipment so that we can get out there in an absolute minimum of time and go into action.

I received the first notification I was to go out there at my quarters on July 2. I came in here to Washington to get my instructions from General Vandenberg and General Le May, alerted two of my wings, one in Spokane and one at March Feld, told them to get going.

I came back, got out there just in time ahead of them to acquire bases from which they would operate; and we were actually in operation on July 13, an over-all time of 11 days from the time we got the first notification.

We were in operation from that day on. It was not a stunt. It was sustained operation. And from that day on right through to the end of the first phase we were operating every single day. I never canceled a mission for weather, either at base, en route, or at the target throughout the entire campaign.

Senator WILEY. Where was your base?

General O'DONNELL. We were based, one squadron in Japan and the other squadron was already out there on Okinawa. These flights entailed an average length of 10 hours of flying time, and this period of time was the monsoon season, where bad weather is the rule rather than the exception.

BOMBING PHASES IN KOREA

During this period, I would say the first phase—we look upon the war as having been fought in three distinct phases, the first of which goes from June until about the end of October when we were engaged in the fighting of North Koreans only.

From the 1st of November on until about a month and a half ago we were engaged with the North Korean and Chinese Communist ground forces only; and from about a month and a half ago until the present time, when we have those two participants, plus a quite enlarged air action on the Chinese Communist side of the border.

During the first phase, when we were operating against the Korean forces, the first phase of the war, we considered that by the 31st of October, that that phase had been completed and successfully completed. The Korean ground forces had been completely defeated. Our own forces were up to the Yalu.

As far as my activities were concerned, I stopped flying and we were actually on the ground for 1 week because the bomb line had moved clear to the border, and there were no targets left in Korea.

We consequently spent that time in practicing landings and checking off copilots and procedures, and getting ready to go home.

During that time we flew 40,000 hours—this is up to the 31st of October.

We dropped 30,000 tons of high explosives, and we did all this at a cost only slightly greater in casualties, facilities, and losses of aircraft than we could have expected for a comparable number of hours of training at home.

Senator SALTONSTALL. That is with very bad weather?

General O'DONNELL. Very bad; yes, sir.

Because of the weather we operated in one of three different ways: We tried to bomb in formation visually, if possible; in formation by radar over the top of the overcast, if necessary; and by individual aircraft in the air overcast, if driven to it. In other words, if the overcast was so high that we could not get on top, we broke up and went into the target by radar in the soup.

[Deleted.]

It was my intention and hope, not having any instructions, that we would be able to get out there and to cash in on our psychological advantage in having gotten into the theater and into the war so fast, by putting a very severe blow on the North Koreans, with advanced warning, perhaps, telling them that they had gone too far in what we all recognized as being a case of aggression, and General MacArthur would go top side to make a statement, and we now have at our command a weapon that can really dish out some severe destruction, and let us go to work on burning five major cities in North Korea to the ground, and to destroy completely every 1 of about 18 major strategic targets.

I was working under the operational control out there of General Stratemeyer. I am trying to remember—I belonged in the States—I am working under the operational control of Stratemeyer, but I still belong to LeMay, General LeMay, in the Strategic Air Command.

General Stratemeyer, of course, worked under the Supreme Commander out there, and he told us it would not be possible to carry out an attack such as that at that time, the reason being that our hard-pressed ground forces were in a very bad state, indeed, and that every weapon at the command of the theater commander must, and properly should be, used in support of the ground forces.

We, therefore, devoted most of our time during those 3 months, I would say, two-thirds of our time, to direct support of the ground forces. We were forced to go into many unorthodox methods of operation for the B-29.

DAMAGE INFLICTED BY BOMBING

We attacked every type of target from culverts and railroad bridges to cars and tracks and tanks, and right on up through war-supporting industries, both direct and indirect.

We did some major damage out there, a damage which I think affects Russia. For instance, we smashed completely the high-frequency steel installation at Songjin which, I was told later, had an output of 3½ million tons of stainless and cobalt steel a year, every bit of which went right into Russia.

We smashed entirely the entire chemical complex at Konan which is far and away the largest in the whole Far East. Its electrolysis plant alone, for instance, was longer than the Empire State Building is tall. They had some very modern industry out there, not generally known; but they had a good steel and coal and iron business; they had well-developed chemical plants and fertilizer plants.

We completely destroyed the large fertilizer combine at Konan, and I am sure that the loss of that fertilizer will certainly be felt by the farmers in Manchuria and north China during the coming years.

Senator WILEY. Who built those plants?

General O'DONNELL. The Japanese originally and they, of course, as you know—Korea was one area in the world that was not very severely, under Japanese domination—had not been very severely damaged by the war. In fact, it emerged from the war the least damaged area in Asia, I suppose, so that it was a nice plum for the Russians to get hold of and to further develop.

[Deleted]

UTILIZATION OF AIR FORCE RESOURCES AND MANPOWER

I would like to say just a word—I wanted to say this, too, that we broke all records for utilization of resources that have ever been set up in the Air Forces and of course, we cannot take too much credit for it or too many bows for it because we were working under optimum conditions, except for the weather.

[Deleted]

We saw no enemy air action worthy of the name, and I saw personally no—never even saw a North Korean or Chinese Communist, Russian-made plane in the air. However, our record for safety of operation and the small fatalities and small loss of aircraft record is a great tribute, I think, to our training system and to our crews.

I mention crews because I think we must look upon trained bombardment crews as one of our prime resources. They are not easily replaced, and they are very hard, indeed, to train and to get completely able to go out and do a job on a global scale.

These boys are mainly—they are not boys, they are mature men. Most of them had experience in the last war. They average about 30–31 years of age. They are truly professional. They go about their job in a professional manner, they approach it in a professional manner, and they achieve professional results. They are the New York Yankees.

I bring that out because I think we have to be very careful in these days of reconversion and activation of new groups not to needlessly waste those crews. They are seed corn and we need them badly.

Chairman RUSSELL. What do you mean by needlessly waste them, General?

General O'DONNELL. Well, I think we have to be very careful. I think that the utilization of the bombers in this campaign was wise and proper. I think it was wise and proper because it was the only—these B–29's were the only available weapons capable of delivering real destruction in the United States arsenal.

We were hard-pressed. We got into a bad bind. We needed to extricate our people and save the situation as best we could.

PROPER UTILIZATION OF HEAVY BOMBERS

I think we should be very careful in the future about assigning heavy bombardment, medium bombardment, to this type of task. I am afraid that particularly after we get new equipment, super, really ultra modern equipment, and highly trained crews to fly them, we must be very careful about their utilization.

I think they should be utilized by one command, the command who has studied their utilization, who knows everything about it, and they should not be given out piecemeal to theaters where they might be used improperly. I think they might be sent against unworthy targets. If we get into a war quickly, I am afraid that it might be if we had that kind of equipment out there, the theater commander might throw them against unworthy targets—the only way I can think of it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, you performed any number of missions that ordinarily are within the sphere of operations of the light bombers, did you not?

General O'DONNELL. That is right, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were talking about bombarding culverts. That is like using a shotgun to kill a flea. Was that due to a lack of light bombers to perform the mission?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; and bad weather, and the fact that we carried a terrific load. Every B-29 carries 10 tons of 500 pound bombs. That is 4, 500-pound bombs. That is a really good load, and they have the power.

Again, as I say, in this situation I think it was right and proper that we utilized them as we did.

Chairman RUSSELL. We have had reports here that the B–29's were being used extensively as tactical support of ground troops.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you think that is an improper use of the B–29?

General O'DONNELL. Well, close support—I do think it is an improper use. Close support, by that I mean trying to attack actual troops. General support is a little bit behind—knocking over bridges and interdicting the supply lines. I think it is proper at that time.

BREAKING UP TROOP CONCENTRATIONS BY BOMBING

The close support I think is improper because it is very difficult to get a true concentration of troops. We read of concentrations of troops, ad I think the average man believes that here we have 30,000 people and they are right here in one little square-mile area. Actually that is never the case.

At the time we were in our toughest straits I think was just about in August when we were down in the tight little line around the Naktong River, and we had knocked out by that time most of our real strategic targets. Inasmuch as we couldn't burn the cities, we went after these targets, we destroyed them, and really destroyed them.

So I went down to General Stratemeyer and said that if they did have a concentration of troops that were really going to cross the Naktong at a given point—and they were supposed to up—six divisions supposed to cross the Naktong at the city of Wagwon—I said, "If they are truly concentrated in a bivouac there, we would like to take a crack at them, declare a dividend." And he was delighted that we thought we might be able to do it. So we went out and tried it, and I was out there for 2½ hours and I haven't seen anything yet.

We were told they were down there, but I couldn't see anything, notice anything. So we just divided the area into a rectangle about like that [indicating] and cut it into 12 smaller rectangles, and each squadron bombed one rectangle. But the area was much too big for us to do effective bombing.

I would say that if you want to saturate an area, a rule of thumb would be about 300 tons per square mile, which would mean that we could have taken care of an area of 3 square miles, but when I told them we would like to do this, they gave us an area of about 28 square miles and of course we just had to open up the interval between the bombs and spread them out and just hope we were lucky in hitting some.

Actually the patterns were laid down right where we planned them but we never found out whether anything was ever happening or not.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, subsequent to that time—and I think we all recall that very dramatic attempt to break up a concentration that was trying to overwhelm our lines, but since that time—we have had evidence here that one B–29 by going in in close support of ground troops with the use of radar had delivered its load, and when we took over that area we found large numbers—I don't know just how many—1,800 or 2,000 dead anyway.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, you still do not think that that is a proper use.

General O'DONNELL. No; I think that is all right, but I think this is a rather bizarre war out there, and I think we can learn an awful lot of bad habits in it. I think it is all right and they have developed some techniques with some of their new radar sets out there which enables them sometimes to really destroy a target.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have you heard any of these reports of the large number that were killed in this operation?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You are inclined to think they are correct?

General O'DONNELL. I think so; yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now you stated there were two phases, the first and second phase of the war, where we encountered practically no opposition in the air.

General O'DONNELL. That is right, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. And in the third phase we have encountered enemy air of high quality and numbers.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; that is since I left the theater.

[Deleted.]

BOMBING OF NORTH KOREAN CITIES

Chairman RUSSELL. Now you stated that you could not burn the cities there, that you hoped to burn out all these cities. As I understood you intended to give them notice you had better get out of the war or we will burn your cities?

General O'DONNELL. I thought that would take care of the humane aspects of the problem. We thought we could do it. Tell them to either stop the aggression and get back over the thirty-eighth parallel or they better have their wives and children and bedrolls to go down with them because there is not going to be anything left up in North Korea to return to.

Chairman RUSELL. What decision was made at that suggestion of yours?

General O'DONNELL. We were not at that time permited to do it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was that for lack of adequate number of planes or was it some matter of policy?

General O'DONNELL. I think it was an overriding political or diplomatic consideration, sir. I don't know. I am the bomber commander out there and I got the word from General Stratemeyer who said "No," not at this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, you can answer this question: Did you have adequate number of planes there to have carried out the strategy that you suggested?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

BOMBING OF RACIN

Chairman RUSSELL. You did have them. Now this bombing of Racin, did you ever bomb Racin?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have any idea how effective the attack was?

General O'DONNELL. Well, the way we operated out there was General Stratemeyer was very liberal with me. He gave me pretty much authority in selecting my own targets. I did, however, have to go through the process of giving him my intentions each day, maybe for a period of 3 days in the future, and, as I told you, when we first got out there, with the exception of one raid on Wonsan we had to devote almost our entire attention to supporting activities; and I was very anxious to get on with what I called the strategic type of attack which of course is to hit the sources of your enemy's supply. If not able to hit the sources, you should hit the line of communications, and if you must attack the line of communications, we ought to hit at the northernmost point and work down, in my opinion.

So, I scheduled a mission on Racin, which was the northernmost town in Korea, and, as you know, is about 17 miles from the Russian border.

It put out the instructions before the mission went on, to, I think, two squadrons, and the target was the marshaling yard at Racin. The marshaling yard at Racin was the focal point through which most of the supplies coming from Russia had to go down the east coast to the support of the North Korean troops.

The squadrons got up there. I gave them instructions before taking off, that they were not to bomb, without positive identification of the target.

They went up there with a good weather forecast, but actually found the place completely overcast, or undercast, so they bombed by radar through the overcast; and I heard later on that people back home were concerned about our hitting Siberia, but Siberia is 17 miles from Racin, and we don't make that kind of errors.

And there was no question in my mind that we should have stayed on; as far as the accuracy, or capability of hitting the town—there was no question in the world about hitting it, and we didn't bomb the town either.

It is a sharp line of demarcation and there is good radar definition between land and water there; and it is in the form of a good harbor, and a perfect radar target, and we could really have smashed it down and knocked it out of business, there is no question about that; but we were trying to hit the railroad yards to the south; and we finally were able to get a photographic reconnaissance of our strike a little later on, and we found that the patterns were very good patterns indeed.

One was about 1,500 feet, the center of impact of one was about 1,500 feet to the right of the railroad yards, and another one was a comparable distance to the left, so they were just good, solid, substantial misses.

The impact was good, the pattern was good, and they just didn't hit the target.

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe another attack on Racin was called off, and a secondary target was chosen, was it not?

General O'DONNELL. It was planned, but we were then told that we would not be allowed to bomb Racin without specific authorization, and that was General Stratemeyer; and I presume that authorization had to come from Washington.

Chairman RUSSELL. As an Air Force officer of great experience and competence, is it your opinion that you could have bombarded Racin without in anywise, or rather, without any danger of encroachment on Soviet territory?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You think there is no doubt but what you could have effectively bombed it without getting or for any other reason getting over Soviet territory?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not any unidentified air was seen on that one mission to Racin?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir. I don't mean I don't know. There was none observed.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is what I say—there was none observed.

ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNNERY AT WONSAN

At the capital of Wonson was the accuracy of the antiaircraft fire sufficient to cause you to believe that it had the latest devices for direction finding?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir. I think it was visual gunlaying at Wonsan.

Senator BREWSTER. Louder.

General O'DONNELL. I think the gunlaying at Wonsan was of visual type. I was up there in the soup one time in the formation and we didn't see a burst of flak, which indicates they did not have radar gunlaying.

Chairman RUSSELL. Reports have come to us lately that they have been showing considerable accuracy.

General O'DONNELL. I am talking of the time I was out there. I have been away from the issue pretty much in the last 5 months, so it is possible they have got in a lot since then.

PROBLEM OF BOMBING THE YALU RIVER BRIDGES

Chairman RUSSELL. Were you there at the time the missions were run to attempt to knock out the bridges over the Yalu River?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Can you tell us as to whether or not those bridges were actually destroyed, whether the effort was successful?

General O'DONNELL. They were partially destroyed, sir. That is the first time we started running into this new situation when the Chinese Communists actually came in the war and were recognized as bona fide Chinese Communist troops and started pouring across the Yalu and the bridges of the Yalu and were actually engaged by our ground forces and recognized by us as bona fide troops, we were then sent up to bomb the Yalu River bridges.

We were not, however, allowed to violate Manchurian territory, and by violation of the territory I mean we were not allowed to fly over an inch of it.

For instance, the Yalu has several very pronounced bends like most rivers before getting to the town of Antung, and the main bridges at Antung we had to attack in only one manner. There was only one manner you could attack the bridge and not violate Manchurian territory, and that was a course tangental to the southernmost bend of the river.

So you draw a line from the southernmost bend of the river to the bridge and that is your course, and these people on the other side of the river knew that, and they put up their batteries right along the line and they peppered us right down the line all the way.

We had to take it, of course, and couldn't fight back. In addition to that——

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean they were firing on you from Manchurian territory?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir. In addition to that, they had their fighters come up alongside; while I didn't see them myself, the combat mission reports indicate that they would join our formation about 2 miles to the lee and fly along at the same speed on the other side of the river while we were making our approach, and just before we got to bombs-away position, they would veer off to the north and climb up to about 30,000 feet and then make a frontal quarter attack on the bombers just about at the time of bombs-away in a turn. So that they would be coming from Manchuria in a turn, swoop down, fire their cannon at the formation, and continue the turn back into sanctuary—and the boys didn't like it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you have any fighter support on those missions?

General O'DONNELL. Later on we did, sir, but it was very hard for our fighters to get on them. Those jets move so fast it is very difficult indeed to get on them.

As you know, most of the real scraps over there start at about 30,000 and go right down to the deck, and in that short an opportunity you don't have a chance to really get the fight on and engage.

Chairman RUSSSELL. General, this hearing isn't confined altogether to an examination of what happened, but we hope that we will benefit in the future from some of the things we have under investigation.

Now, this country has placed great dependence on our Strategic Air Command as a major weapon of protection in the event of an all-out world war. Many of us have supported that concept very strongly here in the Congress.

DEFENSE OF LONG-RANGE BOMBERS AGAINST JETS

In the event of an all-out war, very few of the targets, I assume, at which these bombers would strike would be within the range of a protecting jet plane; is that right? There would be very few targets to which you could send an escort; is that right?

General O'DONNELL. At the present time that is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. As a man who has had considerable engineering experience in the Air Force, is there any hope whatever that we will be able to get an armament that will protect these big bombers from these jets, or will we just send them out and get them all shot down in the event of an all-out war?

General O'DONNELL. I don't think we will go into armament, Senator. I think our main protection and our main armor is our speed and ability to fly in all types of weather and at night and to seek out and recognize our target and hit it accurately.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have just given us a very vivid picture here of the efficiency of our radar, that you can go over here and bomb within very close range with our radar. If the enemy has radar, won't it pick up our planes, whether day or night or bad weather?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Won't they be assailed and shot down by these jet planes? Can't we get superior armament or at least escort them?

General O'DONNELL. They will pick us up, and it is one thing to pick you up and it is another to shoot you down. That is one reason we must in this country build an overwhelming air force. I think our safety is in numbers. They are going to shoot some of us down, there is no question about that, but it is good to remember that no United States Air Force attack once launched has ever been stopped by enemy action, and we don't believe it ever will be.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, of course, we are all very proud of the record the Air Force has made in never turning back, but you emphasized something in the early part of these hearings that is known to everyone that is familiar with the Air Force, and that is that we have a very limited number of men who are capable of flying these heavier bombers. That is more true with respect to the B-36 than it is with the B-29. It doesn't take but one jet plane to shoot down one of these $6 million B-36's. Six million dollars isn't nearly as important as the lives of the men aboard, not only because they are Americans, but because they are the most highly skilled professionals in their job on earth.

I have been greatly concerned at the apparent lack of faith in American ingenuity in devising some armament that would enable these big craft to at least make it very costly for these jets to come in on them.

General O'DONNELL. I thought you meant—by armament I thought you meant armor plate.

Chairman RUSSELL. No, I thought you referred to the guns on the plane as armament.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; we do. I misunderstood you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Don't you?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; our armament is keeping pace with the development of the aircraft itself, and I think we can inflict quite a bit of damage.

Chairman RUSSELL. I wasn't talking about protection on the plane. I learned about 4 years ago when there was a reference to armament, and I thought they were talking about steel around the vital parts of the plane; but I found out that particular air officer was talking about guns.

General O'DONNELL. I misunderstood you. Yes, indeed, we have armament and development of gun systems for all our aircraft that we think will turn out to be quite successful.

Chairman RUSSELL. In shooting down the attacking planes?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is what disturbed me when you said we didn't have anything. Did I misunderstand the usage of the word?

General O'DONNELL. I thought you said armor.

Senator WILEY. Will you tell us what you fellows agreed on?

General O'DONNELL. Well, we will have armament capable of protecting ourselves on the same ratio we had on the B-29's during the last war against the type of fighter we engaged then.

Chairman RUSSELL. In other words, you think that the defensive fire power of our large bombers is keeping pace with the development of superior fighter planes that are likely to attack us?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. That was the question I was getting at, and you make me feel much better. I was disturbed when you said you didn't think we were making much progress with that. Now, General, you are, of course, familiar with some of the issues on strategy and tactics that have caused such widespread differences of opinion and discussion throughout the country.

WISDOM OF BOMBING MANCHURIAN BASES

What are your views as to the wisdom of accepting the recommendation of General MacArthur that we bomb in Manchuria—enemy targets in Manchuria?

General O'Donnell. Well, sir, I think you have to go back to this phase business again. I think our situation changes constantly. I was all for the bombing of Manchuria, and I wanted very badly to do it as soon as we recognized the Chinese Communist forces, as I said, as bona fide forces.

That was back in November. I think we could have hurt them a great deal, and I think that we should have done it. I know I am speaking beyond my position as bomber commander, but I thought we ought to punish those people and let them know they can't come in as an aggressor and get away with it.

At that time they had very little good fighter cover—I am talking about the Chinese. Their antiaircraft was not too good, and I think we could have gotten in and for very small cost in casualties we could have really hit them hard and perhaps even stopped them.

However, now we are in a position where we are meeting heavy air opposition. I don't know how bad it is, but I know the attrition has gone up tremendously; and, of course, we are faced—there is no question in my mind about whether we have the capability of going in there and really hurting them and driving them out, as far as that goes; but whether we can do it and still retain the Sunday punch for Russia in case they get out of bounds is a problem out of my province. I can't answer that.

The whole situation must be reevaluated and studied by those people who know the whole score on ground, sea, and air.

Chairman Russell. I thought in your position you were supposed to keep up with all the global aspects of our strategy as well as having served as commander of the bombing group in the Far East.

General O'Donnell. I know the air picture, sir, and I think right now——

Senator Wiley. Talk to me, not to him.

Senator Green. We can't hear you down here in these little private conversations Senator Wiley refers to.

General O'Donnell. I am sorry.

Chairman Russell. Talk to Senator Gillette then, General O'Donnell.

Senator Wiley. That fellow is just chairman; we are the guys.

General O'Donnell. What I would like to get at is this: That in my estimation we made a mistake when we didn't attack up there. We had a chance to get at very small cost a big dividend. We failed to do it.

I know there were considerations that are beyond the strictly military, but from a purely military point of view we had a military advantage, a very great one, at the time the Chinese first came in.

I believe we should have exploited those advantages and I think we should have cracked them.

FACTORS IN CONSIDERING MANCHURIAN BOMBING NOW

We are now in a position where we are going through a reconversion program, going from the B–29 to the B–36 to the B–50's to the B–49's. In addition to that we are going through quite a large expansion of the Air Force and much of our talent is wrapped up in doing these jobs.

Whether or not it is wise to go over and involve the whole outfit in the Chinese war or to stay back and continue the development, I don't know. It is beyond my province. I know we could do it, but I doubt the wisdom of doing it now because I think we would wind up in a very bad situation, and we would take the threat away from Russia. We have maintained a constant threat against Russia.

Small as the strategic air command is today, it can deliver the most horribly destructive single blow that the world has ever seen from one unit, and as many people—as Mr. Churchill and many other people—have said, it is the deterrent.

We have that force, we maintain it, we keep it always aimed as a deterrent. Now and then what we don't need for that effort we can play around with in these other theaters.

AIR FORCE DEVELOPMENT

I think the great sin, another great mistake we make, is the failure of our country to follow up the tenets of the masterful reports which Mr. Finletter submitted in 1947, in which he said that the Air Force of the United States should never fall below 70 groups, an absolutely irreducible minimum.

And yet 3 years later we get caught right before the Korean War with no warning but 42 groups, and we are paying for that mistake now. If we had 70 groups in being at the time the Korean War started, it isn't only the 70 groups as airplanes and crew members and maintenance men. Seventy groups is a name given to a program which includes the input into the flying school, the input into mechanics school, the input into radar school, the acquiring of bases, all the rest of the things that go to build up, and we would have our training command well established in putting out people to make crews and to make new squadrons and groups.

That was not done and now we are using our seed corn, and we are trying to expand now but we are faced with a very difficult job. We are trying to do in 1 year what we should have been doing for the last 5. We are trying to compress that job into 1 year.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question? When, General, did you leave Korea?

General O'DONNELL. In January; January 16, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You were there through what you call the second phase?

General O'DONNELL. Well, partially.

Senator GEORGE. Partially?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, not keeping the continuity, but you referred to the development of the Air Force. Some of us who have followed this matter have been concerned at the apparent slowness in providing adequate schools for the expanded Air Force that we hope to acquire. Do you have any opinion on that?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir; I don't have any on that.

Chairman RUSSELL. You are not informed as to what is being done?

General O'DONNELL. I am not informed.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, if I understand you, in brief then, you thought at the time the Chinese came in that we should have attacked all of the bases in Manchuria under the conditions that existed then?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. But since that time conditions have changed to where you would doubt the wisdom of such an attack at the present time?

General O'DONNELL. It would have to be reevaluated by people who know more than I do about the situation.

[Deleted.]

USING THE ATOM BOMB IN WAR

Chairman RUSSELL. That could make quite a difference. You referred to the terrific striking power of our strategic air command which of course would use the atomic bomb as a primary weapon in the event of all-out war.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have been quoted, I believe, General, as having favored using the atomic bomb in the Korean War. Just where do you think that weapon should have been applied, if you were correctly quoted? I don't know whether you were.

General O'DONNELL. I was not correctly quoted. I was quoted as having said that I advocated the immediate use of the atomic bomb, and of course I did not advocate that because that is the President's prerogative and I am in the service long enough not to assume his prerogatives.

I did think that we should use every weapon at our disposal, and by disposal of course I meant any weapon that we could spare at the time the Chinese made their invasion.

Chairman RUSSELL. You did not use the expression "atomic bomb" but you did think we should have used every weapon in the arsenal to strike the Chinese?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I do not want to get you involved in any——

General O'DONNELL. Well, my point was I don't know what the position of stockpile is or anything of that nature or whether there would be atomic bombs at our disposal to utilize in that area. We could have done a good job with a conventional bomb, but it might be——

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not want to get you in any difficulty about the President's prerogative, but in the event of an all-out war, you would play about as vital a part in the destiny of our Nation as most men, and you are familiar with the atomic weapon, I assume.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. And you realized, then you suggested that we use every weapon in the arsenals, that we do have atomic bombs in our arsenals?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Chairman Connally?

Chairman CONNALLY. General O'Donnell, to be very brief—I don't care to interrogate you very much—I always voted for the best Air Force we could secure, and expect to continue to do so. I am very proud of it.

SUCCESS OF OUR AIR FORCE IN KOREA

But frankly, some of us have been a little curious about the success of our air, in the Korean War, I mean by that, relatively speaking, with the enemy.

This morning's paper, I haven't got it here now, had an article there, in the Washington Post, had a report that we had lost in the war so far three-hundred-and-some-odd——

Senator SALTONSTALL. Three hundred and eight.

Chairman CONNALLY. Three hundred and eight; and our enemies had lost only four hundred and something——

Senator SALTONSTALL. Four hundred and ninety-one.

Chairman CONNALLY. Of course that is a big difference; but I thought that with our experts and our trained men and our better equipment, that that would probably be a rather large percentage.

What have you to say about that?

General O'DONNELL. The enemy was not involved in the air war at all, for the first phase. We were putting on a great number of sorties, and the question of a great many of those losses—they were not battle losses, but were due to collisions, crack-ups on take-offs, crack-ups on landing, the type of losses you have here right in the United States. They go on constantly; and we had quite a large air effort going on out there.

As a matter of fact, just to give you an idea of the comparison of the effort, I looked at the statistics the other day, and we have, to this date, in the Korean War, dropped 123,000 tons of bombs; and in the entire Mariannas campaign, which was largely launched by 20 groups of B–29s, throughout almost an entire year against Japan, in which 57 major cities were flattened, we only expended 160,000 tons.

LOSS OF UNITED STATES AND ENEMY PLANES IN KOREA

Chairman CONNALLY. I am not concerned about how many tons there were. I am thinking about how many planes were shot down, you shot down.

General O'DONNELL. I don't think there were that many shot down, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. What?

General O'DONNELL. I don't think there were that many shot down. They were losses—operational losses.

Chairman CONNALLY. You mean the 400 enemy planes?

General O'DONNELL. No. You were wondering about our own losses, I thought.

Chairman CONNALLY. I am; and wondering about our own losses, and I am also wondering about their losses.

You can talk about how many tons of missiles you dropped; but I am concerned about the results of the drops—what did you do?

General O'DONNELL. The results of the tonnage?

Chairman CONNALLY. Yes.

General O'DONNELL. I would say that the entire, almost the entire Korean Peninsula is just a terrible mess. Everything is destroyed. There is nothing standing worthy of the name.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Senator Connally, would it be proper to ask General O'Donnell, in there, what would be the relative casualties to our planes in practice runs here at home, as compared with the losses in Korea?

General O'DONNELL. We are taking more losses now than we were taking formerly.

As I told you, as I pointed out, we ran our first 3½ months' missions with losses only slightly greater than we would have expected for a comparable number of hours here at home.

But now they are running into air opposition, and the losses are mounting. I don't know the percentage.

Chairman CONNALLY. When you first began, of course, they were not very active.

General O'DONNELL. That is right, sir. We had no air opposition worthy of the name.

Chairman CONNALLY. You had very little opposition; but since you have gotten air opposition our losses have increased relatively?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Is that true?

General O'DONNELL. That is right, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. You do not know whether the operators of those planes are Russians or Russian-trained or what?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir; I don't know.

Chairman CONNALLY. But some of them are pretty effective, are they not?

General O'DONNELL. Some of them are very aggressive.

Chairman CONNALLY. Where are you on duty now?

General O'DONNELL. I still command the Fifteenth Air Force. I have the west coast bomber bases. My headquarters are at March Field, Riverside, Calif.

Chairman CONNALLY. Riverside?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. All the way down southern California.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; 60 miles from Los Angeles.

Chairman CONNALLY. I have not been there, but I know where it is.

I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman. I do not want to consume the time of the committee; but I was interested in this particular aspect as to why our casualties—I mean our loss of planes had been so large compared with what I thought otherwise would have been the case if we were as efficient as I thought we were, and they were as deficient as I thought they were.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges?

PROHIBITION AGAINST BOMBING CERTAIN AREAS IN KOREA

Senator BRIDGES. General O'Donnell, you spoke earlier in your testimony of cities or towns that you were prohibited from bombing or attacking. Were those towns and cities, some of them, within the area of North Korea?

General O'DONNELL. All of them were, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. About what period did that include; what time?

General O'DONNELL. Well, this was initially when we first got out there we were instructed not to use incendiary bombs, not to burn down the cities, but there were no compunctions on the part of our commanders to bomb legitimate military targets within those cities with high explosives.

Senator BRIDGES. So that the story that we have heard here about the orders from higher up not to bomb Rashin, and not to bomb developments on the Yalu River, are not the only case where orders had been issued prohibiting bombing or attacking them. There have been others, as you have indicated; and you have just testified there were other orders affecting towns and cities in North Korea during the existence of this so-called police action, limited war——

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator BRIDGES (continuing). War or actual war or whatever way people identify it.

General O'DONNELL. That is right, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. What was the reaction of the men in your service when they learned of orders against bombing these towns and cities, enemy towns and cities in North Korea?

General O'DONNELL. Well, I think that, as I told you, their approach to their work is truly professional, and they go ahead and do a job. They get the briefing, study the target, go out, and hit it.

They were, however, upset by not being able to attack the bases right across the river from which the MIG's were coming, and they had worked themselves up to quite a steam about it. In fact, if we ever had a mission given to us over in the Manchurian side of the border, I don't think I would be able to keep the cooks on the ground; everybody wanted to go up and get at them.

Senator BRIDGES. Knowing the attitude of your men, would you be surprised at some of them—I do not want to identify them because they are now high-ranking officers, and I do not want to end their military careers, which, it seems, may be a factor here with some people, for speaking out—but would you be surprised that some of them have written to me, for instance, as a United States Senator on the Armed Services Committee, or to other Senators, very violently expressing their opinion as to the restrictions? I mean, knowing how they felt; is that a surprise to you?

General O'DONNELL. Well, not particularly, sir.

QUESTION OF "HOT PURSUIT"

Senator BRIDGES. On the question of so-called hot pursuit, General, we had a good deal of testimony on that, and I want to ask, were you there when the controversy developed on so-called hot pursuit in the ability to follow the enemy to its base?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; it had just started.

Senator BRIDGES. What do you care to say about that and, secondly, what were your orders on that?

General O'DONNELL. Well, our orders were a little different from those of the fighters because we were not ever engaged in that kind of work. We would go lumbering in on a given line from an initial point to a target, drop the bombs, make a procedural turn, and then come back; while the fighter actually gets into a dogfight. As I say, they might start at 30,000 feet, and go right down to the ground, and the hot-pursuit principle permits the man who is in combat to watch the enemy and not the ground, and continue on even though he violates the Manchurian border.

Senator BRIDGES. Yes. So that you were not directly affected as the commanders of the fighting units were—I mean the fighting planes, the units of fighters, were on the question of hot pursuit; it was more academic with you.

General O'DONNELL. That is right, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. But your only knowledge is that you were aware of the decisions.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

[Deleted.]

UNITED STATES BOMBERS

Senator BRIDGES. Well, now, what is the difference between the B–29 and the B–50—for the record, again this should I think be classified?

General O'DONNELL. Not very much, sir—speed. More speed.

Senator BRIDGES. More speed?

General O'DONNELL. Able to go up higher.

[Deleted.]

Senator BRIDGES. Now, on the B–36, which is the other type we now have in operation besides the B–50 and the B–29, what would their altitude record be?

General O'DONNELL. Well, they rate in the same altitude bracket, same speed. Of course, we keep changing them all the time, modifying them—better equipment, better bombing devices, that sort of thing—better radar devices.

[Deleted.]

Senator BRIDGES. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will you permit me one question?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. General O'Donnell, we have been told time and again that the Russian heavy bomber is a prototype of our B–29 that was compelled to land in Russia during World War II.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not any of these recent developments that were on the planes that might have been lost in Korea have fallen into the hands of the Russians?

General O'DONNELL. Not to my knowledge, sir. I do not think that any—certainly no new equipment in B–29's has fallen into their hands.

Chairman RUSSELL. You do not think that the latest and most improved——

General O'DONNELL. No, sir. We had the same radar sets in the 29 as we did during the war.

Chairman RUSSELL. And that is true as to the other equipment in these planes that were shot down there?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you.

Senator Wiley?

BOMBING OF RACIN AND OTHER AREAS

Senator WILEY. General, you spoke of Racin—that you were ordered to stop bombing it.

General O'DONNELL. I did not understand you, sir.

Senator WILEY. I say, you were ordered to quit bombing Racin.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Now, as I understand it, you said that Racin was a center into which came the supplies that were sent down the coast to the North Koreans and to the Chinese; that it was a center where they got their military supplies.

General O'DONNELL. That is one of the main communication centers—very fine harbor there; good docks.

Senator WILEY. Yes. Well, what other pivotal point in North Korea is there that you were ordered not to bomb—I understand there was another, or several others.

General O'DONNELL. We were not allowed to bomb the power plants, any of the power plants, and particularly the one on the Sinuiju Dam, which as I understand is the third largest dam in the world and has a tremendous hydroelectric output; and that is about—well, it is up the river from Antung.

Senator WILEY. Now Racin, show us where that is.

General O'DONNELL. Racin isn't on this map. It is north of this map.

Senator WILEY. Now I want to get that straight because it seems to me that from a humanitarian standpoint, from the standpoint of Americans, to stop supplies from getting to our enemy is just common horse sense. Now are there any other vast supply depots in Northern Korea that should have been bombed that you were not permitted to bomb?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir; that was the only one.

Senator WILEY. Now what were the casualties that our United States Air Force suffered, do you know numbers?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir; I am not prepared to answer that. It is relatively light. It has been until recently.

BOMBING MANCHURIA

Senator WILEY. And do you want to express your opinion as to what would have happened if you had got carte blanche authority to knock the hell out of the railroad in Manchuria and the bases up there?

General O'DONNELL. I don't think anything would have happened. You mean as far as Russia's intervention is concerned?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General O'DONNELL. I don't think that the Russians would have dared move, personally.

Senator WILEY. And do you think if that had happened, that the Chinese themselves would have been so incapacitated for lack of war matériel they would have been easier to defeat and more American lives would have been saved?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; I do.

EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT IN KOREA

Senator WILEY. Well, I think you have probably covered this question: The advantages or disadvantages experienced by our Air Force in being sent into action in Korea. What advantages did we have and what disadvantages did we have in the Air Force?

General O'DONNELL. In the early days?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General O'DONNELL. We had the advantage of very little opposition in the air either by antiaircraft or enemy aircraft. The disadvantages we had were the poor bases, relatively poor bases, bad weather, and of course the people who had to live in Korea—I am talking now about the fighters which are really not in my province. They had to live in Korea under very difficult conditions, that is the infantry, the marines and the rest had to put up with, cold—that is about all I have, sir.

Senator WILEY. What do you think, of this recent peace offer or suggestion I think it is, that a peace in Korea be based on the restoration of the thirty-eighth parallel as a boundary between North and South Korea? Do you think that would be practicable?

General O'DONNELL. I am afraid that is beyond my ability to answer, too, sir.

Senator WILEY. You have already covered the subject with Senator Bridges on the question of hot pursuit. Now these Russian planes that they have got in there now, as I understand it they are very good planes, are they not?

General O'DONNELL. Our fighter pilots tell me that the Mig-15 is about the equivalent of the 86. That seems to be a pretty agreed general consensus of opinion.

WISDOM OF BOMBING MANCHURIA

Senator WILEY. Your thought that at the present time you would not go north into Manchuria is based on the fact that you feel that in the world situation there are more potential vital targets that ought to be hit if an explosion occurs?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. And we should not risk the fighting Air Force that we have got?

General O'DONNELL. I think whether or not we should risk it is beyond me too. I do think that this is a dangerous time and we dare not let our guard down on the other side of the world.

Senator WILEY. I think you have stated that the tactical air power in Korea was very effective.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Now the reason we did not exploit our advantage which you say we possessed when the Chinese Communists first came in was due entirely to the fact that someone had said "Don't do it," is that it?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. You have got orders to the effect, "Nothing doing, boys, you don't go into Manchuria, you don't cross that river, you don't fight in Manchuria with the fellows that are fighting you."

General O'DONNELL. That is right, sir.

Senator WILEY. I think you have already expressed the idea that that restriction made our boys fighting mad.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; it did.

Senator WILEY. Now apparently you are under no inhibitions as to what you should say here, are you?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir. I understand that whatever we do say that is not supposed to be published will be stricken from the record or censored later on.

FREEDOM TO TESTIFY

Senator WILEY. What I am getting at is this: that there is considerable talk at times—I do not know whether it is true or not—about restrictions imposed on men of your position when they come before a congressional committee, saying, "Thou shalt not say this or thou shalt not say that." You know of no such inhibitions, do you?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. No prohibition?

General O'DONNELL. No prohibition.

Senator WILEY. Now, as you came out of there in January, you, of course, were not present when General MacArthur was recalled?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir.

OUR BOMBER BASES IN KOREA AND JAPAN

Senator WILEY. And you are not acquainted with the facts that relate to that unfortunate incident, are you?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Did we have any usable airfields in South Korea?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir. Seoul was one. Pusan was another. And quite a few smaller fighter stations, quite a few fighter fields. Only a few that we could use for heavy bombardment, and that only for emergency use.

Senator WILEY. Yes. The other field that you operated your bombers from was in Japan?

General O'DONNELL. Japan.

Senator WILEY. Can you show us in Japan just where that was?

General O'DONNELL. Right up here [indicating].

Senator WILEY. How far would that be then? You would have to cross that ocean. What distance is that?

General O'DONNELL. Well, it is 10 hours—the average. We come down this way [indicating] in order not to have to climb and go over the hills, to conserve our gas and our engines, coming down this way and shooting through here, and go up to the various targets and return.

Senator WILEY. Ten hours?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; the average.

Senator WILEY. One way?

General O'DONNELL. No; the average mission was 10 hours over-all mission.

Senator WILEY. Where was the other one?

General O'DONNELL. Others down here at Okinawa, and they fly due north and back. It is just a little bit longer—about 10½ hours.

Senator WILEY. Would you mind estimating roughly the distance from Okinawa to the southern point of Korea?

General O'DONNELL. That is about 750 miles, I would say offhand.

Senator WILEY. Had you intimate contact with the fliers under your command, the men that were doing the fighting and the operational work—personal, intimate contact with them?

General O'DONNELL. Did I have?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General O'DONNELL. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. And when you spoke about their attitude when you were restricted from going north of the Yalu, you spoke from personal observation and contact with these men as to how they felt?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. What do you say about our ground forces? Do you know anything about them? Did they do a grand job?

General O'DONNELL. No; except I have the greatest of admiration for the task they have accomplished under terrific obstacles, particularly in the early days.

Senator WILEY. Did you have any opinion as to the advisability of imposing a blockade on China?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir; I don't know much about that.

Senator WILEY. You would impose a blockade, and an effective blockade, on the Russians getting stuff through Rashin, though, by bombing?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, destroying it.

MANCHURIAN RAILROAD CONNECTIONS IN KOREA

Senator WILEY. Yes. Now, did the Manchurian Railroad cross any of those bridges across the Yalu?

General O'DONNELL. They have tie-ins with all of them. The Manchurian Railroad ties in with Rashin, I think, through the Tumen Railroad, a small spur line. I don't know exactly what the net comprises, but all the railroads that go into Korea had to go through one of threes spots. One was Wonsan, Seoul, and Pyongyang. Those were the three points within Korea, and they tied in directly with the Manchurian Railroad through various nets, but I am not familiar with them.

PROHIBITION ON RECONNAISSANCE IN KOREA

Senator WILEY. What information have you as to the depots in Manchuria, supply depots and air depots and other depots? How close were they to the Yalu?

General O'DONNELL. I don' know, sir. We were not permitted to go across there so we didn't have the reconnaissance that we would have had if we were allowed to go across.

Senator WILEY. You were prohibited from even sending planes to ascertain what the situation was?

General O'DONNELL. That is right, sir.

Senator WILEY. Observation planes?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Just before the Chinese came in what were you doing with your planes?

BOMBER CREW TRAINING AND REPLACEMENTS

General O'DONNELL. Just before the Chinese came in we were grounded. There were no more targets in Korea. We were practicing landings at our own bases and going through procedural checks for the copilots.

[Deleted.]

Senator WILEY. You would have retained those and done the work with them if you had not been prohibited from going north?

General O'DONNELL. Yes. I was very anxious to get them home because I was cognizant of the world-wide picture, the global picture in strategic, and I wanted to get those crews home with their experience, and to get them reconverted to be used as a basis, the nuclei, for the other new groups that were being activated.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time is up.

Senator WILEY. May I ask just one question?

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection.

Senator WILEY. As I understand it from the other testimony—I want to know whether you agree with it—you were not only anxious to get them home, but because of the restrictions, you really had no use for them?

General O'DONNELL. I had no use for them. I anticipated sending the whole command—we were all out there on loan, and we were all coming back.

Senator WILEY. Thank you.

That is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. [Deleted.]

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; and we have replaced all the crews. We have completely replaced the crews throughout the command out there now.

We have replaced the crews that were sent out there originally, they were brought home, and we sent new crews from the schools, and they have an entirely new command.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, you are using the bombing force out there now, partly as a training job, too?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

SUFFICIENCY OF AIR POWER IN KOREA

Senator SALTONSTALL. Are you satisfied with the number of bombers you have got out there now?

General O'DONNELL. Well, I don't know whether I can answer that.

It seems that General Ridgway and General Stratemeyer would have to answer that. They are the ones who are operating it.

Senator SALTONSTALL. From the point of view of the greatest efficiency, of course, we would like to have more out there than we have got?

General O'DONNELL. Oh, yes, sir.

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET RETALIATION ON MANCHURIAN BOMBING

Senator SALTONSTALL. Did I understand you correctly to answer Senator Wiley that you, in the first phase that you talked about, you think the Russians would not have dared move, if you had gone up into Manchuria and bombed?

General O'DONNELL. That is my personal belief; yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, you agree with General MacArthur's point of view, on the bombing of Manchuria, certainly in the first phase?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would you agree with it, under the conditions that are now in existence, in the third phase?

General O'DONNELL. Let me answer it this way, Senator: [Deleted.]

That should be off the record.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Your observation is based——

Chairman RUSSELL. You got that "off the record?"

Senator SALTONSTALL. Your answer is based purely from a bomber command point of view?

General O'DONNELL. Strictly from a military point of view.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Strictly from a military point of view; and your judgment on what the Russians might have done in the first phase is based on the fact that you think, from a strategic bombing point of view——

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. They would not have dared to come across?

General O'DONNELL. I think they would have feared an attack on their main cities in Europe.

"SHOESTRING" AIR FORCE

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, General Vandenberg testified that he believes we are operating with a shoestring Air Force.

I assume, from your testimony, that you feel very strongly the same way?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; in numbers.

I, knowing General Vandenberg, think that the words "shoestring" meant to denote that we didn't have enough to maintain a sustained effort.

Certainly it is not shoestring, as far as equipment and crews and airplanes that we have on hand. We do not have enough to maintain a sustained effort.

EFFECT OF GREATER AIR RESISTANCE IN KOREA

Senator SALTONSTALL. Do I understand, from your previous testimony, that you feel differently now about the situation in Korea, because of the tauter world situation, or is it because of your feeling of a different climatic condition, and so on? Is that more important?

General O'DONNELL. Well, I would like to restrict my views to the strictly bombardment problem, and I think it is a changed bombardment problem, now, than it was in November.

Senator SALTONSTALL. A changed bombardment problem now, because there is greater air resistance?

General O'DONNELL. That is right.

We do not have the cover that we would have had in the winter time.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And is it also true, because of the more hostile planes coming up against you?

General O'DONNELL. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And those hostile planes are being better operated?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Of course we didn't see very many in the beginning, so it isn't a question of very many; but they are effective.

POSSIBLE BOMBING OPERATIONS IN CHINA AND THEIR EFFECT ON EUROPE'S SECURITY

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, one of the questions before this committee is the question of reconnaissance over China, air reconnaissance over China.

That, I assume, is not within your jurisdiction, so to speak?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir; it is not.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, assume that there was a broader field undertaken against China, the Chinese Communists, than in Korea proper—is our bombing command in a position to effect a strategic bombing against China, efficiently, at the present time?

General O'DONNELL. You mean, the United States Strategic Bombing Command?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes.

General O'DONNELL. Well, of course we don't have the targets in China comparable to the type we have in Russia, because you do not have the tremendous buildup of industrial systems.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, as a commander of a bomber air force, you believe that our Air Force is so limited at the present time, in view of all the world conditions, that we should not undertake greater targets out in China, if we are going to protect our problems that are under our command in Europe, is that a fair statement?

General O'DONNELL. I think that is a bigger problem than I can answer, Senator.

I think there are too many angles to it, such as stockpile——

Senator SALTONSTALL. I gathered from your testimony here, listening, that by the third phase, your point of view has changed from what it was at first?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. It has changed, not only because of climatic conditions, because of greater fighter resistance, but I received the impression it was also because of the change, of your greater knowledge of our problems in Europe and the demand upon a strategic air force in the condition of the world as it is today?

General O'DONNELL. I think we were aware of our problem in Europe right along. I don't think there is any great change in that.

I think the other three stipulations are correct.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, you would prefer to confine your answer to the fact that we have got a shoestring air force at the present time, for strategic bombing, and we have to watch our step as to how we take chances?

General O'DONNELL. That is right; and spend all our efforts in getting it built up and expanded in such a way as our program calls for.

Senator SALTONSTALL. If we concentrate too much in the Far East at the present time, then we have not got too much with which to do our job in Western Europe?

General O'DONNELL. That is right.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I ask this question, which is also one of the problems facing this committee: How necessary, from the point of view of security in the air, and that is what I want you to confine your answer to, is the island of Formosa?

General O'DONNELL. I don't know, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well now, you are using Okinawa as a base of attack, and you have got big bases on Okinawa, and you have got bases in Japan.

General O'DONNELL. Right, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Assume that Formosa fell into hostile hands, would you be able to keep your strategic bombers on the island of Okinawa and Japan?

General O'DONNELL. If they had a big Air Force, I think they could attack us from Shanghai, which would be just as close, right from the mainland; you see it is about, pretty close to, the same distance.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So, from the point of view of the Strategic Air Force, Formosa would not necessarily——

General O'DONNELL. Be more than a threat—more of a threat than the mainland.

Senator SALTONSTALL (continuing). Be more of a threat than from the mainland.

General O'DONNELL. That is right, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. From our point of view of the general security of the United States, Formosa, from your point of view, would not be a particular threat one way or the other; I mean a greater threat than we have now?

General O'DONNELL. It might be—it would not against Okinawa, but it might present a real problem in the Philippines.

Senator SALTONSTALL. But from the point of view of strategic air, you certainly would like to see Formosa stay in friendly hands?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. But you could get along without it probably?

General O'DONNELL. So far as we are concerned.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes; that is what I mean. I am trying to keep it to what you——

General O'DONNELL. In the war as it is being fought now at Okinawa. If we were operating out of the Philippines, out here, it might be quite a threat.

AIR AND GROUND FORCES IN EUROPE AND ASIA

Senator SALTONSTALL. From the point of view of strategic air, and the security of the United States, is it more important for us to keep our forces free for maintaining the security in Europe and our bases there or is it more important to keep our bases in the Far East?

General O'DONNELL. I cannot answer that either, Senator. I don't know enough about the over-all picture now, and it keeps changing, and I say that is a decision for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, I was trying to make that from the point of view of being within your jurisdiction, so to speak, and within what you are testifying, and you have done very ably in keeping your answers to what you know and not going into conjecture.

[Deleted.]

General O'DONNELL. That is right; yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I have no further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. General, if we had all-out war in Europe, would it be better to have our ground troops free, too? It would, would it not?

General O'DONNELL. I didn't understand you, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I say, if you had an all-out war in Europe, following up the line of questions propounded by Senator Saltonstall, we would be better off if we had our ground forces so we could utilize them there in Europe, would we not?

General O'DONNELL. I don't know too much about the ground picture, Senator.

Senator GEORGE. Well, you would think so, would you not?

General O'DONNELL. I don't know. I have my own opinions. It would be——

Senator GEORGE. General——

Chairman RUSSELL. He was prepared to answer it, I think, to some extent, Senator George. He said, "It would be"—and I do not know how much further he wished to go.

Senator GEORGE. Well, I do not think that is a military question. I think if we were out of Korea, with all of our forces, and if we are going to be faced with a war in Europe, we would feel more comfortable if we were out with the air, ground, and what have you, wouldn't you think so, General?

General O'DONNELL. Well, I think we have a pretty rich stake over there in Japan, too.

Senator GEORGE. I think you are right about that.

SOVIET ASPIRATIONS IN FAR EAST

General O'DONNELL. I have a personal opinion that Russia's objective in the Far East is Japan ultimately anyhow. I think they have had their sights on it for centuries and if they ever got into Japan and got that homogeneous nation of 70,000,000 people under their control, and highly industrialized as they are and as hard working as they are, and backing it up with the natural resources of Korea and Manchuria, our old fear of the yellow peril would be multiplied a hundredfold.

Senator GEORGE. Especially since Yalta with Manchuria and north China in the hands of the Red Chinese.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Where 70 percent of all industry of the whole of China was located, was it not, even at the outbreak of this war—even at the outbreak of World War II?

General O'DONNELL. Yes.

Senator GEORGE. I agree with you thoroughly. I don't think the half of Yalta has ever been told, and it will not be told for the next half century, because they not only have the iron and coal but the biggest pool of dependable cheap labor in the world, and they have access to all warm-water ports.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And through it, if the Russians can exploit it they can control Asia, of course.

WHEN MANCHURIAN BOMBING WOULD HAVE BEEN MOST EFFECTIVE

I was interested, General, in your statement about your first phase. You consider the first phase as having ended about November 1?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. When the Chinese, the Red Chinese, came in in organized units?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. There was no question but what they were doing it early in November?

General O'DONNELL. And the myth of the volunteer army was broken, and they recognized them by armies——

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

General O'DONNELL (continuing). Actual military commanders.

Senator GEORGE. That is right. That, in your opinion, was the time when we should have been free to have struck along the Yalu River and at points just north of it?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. If we had been free to do so, are you of the opinion that we could have inflicted terrific damage, at least?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Might have been decisive?

General O'DONNELL. Might have.

Senator GEORGE. Might have?

General O'DONNELL. In my opinion.

Senator GEORGE. I congratulate you, General, on your Americanism. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

TRAINING AFFORDED ENEMY PILOTS IN KOREA

Senator KNOWLAND. General O'Donnell, relative to this plane operation which has been going on now for some time in North Korea, is it your professional opinion that the Communists, whether they be Russian fliers or Russian-trained fliers, are getting a considerable amount of experience in North Korea against our bombers and against our fighters?

General O'DONNELL. Very definitely, sir; they are able to get up there and toy with us, you see. They can run away if they want to, and they can come in if they want to, and as they have been building up their strength, they get more and more courageous, and come further down the line, and they have learned how to attack our bombers and how to fight with our fighters, and by just taking a little bit of time—I never will forget during the last war, the first raid over Tokyo, we were told that we would be opposed by a thousand fighters over there.

Well, we went up there and we had nothing; that they were down climbing below us; they didn't know how to fight us, but as we stayed with them they became more and more accustomed to our method of operation, and later on we did have a little serious opposition from both antiaircraft and the fighters; so this is giving the practice.

Senator KNOWLAND. Practice which they could rotate crews in a way.

General O'DONNELL. That is right.

Senator KNOWLAND. And send them in and then send them back to train Communist crews in Russia with the latest techniques of combating our fighter bombers?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; they are very definitely doing that and getting a lot of valuable information, I am afraid.

Senator KNOWLAND. I was over in Korea, General, in November of last year, both the Communist capital and later at Hamhung and Hungnam, and had a chance to talk to some of the men who had flown the Yalu River line, and they were certainly taking a very dim view of being fired on by these antiaircraft batteries that you have mentioned here and being able to see the Communist planes come up and attack them and then run back into sanctuary.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

LETTER OF CAPT. JOHN THOMAS WELLS, III

Senator KNOWLAND. Because I do not want you to think, General, that it was only the air force that felt somewhat that way about it. A letter came into my hands yesterday and I want to give a little background on it.

On June 1 Capt. John Thomas Wells, III, of Baltimore, Md., a West Point graduate and counterintelligence officer, was killed in Korea. On May 24, 7 days before his death, he wrote his wife a letter, and I have a copy which I would like to read into the record at this time:

> KOREA, *May 24, 1951.*
>
> ANN MY DARLING: I am writing now because I had to relieve the tension beside me and I can only do that with you. If I could only describe for you the true picture over here, then you would know more than millions of other Americans. But even a clear description wouldn't be enough, because you've got to be here to realize how it is.
>
> There is such a hopeless feeling inside me because of the helpless situation we are in. Here we have enough force to prevent defeat, but we haven't enough to win a victory. What is more hopeless than that? Every soldier fights to win: That's what keeps him going.
>
> You remember that extremely patriotic feeling I had in Panama? Well, that's all gone now. Our Nation has flubbed this thing so badly that it hardly seems that we'll ever pull ourselves out. We could, with a strong, ruthless, firm hand at the wheel, which we don't have. We need somebody who will overlook the petty details, look at the big picture, decide what is necessary to end the war, make a plan, give Russia an ultimatum, slap down a few dissenters (which we have a perfect right to do since we're supporting them all), jump into the driver's seat, put the gas to the floor and a hand on the horn, and let her roll so that everyone will see we mean business. Certainly we'll scrape a few fenders, may even lose one or two, but it won't stop us. What gags me is the way we're driving like Caspar Milquetoast, trying to avoid every bump.
>
> We immediately put ourselves on the defensive by knocking ourselves out trying to avoid war with Russia and she's smart enough to take advantage of it. If she wanted war, we'd be in it by now. Why can't we smarten up and take advantage of it by putting her on the defensive? I'm so damn sick and tired of this pussyfooting that I'm getting numb.
>
> And this business of holding on to our allies at all costs is so much flimflam. Damn it, it should be the other way around and we could make it that way if we half tried. * * *

> I love America because you are a part of it, Darling. You and our children are my America. That's what America means to me and I'm selfish about it.
>
> God bless America.
>
> All my love,
>
> JACK.

RESTRICTIONS ON AIR POWER UTILIZATION IN KOREA

General, from the time we got involved in the Korean War, in going through the paraphrases of documents furnished us by the Joint Chiefs I find that there have been various restrictions put on the military operations there including the air operations. For instance, the first one that I found appeared on page 8, paragraph 14, reading as follows:

> The instructions furnished CINCFE by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, 1950, provided for the employment of United States naval and air forces against North Korea and units south of the Thirty-eighth parallel only.

Now that was subsequently changed because obviously it would have brought destruction to our ally and would have left the aggressor untouched, but that apparently was the first of the restrictions which was subsequently changed.

Then I find on page 49 of the same document the following:

> 25. Because of the political implications involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCFE on October 21 that the Department of State wished a special report to the Security Council by CINCUNC to the effect that it was the intent of the unified commander not to interfere with the operations of the Suiho hydroelectric power plant near Sinuiju.

Which I think you have already mentioned. Then I find on November 6 the following:

> On November 6, 1950, CINCFE, by Telecon, indicated that he planned to employ 90 B-29 aircraft in attacking the first overwater span of the international bridge at Sinuiju crossing the Yalu River, the approaches to the bridges at Sinuiju, and the communication and supply centers at Sinuiju. The Joint Chiefs of Staff took cognizance of this proposed air attack and dispatched a message to CINCFE directing him to postpone all bombing of targets within 5 miles of the Manchurian border until further orders.

Senator FLANDERS. What was that date?

Senator KNOWLAND. That was November 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCFE that consideration was being urgently given to the Korean situation at the governmental level. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urgently requested CINCFE's estimate of the situation and reasons for bombing the Yalu River bridges.

Then on that same day General MacArthur replied, stating there was a substantial movement across the bridges on the Yalu River and among other things that the only way to stop this movement—

> is the destruction of the bridges by air attack and air destruction of installations in North Korea which would facilitate the movement. The air operations against the bridges at Sinuiju were being mounted and the strike on Sinuiju would be made within the next few hours. Under the gravest protest CINCFE could make, the operation was suspended. CINCFE felt that the operation was within the scope of the rules of war and the resolutions and the directions which he had received.
>
> CINCFE requested that the matter be brought to the attention of the President since he believed the instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff might well result in a calamity of major proportion, for which he could not acept the responsibility. He further requested immediate reconsideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff decision.

And finally in answer to that urgent message he was given permission to bomb the river but again was told that he must not bomb any of the dams or power plants on the Yalu.

Now, the only reason—and there are many other examples other than the one I raised—do you not think, General, from a purely professional military point of view that the strategic air command and for that matter the military, had been operating under restrictions that perhaps had been without parallel in American history in fighting a war?

General O'Donnell. I do not think there is any question about that, Senator. The United Nations decision to restrict us to areas south of the Yalu definitely put us under wraps and made us work against an inordinate disadvantage.

EFFECT OF LIMITATIONS ON EFFICIENCY OF OUR AIR OPERATIONS

Senator Knowland. Well, then, I want to raise this question, General. Consistently since I have been here I have supported the 70-group air program, as I felt the 70-group program should be carried out, and I tried to get some funds in the Senate when they had been reduced in committee.

My feeling has been that one of the difficulties we now face rose out of our not having a sufficient force in being, which the very realistic men in the Kremlin would understand.

But the thing that concerns me is that now as the result of the Korean War you hear upon the floor of the Senate and throughout the country that maybe the Air Force is not all that it is cracked up to be, because they have not been able to knock the enemy out of the Korean operation.

I think that has had a detrimental effect upon our allies or potential allies in Europe and Asia and the Middle East, because they do not understand that our strategic air force was not permitted to operate in the way that that strategic air force was supposed to operate; and therefore it was not necessarily the fault of the Air Force that they have not been able to do the job that we all thought it could do, but because it was operating under restrictions nobody contemplated would be imposed upon it.

General O'Donnell. That is correct. We were engaged in an unorthodox utilization of our equipment; and of course our equipment was not designed and our units were not designed and our crews were not trained to do that particular type of job. They were trained and designed to do a much more devastating type of job.

Senator Knowland. And in the event aggression should take place elsewhere in the world, let us say from the East German satellites into West Germany, if you were restricted to not moving outside West Germany and into East Germany, you would again be faced with the same limitations?

General O'Donnell. That is right.

Senator Knowland. In Germany as in Korea, if you were prohibited from going beyond the Polish border, let us say.

General O'Donnell. That is correct.

Senator Knowland. That is correct, is it not?

General O'Donnell. Yes, sir.

Senator Knowland. That is all, General.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. General, I want to thank you, first, for some of the things that you have told us today. They have been very enlightening to me, a mere layman in air strategy.

POSSIBLE EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR AND NAVAL OPERATIONS ALONE

I would like to ask you this question, General. When the Korean attack came, the instructions were to just give air and naval support to the South Koreans and we did not think of providing ground troops. Now, had we stuck to that and had the North Koreans overrun South Korea, could we have given them so much trouble by air and by the Navy that we could perhaps have forced them back, could have cut off their supplies and gotten them out of South Korea, without operating with any substantial number of ground troops at all, except perhaps at some base port?

General O'DONNELL. Well, Senator, it might come under the head of Monday morning quarterbacking, but it is an interesting speculation, to think what might have happened had you never put an American ground soldier in Korea and had taken the view or had taken the stand with the North Koreans:

"You have gone too far. You are guilty of raw aggression and we in the United Nations have decided to punish you; and you will either withdraw from South Korea and go back to where you came from or we are going to unloose the American air power or United Nations air power and naval power against you, and we are going to destroy every single thing there is in North Korea"—and then go out and do it.

There is no question in my mind I could have gone out there with the force I had and done that type of job within 3 months.

And then, on the other side of the picture, the North Korean Army would have gone through the whole of Korea; but we would not have had the devastation and destruction and American casualties and the tremendous expense and the rest of those things. And we also might have put in our time building up strength and training in Japan.

There are implications involved—but I think it is a very interesting speculation, what might have happened—and what might happen again if the same thing occurs in the future.

Senator SMITH. It is just the reason I am asking the question, because that question has been in my mind, and I thought if we got a similar thing coming up again, we ought perhaps to think in terms of that kind of punishment rather than this. I am not criticizing it, but raising the question.

Could you have done that operation from bases in Japan and Okinawa without having to have bases in Korea itself?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; we never go into Korea. The Bomber Command never goes into Korea except possibly emergency landings, get a little shot up, engines out.

Senator SMITH. Would there have been any danger of invasion of Japan as long as you had your Air available in Japan and Okinawa to defend it?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir; I think we could have built up a strong stand in Japan. Of course, that type of operation would have precluded a Chinese Communist force in Korea today, such as we have. There would have been no reason for them to come into Korea.

If the South Koreans laid down their arms and gave up, had their top people or their government withdrawn to Japan or some other place, it might have been quite a different story.

PROTECTING FORMOSA

Senator SMITH. Now, my other question is a similar one. It is our policy now not to let Formosa get into hostile hands. I think you agree that is desirable.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Can your Strategic Air Command from your base in Okinawa take care of Formosa and protect it against attack by the Chinese Communists? Of course, you have naval support, too.

General O'DONNELL. I don't think I am qualified to answer that. Just because I have heard it is possible with all the junks, thousands of junks and that type of thing, that might move across the straits at night, I don't know what we could do against them. They are not even congested or concentrated in their points of departure. If they were really concentrated somewhere, we could do a lot of damage to them.

Senator SMITH. You would probably want authority to bomb their jumping-off places in South China there, wouldn't you, if we had to defend Formosa?

General O'DONNELL. I should think so, unless the Navy could handle it themselves, getting them en route or just as they are at the point of sortie.

UNITED NATIONS AIR FORCES IN KOREA

Senator SMITH. Now, let me ask you this: Are there any United Nations forces in our Air Force or is the United States carrying the air battle alone?

General O'DONNELL. Not in the bomber command. They do have fighter forces. The British have fighter forces.

Senator SMITH. But not in your bombing operation?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir.

THREAT OF RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IF WE BOMB MANCHURIA NOW

Senator SMITH. Is it your feeling that if our air operations today were more active—setting aside for the moment this point you raised about the danger of diverting our forces from other parts of the world—do you think more activity by our forces and possibly bombing bases in Manchuria would bring Russia in?

General O'DONNELL. I think I tried to answer that before, Senator. I think it is a dangerous period. I think we made a mistake in not attacking in November.

Senator SMITH. I understand that.

General O'DONNELL. We are paying for that mistake now.

[Deleted.]

Senator SMITH. And you have found from your observation that lately Russia has apparently sped up some kind of air support?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Whether manned by Russian pilots or not, you don't know, but probably manned by Russian-trained pilots?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Among the Chinese Communists.

General O'DONNELL. The equipment is there, and, of course, we are seeing them become bolder every day.

Senator SMITH. And that is why you hesitate to involve our Air Force further?

General O'DONNELL. That is right.

Senator SMITH. For fear of damage that might be done to what available Air Force we have?

General O'DONNELL. That is right, which must serve as a nucleus for our expanding Air Force.

Senator SMITH. I think you made a very clear case for that.

[Deleted.]

Senator SMITH. Now, General, are you aware of what our intelligence in Korea was prior to the Communist invasion? We had to my mind some difference of opinion as to whether our intelligence was adequate and why we didn't know they were going to make that attack. Do you have any thoughts on that?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir; I have not.

SETTLEMENT AT THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

Senator SMITH. On the air today a possible settlement at the thirty-eighth parallel was mentioned.

Let's suppose that all outsiders withdraw and you leave the North Koreans and South Koreans, armed, as they are today, probably with Russian equipment, and the South Koreans armed perhaps with American equipment. Could the South Koreans, from what you have seen of their ability and army, defend themselves?

General O'DONNELL. I don't know, sir. They are a pitiful sight—the whole of Korea. I just saw in the paper the other day that they have suffered something like almost a half a million civilian casualties in South Korea alone. They have been bled terribly. I don't know whether they would have the wherewithal to stand up and fight again in the next half century.

Senator SMITH. That, of course, might apply both ways?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Unless they were thoroughly backed up by the Communists.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Now, General, I have just one other question here I think.

If we operate under military inhibitions which prevent our forces from using their maximum power and exploiting the victory, how is it possible for us to clean up this whole Korean picture? Have you got an opinion as to the way it might be settled without a military victory?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir; not unless something would come from the truce that would give us a peace with safety and honor. I don't think we can accept anything less. And we have gotten ourselves in a bad predicament over there. I mean we are engaged in a blood and mud fight, a quagmire, and the only thing we can do, it seems to me, is to hold and to build up as rapidly as we possibly can back here—to build the strength to get at the real enemy if and when the time arises.

Senator SMITH. That is all; thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. General O'Donnell, you are a breath of fresh air. You are a military witness who with all frankness has answered military questions, and in just sitting here I am pleased and made more thoughtful by the information we have been getting.

I have a few questions I should like to offer for your consideration, but before that I would like to do two things.

If I might, by way of compliment, make a reference to the officer who sits on your left, Lt. Col. C. George Doyle; some years ago, I served with a then Capt. C. George Doyle. He was energetic and resourceful, intelligent and courageous. I did not know that he was still in the armed services, but I am delighted to know it. I thought you would not take exception to a deep word of affection directed toward a first-rate American.

Colonel DOYLE. Thank you, sir.

LETTER FROM EUGENE R. GUILD

Senator CAIN. Secondly, I was privileged several weeks ago to meet an American by the name of Eugene R. Guild, who came into my office as a part of a visit to Washington during which he buried in Arlington Cemetery his marine son who had died in Korea.

Mr. Guild is a captain of the First World War. He is and has been retired for a long time. Under date of June 18, 1951, he wrote to me from Roaring Fork Ranch, Glenwood Springs, Colo.

I wish the record to carry his letter and my very brief response:

Senator HARRY P. CAIN,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR CAIN: May I appear before your committee to speak for my son; like the 17,000 other sons killed in Korea he fought well; his brother marines have told me how well he died.

His service to his country did not stop with his dying for he left a $5,000 policy, directing it be used to develop an engine of revolutionary design and great promise he invented. When it is developed and patented I am directed to turn it over, not to his relatives, not to his estate, but to the Navy for the benefit of his country.

Do you think that this unselfishness and that of the other 17,000 entitles them to a small favor from their country? Do you think that it entitles them to be heard by your committee, even if only through the consciences of their fathers, consciences which now trouble them because they did not fight until too late for their sons, fight against the action of our leaders in abandoning American traditions of courage and sending our sons out to die, shackled by appeasement?

America may squander money, but until now Europe and others were the ones who squandered the lives of their fighting men—as Britain spent the lives of its heroic Gloucesters while it supported and supplied the enemy who killed them. But it is a new and terrible thing for an American Government to squander American lives. Herein lies the present degeneracy of our leaders' concept of national honor.

To rob our sons of the sweetness and the greatness of life is bad enough, but to cap it by appeasing, by paying blackmail with their lives is to add the final indignity of cheating them in their dying.

We must not allow those who have yet to die to be thus cheated. Having changed the rules by lowering and degrading the things for which Americans are being expected to die, we must in all fairness change the rules by which we send our sons out to do the dying. Having turned from the old American ideals of courage to this alien thing, appeasement and fear, we must no longer deceive them into thinking they will die for the one when it is really the other.

We must either return to the American traditions of honor or revert to the voluntary system of recruiting, or if that fails we should hire mercenaries. Every boy who comes to offer his life should be frankly informed of these new and sadly changed standards of honor. If with his eyes open he desires to go, all right. If he wants no part of a bloody, one-hand-tied-behind-the-back stalemate in a bull pen with no hope for victory, he should have the option of declining. I want to urge legislation to implement such an option.

You have listened to witnesses in defense of the President and his Secretaries of Defense and State; in defense of our top military leaders who suffer on their high level from the same foxhole funk or paralysis as the GI does on his level; in defense of the British and those few terrified and tawdry Americans who prefer to see our fighting men keep on dying with one hand tied rather than to share with them whatever risk there may be to those at home by letting our men fight with both hands. I ask that you listen to a witness on behalf of my dead son and the other sons who would themselves cry out against their betrayal had their voices not been stilled forever.

ANSWER OF SENATOR CAIN

Under date of June 22, 1951, I wrote in quiet form to Captain Guild at his home in Colorado as follows:

My Dear Captain Guild: This is but a hasty word to express my deep appreciation for your letter and to tell you that I will offer it to be a part of the record on Monday.

There is no likelihood as I see it at this time that you will be called as a witness. The judgment of the chairman and a majority of the joint committee is that the hearings must be concluded at an early date. We have already taken 8,000 pages of testimony. We have learned a lot but much remains unsaid. Senators such as Bill Knowland and myself will continue to represent and fight for your point of view.

With your letter in the record, it will remain as a part of history and be available to every press service in the country.

With continuing gratefulness for your loyalty to the memory and conduct of a splendid son, I am

Most cordially.

FACTORS IN THE BOMBING OF RACIN

General O'Donnell, permit me to ask you, please, a question or two about this city of Racin in northeast Korea.

When Douglas MacArthur was before us as a witness he said this in part about Racin:

I was very anxious to destroy that. Its usefulness to the enemy was self-evident. Great accumulations, depot accumulations, were made there. It was a great distributing center. They could run—the Soviets could run stuff from Vladivostok right down there.

We asked to bomb that and we were forbidden.

At a date considerably later in our testimony in our hearings, this was said by a witness not a military man:

The view that this is an important supply point—

referring to Racin—

I think is not borne out by the facts. It is 17 miles from the Soviet border. There is a rail line running down from Siberia into Manchuria, and then down into Racin. There is no rail line south from Racin, so it is not an important supply point. Supplies would have to go by truck from there. It was thought that it was much more important to interrupt the rail lines in the southerly parts of it—

referring again to Korea—

> which were not near the Soviet border and which would not run the risk of involving the Soviet forces.

I want you to give us a broader word, if you feel inclined to do it, of why it was in your opinion that Racin was an important supply depot and distributing point for the enemy, as you testified earlier this morning.

General O'DONNELL. Senator Cain, I will have to go back on my memory. It has been some time since I have been out there. But, as I remember it, Racin is a warm-water port. I believe that the Soviet leases that port for its own use and has been doing so for some time, or at least has been leasing facilities within the port. It is possible that they have a submarine base there. It is a very excellent port. I think it is supposed to be the best port on the west coast.

We were told—my intelligence was that it was used as a transhipping station. Things came in there by sea and were transhipped to, I think it was called, the Tumen railroad, which ran from Racin up to a point where it connected with the Manchurian railroad.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me, General. You said the best port on the west coast.

General O'DONNELL. I beg your pardon. On the east coast I meant.

Senator CAIN. General O'Donnell, from the military point of view there appears to have been no doubt in any military man's mind but what Racin was important to the enemy as a supply depot from which they could largely maintain enemy forces in the field. Is that your understanding?

General O'DONNELL. I was led to believe that and certainly, being that far north, my own opinion was in selecting targets to go as far north as you possibly can and get as close to Russia as you can and really work them over. I thought it might be quite helpful to have them hear a few bombs going off up there in Vladivostok.

Senator CAIN. You have testified, I think that Rashin was so situated or laid out that it was a relatively easy target for your bombers to destroy its supply facilities and rail centers without destroying or damaging in any substantial way the city of Rashin itself.

General O'DONNELL. If we had one visual—if we were allowed to go after it, Senator, there is no question about it, we would have gotten it. We would have to wait for a visual day to get that. The rail yards, sir, were separated from the city, and that is, the rail yard itself is not a good radar target; the city is an excellent radar target, and I could guarantee almost complete destruction of the city any time whether we used radar or visual. But I think we would have had to have a good visual day and I could have guaranteed destruction of the yards on that.

Senator CAIN. It has likewise been your professional view that Rashin could be bombed as a military target or any portion of Rashin could be so bombed without the bomber command running any risk whatsoever of so overshooting the target as to have the bomber command planes cross into Soviet territory?

General O'DONNELL. Oh, yes, sir; absolutely.

Senator CAIN. From a military point of view, then, without any other consideration, Rashin can be destroyed in whole or in part by the Allied air power whenever a decision is made to destroy or put it out of commission?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir. Of course, I have to put this into it now. They might decide to heavily defend it in the air, but at that time, things being as they were, there is no question in my mind that we could have taken it in one raid.

AIR FORCE TARGETS IN KOREA NOW

Senator CAIN. General O'Donnell, you have told us that before you left Korea, the Allied air force had very generally run out of targets. That was, I suppose, because of our success on the ground?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. Which took our forces up to or close to the Yalu River?

General O'DONNELL. That is correct, sir.

Senator CAIN. Does it appear from your present understanding of the progress of our campaign in Korea that we are again headed in the direction where we shall have no targets for our air power to attack and destroy?

General O'DONNELL. I think most of the air power in Korea, in fact all of it, is used in direct support of the ground forces now. Wherever they go, of course, the Air Force will be used to support them.

Senator CAIN. Does it not logically follow that the further north our ground forces go, the fewer targets are available for our Air Forces until once we have regained the Yalu River, the point of diminishing returns has been reached and the Air Force is powerless except for observation flights over the Yalu River?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. I have no questions at present, thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

RED AIR FORCE BUILD-UP IN KOREA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General O'Donnell, I would like to ask you about this situation. As I understand it, the Red Air Force has given quite a lot of evidence of building up in the last few months. Is that your understanding?

General O'DONNELL. That is my understanding, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And now if circumstances should arise or authority or permission should be now given for our strategic air force to bomb concentrations of supplies or arsenals or things of that sort back in Manchuria, what is your opinion about the type of resistance which we would meet now as compared to the type of resistance which we would have met 6 or 8 months ago?

General O'DONNELL. Very much more difficult.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Therefore, if we did undertake such activities now, the difficulties would be far greater because they have more jets?

General O'DONNELL. They have had the time to build up.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have had the time to build up and prepare their defenses?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have you any evidence that any of these Red planes have been piloted by other than North Chinese Communists?

General O'DONNELL. Not to my knowledge, sir. I have never heard of them obtaining the body of a dead pilot, so I don't know.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We do know that some of these planes that they are using, in fact all of them, I guess, are Russian-made planes; are they not?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was reading an article yesterday in one of the papers I think by this pilot who has just come back that shot down more planes in the Korean War than anyone has shot down—I can't think of his name right now——

General O'DONNELL. Jabara.

DEVELOPMENT OF JETS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It was in the nature of an interview I believe with him, in which he discussed the speed of the Russian jet fighters, their top flight, MIG, or whatever it is, 15, as compared with ours.

In your opinion is that Russian jet based upon the British jet models? In other words, what I am getting at is this: It has been my understanding that in the development of jets, the British have emphasized speed to the sacrifice of some stability or armor, and that we have emphasized stability to the sacrifice of some slight reduction in speed of our jets, and I am wondering if these Russian jets are the jets patterned after the jets which the British gave or sold or transferred to the Russians some time ago.

General O'DONNELL. I am not an engineer, Senator, and it is hard for me to answer that question. I understand that the MIG is a development more along the German lines, if anything. The power plant is a different thing. I think that the power plant is an elaboration of the Nene model, which is a British engine.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have heard that it is an extremely efficient engine.

I think that the record shows for a time anyway, 2 or 3 years ago or maybe 4, that the British were selling jet power plants to the Russians. Now, General O'Donnell, did you ever learn or did you ever get information to the effect that an international brigade was being built up in Manchuria?

General O'DONNELL. I had heard a rumor about it. I had heard it; that is all it was, a rumor, to me.

EXISTENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Had you ever heard about the ceremonies, if there were such ceremonies, in Mukden, along in September or the late fall, I should say, of 1950 and early 1951, activating such an international brigade?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir; I did not.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have you ever had any information upon the composition of such an international brigade, if one is being formed?

General O'Donnell. No, sir; I have heard the words, the "international brigade." I have no other information on it.

Senator Hickenlooper. Well, the information I have, which allegedly covers the types and kinds of units of the international brigade indicates that one has been formed some 6 or 8 months ago; that at least now its formation and its units are reasonably well suspected, I will say; that is, enough so that some of them could be designated, and that it is being developed and built primarily under the influence and the stimulus of Russia, with strong Chinese Communist backing, and with the furnishing of, perhaps, the bulk of the troops by Chinese Communists, and I wondered if you had had any direct information touching on that matter.

General O'Donnell. No, sir.

INFORMATION ON TARGETS IN MANCHURIA

Senator Hickenlooper. When you were in Korea, General, do you believe that you had reasonably accurate information about the supply depots, and the logistical concentration points, together with the industrial plants in Manchuria, around Mukden and Harbin, so that you could have done a pretty effective job with your long-range bombers?

General O'Donnell. We had some information on it, Senator, and I think we could have gotten the information that we needed readily by strategic reconnaissance.

We photographed all the targets in Korea, and we could have very easily gone over and gotten theirs in Manchuria, too. We could have gotten the information on which to base the attacks, there is no question about it.

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.

General O'Donnell. I don't say throughout all of Manchuria but I would say up to and including Mukden, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper. The fact is that Manchuria is—its transportation system is not very modern, is it?

General O'Donnell. No, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper. I mean, they have just a few lines of transportation; and do you believe that those lines of transportation were such that they would lend themselves readily to serious destruction or disruption, at least?

General O'Donnell. Yes; I think they were capable of being interrupted, and I think the main centers along those lines and which are where the warehousing and the storaging and the repair of locomotives and all that sort of thing could have been attacked, and with effectiveness.

Senator Hickenlooper. Now, General, perhaps you have been asked this question, and if I am asking you a question that you have answered before, I don't mean to repeat it in this record.

General O'Donnell. Yes, sir.

ISOLATING THE BATTLEFIELD

Senator Hickenlooper. Isn't one of the prime—if not the—one of the prime purposes of the Air Force to isolate the batttlefield as much as possible by disrupting the enemy's ability to resupply himself and to reinforce himself?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; it is.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In your professional judgment did we attempt, in the broadest sense, I mean from a strategic standpoint, did we attempt to isolate the battlefield of Korea?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; we did——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. By that I mean not the immediate front. I understand we used tactical air in support of the ground troops and we did disrupt some supply lines back of the front, but I am talking about the sound military objective of isolating the battlefield as far away and in the rear of the enemy as was reasonably possible and feasible. Did we do that?

General O'DONNELL. Not originally. Originally we were up too close to the front lines.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, but we did not go into Manchuria?

General O'DONNELL. Oh, no; no, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And disrupt their ability to resupply themselves or to make that sanctuary an untenable place for them. We did not do that?

General O'DONNELL. No; we did not, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have asked this question repeatedly, General, and I want to ask it of you; and I will preface it by saying that at least so far as I am concerned, I am aware of what has been called our policy, that is our policy has been announced as the defeat of aggression and the pacification of Korea. I understood that is what our announced policy is.

PROGRAM FOR PEACE IN KOREA

But I am troubled and concerned about what our program is for attaining the ends announced in our policy. In other words, what is our program for bringing this war to an end, for stopping this business over there in Korea, and for bringing about peace in Korea?

Now, can you tell me what our program is to do that other than to just stand and fight?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir; unfortunately I am not in the programing business, and I don't know.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I don't think you need to apologize for that because I have asked that question of a number of people who are in the programing business, in this country, and they have no better answer than you gave just now.

I have failed to receive any program that is designed to attain what we call our policies.

From your experience in Korea, and this is conjecture, I understand, and may not be strictly military, but from your experience, if the Red Chinese today or in the immediate future just picked up their guns and went back across the line into Manchuria, do you think that we could rely upon that being a peace or could we look forward under all the past experience we have had with them to their regrouping and coming back to the fray another day in the not too distant future, so that we might have to keep substantial armies there because of the uncertainty of the situation?

General O'DONNELL. Well, I personally believe that the latter would be true until such time as we get some action on the part of the international Communists showing that they have a truly sincere interest in obtaining world peace and getting along with us.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I will pass.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders.

LIGHT BOMBERS FOR TACTICAL SUPPORT

Senator FLANDERS. General, there are one or two questions that I would like to ask you and one of them relates to your statement that your B-29's when you first got over there were employed in missions which they were not designed to be used for. In other words, as I understood you, they were used in close tactical support of ground troops.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FLANDERS. Well, are there any groups in the Air Force that are designed for that purpose?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir. That is more of a function of light bombers, sir.

[Deleted.]

Senator FLANDERS. The plane, then, that is especially adapted to close-quarter work with the ground forces is the light bomber?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir, the light bomber and the fighter—the fighter with its rockets and its napalm—they both make the tactical air command.

Senator FLANDERS. Was there perhaps a little error in not supplying those more freely at the beginning of the combat?

General O'DONNELL. I do not think they were available, sir.

Senator FLANDERS. You do not think they were available. Well, here is another question.

Do you believe that they are being provided in the future program of the Air Force in sufficient quantity to be used in case of some future need?

General O'DONNELL. I am not familiar with the expansion program in the light bomber—that is, not enough to give you accurate information. But I do believe they are included.

Senator FLANDERS. At least you are quite sure the idea is not neglected.

General O'DONNELL. Oh, to the contrary, it might be we are even going overboard in that direction.

POWER PLANTS IN KOREA

Senator FLANDERS. All right, thank you. Now, I want to ask you a question about these power plants you were forbidden to bomb, such as this big power plant on the Yalu—and there were two others you mentioned. Were they on the Yalu?

General O'DONNELL. No, sir, they were down around the Chosin area above Konan.

Senator FLANDERS. Did the Yalu power plant supply power to Manchuria?

General O'DONNELL. That is what I understand. I think they drew power from the Sinuiju Dam and I think they send power to Mukden, Dairen, and Port Arthur.

Senator Flanders. Now, the others, they were more for local use?

General O'Donnell. Yes, sir. The Chosin Reservoir dams and hydroelectric plants supported I think mainly the huge chemical combine and complex at Konan. I think they had a requirement for something like 400,000 kilowatts and it was supplied from there.

Senator Flanders. Now, I think it is easy to understand why, as long as the Chinese did not come in, you should have been forbidden to bomb a power plant which primarily supplies Manchuria. But, there was no change in your instructions after the Chinese came in.

General O'Donnell. No, sir.

Senator Flanders. Just from looking at it from over here, it would have seemed appropriate to initiate a change of policy at that moment.

General O'Donnell. It was one of the targets that we would have liked to have hit.

Senator Flanders. Yes.

General O'Donnell. Not so much the dam, as the transformer yard adjacent to the dam. We could have very easily knocked that out of commission completely, and it would be some time before they could reconstitute it.

Senator Flanders. So that there doesn't seem to be any good reason, from your standpoint or mine, why you shouldn't have been given permission to do it?

General O'Donnell. No, sir.

Senator Flanders. The transformer yard was doubtless on the Manchurian side?

General O'Donnell. No, sir; on the Korean side.

Senator Flanders. That makes it even a little more mysterious.

I think that is about all, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman Russell. Senator McMahon?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Sparkman?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Does any member of the committee present have any further questions of General O'Donnell?

Senator Knowland. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would merely like to say——

Chairman Russell. Senator Cain indicates that he has some questions.

Senator Cain. I have two questions.

THE ATOM BOMB AS A TACTICAL WEAPON

General, several months ago I read, with real interest, an article by Maj. Gen. James Gavin on the employment of the atomic bomb as a tactical weapon, and I would like to address to you just that question: As to what is your view about this possible employment of the atomic bomb as a tactical, rather than a strategic weapon?

General O'DONNELL. I am afraid I can't answer that, Senator. I am aware of the fact that development is going along that line to develop smaller units using nuclear activity, but I am absolutely unaware of what is being done.

Senator CAIN. I obviously would not press further on this subject, but I would draw that article to your attention, and I think General Gavin wrote it in his then capacity as an officer in the research and development end of our Defense Establishment.

I found it not only interesting, but it just made an awful lot of sense to me, because I took the article and tried to apply it, with my limited knowledge, on the Korean area, with particular reference to last November. I thought that had it been employed at that time, its results would have been extremely useful to all of us.

These hearings, sir, began in the early part of May, we have had as distinguished and knowledgable a set of witnesses, I think, as could be produced in the entire United States.

APPLICATION OF ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN KOREA

Every member of the committee, on either side of the table, has constantly been driving at the nature of the war, what is it, how did it begin, where is it now, how do we conclude it, and all the rest.

General MacArthur referred to the war as being an accordian war, others have referred to it as being a limited war, some have mentioned it as being a police action war. Earlier today you gave us a new definition, that it might be characterized as being a bizarre war.

I remain mindful that you are speaking to us in your military capacity, unrelated to political considerations, and against that I raise this question:

Did you intend to say to us by inference that against the military doctrine which you and other American officers in all of the services have been taught over many decades that the war in Korea, as it has been waged, has simply violated what has always been your concept of how to attack and defeat and destroy an enemy?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; I think that is a fair statement.

Senator CAIN. Without prejudice, implied or otherwise, to anybody, would you take a couple of minutes and tell us in what military ways has the Korean war violated military doctrine.

General O'DONNELL. Well, I think that there is one principle of war that I have always liked and have always wanted to observe, and that is the economy of force. When I think of economy of force, I am thinking primarily in our country of trained officers and men, and I think that we should train and organize and equip ourselves with that objective in view at all times.

I think it is against the national interest for us in the United States to become involved in large-scale ground wars in either Asia or Europe. I think there is another way of handling it.

I don't want to give you an oversimplified solution, because there is not a simple way out of this predicament we are in. I think we are suffering right today as a result of some terrible mistakes that we, the American people, have made.

MISTAKE OF DEMOBILIZATION AT END OF WORLD WAR II

I don't think there is any need for recrimination or trying to say so and so is to blame or so and so is to blame. I think we as a nation have failed to exercise the leadership which God rested in our hands at the end of the last war.

Since you ask me for my views, they are absolutely personal, when you think of 1945, here we were out there with the greatest military juggernaut that the world has ever seen, deployed and ready for action at the end of the war.

The pipelines were loaded with supplies and bombs and radar and everything else. As I recall, the expenditure figure was something around $300 billion. It cost us a million casualties, to say nothing of the rape of our natural resources, and our mines and our oil reserves.

We had the world in a position, we were in a position, I think, with courageous leadership and a courageous responsible attitude by the people of our country, a mature attitude, I should say, we were in a position to enforce a period of peace in this world for at least 50 or 100 years by simply telling Mr. Stalin and his Russian hordes that we are not going home until you go home, and if you don't go home, we are going to take you home. And we were in a position to do that, just as surely as I am sitting here today.

What do we do? We throw the whole thing over our shoulder and we throw away the strength, the juggernaut, the expenditures, and blood, and everything else that went with it, and 5 years later we find ourselves in a position of having to rebuild what we had and threw away.

The advantage was terrific at that time, because we had the finest aircraft in the world, the jets had not been developed. We had the B–29, and were capable of flying all over Asia or Europe and any place else.

We had our ground forces in position, and I think that we failed to exploit our victory and in typical American fashion we only half did the job.

Senator CAIN. General O'Donnell, you have told us that it was your view that in 1945 America possessed sufficient force so that America might have said to other nations, "We not only have this force, but we will be determined to apply this force against you if you are not willing to be reasonable as concerns the future."

TACTICAL AIR POWER PROBLEM IN KOREA

One thing that concerns me tactically about the war in Korea is that we have much more force, particularly in the air and on the sea, than we have been willing for one reason or another to apply against our enemies.

I couldn't put it in percentages, but I would say with reference to your own bomber command that because you were not permitted to attack enemy targets in Manchuria and in the instance of Rachin, for example, in northeast Korea, that you were minimizing your own potential by a very large percentage. Is that approximately a fair statement?

General O'DONNELL. That is right, sir. I think we are not using our weapons effectively.

Senator CAIN. And so far as you know, we still are pursuing a program which will not call for a complete utilization of the admittedly limited weapons and ground strength that we presently have in Korea?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; I think that is about right.

Senator CAIN. General O'Donnell, I am not an air person in any authoritative way, but will you give us a word or two on this tactical situation where the enemy jets are permitted to engage our jets on or about the Yalu River and break off from an engagement at the enemy's will and choice?

To what extent does that affect morale in the pilots and crews of our own air forces who are engaged in such conflicts?

General O'DONNELL. Well, let me say this. They don't like it. I again say we are fortunate enough to have professionals. They don't like it but it isn't a devastating morale factor.

Our boys know—I am not a fighter pilot now. I used to be, but our lads go up there just hoping they can get their hands on these people because they always come out on top. I mean our fighters have been superior to theirs right on through, partly due to their aggressiveness and their naturally competitive instinct, I think.

[Deleted.]

Senator CAIN. Have we lost any of our large bombers in attacks on bridges?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. Yalu River bridges?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. Is that partly because our bombers are totally and completely without defense on their left flank if they are running from west to east and parallel to the Yalu River?

General O'DONNELL. Well, I wouldn't say it was on the left flank. I can't honestly say that because they can get out in front and you can't say it just because the left flank is open. They have had a few pretty tough scraps up there. The bombers have shot down Migs, too.

Senator CAIN. Oh, yes.

General O'DONNELL. The bombers have knocked them down.

Senator CAIN. I have been very aware of that.

General O'DONNELL. And they have always gotten through, but they don't like it. It makes them mad. It isn't a question of morale when you ask me that. It isn't a question of wanting to quit or anything of that nature. They are perfectly willing to get in there and slug it out.

Senator CAIN. More a feeling of indignation?

General O'DONNELL. That is right. My boys do have a pretty fine regard for constituted authority, I am very proud to report, and I am glad to be able to report.

Senator CAIN. Their discipline must be of a very high order.

General O'DONNELL. I think we have it that way.

Senator CAIN. Just this one last tactical question out of a real interest in this problem in Korea. Is it literally so that our jets, for example, in engaging in combat with the enemy and running for example from west to east or from east to west along the Yalu River, have only got one direction in which to maneuver? It seems mathematically that must be obviously the result.

General O'DONNELL. That is right.

Senator CAIN. That when somebody is on their tail, that enemy knows that when the American pilot seeks to evade his pursuer, that he can only go in one direction and that permits that enemy following a fighter pilot to have a much better chance to knock our plane down? In part, sir, that is what I presume you meant when you said this is quite a bizarre war.

General O'DONNELL. That is right.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

[Deleted.]

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question off the record, if I may.

(Discussion off the record.)

DEMOBILIZATION AFTER WORLD WAR II

Chairman RUSSELL. Now General, I was much impressed with your very graphic description of our military posture at the end of World War II. You are undoubtedly correct, we were stronger then than we had ever been before, and as related to the strength of other powers, I doubt if we will ever be in that position, but did you hold a view then that we should have held all of our forces together and have carried out the policies that you laid down?

We can all see now that that would have been a highly desirable policy, but I just wondered if that was your opinion after VJ-day in 1945?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir. I will say this, sir. I don't want to appear as a clairvoyant or someone who sees what is coming, but I never will forget coming home from Japan at the end of the war. The war ended as I recall on the 15th of August and about the 5th of September I took off from the northernmost island up there in Japan and attempted a nonstop flight to Washington in a B-29, and I got up over the island of—over the town of Paramushiro up in the Kuriles, and by George—this was less than 3 weeks since the end of the war. We had turned those islands over to the Russians, and I was intercepted by three Russian fighters 3 weeks later who made a pass at me from the front quarter, and I didn't have any armament.

We stripped the guns off and loaded up some extra gas in there, and I thought to myself, "What a fine way to end the war. These birds are liable to cut loose."

If I had had the guns, I would have shot them down. I mean you never let anybody make an attack like that from the front quarter. I would have ordered the gunners to open fire on them.

However, they didn't fire on me but I couldn't help but—it was an omen, an ill omen that they were in that position so quickly after the war, and it worried me a great deal and I said so when I came home, and I said too that I never would have believed that the position being what it was at that time, that they would have taken the Air Forces anyhow.

They could have sent the infantry or anybody. They should have kept the Air in position until the peace was arrived at, and to my information I don't think the peace has ever been arrived at; has it?

Chairman Russell. Not formally, and it has been a very uneasy peace such as we have enjoyed even though there has been no peace treaty.

General O'Donnell. We could have done it in lots of ways. Triple the pay if necessary. It certainly would have paid us off in the long run instead of abandoning our bases and abandoning our bombs and all munitions and throwing everything away to go home and then going back again in this short time.

My only point in bringing it up, of course, it is hindsight, but I think that we as a people have got to grow in maturity and I hope that this situation we are in now will make our people more serious-minded and worry more individually about our troubles.

Because we can't continue to go on, in this life, either as a nation, or as individuals, and continue to make mistakes like we have been making.

Chairman Russell. Off the record.

(There was discussion off the record.)

WISDOM OF SENDING GROUND TROOPS TO KOREA

Chairman Russell. Did Senator Smith ask you as to whether or not you believed we could have withdrawn our Ground Forces from Korea at the time the Chinese appeared in mass, and used the weapons of the air to force the Chinese to evacuate the Korean Peninsula?

General O'Donnell. No; I don't think he did, sir.

I think he brought up the question of whether we could have handled it by air alone, when the North Koreans invaded South Korea, but not the Chinese.

Chairman Russell. What was your statement, when he asked you that?

General O'Donnell. I said it was an interesting speculation, which I think should be studied, and we should think about it in case this type of campaign arises again, we should have a better plan for coping with it.

Chairman Russell. A great many people had the view, and I must confess I shared it somewhat, that we should not have undertaken to have engaged large masses of Chinese on the ground; and that if we had withdrawn our forces from Korea in December, or January 1950 or 1951, and served notice on the Chinese that we would bomb their cities every day until they pulled out of Korea, we might have been able to have avoided any further war.

That is also just an interesting speculation. I know you have thought about it.

General O'Donnell. I don't know what the answer would be.

The only thing I can tell you is, we expended 123,000 tons of bombs there, and that is a lot of bombs.

With 160,000 tons of bombs from the Marianas we flattened 57 cities in Japan, and brought them to their knees, and from my point of view the war was over, whether we dropped the atomic bomb or not. It might have gone on for a few weeks, but they were knocked to their knees with 160,000 tons, and with the expenditure of 123,000 we certainly could have done a lot of damage.

Senator Smith. To follow up the chairmen's questioning, I asked originally whether if we had not put any ground troops in at all it was possible to put so much punishment on the North Koreans to defeat them. But the thought occurs to me now if we do not get to a settlement, would the speeding up of air attacks at this stage of the game drive the Communists out of there. Would it be effective or do we have to go along as we are going along now in sort of wobbling back and forth with supporting ground troops?

It has occurred to me many times that we just could not be in the position of going on indefinitely leaving our boys to be slaughtered. We might have thought, after the Communists came in, as the chairman suggested, that we would withdraw our ground troops then back to Japan, and possibly, just as the chairman suggested, threaten the commies that if they did not get out of Korea we would keep on with a heavy attack, and keep on going until they got out. We are speaking for the UN, not the United States.

General O'DONNELL. It is a little beyond the scope of my book. I know there are so many other considerations, such as the logistics picture and whether or not we get troops from other nations and all those things, which I dont' know anything about. I really don't know.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, if there are no further questions, this concludes the examination of General O'Donnell.

Senator STENNIS. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman, I didn't know you had started a second round. You did not call my name.

Chairman RUSSELL. We did not.

Senator STENNIS. That is entirely all right. I merely have two more questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. I merely asked if the Senators had any further questions. You may propound them.

Senator STENNIS. Just a question or two, General. Your testimony here has been very valuable to us, very valuable to me, at least, and I think to all of us.

TACTICAL AIR FORCE FIGHTING IN KOREA

There has not been anything much said about the tactical Air Force fighting in Korea. You barely mentioned that. Would you just mind giving us a little review of that fighting.

General O'DONNELL. I didn't see very much of it, Senator.

Senator STENNIS. Frankly, as someone brought up, we don't understand why the Air Force did not get off to a better start over there, and you explained that in great detail as to strategic——

General O'DONNELL. I was stationed—my station was in Japan and Okinawa, so I did not see very much of the problem . However, I know—I spoke to a good many of the ground officers out there, and this has been said very many times—they all admitted that if it had not been for the strategic Air Force, they would have been thrown off the peninsula, and right early in the game; and I think General Partridge and his Fifth Air Force has done a stupendously fine job. I don't think you will get anyone to quarrel with it at all.

Senator STENNIS. It was just the balance of power in the beginning, then to enable them to stay on the peninsula?

General O'DONNELL. That is right; they worked hard; they were flying day and night; they were sharing the same hardships as the doughboys were, and the same climate, and it was very, very rugged, and to keep those airplanes maintained in that kind of weather is a tremendously tough proposition.

TARGETS IN NORTH KOREA

Senator STENNIS. Well, early in your testimony this morning you said that the O'Donnell plan had 18 major strategic targets, I believe, in Korea?

General O'DONNELL. Roughly; yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. And then you had five primary spots of some kind. Did you not mention that figure?

General O'DONNELL. The main cities were Pyongyang, first, the capital, Seishin, Rashin, Wonsan, and Chinnampo.

Senator STENNIS. Five main cities and 18 primary targets?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir. We thought that the impact of taking those quickly, and getting—we could have gotten the 5 cities—I could have done that in 10 days flat, and we think that maybe that terrific impact would so shock them that it might have pressed them into getting out.

Senator STENNIS. Just knocked them out of the war.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir; it is a possibility. I can't say that it would have happened.

Senator STENNIS. Yes, I know.

Now, as a matter of fact, Northern Korea has been virtually destroyed, hasn't it? Those cities have been virtually destroyed.

General O'DONNELL. Oh, yes; we did it all later anyhow.

Senator STENNIS. Well, those were the only questions I had.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have just an observation which won't take more than a minute.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

LEARNING FROM PAST EXPERIENCES

Senator KNOWLAND. But in view of the General's statement a while ago, so many times we get letters or statements asking why the committee is going into the past phases, and going clear back into World War II, and I think the reason is not for the purpose of reopening old wounds, but in the hope that nations, like individuals, might learn from their past mistakes, and so that in the future we won't again permit our diplomats to lose what our fighting men have won. I think that is the basic thing that we are trying to gather here, in the hope that if we are involved again that we will learn from some of these past mistakes.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir, and the big thing is that once we make a mistake, we know we are going to have to pay for it. We are going to have to pay either in resources, natural resources, and time and money, or we pay in blood. It is just that simple.

Chairman RUSSELL. We might pay in both.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, gentlemen, if——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I had questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sorry. Go right ahead.

PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE SURRENDER IN SPRING 1945

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General O'Donnell, you were in the South Pacific at the close of the war, were you not, fighting Japan?

General O'DONNELL. I was in the Mariannas. I had the B-29 wing in Saipan.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, now, you touched on a matter I would like to ask you about just briefly.

Was there any question in January or February and March of 1945 but what the Japanese were, as some people expressed it, dying on the vine as the result of our air bombardment and naval blockade?

General O'DONNELL. Not that early. Later, in June and July, we were operating absolutely unmolested.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What I am trying to get at is concerning this controversy about whether it was absolutely necessary for a land invasion of Japan, or whether or not we felt reasonably certain that the naval blockade and the air attacks would sufficiently isolate Japan so that an actual landing operation might not even be necessary.

Now, what is your view on that, in the spring of 1945?

General O'DONNELL. Well, we were convinced in the bomber command out there that we could end the war. Once we were in Saipan—I do not mean that we could do it alone, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and Army, everybody else was helping us get out into position—but once we were in the Mariannas we were convinced it was over; because they were taking the most horrible pounding.

Take the town of Tokyo. There were 54 square miles of Tokyo completely burned to the ground, which is the equivalent of about 18 times the destruction done at Hiroshima, which was only a couple miles, you see. So with the conventional methods and the old fire bomb, we had done a terrific amount of damage. And they just could not stand up against it, they were down to their knees. I thought—we all thought—I thought personally in a couple of weeks it would be all over.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So I understand that the program of the Air Force and of the Navy with its naval blockade and sinking of their transport ships and whatever other activities the Navy had along the shore with their air and so on—that those two alone were calculated to bring Japan to its knees.

General O'DONNELL. To do the job; yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And in the planning and in the consideration of those operations in the winter, let us say, of 1945, was it calmly and calculatedly considered that such result could come from aerial bombardment and from naval action—or, that is, that the absolute necessity of a land invasion did not exist?

General O'DONNELL. Well, I do not know. Those were in higher circles than those which I was accustomed to be around. I think they did plan on invasion. As I recall, it was estimated it would cost us some 1,000,000 casualties to land and take Honshu. However, it was not——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am probably not making myself clear. I understand that in anything there is never a complete certainty——

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

PROGRESS OF WAR AGAINST JAPAN IN WINTER OF 1945

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am just trying to develop what was the thinking in the planning in the military circles, professional military circles out there in the South Pacific as to the probability that we could starve Japan out or wreck her will to fight short of an actual landing with land operations following.

General O'DONNELL. Well, I can say—I think you will find that the Air Force and Navy thought we could do it and the ground forces did not think we could do it. The ground forces felt it would be necessary to have an invasion just as they had in Normandy.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, the Navy was sinking or had sunk by the spring of 1945 an overwhelming percentage, something like 80 or 85 percent of all the Japanese transport shipping, had they not?

General O'DONNELL. I could not remember those figures, sir. It was a tremendous percentage.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It was a tremendous amount.

General O'DONNELL. And of course the mine laying took care of an awful lot. I think close to 1,000,000 tons with mines laid by B-29's around Kyushu.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. I mean, there was a strangulation from that and from aerial destruction of their industrial and communication centers; and that was known. And it was being stepped up all the time, and we had the power to step it up.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And the facilities.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And it was known in the winter of 1945; and it was known we were sinking their shipping in great volume.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And it was also known that the Japanese did not have the facilities as the result of the punishment she was getting to replace that shipping and to replace her lines of communication for foodstuff and raw materials and things of that sort. That was generally known, was it not, in military circles?

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. After the war was over you had an opportunity to observe. Now, what conclusion, professional conclusion as a professional military man did you come to as to the soundness of that judgment; that is, did you come to the conclusion that the judgment of the Air Corps and Navy was right, that Japan could be brought to her knees without a landing operation?

General O'DONNELL. Oh, yes, sir. As an island empire they were our dish of peas, so to speak.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, it seemed reasonable to me, but there are many factors I am not qualified to judge on.

You found when you went into Japan, did you not, that they had suffered tremendous destruction of their facilities?

General O'DONNELL. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of all kinds for production of war materials.

General O'DONNELL. They were completely out of business.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And do you know anything about what their food supply was by the time the war was over?

General O'DONNELL. Very meager.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you have any idea as to about how long they could have subsisted with the supply of food they had?

General O'DONNELL. No; I don't, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But we did have to ship food in, did we not?

General O'DONNELL. For our own people, of course.

Senator SMITH. Will the Senator yield for a question in this connection?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

REFERENCES TO PREVIOUS SURRENDER OFFERS IN FINAL JAPANESE OFFER TO SURRENDER

Senator SMITH. General, were you aware of the fact that several weeks before Russia actually entered the war the Japanese Government asked the Soviet Government, with which at that time mutual relations prevailed, to render good offices in restoring peace?

General O'DONNELL. I am aware of that.

Senator SMITH. You are aware of that?

General O'DONNELL. Yes.

Senator SMITH. I have here a document which I think would be appropriate at this point in this examination. It is a memorandum from the Charge d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland to the Honorable James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, dated August 7, 1945, and is entitled "Appendices Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, Report of the Government Section, Supreme Commander Allied Powers." It contains this memorandum to the Secretary of State in full, which if it has to be read to get in the record, I would like to read it. It is not very long, and rather than have it go into the appendix, I would like to read it, because it is right in line with the questions Senator Hickenlooper is asking.

If there is no objection, I would like to read this right now.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may read it on Senator Hickenlooper's time if it is agreeable to the Senator.

Senator SMITH. May I read this on your time?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Senator SMITH. It is entitled appendix A: 4 to this compendium of appendices of which I just gave the title, dated August 10, 1945, and it is headed Legation De Suisse, Washington, D. C., and reads:

> SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the Japanese Minister to Switzerland, upon instructions received from his Government, has requested the Swiss Political Department to advise the Government of the United States of America of the following:
>
> "In obedience to the gracious command of His Majesty the Emperor who, ever anxious to enhance the cause of world peace, desires earnestly to bring about a speedy termination of hostilities with a view to saving mankind from the calamities to be imposed upon them by further continuation of the war, the Japanese Government several weeks ago—

that is, several weeks prior to this August 10 date—

> asked the Soviet Government, with which neutral relations then prevailed, to render good offices in restoring peace vis-à-vis the enemy powers.

That was about the time that your bombing was having its effect.

General O'DONNELL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH (continuing):

> "Unfortunately, these efforts in the interest of peace having failed, the Japanese Government in conformity with the august wish of His Majesty to restore the general peace and desiring to put an end to the untold sufferings entailed by war as quickly as possible, have decided upon the following:
>
> "The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26, 1945, by the heads of the Government of the United States, Great Britain, and China, and later subscribed by the Soviet Government with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.
>
> "The Japanese Government sincerely hope that this understanding is warranted and desire keenly that an explicit indication to that effect will be speedily forthcoming."

Then the Chargé d'Affaires adds:

> In transmitting the above message the Japanese Minister added that his Government begs the Government of the United States to forward its answer through the intermediary of Switzerland. Similar requests are being transmitted to the Governments of Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics through the intermediary of Sweden, as well as to the Government of China through the intermediary of Switzerland. The Chinese Minister at Berne has already been informed of the foregoing through the channel of the Swiss Political Department.
>
> Please be assured that I am at your disposal at any time to accept for and forward to my Government the reply of the Government of the United States.
>
> Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

It is signed by Grassli, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland.

Of course, this was the message that led to the surrender on August 14, accepting the Potsdam terms. But the point here is that this recites that several weeks prior to this date, August 10, the Japanese Government had asked the Soviet Government before the Soviet Government got into the war actually to intervene and bring about a peace. And yet the Soviet Government up to that time had been assured of the advantages in the Chinese area by the Yalta secret agreement, as we know.

I thank the chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Are you through, Senator?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. If there are no further questions, this will conclude the examination of General O'Donnell.

General, I wish to express to you personally and on behalf of the committee my appreciation for the assistance that you have given us in these hearings. You have been an unusually interesting witness to me.

You have dealt forthrightly and frankly with all matters within the military field. I think you have demonstrated soldierly qualities that endeared you to the American people. It makes me feel much more confident of the future security of this Nation to know that as important a weapon as our strategic air is employed in such capable hands.

We thank you for your appearance here.

General O'DONNELL. Thank you very much, Senator. I would like to say one thing in closing, if I may.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may make any statement you desire.

UNITY OF AIR FORCE

General O'Donnell. When I was called down here, I had heard some rumors and some editorial comment that might have led people to believe that I represented a minority group within the Air Force and that there might be a schism or widening of a breach of difference of opinion, as to how the Air Force should be run or operated.

I want to assure you that such could not be further from the case. General Vandenberg is our chief and we are all shoulder to shoulder, squarely behind him, pushing with all our power to overcome the very grave difficulties we face.

Chairman Russell. I had not heard any report of that kind, General.

General O'Donnell. I might be supersensitive.

Chairman Russell. I did not know what your testimony would be, but I knew that you did have in your possession facts that would be of interest to the committee. I am sure that we have all found that to be the case. I had not heard that you represented any minority group that was trying to disorganize the air force.

General O'Donnell. Perhaps I am supersensitive.

PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS

Chairman Russell. Gentlemen, unless the committee takes some further action to reopen these hearings and call other witnesses, General O'Donnell will be the final witness whose testimony will be received here.

Senator Cain. Mr. Chairman, would you let me labor for a second the point I brought up this morning? It would be my very sincere hope that the Chairman of the JCS or the JCS come before this combefore this committee in person to discuss with us those several paraphrases revolving around the message of the JCS of December 29, 1950, to General MacArthur in the field, sir.

Chairman Russell. Well, Senator, you of course know the situation. That matter can be passed upon by the committee, and I predicated my statement that unless the committee takes some other action, that he would be the final witness we would hear. I understand that there is some question about the witness indicated by Senator McMahon, and the committee is to vote upon your motion.

Frankly, if the evidence can't be received in some acceptable way, I should support having him return here, but it is my opinion that we can clarify that matter without having to reopen these hearings.

But I shan't oppose the Senator's motion. I mean in the sense that I shall speak against it. If we cannot arrange some method whereby we can get a statement that it will be satisfactory, I would vote to bring the witnesses in.

Senator Cain. The only conceivable reason why I have raised the question is that I do believe that neither of the two paraphrases or the two paraphrases together adequately give to the public a proper or accurate interpretation of what the JCS said to General MacArthur last December.

Chairman Russell. I think that the Senator is undoubtedly correct if he is depending upon those two paraphrases. I will say, however, that through the continuity of the whole matter that was submitted to us by the Joint Chiefs, I think that it could be read into it, but it was not in the specific paraphrase to which the Senator adverts. There is no doubt about that. But I went back some distance before that and read down to it, and I could see why perhaps there was no malice or vindictiveness involved in leaving it out of that particular paraphrase because it had been mentioned.

Senator CAIN. I have not suggested that. I have only indicated that it is interesting that those for whom I hold such a high respect in terms of accuracy should have been so inaccurate on that occasion, and I continue to be very curious, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committees will pass upon that.

ATOM BOMB DEVELOPMENT IN 1945

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I didn't want to interrupt, except that I want to be heard before you close the meeting, in connection with the information on the progress of the atomic-bomb development in 1945.

I did not urge that these men be called, particularly, because while I suggested it, I thought it was somewhat collateral.

But, this morning I sent a telegram to General Groves and to Colonel Consadine, who had furnished information in January 1945, about the progress of the atomic bomb to both Persident Roosevelt and to Secretary of State Stettinius.

I have been expecting a reply to the telegrams all morning. They had not arrived when I left the meeting about 15 minutes ago; and I phoned them to see why I had not received a reply, or, if they had received my wires.

They said they had received my wires, my telegrams, and that they had replied.

I have not received it as yet.

They read me their reply, so I know what the reply to the telegram was, but I won't undertake to put it in the record.

However, I do ask permission to insert into this record, this morning, my telegram to each of them, and their telegram in reply—that is, of General Groves and Colonel Consadine.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well now, it will be perfectly all right with me, Senator Hickenlooper, if you desire to follow that course.

However, there will be at least one more record of the committees' actions. You could read it into it, just as well, when the replies are returned.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It does not make any difference to me when they are to go in; I thought if this was the last record—

Chairman RUSSELL. No. My statement was that unless the committee takes further action, that this is the last witness from whom we would receive oral testimony.

As a matter of fact, a number of matters that we have suggested have not yet been supplied, and some of them undoubtedly will be placed in the record, and I am not undertaking to close the record at this date.

I do hope that it will close, as to oral testimony, but it really is impossible to close the record at this time, on account of the number of matters that of necessity are to be placed in the record.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If these replies get in within the next hour or so, is there any objection to my handing them to the reporter and having him write them?

Chairman RUSSELL. Not the slightest on my part. But it would seem to me the Senator would want the telegrams to get in the record that goes out to the press today and that is the only reason I made the suggestion to him that I did.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not care when it gets in.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, if the Chair has a statement of general interest to the committee members, may he make it now so these individual items can be taken up?

Chairman RUSSELL. I had about concluded I would not make the statement today. I did have a little statement of appreciation to those who have served us and the country so loyally through the course of these hearings, but I shall not make that today, I shall make it on the occasion of our next meeting to consider further procedures of the committee.

If there is nothing further——

Senator SMITH. When can we give a bouquet to the chairman?

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. If the Chair gets out of this with his life, he will be willing to forego the bouquets, as deeply as they are appreciated by all persons in public life.

The committees will now stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair. I will confer with the senior Senator from Georgia and undertake to arrange a meeting time for these committees this week, of which all of you will receive due notice, at which time we will discuss further procedures.

The committees stand in recess.

(Whereupon, at 1:47 p. m. the hearing was adjourned to reconvene on Wednesday, June 27, 1951, at 2:20 p. m.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 27, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to call, at 2:20 p. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell, chairman, Committee on Armed Services, presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, George, Smith, Green, Hickenlooper, Gillette, Brewster, Bridges, Saltonstall, Johnson, Cain, Stennis, Flanders, and Long.

Also present: William H. Darden, clerk, Committee on Armed Services; Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; and Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman **Russell**. The committees will come to order.

Senator Hickenlooper is recognized.

GROVES AND CONSIDINE TELEGRAMS REGARDING A-BOMB

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I referred to and had permission to put these telegrams in the record at the last meeting, with regard to the question of information on the possibility or the probabilities of the success of the atomic bomb project prior to the Yalta Conference. I sent this telegram on June 25, 1951, to General Groves:

> Lt. Gen. Leslie R. Groves,
> *Remington-Rand, Inc., South Norwalk, Conn.:*
>
> It has been stated that you and then Secretary of War Stimson informed President Roosevelt at the White House just before he left for the Yalta Conference to the effect that it was a 99 percent certainty that the A-bomb would be successful. Also that you told him the first bombs would probably be ready in August 1945 and that the bombs would be extremely powerful. Can you confirm the above by wire to me.
>
> B. B. Hickenlooper,
> *United States Senator.*

I received back that evening this telegram addressed to me, Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, the Capitol, Washington, D. C.

The message stated:

> The statement reported in your telegram of today reference information given to President Roosevelt is correct.
>
> Leslie R. Groves.

Another telegram, which I sent to Mr. William Considine, 744 Broad Street, Newark, N. J. Incidentally, Mr. Considine was then a colonel at the time referred to in the telegram and with the Manhattan District. The message is as follows:

> It has been stated that you as colonel representing the Manhattan District were sent to the Mediterranean to brief then Secretary of State Stettinius just prior to the Yalta Conference to the effect that the A-bombs as a practical certainty for success and that the first bombs would probably be ready by August 1945. That you also briefed Stettinius on the power potentials of the bombs. Can you verify this to me by wire?
>
> B. B. Hickenlooper,
> *United States Senator.*

I received that evening this telegrom from Colonel Considine addressed to Hon. Bourke B. Hickenlooper:

> At time mentioned your telegram I delivered certain papers to Mr. Stettinius and discussed their effectuation. Discussion also involved questions of certainty of explosion, possible date of use and power potential of A-bomb. I advised him that my information from General Groves was that bomb would explode, that Groves had double checked scientists on this, that probable date would be about August 1st in accordance with statement in August 1944 that bomb would be ready in year and that explosion of bomb would wreck a large city. Meeting took place in stateroom of British man-of-war in Grand Harbor Malta few days before Yalta Conference.
>
> William S. Considine.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COMMENDING COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Chairman Russell. Gentlemen, I had hoped to have a fuller attendance. If the committees will indulge me, I would like to make a statement.

The meeting today was called to enable the committees to discuss the future course of the committees with respect to the matters that we have had under investigation.

There is a motion pending to recall witnesses, and there are other procedural matters before the committees, but we have concluded the hearing of all of the witnesses that had been scheduled.

If any witnesses appear here subsequently, unless the committees take action to the contrary, it will be the same witnesses for clarification of points that have been raised. These have been long and exhaustive hearings that we have conducted. They have involved days and nights of lengthy interrogation and cross examintaion. They have caused every member of the committees to spend many hours in deep study and reflection.

Our hearings have covered a wide range of subjects. We have touched upon many vital problems. It is doubtful whether any congressional group has ever delved so deeply into such important and complex problems of national security.

At the outset I approached the task of serving as chairman of this joint committee with much trepidation. I fully realized that it would require the complete cooperation of every committee member if I were to meet the requirements of this position.

As I look back over the weeks that have passed since General MacArthur appeared before us on May 3, I can fully appreciate that I have had that cooperation. Indeed, the Senators have been more than cooperative. Regardless of party affiliation, they have been very generous in their assistance and counsel to the chairman.

Members of the committees have sat through many long hours of hearings. They have been compelled to put aside pressing tasks to devote precious time to these hearings.

They have been courteous and patient in situations that would try the temper of a saint, and we know that time and again points have been raised and discussed that were calculated to stir the deepest emotions of men.

In a word, the members of these committees have conducted themselves as responsible Senators, and the proceedings have been in the best traditions of the Senate.

As chairman of these committees I wish to sincerely congratulate every member. I wish to from the bottom of my heart thank you for your cooperation. The helpful and understanding aid you have so generously extended will ever be one of the most cherished memories of my legislative career.

I wish also to extend thanks to the witnesses who have appeared before us. They have demonstrated frankness, complete willingness to open their minds and their hearts to our scrutiny. They have stated their views fully and frankly. Every one of them has been of assistance to the committees on some important phase of the investigation.

When the inquiry was first proposed, there were some predictions that it would quickly degenerate into a cat-and-dog fight. I am very happy to be able to say that those making those predictions have been proved to be false prophets.

EFFICIENCY OF COMMITTEES' STAFFS

I would not have this record closed without expressing my thanks to our efficient staff. The committees and the country owe a debt of gratitude to those who have spent so many long hours in making essential arrangements and assisting the members of the committee. General Mudge, Colonel Galusha, Mr. Darden, Dr. Wilcox, Mr. Kalijarvi, in fact, the entire staffs of both committees have made notable contributions to the work of these committees.

An especial vote of thanks is due to Vice Adm. Arthur C. Davis, who has had the very delicate task of censoring the public transcript for security. He has performed a notable service under the most trying circumstances. Not only these committees but the Nation are indebted to him. Such harmony and success as has characterized our efforts is in a measure due to the painstaking care with which he has performed the duties imposed upon him by the committees.

He was requested to eliminate from the public transcript only the matters which might be used to increase the dangers to our forces in Korea, or which would imperil the national security.

I believe that anyone familiar with these hearings would agree that he has succeeded admirably in carrying out his objective.

The reporters who have been responsible for establishing and releasing the printed record of these committees certainly deserve a word of praise and appreciation. Their work has been exhausting physically and trying from the standpoint of security. Day after day they have been in the hearing room faced with taking down questions and answers and transcribing them into the printed pages.

They have done their work accurately, quickly, and with a full sense of the responsibilities that were theirs.

To sum up, I wish to thank everyone who has participated in the inquiry. All in all you have set a high standard in the discharge of these committees' duties.

FEASIBILITY OF FORMAL REPORT ON HEARINGS

The record of the hearings cannot yet be closed. We have the procedural matters to which I have referred. In addition there are a number of matters that have been requested by members of the committees either in writing or in the course of the examination of witnesses that have not as yet been entered into the record of our proceedings.

Within the next day or so the staff will go over all the requests that have been made and prepare the matter that has already been received for insertion into the record. They will also check against all of the requests that have been made and endeavor to have the executive branch expedite any requests that have not yet been answered.

Now, this inquiry has been very unique in many respects. The committee has had no legislation before it. The committees have not yet determined as to whether or not it will undertake the making of a formal report to the Senate. If it is decided to make a report it will be necessary for us to give consideration to the nature and the scope of our findings.

I have given a great deal of thought to this question of a report and I am frank to say that I am not prepared to outline in detail any kind of report that we can or should make in the event we do decide to make a report.

I certainly believe, however, that we should not commence writing any detailed report until we have completed the record.

It has occurred to me that there is a service we can perform and should perform for the American people and for the free world without regard to the action we may take as to a report on specific questions. Briefly, this was my thought:

Over the past 7 weeks, the innermost thoughts of our highest officials, military and diplomatic, have been laid bare before the world. There is no concealing the fact that we have revealed deep-seated differences between leaders in our Government.

Our records, stripped only of the most important security matters, have been sent all over the world by the fastest means of communication available.

The American people are accustomed to strain and conflict in our political life, in which everyone has his say. Facts and opinions on public questions are considered the rightful property of the American people.

However, the scope and nature of these hearings have been most unusual not only in the experience of the American people, but to the peoples of the earth.

To those who do not understand our methods, we may well have appeared to be a people so bitterly divided that we are incapable of forceful and united action.

I am completely confident that every member of this committee is a patriotic American, and I know that each and every member would subordinate any and all partisan politics or differences to meet a common danger. I know that our people would forget differences, and unite against a foreign foe.

It is my belief, pending our decision on the question of a report, that it would be helpful to make a public statement reassuring our own people and those we claim as friends, as well as a statement in the nature of a warning to those who are unfriendly.

Pursuant to that belief, I have undertaken to prepare a statement. It is general in nature, and might be simply described as an affirmation of faith in our country and its destiny. It is a statement that undertakes to express my own feelings, as a member of these committees, as to a proper view of this investigation and the general results that will flow from it.

It is in no sense a partisan statement. It draws no specific conclusions from the facts presented to us during our hearings. It is a simple statement of confidence in the strength of America and American institutions, of our determination to protect our country, and to protect its interests, as we see those interests.

It undertakes to express the belief that despite differences of opinion, which are inevitable in a democracy, we are united when we come to those fundamentals which are necessary to our survival.

I think the staff has had the statement multigraphed, and I wish you would hand one to each member of these committees.

APPRECIATION OF CHAIRMAN'S PROCEDURES

Senator BRIDGES. Right before you read that, Mr. Chairman, may I, as the ranking minority member here, on behalf of myself and my associates, express to you our appreciation normally for the very fair method, very fair way, in which you have conducted this hearing; for your extreme courtesy to all members on all things at all times, and an assurance to you of our affection and respect, and our pleasure in being associated with you in this joint committee here, consisting of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, in looking into, reviewing, and investigating one of the very complex problems and important problems that has been before our country in many years.

Chairman RUSSELL. I appreciate that, Senator Bridges. I have already undertaken to give expression to my feelings toward the members of these committees; and I can only say that the very cordial sentiments that you express are more than reciprocated.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to second that feeling very strongly.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you, Senator Saltonstall.

Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I would like to warmly reciprocate those statements.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you; it is more than generous of you. I will read the statement [reading]:

STATEMENT AFFIRMING FAITH IN COUNTRY

For the past 7 weeks the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations have assiduously examined into the facts and circumstances bearing on the relief of Gen. Douglas MacArthur and on American policy in the Far East.

At a critical juncture in their affairs, the American people had become deeply concerned and sorely confused over events in the Far East. Long pent emotions erupted with the removal from command of an able and brilliant military leader.

When the need for counsel appears imperative, the American people take counsel through their Congress. In this instance, these committees, as an agent of Congress, assumed the responsibility of serving as the medium for informing the people on the formulation of policies and the conduct of operations.

Our Government is one which depends for existence upon the conclusions of an enlightened people. The exhaustive record of our proceedings bears testimony to our faith in our democratic syste. This hearing sprang from this concept, which we hold to be inherent in our very form of government.

The inquiry has pushed to its very limits a principle to which the American people jealously cling—the right of every man to say what he thinks. In the fullest light of day we have weighed before the world our motives, our doubts, the sources of our strength and of our weakness. From the transcript of our proceedings, momentous counsels taken among ourselves have gone to both our friends and enemies. Such a hearing involves risks, but it also involves rights, and it is the rights which have made the risks inevitable.

To those critics of our form of government who contend that public discussion of such matters creates dissent and breeds confusion, we have a simple answer. Those who are still privileged to breathe the air of freedom utilize such discussion as a means to temper the steel of national determination and unity.

Every informed and patriotic American will agree that there is present in the world a force, an ideology, which seeks to subvert democracy everywhere and degrade man to the role of slave of the state.

No one would deny that when the object of public enlightment is sought precisely in the area of military strategy, serving the public interest is to risk aiding our enemies. Recognizing this danger, the committees have followed procedures carefully designed to minimize the risk without withholding essential information. Wherever testimony appeared valuable chiefly to a present or potential enemy, the Nation's security has been our paramount concern.

We do not deny that the record compiled is replete with discord and disagreement. We could not conceal this fact and we would scorn to do so if we could. Those who have appeared before us have spoken in forceful tems. Out of their words have appeared disagreements as to policies and a division of opinion as to the course which should have been followed. Some of their criticisms have been harsh and they have spared no one, including themselves. These men spoke strongly because they felt strongly. They differed because they saw things differently and had the courage to say so.

It has been asserted that the cleavages made evident by these hearings have caused confusion at home, dismayed and frightened the free people we hold as friends, and has lent encouragement to those who would destroy us.

We believe that our democracy has the vitality to withstand any strains that reflect the tensions of an uneasy world. We are convinced that an open discussion of such differences brings strength and unity of purpose. To the American people we assert these differences in nowise alter the fact that our great objective is still to live within the family of nations as a free people. The Nation will take the record of the hearings. We will study it. We will draw conclusions. We will not all be together on those conclusions. We may differ on the proper policy to be applied in the Far East. We may separate on questions of strategy. We may divide on personalities. But we will be united in our devotion to liberty and justice, be single-minded in our will to preserve our institutions. We hope they may be preserved in peace, but preserve them we shall. We will be together in the defense of our way of life against any alien aggressor.

These hearings have increased our faith in our strength and in our ability. Mistakes may add to the measure of our sacrifices or change the form of the ordeal we may be called upon to endure, but come what may America has the means and the will to enable us to survive. Strengthened by this conviction, let us reject all counsels of defeatism and despair.

TO THE FREE NATIONS

We would also reassure the people of the free world beyond our boundaries—all of those determined not to be enslaved by Communist aggression.

We can understand how even those people whose institutions are most akin to ours may have been concerned over the public discussion into our policies and strategies. The differences of opinion revealed may have raised fateful questions in their mind. Among those peoples less familiar with our system of government, what we have done here may have produced alarm. The rights we casually take for granted are sometimes not understood by those unfamiliar with our traditional methods.

But the free world has no cause for dismay. The fact that we do not always speak with a single voice does not mean that we have weakened in our united purpose. The objectives of the people of the United States are unchanged by anything that has transpired during this ordeal of controversy. We are unshaken in our determination to defend ourselves and to assist to the limit of our capabilities all of those free nations determined to survive in freedom.

TO THE COMMUNIST WORLD

Even as the free world has no reason for dismay, neither should the Communist world be deceived by the searching review given our global strategy. It would be well for those who may contemplate aggression to understand that disagreements among individuals or groups will not deter the American people and their Government from the relentless quest for our ultimate security. The goal of our people and their Government is a permanent world peace. The method by which that goal may be obtained has been, and will continue to be, the subject of disagreement in our democratic society. But if need be, we stand united in readiness to defend ourselves and to cooperate with like-minded peoples against whatever forces may threaten world peace or our freedoms.

If those who threaten us take only a tyrant's lesson from differences among freemen and mistake the temper of our people, they can plunge the world into war. But it would be a war they could never win and which would bring them to ultimate destruction.

The issues which might divide our people are far transcended by the things which unite them. If threatened danger becomes war, the aggressor would find at one stroke arrayed against him the united energies, the united resources, and the united devotion of all the American people.

I think, gentlemen, that it would serve a useful purpose for the committee to make a statement along these lines, either as written or as the committees might see fit to change it.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, when you first started to read, I thought you had in mind a sort of a report as a result of these hearings, and I was going to suggest we ought to take time to consider that, But, as you have read it, I can see where mainly it is a declaration of principle and faith rather than a report, and I see no reason why we could not act on that immediatley. I think you have done a wonderful job, myself.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you. I stated I did not undertake to go into the issues developed there. It was merely an affirmation of our faith in our Nation and our capacity to endure and survive.

Senator STENNIS. It is very timely, Mr. Chairman, I think. It will be well received at home as well as abroad. It is a very fine statement.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment you on that statement. I think it is a beautiful presentation of the united spirit here, which is very important. I understand it is a statement made now, and we will consider later what we may put out in the form of a report.

Chairman RUSSELL. I undertook to state before I read this it had nothing whatever to do with any report we might develop on specific issues.

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman, have you put out this report yet?

Chairman RUSSELL. I have not. I was waiting action of the committees.

Senator GILLETTE. I think it is a superb report and a timely one, and I move it be adopted as the report of this joint committee.

CHORUS OF VOICES. Second the motion.

CLARIFYING PARTS OF STATEMENT

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I think it an excellent report. I think one or two minor corrections might be made which I suggest for your consideration, but I heartily agree it is desirable from the point of view of our people and also of people of foreign nations to have this statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. There is one difference between the copy you have. There is a paragraph which commences:

> No one would deny that when the object of public enlightment is sought precisely in the area of military strategy, serving the public interest is to risk serving the interests of our enemies.

That has been changed on the report which I read.

Senator GREEN. I noticed that change.

Chairman RUSSELL. To "aiding our enemies."

Senator GREEN. I noticed that change, but I think still the meaning is not clear to the ordinary reader. If it read,

> No one would deny that when the object of public enlightenment is sought precisely in the area of military strategy there is a risk of serving the interests of our enemies also—

that makes it clear. But I think when you have "serving the public interest," it seems to go with what went before, and that is confusing.

Senator JOHNSON. How do you suggest it read?

Senator GEORGE. I think Senator Green's suggestion is worthy of consideration, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. What do you suggest, gentlemen? That is the reason I read it.

Senator GEORGE. I think it preserves the full sense of the sentence and at the same time clarifies it.

Senator JOHNSON. Could we ask Senator Green to read it again?

Senator GREEN. If you would strike out the words "serving the public interest" at the end of line three, and then have the next line begin to read "there is a risk of serving the interests of our enemies also."

Senator BREWSTER. Of aiding our enemies?

Senator GREEN. Page 2——

Senator BREWSTER. There is a risk of aiding our enemies?

Senator GREEN. There is a risk of serving the interests of our enemies also.

Chairman RUSSELL. That change will be made.

Senator GREEN. Then there is another on the same page. We are speaking there in the first person—"We believe" and so forth and then we go on to "The Nation will take the record of the hearings." And then: "We will study it."

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, Senator, I did that deliberately, because I had that written "we" and I changed it to the "Nation" because in the event the committee did not see fit to make a report that would indicate that, and I made it deliberately. I hope it is not too confusing.

Senator GREEN. I think it is a little bit confusing, because I think if we used "we" throughout it would be much clearer. We change back and forth as to this use of "we" and we start out with the members of the committee as "we" and then "we" is the Nation, all of it in the first person. If we just change "the Nation" to we I think it would be better.

Chairman RUSSELL. If I say "We will take the record of these hearings" and then there is no doubt in my mind that if we leave it that way the people will expect us to make a formal report.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I think you are drawing a distinction worthy of note. You say "the Nation" will note it and "we will" note it, and I think that distinction should be kept clear. I like it the way you said it and I would not like it changed.

Senator GREEN. Just a suggestion, that is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. I thought about that. I said the American people will take the record of the hearings, and then I said we will. Now, we are a part of the people, and we will take it and the people will take it.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that is wise.

Senator GREEN. I think that "to the American people" should be transferred from the middle of the second page to the top of the first page.

Chairman RUSSELL. How is that again?

Senator GREEN. Put the words "to the American people" at the very start of the first page.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, we will make that change.

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman, when I made my motion I inadvertently used the word "report" instead of "statement."

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator from Iowa accept an amendment to his motion or consider it?

Senator GILLETTE. I will be glad to hear it.

STATEMENT NOT NECESSARILY COMMITTEE'S FINAL ACTION

Senator SALTONSTALL. It seems to me what we are doing now is getting out—I just jotted this down—this statement, which is a united declaration of faith in our way of living, and that the chairman will call the committees together when the record is complete and determine what action should be taken on the issues presented by the record.

In other words, when we get out our statement today, it is a united declaration of faith and we want to make clear at the same time that when the record is complete will determine what action to take at that time.

Chairman RUSSELL. I thought perhaps we might discuss that in general terms now after we take action on the motion.

Senator SALTONSTALL. The amendment I would like to suggest to the Senator from Iowa is to add the paragraph—if you want to—some statement to the effect that the chairman will call the committees together at a later date to determine what action to take on the issues, if any.

Senator GILLETTE. A supplemental action.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes, so this will not be considered a final action.

Senator GILLETTE. I have no objection to it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I tried to make it perfectly clear when I submitted it. I will read what I stated——

Senator GILLETTE. Well, I have no objection.

Chairman RUSSELL. I stated that I did not think we were in any position to write a detailed report now; that this was a general statement that I had taken the liberty of preparing; that it was in the nature of an affirmation of faith in our country and its ability to achieve its destiny; and that it in nowise dealt with any conclusions on any evidence that was taken before the committees.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I just thought by the amendment the motion would be perfectly clear.

Senator GILLETTE. I have no objection to that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will you read it, Senator Saltonstall; reread it.

Senator GEORGE. Where would you put it?

Chairman RUSSELL. He was not going to put it; this was in the committee's motion.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I simply put it this way, that the Senator from Iowa moved that this statement represented a united declaration of faith in our way of life that the hearings have made so clear to the membership of our committee; and the chairman will call the committees together when the record is complete to determine what action may be taken on the issues presented.

Chairman RUSSELL. Let us not put that last part in it, Senator.

Senator SALTONSTALL. What is that?

Chairman RUSSELL. Let us not put that last sentence in here. If you state this is not a formal report; the committees have made no decision on that question, that will be all right.

Senator SALTONSTALL. All right.

Senator GEORGE. This is not to go into this report; that is in the motion approving it.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes.

Senator GEORGE. Oh, yes; and Senator Gillette has no objection to it, and certainly no one else has, and it seems to be very well put.

Of course, you will be asked, Mr. Chairman, if this is our final report. The press will do that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, if the record of the hearing goes out as it has heretofore, and I understand that the press associations have asked for it, it will show that this is a statement that I undertook to make before reading it, and I said that we could not begin action on a formal report now, and that the committees had not even decided as to whether it should make a formal report or not.

Senator GEORGE. I understand that; that is going out with this statement?

Chairman RUSSELL. It is going out with—before this statement; it precedes the statement.

Senator GEORGE. Yes; but that will not keep the press from asking a million or a good many questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. This is in no sense a formal report.

Senator GEORGE. I know.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will be happy to state so for the record again.

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman, if the language used to embody the thought of the language of the Senator from Massachusetts that this is adopted as a statement of faith preliminary to the formal report——

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator GILLETTE (continuing). It would be all right.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will read the motion then, as I understand it now: That this declaration of faith in our way of life that the hearings have made so clear to the membership of these Committees be adopted and released by the committees; that this is in no sense a formal report on any issue or question which may have been considered by the Committees, but is issued pending a determination by the Committees as to whether or not it shall issue a formal report; and if it is decided to issue a formal report, as to the nature and scope of the report.

Did I clarify it or muddy it up?

Senator BREWSTER. I second the motion.

TITLE OF STATEMENT

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, is it your purpose to have any title to this statement?

Chairman RUSSELL. We have adopted one on the suggestion of Senator Green, "To the American people."

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Senator SMITH. I am just wondering whether it would be to the American people.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, "To the American people."

Gentlemen, is there any further discussion?

IDEA OF MUTUAL CONTRIBUTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I have one thing I would like to raise as to page 3, the last two lines in the section on the free nations. It is just ahead of the heading, "To the Communist World."

It is the last sentence reading:

> We are unshaken in our determination to defend ourselves and to assist to the limit of our capabilities all of those free nations determined to survive in freedom.

It is very important to me in my thinking that we keep the idea of mutual contribution alive and clear at all times.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is the reason I phrased it that way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And I wondered if we could not emphasize it a little by some words such as—

> to assist to the limit or our capabilities all of those free nations determined through mutual contribution to survive in freedom,—

or something of that kind.

Chairman RUSSELL. That goes a little further than I wanted to go.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. I wonder whether his idea could not be met by saying, "to cooperate to the limit of our capabilities with all of those free nations determined to survive in freedom." Would that meet what you want—"cooperate"?

Chairman RUSSELL. I would be perfectly willing to accept the word "cooperate," but the main clause that I intended in this statement was, "determined to survive in freedom." In other words if they do not manifest such a determination, which is supported by action to survive, we are under no obligation whatsoever.

Senator BREWSTER. I endorse the idea of cooperation. I think the Senator from Iowa has a very good idea there; and it gets away a little from the unilateral idea.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I am perfectly willing to change that to "cooperate," then. It is changed to "cooperate."

Senator LONG. "Would assist to cooperate," Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. "Would assist to cooperate."

Senator BREWSTER. "To the limit of our capabilities all of those free nations determined to survive in freedom."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think probably that would be all right. My whole thought was to keep clear all the time that our assistance has got to be based on their contribution, too, rather than to have them——

Chairman RUSSELL. I had that very thought in mind, Senator, when I rewrote this phrase.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, it is strong the way it is written.

Chairman RUSSELL. That they were determined to survive in freedom, and unless they manifested a determination, of course, we are under no obligation to cooperate or assist, and I think it was a little stronger the way it was written, but I am perfectly willing to accept the change.

UNANIMOUS VOTE ADOPTING AND ISSUING STATEMENT

If there are no further suggestions, gentlemen, those who favor the issuance of this declaration of faith will say "aye."

(There was a chorus of "ayes.")

Chairman RUSSELL. Those opposed, will say, "No."

(There was no response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The "ayes" have it, and it is unanimously agreed to; it is agreed unanimously by the committees.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to suggest that if you are in shape to release it as quickly as possible on account of the time element, together with your phrasing of the motion, I would suggest that, because I know what the deadlines are.

If the corrections could be made there quickly, I think if the press could get it right away, you would get a much better coverage throughout the country.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well. If there is no objection, I believe we have enough copies. Do you have them corrected, General?

Mr. MUDGE. Yes.

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that if the word "cooperate" is to be used instead of the word "assist," that the word "with" be added, so that it reads "cooperate with."

Chairman RUSSELL. The word "with" has been added.

I shall be glad to have anyone who has views to express them as to the formal report any Senator may envision.

RELEASE OF WAKE ISLAND REPORT

Senator BRIDGES. There are two or three things I made notes of here. One is the Wake Island report, which was featured in these hearings early in the hearings. The Wake Island report, if you remember, was top secret.

Somehow it leaked to the press. The release of a top secret document is a Federal offense of a very serious nature and I made the request, as did others in these committees, that the Defense Department takes steps to see who had leaked that report and who was responsible, and then proceed to take action against such persons.

So far as I know, there has been no report on that, and I would like to call that to the attention of the committees.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, I heard the discussion on that. I don't know of anything that the committees can do with respect to it.

Senator BRIDGES. If top secret documents can be released without even the agency of the Government that is supposed to hold them inviolate even investigating and making inquiry, certainly we are in a deplorable situation in this country.

Chairman RUSSELL. I expressed my opinion on leaks from any source so many times that I hesitate to go into that again.

Senator LONG. Is the person who released that document, who broke this story in the New York Times, in a position to legally refuse to answer questions designed to disclose the source of that information insofar as he is concerned?

Chairman RUSSELL. That is a legal question, Senator Long, and I would have to look into it before undertaking to answer it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have a brief on that subject prepared by the Library of Congress, and there is no immunity—that is, there is no blanket immunity such as exists between a priest and a parishioner, or a lawyer and client, or physician and patient, so far as the Federal situation is concerned. But there is always the constitutional objection that to answer the question might tend to incriminate the reporter.

I suggest that in connection with demanding that a reporter disclose the means by which he got hold of and promulgated a top secret document, which is a crime, he might use the constitutional objection against self-incrimination in the matter.

But so far as any immunity the reporter has under the Federal law, he has none.

Senator LONG. As a matter of fact, hasn't the reporter himself violated the Federal law by publishing it at all?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say that because he has acquired a top secret document and published it, which, in my opinion, might be a violation of the law, he might use the constitutional objection that he would be tending to incriminate himself.

I thought I made that clear. That is my opinion based upon this brief which I have.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, it is my impression, sir, that the Senator from New Hampshire—and I think I was one of the Senators—made a request of the State and Defense Establishment to inquire into this matter. And I think they said they would do so and let us know at a later date.

My only suggestion is that we do raise the question with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense as to whether or not they have made an inquiry.

Chairman RUSSELL. Colonel Galusha, what has been done along that line?

Mr. GALUSHA. I don't know what has been done. I don't recall a statement being made that they were going to look into it, but I will check it.

Senator CAIN. My impression may be incorrect, but I do know the question was raised.

COMPLETION DATE OF A-BOMB

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, pending the inquiry that has been made in relation to this other matter, could I be heard for just a moment on the subject of the telegrams which Senator Hickenlooper read into the record today?

Chairman RUSSELL. Certainly. You are recognized, Senator.

Senator McMAHON. I notice that Gen. Leslie R. Groves certifies in answer to Senator Hickenlooper's inquiry that he had informed the President in company with the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, that it was a 99 percent certainty that the A-bomb would be successful, and this was stated to the President just before he went to the Yalta Conference, and that they also, meaning Groves and Stimson, told the President that the first bombs probably would be ready in August 1945.

And I notice another telegram to the same effect, the same purport, to Senator Hickenlooper signed by William S. Considine. Of course the record has been disclosed for many years on this subject. This is the first time that I have ever known such a claim as this to be made.

I remember Senator Vandenberg raising this question in November of 1945, and General Groves is on record in the hearings of the Special Committee on Atomic Energy saying that they were exploded at the first feasible opportunity, that is, as soon as they were ready.

General Farrell, who was Chief of Engineers on the project, stated —and I read it into this record—that they hoped it would go off, but of course no one knew until the event took place, and there is other testimony in the form of a memorandum which has been prepared for me and I would like to insert it in the appendix of the record.

This comes from General Groves who was head of the Manhattan District at the time, and I move to say right now that his job principally was as the head of security.

The record of his maintenance of security is known I think to the people in the United States. He succeeded in keeping it a secret from the American people, but certainly not the Soviet Government in the Kremlin. It was during General Groves' administration of the project that Fuchs and Gold and Greenglass and every spy that penetrated this project came into the project.

So, Mr. Chairman, I shall insert in the appendix of the record the historical memorandum.

It is certainly to be noted that both Groves and Considine, for the first time, report on conferences that they had over 5 years ago, with men who are now dead and who cannot contradict them.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection it will be printed in the record.

(The document above referred to will be found in the appendix of this record.)

ADJOURNMENT SUBJECT TO CALL OF CHAIRMAN

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, gentlemen, I had hoped that we might be able to discuss in broad outline our views on the question of a report, but we have a vote over there. Now what is the pleasure of the committees?

Senator BREWSTER. We have to vote every half hour now.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, I am aware of that fact.

Senator BREWSTER. Could we meet in the District of Columbia room?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, we made no arrangements to get it. I suppose we could. Is that agreeable to the members of the committees?

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, might I ask whether it is necessary for us to meet the remainder of this afternoon? I did not understand all these amendments that were going to be offered here, and I would certainly be benefited by a discussion on the floor. Could we continue this meeting at a later date?

Senator SALTONSTALL. The suggestion in that motion that you call us together at a later date when the record is completed——

Chairman RUSSELL. We haven't completed the record yet, Senator. Without objection the committees will stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair. I will endeavor to give you gentlemen 10 or 12 hours' notice.

(Whereupon at 3:15 p. m. the hearing was recessed, to meet at the call of the Chair.)

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